The implications of a relational feminist interpretation of socio-economic rights for cohabiting partners by Bannister, Tarryn
i 
The implications of a relational feminist 
interpretation of socio-economic rights for 
cohabiting partners 
Tarryn Bannister 
Dissertation presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Laws in the Faculty of Law at Stellenbosch University 
Promoter: Prof Sandra Liebenberg 
Co-Promoter: Prof Sonia Human 
2016 
ii 
Declaration 
By submitting this dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of 
the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole 
author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), and that I 
have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any 
qualification. 
Tarryn Bannister 
December 2016, Stellenbosch 
Copyright © 2016 Stellenbosch University: 
 All rights reserved 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
iii 
 
Summary 
 
Within South Africa, it is disproportionately women and children who bear the socio-
economic burdens of divorce and family dissolution. While all family relationships need 
to be effectively regulated so as to protect the socio-economic needs of its members, 
women who are cohabiting remain particularly vulnerable. This is due to the fact that 
their status is governed by a patchwork of laws that do not express a coherent set of 
family law rules. Upon the termination of these relationships, whether initiated by one 
of the partners or upon a partner’s death, these women tend to fall between the cracks 
of the legal system. As a result of this, they often face eviction and destitution. This 
stands in sharp contrast to South Africa’s progressive constitutional framework which 
appears highly conducive to combating gender inequality and poverty. For example, 
the Constitution protects the right to equality (section 9), human dignity (section 10), 
the right to have access to adequate housing (section 26) and the right to have access 
to health care services, food, water and social security (section 27). The Constitution 
also provides for the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights through sections 8 and 
39 of the Constitution. The Constitution’s commitment to founding a society based on 
human dignity, equality and human rights and freedoms, therefore extends to private 
relations. In spite of these provisions, the family law regime is primarily perceived 
through a private law lens informed by liberal conceptions of choice, contractual 
autonomy and marriage fundamentalism. This dissertation examines the potential of 
a relational feminist framework to guide the horizontal application of socio-economic 
rights between cohabitants so as to guide both common law and legislative reform in 
this area. This horizontal application is primarily through the vehicles of sections 8 and 
39 of the Constitution. Progressive foreign law developments pertaining to the 
protection of unmarried cohabitants are then analysed to determine whether they can 
inform the development of the South African family law regime. This dissertation thus 
analyses how existing family law rules and doctrines can be transformed so as to be 
more responsive to the lived realities and needs of female cohabitants. 
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Opsomming 
 
In Suid-Afrika is dit vrouens en kinders wat buite verhouding die gevolge dra van 
egskeiding en die beëindiging van gesinsverhoudings.  Terwyl alle gesinsverhoudings 
effektief gereguleer moet word om sodoende die sosio-ekonomiese behoeftes van 
gesinslede te beskerm, bly veral vrouens in saamwoonverhoudings besonder 
kwesbaar.  Dit kan toegeskryf word daaraan dat hul status nie deur ŉ samehangende 
stel familiereg reëls gereguleer word nie, maar eerder op ŉ lukrake wyse deur 
wetgewing.  By die beëindiging van hierdie verhoudings, hetsy geïnisieer deur een 
van die partye of deur die dood van ŉ party, is dit veral vrouens wat geneig is om 
tussen die krake in die regstelsel te val.  As gevolg hiervan word hulle dikwels deur 
uitsetting en ontbering gekonfronteer.  Dit is ŉ teenstelling met Suid-Afrika se 
progressiewe grondwetlike raamwerk wat meewerk tot die bekamping van 
geslagsongelykheid en armoede.  Die Grondwet verskans byvoorbeeld die reg op 
gelykheid (artikel 9), die reg op menswaardigheid (artikel 10), die reg op toegang tot 
geskikte behuising (artikel 26) en die reg op toegang tot gesondheidsorg, voedsel, 
water en maatskaplike sekerheid (artikel 27).  Die Grondwet maak ook voorsiening vir 
die horisontale toepassing van die Handves van Regte op grond van artikels 8 en 39 
van die Grondwet.  Die Grondwet se verbintenis tot die daarstel van ŉ samelewing wat 
op menswaardigheid, gelykheid, menseregte en vryhede gegrond is, strek dus tot 
privaat verhoudings.  Ten spyte van hierdie bepalings, word die familieregstelsel 
hoofsaaklik deur ŉ privaatreglens waargeneem, wat deur liberale opvattings van 
keuse, kontraktuele outonomie en huweliksfundamentalisme informeer word.  Hierdie 
proefskrif ondersoek dus die potensiaal van ŉ sogenaamde “relational feminist” om 
die weg te baan vir die horisontale toepassing van sosio-ekonomiese regte tussen 
persone in saamwoonverhoudings.  Die horisontale toepassing vind hoofsaaklik in 
gevolge artikel 8 en 39 van die Grondwet plaas.  Progressiewe ontwikkelings in ander 
jurisdiksie ten opsigte van die beskerming van ongetroude persone in 
saamwoonverhoudings word ontleed ten einde te bepaal in watter mate dit kan bydrae 
tot die ontwikkeling van ŉ Suid-Afrikaanse familiereg regime.  Die proefskrif ontleed 
dus die wyse waarop bestaande familiereg reëls en doktrines getransformeer kan 
word ten einde meer ontvanklik en sensitief te wees vir die leefwêreld en behoeftes 
van vrouens in saamwoonverhoudings. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
v 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
Thank you to Tanja Jegger at the Stonehage Charitable Trust for assisting me with 
obtaining the Sophie Jacobs Memorial Scholarship from the Ciucci Centre for Law and 
Social Development. Together with the Stellenbosch Law Faculty, the Ciucci Centre 
provided me with the invaluable opportunity to further my studies. I am particularly 
grateful for the opportunity to pursue an LLD degree within an area of law about which 
I am passionate. I am also grateful for the research scholarship I received from the 
Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2014, which allowed me to conduct research at 
the Institute for Human Rights at the Åbo Akademi University in Åbo/Turku, Finland.  
 
Most importantly, thank you to my promoter, Professor Sandra Liebenberg, for being 
an inspirational mentor and for your enduring patience throughout this entire process. 
Thank you to my co-promoter Professor Sonia Human for all of your support and 
guidance. I am very grateful for all the time and energy that was put into my study. 
 
Thank you to my friends, particularly Margot Strauss and Gareth Truebody, for reading 
earlier drafts of my dissertation and for providing me with your patient critiques. I would 
also like to express my gratitude toward my colleagues in the Socio-economic Rights 
and Administrative Justice Research Project for their collegiality and support. 
 
And finally, thank you to my family, for all of your support during the past four years. I 
couldn’t have done it without you all.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
vi 
 
Table of contents 
 
Table of abbreviations         x 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction  
1 1  Introduction          1 
1 1 1 Background to the research problem          1 
1 1 2 Socio-economic implications of terminated domestic partnerships  4 
1 1 3 Rationale and motivation for the study: A transformative Constitution 8 
1 1 4 A relational feminist framework      13 
1 2 Research question, research aims, hypotheses and methodology    15 
1 2 1 Primary research question       15 
1 2 2 Supplementary research aims and hypotheses     15 
1 2 3 Methodology         16 
1 2 4 Scope of the study         18 
1 3 Overview of chapters        19 
1 4 Conclusion           21 
 
Chapter 2: Developing a relational feminist framework for interpreting the  
socio-economic rights of female cohabitants   
2 1 Introduction          22 
2 2 Justification for a relational feminist framework     23 
2 3 Four-step analysis of relational feminism      29 
2 4 A context sensitive approach        32 
 2 4 1 Introduction          32 
 2 4 2 Deconstructing the public/private law divide     33 
 2 4 3 Conclusion         41 
2 5 A value-sensitive approach: Countering an abstract conception of rights 42 
 2 5 1 Introduction         42 
 2 5 2 Developing a substantive conception of autonomy     44 
 2 5 3 Developing a relational conception of human dignity    50 
 2 5 4 The values of non-sexism and equality      52 
 2 5 5 Conclusion          54 
2 6 Structuring relations that give effect to constitutional values    55 
2 7 Interpreting socio-economic rights to structure socio-economic equality 
between cohabitants        61 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
vii 
 
2 7 1 Introduction         61 
2 7 2 Developing a framework for the horizontal application of socio-economic  
rights between cohabitants        62 
2 7 2 1 Introduction        62 
2 7 2 2 Section 8 of the South African Constitution    62 
2 7 2 3 Section 39 of the South African Constitution    70 
2 7 2 4 The transformative potential of sections 8 and 39   73 
2 7 3 Reflections on the need to develop private socio-economic 
responsibility         73 
2 8 Conclusion: Key concepts underlying a relational feminist interpretation  
of socio-economic rights         74 
 
Chapter 3: The South African legal framework through a relational  
Feminist lens 
3 1 Introduction          77 
3 2 The South African family law regime before the advent of democracy  78 
3 3 Jurisprudence on the interaction between the Bill of Rights and  
unrecognised relationships       81 
3 3 1 Introduction         81 
3 3 2 Constitutional jurisprudence on same-sex relationships    84 
3 3 3 Jurisprudence on customary marriages      87 
3 3 4 Jurisprudence on religious marriages      91 
3 3 5  Cohabitation: Volks NO v Robinson        94 
3 3 6 Jurisprudential analysis       101 
3 4 Legislative interventions following the advent of democracy   104 
3 4 1 Introduction         104 
3 4 2 Incremental legislative recognition to cohabitants    105 
3 4 3 Protection provided by the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998  107 
3 4 4 Potential relief under the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of  
Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000      109 
3 4 5 Inadvertent forms of cohabitation due to legislative gaps            115 
 3 4 6 Civil Union Act 17 of 2006                                 118
 3 4 7  Domestic Partnerships Bill of 2008                 119
 3 4 8 Conclusion: A separate and unequal family law system             123 
3 5 Common law framework governing cohabitation                         125 
3 5 1 Introduction                    125 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
viii 
 
3 5 2 Contracts                    126 
3 5 3 Universal partnerships                  128 
3 5 4 Unjustified enrichment                  135 
3 5 5 Proprietary estoppel and the constructive trust               136 
3 5 6 Extension of the common law duty of support              136 
3 5 7 A summary of the applicable common law developments             139 
3 6 Conclusion: An evaluation of the family law regime through a relational  
feminist lens                                                139 
  
Chapter 4: An examination of Canadian and Dutch family law through a  
relational feminist lens 
4 1 Introduction                     142 
4 2 Justification for a comparative study of Canadian family law     143 
4 3 The Canadian Charter        146 
4 3 1 Introduction         146 
4 3 2 Social rights under the Canadian Charter                148 
4 3 3 Application of the Canadian Charter to family law             151 
4 3 4 Conclusion                   153 
4 4 Canadian legislation                                         154 
4 4 1 Introduction                            154 
4 4 2 Provincial legislation: Ascription (status) versus contract   155 
4 4 3 Conclusion: The debate between status and contract                        159 
4 5 Canadian jurisprudence                              160 
4 5 1 Introduction                             160 
4 5 2 Gender-sensitive Canadian jurisprudence from the 1980s to the early  
1990s                                         161 
 4 5 3 Feminists trends in Canadian family law in the 1990s                  166 
 4 5 4 Innovative judicial developments in Québec in the 1990s              170 
 4 5 5 The dangers of neoliberalism and the liberal choice argument: Nova  
  Scotia v Walsh                   171 
 4 5 6 The retrogressive trend continues: Kerr v Baranow and Eric v Lola    175 
4 5 7 Conclusion: An overview of the trends in Canadian jurisprudence  181 
4 5 8 Lessons from a comparative analysis of Canadian family law  182 
4 6 The Dutch family law system       184
 4 6 1 Introduction         184
 4 6 2 The Dutch Constitution       187 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
ix 
 
 4 6 3 The Dutch family law regime       192 
 4 6 3 1 Introduction          192 
 4 6 3 2 The recognition of same-sex marriages and domestic partnerships  192 
 4 6 3 3 Unregistered partnerships: Legislative developments              195 
 4 6 3 4 Unregistered partnerships: Judicial developments        197 
 4 6 4 Conclusion: Lessons from a comparative analysis of Dutch family law 202 
4 7 Concluding remarks: Lessons from Canadian and Dutch family law  203 
 
Chapter 5: The implications of a relational feminist interpretation of socio- 
economic rights for South African cohabitants   
5 1 Introduction                     204 
5 2  Shifting the theoretical lens informing the regulation of cohabitation              205 
5 3 Improved public provisioning of socio-economic rights               207 
5 4 Towards a transformed legislative framework for cohabitation              209 
5 4 1 Introduction                    209 
5 4 2 Utilising a relational feminist lens to develop the legislative framework 209 
5 4 3 Conclusion                     219 
5 5 Jurisprudential developments                  220 
 5 5 1 Introduction                     220 
 5 5 2 Utilising a relational feminist lens to foster gender-sensitive family law 
jurisprudence                    221 
5 5 2 1 Utilising a relational feminist framework to inform the  
horizontal application of socio-economic rights   223 
  5 5 2 2 Interpreting legislation      226 
5 5 2 3 Developing the common law      229 
5 5 2 4 Developing a new constitutional remedy     234 
 5 5 3 Summary of the judicial interventions required     236 
5 6 Implications of a relational feminist framework for transforming  
the socio-economic consequences of cohabitation      237 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion         
6 1 Introduction                               240 
6 2 Synthesis of study’s recommendations                           241 
6 2 1 Value of a relational feminist framework                           241 
6 2 2 Need to transform the South African legal framework                         243 
 6 2 3 Value of a comparative study                              244 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
x 
 
 6 2 4 Positive developments required                           246 
6 3 Concluding remarks                                   247 
 
Bibliography                                                 249 
 Books                     249 
 Chapters in books                   250 
 Journal articles                   253 
 Research reports                   263 
 Theses and dissertations                  267 
 Table of cases                   267 
 Table of Constitutions, legislation and bills                271 
International law instruments                  273 
 
 
 
      
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
xi 
 
Table of abbreviations 
 
ALRDP  Alliance for the Legal Recognition of Domestic Partnerships 
CALS   Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
CUA   Civil Union Act 17 of 2006   
CHRA   Canadian Human Rights Act 1985 
DCC   Dutch Civil Code 
DVA   Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 
ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
IFHR     International Federation of Human rights 
ISA   Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987  
JFV   Joint family venture  
MPL   Muslim Personal Law 
MSSA   Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990  
NSMPA  Nova Scotia Matrimonial Property Act of 1980  
OHCHR  Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights 
PEPUDA Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 
4 of 2000  
PFVA Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993 
QCHRF  Québec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms 1976 
RCMA  Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998  
SALRC  South African Law Reform Commission   
SERI   Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa 
STATSSA  Statistics South Africa 
TLAC   Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy Centre
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
1 1 Introduction 
 
1 1 1 Background to the research problem 
 
Gender inequality has been described as one of the leading moral and human rights 
issues of this century.1 While this inequality is rooted in various causes, discrimination 
in the private sphere continues to serve as a central foundation of women’s social and 
economic disadvantage.2 This imbalance is evinced by the fact that women continue 
to bear the socio-economic burdens of divorce and family dissolution 
disproportionately.3 Women as a group are also more vulnerable to destitution,4 
homelessness,5 and violence.6 Developing a theoretical paradigm that enforces, 
enables and realises socio-economic rights within the private sphere is thus 
interconnected to combating systemic patterns of gender inequality in South Africa.7 
 Historically, the legal system played a key role in entrenching existing patterns of 
inequality in our society. Discriminatory laws and policies that were enacted under the 
apartheid regime entrenched racially-based disadvantages in our society.8 While not 
                                                          
1 N Kristof & S Wudunn Half the Sky: How to Change the World (2010) xviii.  
2 D Nath (One in Nine Campaign) We were Never meant to Survive: Violence in the Lives of 
HIV Positive Women in South Africa (2012) 23 <http://www.oneinnine.org.za/58.page> 
(accessed 04-06-2012); and R Kaddaria & MA Freeman “Economic Consequences of 
Marriage and its Dissolution: Applying a Universal Equality Norm in a Fragmented Universe” 
(2012) 13 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 323 323. 
3 B Goldblatt “Regulating Domestic Partnerships: A Necessary Step in the Development of 
South African Family Law” (2003) 120 SALJ 610 611. 
4 See D Budlender “Women and Poverty” (2005) 64 Agenda 30 35, where she points out that:    
“While there are many different ways of measuring poverty, all suggest that women are 
more likely than men to live in poverty.” 
5 L Chenwi & K McLean “A Woman’s Home is her Castle? Poor Women and Housing 
Inadequacy in South Africa” (2009) 25 SAJHR 517 518. 
6 B Meyersfeld Domestic Violence and International Law (2010) xxxv; and N Abrahams, S 
Mathews, R Jewkes, LJ Martin & C Lombard “Every Eight Hours: Intimate Femicide in South 
Africa 10 years later” (2012) Medical Research Council Policy Brief 4. 
7 This was recognised by the Constitutional Court in the case of Government of the Republic 
of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) (“Grootboom”), 
para 23: 
“There can be no doubt that human dignity, freedom and equality, the foundational values 
of our society, are denied those who have no food, clothing or shelter …The realisation of 
these rights is also key to the advancement of race and gender equality and the evolution 
of a society in which men and women are equally able to achieve their full potential.” 
8 Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the “Constitution”).  
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as publicised, the legal system also established deep patterns of gender inequality in 
South Africa.9 Courts regularly interpreted family law rules in a formalistic manner, 
regardless of the material consequences for vulnerable family members.10 The 
judiciary also frequently resorted to the strict enforcement of family contracts in the 
name of pacta sunt servanda.11 This anachronistic approach remains rife, 
notwithstanding the frequent inclusion of terms that predominantly cause women 
socio-economic disadvantage.12 In relation to access to adequate housing,13 the 
precarious position of a non-owning spouse arises during the subsistence of the 
marriage once the parties are heading towards the divorce courts.14 Intersecting with 
these jurisprudential trends is South Africa’s incoherent and hierarchical statutory 
framework. While the South African family law system recognises a variety of 
relationship forms, religious marriages and domestic partnerships remain 
                                                          
9 See Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 4 SA 197 (CC); 1996 6 BCLR 752 (CC) (“Brink”), para 44, 
where Justice O’Regan J states:  
“Although in our society, discrimination on grounds of sex has not been as visible, nor as 
widely condemned, as discrimination on grounds of race, it has nevertheless resulted in 
deep patterns of disadvantage.”  
10 For example, in MM v MN 2010 4 SA 286 (GNP), the court had to consider the validity of a 
second customary marriage where the husband had failed to comply with the formalities set 
out in the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 for the registration of a second 
marriage. Ultimately the court decided to declare the second marriage void. This declaration 
of voidness usually occurs after the death of the husband, and has devastating legal and 
emotional consequences for the discarded wife. 
11 J Heaton “Striving for Substantive Gender Equality in Family Law: Selected Issues” (2005) 
21 SAJHR 547 555. 
12 This is illustrated in the case of Barnard v Barnard 2000 3 SA 741 (C) (“Barnard”). In this 
case the wife attempted to attack the validity of a clause in the spouses’ ante-nuptial contract 
through which the parties had agreed to the complete separation of property upon their 
divorce. The applicant argued that at the time of signing the contract the respondent had been 
in a position of substantial influence and advantage over her, which resulted in her signing the 
ante-nuptial contract. In this case the applicant was in her twenties, while her partner was in 
his sixties and experienced in business matters. Upon their divorce, she alleged that, if she 
had been free to exercise normal free will, she would not have agreed to the exclusion of the 
accrual system. She sought an order declaring the marriage to be in community of property. 
In para 39, the court held that an ante-nuptial contract providing for the complete separation 
of family property “can never be contrary to public policy.” See Heaton (2005) SAJHR 555, 
where she discusses this case.  
13 S 26(1) of the Constitution states that “[e]veryone has the right to have access to adequate 
housing.” 
14 JC Sonnekus “The Personal Consequences of Divorce” in J Heaton (ed) The Law of Divorce 
and Dissolution of Life of Partnerships in South Africa (2015) 33 50. 
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unrecognised.15 As a result of these interconnecting factors, the South African family 
law regime currently exacerbates gender inequality.16  
 While all family relationships need to be regulated to protect the socio-economic 
needs of its members, research has revealed that cohabiting women remain 
particularly vulnerable. A major factor underlying cohabitants’ socio-economic 
disadvantage is the fact that these relationships have traditionally been perceived and 
regulated through a discriminatory lens. During the 1970s, for example, the occurrence 
of an unmarried man and woman living together was referred to as “concubinage”.17 
Nowadays, reference is instead made to “cohabitation”, “domestic partnerships” and 
“life partnerships”.18  
 The primary reason for the vulnerability of cohabitants is, however, the fact that their 
status is currently governed by a “patchwork of laws that [do] not express a coherent 
set of family law rules”.19 These rules are also predominantly based on liberal 
conceptions of choice and individualism, which have the propensity to entrench 
patterns of inequality and disadvantage.20 While the liberal conception of choice is 
deeply embedded in our law,21 recent trends indicate the need to question and 
transform this underlying paradigm.22 
                                                          
15 P Bakker “Chaos in Family Law: A Model for the Recognition of Intimate Relationships in 
South Africa” (2013) 16 PELJ 116 118. 
16 Heaton (2005) SAJHR 555. 
17 HR Hahlo “The Law of Concubinage” (1972) 89 SALJ 321 321. 
18 B Smith “The Dissolution of a Life or Domestic Partnership” in J Heaton (ed) The Law of 
Divorce and Dissolution of Life Partnerships in South Africa (2014) 387 390-391. 
19 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie (Doctors for Life International, Amici Curiae); Lesbian & 
Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 1 SA 524 (CC); 2006 3 BCLR 355 (CC) 
(“Fourie”), para 125.   
20 D Bhana “The Development of a Basic Approach for the Constitutionalisation of Our 
Common Law of Contract” (2015) 26 Stell LR 1 3. 
21 This can be seen from an analysis of the rhetoric underlying much of the family law 
jurisprudence, including cases such as: National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC) (“National Coalition v Minister of Home Affairs”); 
Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 6 SA 1 (CC) (“Satchwell”); Du Toit 
v Minister of Welfare and Population Development 2003 2 SA 198 (CC) (“Du Toit”); J v 
Director-General: Department of Home Affairs 2003 5 SA 621 (CC) (“J v Director-General”); 
Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund 2004 1 SA 369 (SCA) (“Du Plessis”); and Gory v Kolver 
2007 4 SA 97 (CC) (“Gory”). See in particular, Volks NO v Robinson 2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC) 
(“Volks”), which is discussed in detail in part 3 3 2 of chapter three of this study.  
22 B Coetzee Bester & A Lou “Domestic Partners and “the Choice Argument: Quo Vadis?” 
(2014) 17 PELJ 2951 2955; and E Bonthuys “Developing the Common Law of Breach of 
Promise and Universal Partnerships: Rights to Property Sharing for all Cohabitants?” (2015) 
13 SALJ 76 78. 
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1 1 2  Socio-economic implications of terminated domestic partnerships 
 
 As a result of the patchwork of rules regulating cohabitation, upon the termination 
of a domestic partnership, cohabiting women tend to fall between the cracks of the 
legal system.23 These gaps in the legal regime often result in socio-economic 
disadvantage for women. Their precarious position is evinced by the fact that upon the 
termination of a partnership, it is disproportionately women and children who have to 
leave the family home.24 Forced removals and evictions implicate female cohabitant’s 
constitutionally protected right of access to adequate housing.25 One reason for these 
evictions is that the family property is usually registered in the name of the man in the 
relationship, regardless of whether his partner contributed to the family home through 
value-added services.26 As non-owning cohabitants do not have the right to occupy 
the family home, women’s vulnerability to homelessness and eviction is 
exacerbated.27 The failure to regulate domestic partnerships also prevents cohabiting 
women from claiming a duty of support from their partner.28 Cohabitants are further 
excluded from inheriting from their partner’s estate, unless their partner specifically 
nominates them as a beneficiary.29 For many cohabitants who are at an advanced 
age, the inability to claim maintenance from their deceased partner’s estate implicates 
their constitutionally protected right of access to social security.30 Their vulnerability is 
                                                          
23 B Clark & B Goldblatt “Gender and Family Law” in E Bonthuys & C Albertyn (eds) Gender, 
Law and Justice (2007) 195 205; and South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) Project 
118: Report on Domestic Partnerships (2006) 7 <http://www.justice.gov.za/ 
salrc/reports/r_prj118_2006march.pdf> (accessed 20-10-2012). 
24 Alliance for the Legal Recognition of Domestic Partnerships (ALRDP) Submission to the 
Department of Home Affairs on the Draft Partnerships Bill, 2008 (2008) 3 <http://www.tlac. 
org.za/wp-content/ uploads/2012/01/domestic-partnership-alliance-submission-on-the-draft-
domestic-partnerships-bill.pdf> (accessed 26-02-2013). 
25 S 26(1) of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to have access to adequate 
housing. This right is discussed in further detail below in part 1 1 3 of this study. 
26 Chenwi & McLean (2009) SAJHR 532; and Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy Centre (TLAC) 
Submission to the Portfolio Committee on Housing (2007) 1. 
27 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) Women and 
the Right to Adequate Housing (2012) 6 <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ 
WomenHousing_HR. PUB.11.2.pdf> (accessed 12-09-2012). 
28 L Gerntholtz & N Nsibandeby (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation) Using 
the Law to Secure Women's Rights to Housing and Security of Tenure: A Brief Examination 
of Some Key Aspects of Family and Customary Law and Domestic Violence Legislation (2006) 
4. 
29 4. 
30 S 27(1) (c) of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to have access to:  
“Social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, 
appropriate social assistance”.  
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further perpetuated if they do not have access to a pension fund. Given that many 
poor women do not have the power to insist that their partner marry them, or appoint 
them as a beneficiary, this places them at the mercy of their partner’s goodwill.31 If a 
cohabitant relies on their partner to assist them in accessing health care, their 
constitutionally protected right of access to health care services is also implicated.32 
This is evinced by the reality that cohabitants are often removed from their partner’s 
medical aid scheme upon the termination of their relationship.33 Cohabitants, who 
require their partner to assist them in supporting children, face additional obstacles, 
as it is still predominantly women who remain responsible for child care once a 
relationship breaks down.34  
 Maintenance orders are also notoriously difficult to enforce in South Africa, let alone 
to obtain. As emphasised by the Constitutional Court in Bannatyne v Bannatyne 
(“Bannatyne”),35 upon the breakdown of a marriage, women experience the dual 
disadvantage of being “overburdened in terms of responsibilities and under-resourced 
in terms of means”.36 In contrast, fathers, tend to remain employed and generally 
become wealthier following the breakdown of a relationship. Maintenance payments 
are consequently essential to relieve this gendered “financial burden”.37 The potential 
of socio-economic rights to highlight the socio-economic implications of family 
dissolution for women has not yet been fully explored. Socio-economic rights have 
also not been systematically raised as potential tools to alleviate the socio-economic 
consequences of family dissolution. The reality remains however, that women who 
cohabit with men are often left with nothing once their relationship ends.38  
                                                          
This right is discussed further below in part 1 1 3 of this study.  
31 M Pieterse “Relational Socio-Economic Rights” (2009) 25 SAJHR 198 203. See also P de 
Vos “Same-sex Sexual Desire and the Re-imagining of the South African Family” (2004) 20 
SAJHR 179 182-183; and Goldblatt (2003) SALJ 614. 
32 S 27(1) (a) of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to have access to health 
care services, including reproductive health care. 
33 An example of this is provided by the case of Volks, which is discussed in detail in part 3 3 
5 of this study. In this case Mrs Robinson was at an advanced age when her long-term partner 
passed away, implicating her need to access a pension fund and ultimately her right to have 
access to social security. Following her partner’s death she would have also been removed 
from his medical aid, with implications for her right of access to health care services. 
34 Bonthuys (2015) SALJ 76. 
35 Bannatyne v Bannatyne (Commission for Gender Equality, as Amicus Curiae) 2003 2 SA 
363 (CC) (“Bannatyne”). 
36 Para 29. 
37 Para 29. 
38 Clark & Goldblatt “Gender and Family Law” in Gender, Law and Justice 242. 
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 Interpersonal power dynamics intersect with communal relations, while a lack of 
knowledge of the law and insufficient access to legal services compounds 
vulnerability. Consequently, a significant number of women living in domestic 
partnerships often mistakenly believe that their relationship is regulated by law.39 In 
addition, women who are married under customary law, but who fail to fulfil certain 
prescribed formalities mistakenly believe they are officially married. Many of these 
women only find out their true legal position once it is too late.40 The legal gaps 
confronting cohabitants are patently unjust when compared to how civil marriage offers 
socio-economic benefits, such as the right to inherit, spousal benefits and tax 
advantages.41 
 The failure to recognise domestic partnerships entrenches the subordination and 
material insecurity experienced by a significant number of South African women.42 
Statistics illustrate that these relationships have almost doubled between the Census 
periods of 1996 and 2001.43 The number of cohabitants has also continued to increase 
over the years with reports indicating that over three million South Africans were living 
together “like husband and wife” in 2011.44 Statistics from 2012 and 2013 reveal that 
marriage rates continue to decline, while the number of cohabitants steadily rises,45 
and that marriage rates are substantially lower among African women.46  
 Against this backdrop of gendered inequality, centuries of colonialism and decades 
of apartheid rule have perpetuated the disadvantaged position of African women. For 
instance, the combination of apartheid spatial planning laws and the migrant labour 
                                                          
39 B Meyersfeld “If You can See, Look: Domestic Partnerships and the Law” (2010) 3 CCR 
271 310. 
40 275. 
41 SALRC Report on Domestic Partnerships (2006) 39; and E Bonthuys “Race and Gender in 
the Civil Union Act” (2007) 23 SAJHR 526 527. 
42 Goldblatt (2003) SALJ 615. 
43 Volks para 119. 
44 Smith “The Dissolution of a Life or Domestic Partnership” in Law of Divorce 392, citing the 
General Household Survey, which reports that 3,165,497 South Africans were living together 
in 2011 without being married to one another. See Statistics South Africa (STATSSA) General 
Household Survey (2011) 2 <http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0318/P0318 
April2012.pdf> (accessed 07-08-2015). 
45 STATSSA Marriage and Divorce 2013 Statistical Release (2013) 2-3 <http://www.statssa. 
gov.za/ publications/P0307/P03072013.pdf> (accessed 09-08-2015). 
46 D Posel & S Rudwick “Changing Patterns of Marriage and Cohabitation in South Africa” 
(2013) 13 Acta Juridica 169 170. 
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system resulted in the breakdown of African families.47 The migrant labour system 
forced many young African men to leave the rural areas to search for work on the 
mines and in urban areas. Many of these men formed a second household in the urban 
area, while previous female partners were left to look after the rural homestead.48 An 
appropriate human rights-based response to this phenomenon would entail protecting 
the fundamental rights of both the rural partner and the urban partner when the man 
dies or the relationship ends.49 This approach of protecting both partners has, 
however, not been adopted.50 Given South Africa’s history of inequality and the reality 
that cohabiting relationships are predominant within poorer segments of our society, 
there is a clear need for positive socio-economic intervention by the state. 
 It is evident that the apartheid regime contributed to entrenching the systemic 
patterns of inequality currently pervading our society, as well as the rise in 
cohabitation. The legal system did not, however, respond to this phenomenon by 
providing cohabitants with any additional form of protection. This gendered 
disadvantage is evinced by the fact that the male primogeniture rule under customary 
law restricted the capacity of African women to inherit property. While this rule was 
declared unconstitutional in 2005,51 it is clear that African women have experienced 
intersecting forms of socio-economic disadvantage within South Africa.52  
It needs to be emphasised that not all cohabiting women are powerless and that 
not all unmarried women wish to be married. Moreover, there are a number of complex 
                                                          
47 D Budlender & F Lund “South Africa: A Legacy of Family Disruption” (2011) 42 Development 
and Change 925 927-932; B Goldblatt “Citizenship and the Right to Child Care” in A Gouws 
(ed) (Un)thinking Citizenship: Feminist Debates in Contemporary South Africa (2005) 117 131.   
48 Budlender & Lund (2011) 927-932; and C Albertyn “Contesting Democracy: HIV/AIDS and 
the Achievement of Gender Equality in South Africa” (2003) 29 Feminist Studies 595 598.  
49 Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) Submission to the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Home Affairs: The Civil Unions Bill (2006) 1 <http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-
west-1.amazonaws.com> (accessed 12-10-2013.) 
50 This is discussed in detail in chapter three of this study. 
51 See Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; South African Human Rights 
Commission v President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 1 SA 580 (CC); 2005 1 BCLR 1 
(CC) (“Bhe”), para 91, where Chief Justice Pius Langa (as he was then) stated:  
“The exclusion of women from inheritance on the grounds of gender is a clear violation of 
section 9(3) of the Constitution. It is a form of discrimination that entrenches past patterns 
of disadvantage among a vulnerable group, exacerbated by old notions of patriarchy and 
male domination.”   
52 S Liebenberg & M O’Sullivan “South Africa’s New Equality Legislation: A Tool for Advancing 
Women’s Socio-Economic Equality?” (2001) 21 Acta Juridica 70 71. See also Brink para 44.   
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intersecting factors that have contributed to the decline in marriage in South Africa.53 
Women are occasionally criticised for “choosing” to stay in unregulated domestic 
partnerships. Remaining in a domestic partnership may however, represent the most 
feasible option amongst a limited range of choices. A significant number of cohabiting 
women may furthermore, prefer to be married, but lack the power to determine the 
official form of their relationship. The social realities of poverty, unemployment and 
gender inequality play a significant role in shaping these relationship choices.54 The 
South African Law Reform Commission (“SALRC”) has emphasised this point, stating 
that while cohabitation may be a matter of choice for the middle class, it is a serious 
problem for the majority of poor women who have little or no control over it.55 
 The point of departure of this study is that the legal approach of focusing on the 
form of a relationship, as opposed to a relational feminist interpretation of the socio-
economic rights of the partners, upon its termination, undermines the constitutional 
commitment to establish a society based on non-sexism56 and fundamental human 
rights.57 In order to protect and fulfil the socio-economic rights of women, the 
underlying gendered dynamics shaping women’s choices and their access to 
resources must be more effectively recognised and addressed.  
1 1 3 Rationale and motivation for the study: A transformative Constitution 
 
The neglect of the socio-economic rights of women within South African family law 
is somewhat surprising, given the progressive framework of rights protected within the 
1996 Constitution. The founding constitutional provisions describe South Africa as a 
democratic state founded on human dignity, the achievement of equality, the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms and non-racialism and non-sexism.58 The 
Constitution is also committed to healing the divisions of the past,59 while establishing 
a society based on social justice. 
                                                          
53 D Cooper, E Moore & JE Mantell “Renegotiating Intimate Relationships with Men: How HIV 
Shapes Attitudes and Experiences of Marriage for South African Women Living with HIV: ‘Now 
in my life, everything I do, looking at my health’” (2013) 13 Acta Juridica 218 218. 
54 SALRC Report on Domestic Partnerships (2006) 24. 
55 87. 
56 S 1(b) of the Constitution. 
57 Preamble. 
58 Preamble.   
59 Preamble.  
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Unlike many international instruments,60 and foreign Constitutions,61 the South 
African Constitution does not expressly protect the right to family life or the right to 
marry. During the certification process, the Constitutional Court (the “Court”) pointed 
out that owing to the fact that families are constituted, function and dissolved in a 
variety of ways, the possible outcomes of constitutionalising family rights remains 
uncertain.62 By not constitutionalising these rights, the Court argued that the 
constitution-makers would avoid disagreements over the kinds of families in need of 
protection or over which ceremonies, rites or practices would constitute a marriage 
under our Constitution.63 Notwithstanding this positive intention, the South African 
family law regime has established various legislative structures that have resulted in 
a separate and unequal family law system.64  
In the certification judgment, the Court stated that there is no universal acceptance 
of the need to constitutionalise family rights.65 It explained that numerous provisions 
in the 1996 Constitution clearly prohibit any arbitrary state interference with the right 
to marry or to establish and raise a family.66 This statement appears to be justified. 
For example, section 2 of the Constitution states that it is the supreme law of the 
Republic, while section 7(1) describes the Bill of Rights as a cornerstone of democracy 
in South Africa. Section 7(2) goes on to state that the “state must respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights”. The state is therefore under a positive 
                                                          
60 For example, art 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) UN doc A/810 and 
art 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 999 UNTS 171 protect 
one’s family from arbitrary interference. Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(1950) 213 UNTS 222 also protects the right to respect for one’s family life. This article is 
discussed in more detail in part 4 6 2 of this study. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (1981) OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/rev5 also expressly protects the right to family life in 
article 18. For example, article 18(1) states that: “The family shall be the natural unit and basis 
of society. It shall be protected by the State…” Article 18 does not however expressly refer to 
marriage or spouses. Similarly, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (1977) UN Doc A/34/46 departs from many other international 
documents by emphasising rights of free choice, equality and dignity in all matters relating to 
marriage and family relations (art 16), without referring to the family as the basic unit of society. 
61 Examples include s 37 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, which 
protects the right to private and family life. Art 6 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of 
Germany, also expressly protects marriage and family life, while s 35 of the Constitution of 
Pakistan, 1973, expressly protects marriage and family life. 
62 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa (1996) 4 SA 744 (CC) (“Ex parte Chairperson of the 
Constitutional Assembly”), paras 98-102. 
63 Paras 98-102. 
64 Bakker (2013) PELJ 118. 
65 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly 98-102. 
66 Paras 98-102. 
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duty to promote a family law regime based on the fundamental rights protected in the 
Bill of Rights. Moreover, arbitrary interference in the family law regime, which 
undermines the rights protected in the Bill of Rights, contravenes sections 2 and 7 of 
the Constitution. 
The Constitution specifically provides that the rights in the Bill of Rights apply to all 
law and that they bind the “legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of 
state”.67 Section 8(2) of the Constitution further states that a provision in the Bill of 
Rights binds both natural and juristic persons.68 The Constitution’s commitment to 
founding a society based on “human dignity, equality and human rights and 
freedoms”,69 therefore extends to private relations.70  
 Interconnected to the horizontal commitments in section 8 is section 39 of the 
Constitution. Section 39(1) states that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, courts must 
promote the values underlying an open, democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom. The courts may also consider foreign law.71 Section 39(2) goes 
on to state that when interpreting legislation or developing the common law or 
customary law, courts must “promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights”. This progressive instruction reveals that all law, including the common law, is 
subject to the Constitution.72 Moreover, under our Constitution no exercise of power – 
whether public or private – is immune from constitutional scrutiny, in light of the 
progressive rights and values protected within our Constitution.73  
 The provisions of sections 8 and 39(2) of the Constitution justify transcending the 
public/private law divide and analysing the potential implications of socio-economic 
rights within the area of family law.74 While sections 8 and 39 of the Constitution clearly 
mandate a methodology for the horizontal application of the rights within the Bill of 
                                                          
67 S 8(1) to the Constitution. 
68 S 8(2) of the Constitution provides that the rights in the Bill of Rights apply to natural persons 
while s 9(4) of the Constitution provides that private individuals are prohibited from 
discriminating against one another. 
69 Preamble.   
70 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication through a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 319. 
71 S 39(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
72 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In Re Ex Parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674; 2000 3 BCLR 241 (CC) (“Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers”), para 44. 
73 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 319. 
74 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 319; Abrahams, Mathews, Jewkes, Martin, & Lombard 
“Every Eight Hours” Medical Research Council Policy Brief 4.   
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Rights, the courts have not been consistent in their application of these provisions.75 
A need for further development is thus clear, particularly to give substantive content 
to the socio-economic rights of cohabiting women. 
Section 9(1) of the Constitution provides that everyone is equal before the law and 
that everyone has the right to enjoy the equal protection and benefit of the law. Section 
9(2) elucidates that equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all the rights in 
the Bill of Rights, demonstrating its interconnection to other fundamental rights, 
including socio-economic rights. It has been argued that this right should be 
interpreted in ways that promote greater equality in people’s access to resources and 
services, as protected by the socio-economic provisions.76 Section 9(3) specifically 
prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race, gender, sex, marital status and social 
origin, while section 9(5) states that discrimination on any of these grounds is 
presumed to be unfair. Section 9(4) specifically prohibits discrimination between 
private individuals.  
The right to human dignity is protected under section 10, while section 12(1)(c) 
states that everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, including 
freedom from private violence. Section 14 of the Constitution provides that everyone 
has the right to privacy. The rights to human dignity, freedom,77 and privacy78 have 
been utilised by the judiciary to develop family law rules. The majority of family law 
developments have, however, been based upon the right to equality. While section 9 
                                                          
75 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 321. 
76 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 53; S Liebenberg & B Goldblatt “The Interrelationship 
between Equality and Socio-Economic Rights under South Africa’s Transformative 
Constitution” (2007) 23 SAJHR 335 33; P de Vos “Grootboom, the Right of Access to Housing 
and Substantive Equality as Contextual Fairness” (2001) 17 SAJHR 258 259; and S Fredman 
“Engendering Socio-Economic Rights” (2009) 25 SAJHR 410 411.   
77 S 12(1)(c) of the Constitution is of vital importance in a country like South Africa, which 
experiences extreme levels of domestic violence. In accordance with the Domestic Violence 
Act 116 of 1998, freedom from violence includes freedom from socio-economic abuse in 
interpersonal relationships. 
78 In the case of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 
SA 6; 1998 12 BCLR 1517 (“National Coalition v Minister of Justice”), the Court recognised 
that this right extends beyond the right to be left alone. This right was held to encompass the 
right to establish and live in supportive personal and public contexts and relationships. This 
necessarily entails a duty upon the state to establish the conditions necessary for the fulfilment 
of this right. The majority judgment defined privacy as “entailing the opportunity to establish 
relationships without interference from the outside community.” (Para 32). The concurring 
judgment, by Sachs J, linked the right to privacy to the right to identity and emphasised the 
fact that rights are not exercised in isolation, but by people as members of communities. See 
Justice Sachs’ judgment in paras 116-119. 
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is relied upon in a number of cases,79 the socio-economic equality of women remains 
neglected within South African family law. 
 Of particular importance for the development of our family law regime, is the 
express constitutional protection of justiciable socio-economic rights. The Constitution 
specifically mandates, for example, that everyone has the right to have access to 
adequate housing in section 26(1). Section 26(2) elaborates that “reasonable 
measures” must be taken, within the state’s “available resources”, to achieve the 
“progressive realisation” of this right. Section 26(3) further stipulates that no one may 
be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court. 
The Constitution also protects the right to have access to health care services, food, 
water and social security.80 It is thus praised for its “transformative”81 potential to 
facilitate a socio-economic shift towards a more egalitarian society, where all are able 
to access vital resources to achieve their full human potential.82 In stark contrast to the 
Constitution’s transformative goals, South Africa is currently facing extreme levels of 
poverty83 and high levels of gender inequality.   
From the progressive framework of rights outlined above, it is clear that the South 
African Constitution encompasses a human rights-based ethos that should 
necessarily infuse all areas of our legal system.84 In this regard, significant attention 
has been paid towards addressing and transforming public law aspects of poverty and 
                                                          
79 Examples include: Bhe para 91, Volks para 46- 48; Bannatyne para 30; Brink para 44 and 
Daniels v Campbell 2004 5 SA 331 (CC); 2004 7 BCLR 735 (CC) (“Daniels”) para 34. 
80 S 27 of the Constitution. 
81 The phrase “transformative constitutionalism” was first used and developed in a seminal 
article published by Karl Klare in 1998. In his article, Klare specifically described this project 
as entailing constitutional interpretation and enactment aimed at transforming South Africa’s 
“political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory and 
egalitarian direction”. He went on to state that this project necessarily entails “large-scale 
social changes through non-violent political changes”. See K Klare “Legal Culture and 
Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 150.  
82 De Vos (2001) SAJHR 259; P Langa “Transformative Constitutionalism” (2006) 3 Stell LR 
351 352; C Albertyn & B Goldblatt “Equality in the Final Constitution” in S Woolman, T Roux 
& M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (Original Service, June 2008) 35-1 
35-5.   
83 Stats SA Poverty Trends in South Africa: An examination of absolute poverty between 2006 
and 2011 (2014) 12; see also JP Landman, H Bhorat, C van Aardt & S van der Berg Breaking 
the Grip of Poverty and Inequality in South Africa 2004 – 2014 (2003) 1 
<http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000649/index.php> (accessed 20-04-2012); S 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 
26 
84 Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister for Justice and Constitutional 
Development 2009 4 SA 222 (CC); 2009 2 SACR 130 (CC) (“Director of Public Prosecutions”), 
para 2. 
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inequality. Less attention has, however, been paid to utilising socio-economic rights 
as vehicles for addressing private causes of women’s poverty.85 In particular, very little 
consideration has been given to socio-economic rights as potential tools for 
addressing the gendered inequalities found within the family law regime. This 
dissertation consequently investigates the potential of developing a theoretical 
framework that recognises and addresses the socio-economic impact of relational 
dynamics between cohabitants upon the termination of their partnership. In this 
manner, a relational feminist framework is examined in terms of its potential to 
transform the socio-economic consequences of terminated domestic partnerships in a 
manner that fosters substantive gender equality. 
1 1 4 A relational feminist framework 
 
 The need for a transformative approach to family law is emphasised by the fact that 
the family unit plays an integral psychological role in shaping peoples’ identities, 
values and decisions.86 The importance of the family unit is emphasised by the fact 
that many people gain access to the objects of socio-economic rights privately, “within 
and by way of relationships”.87 Family law scholars have accordingly recognised the 
constitutive power of the family, accentuating how family law rules play a political role 
in entrenching inequalities on numerous grounds.88 Significant scholarship therefore 
exists on the manner in which the family law regime perpetuates discrimination on the 
grounds of gender, race, sexual orientation, class, religion and culture.89  
While it may be easy to recognise the constitutive nature of the family for young 
children, Jennifer Nedelsky highlights that in reality relational interdependence 
                                                          
85 Pieterse (2009) SAJHR 203; and B Goldblatt & L Lamarche “Background Document for the 
Workshop: Interpreting and Advancing Women’s Rights to Social Security and Social 
Protection” (2013) International Institute for the Sociology of Law 2; S Liebenberg “Socio-
Economic Rights Beyond the Public-Private Law Divide” in M Langford, B Cousins, J Dugard 
& T Madlingozi (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: Symbols or Substance? (2015) 
63 63. 
86 J Nedelsky Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (2011) 208. 
87 Pieterse (2009) SAJHR 198. 
88 F Kaganas & C Murray “Law and Women’s Rights in South Africa: An Overview” (1994) 
Acta Juridica 1 1; Clark & Goldblatt “Gender and Family Law” in Gender, Law and Justice 205; 
and Nedelsky Law’s Relations 20. 
89 Clark & Goldblatt “Gender and Family Law” in Gender, Law and Justice 205; Heaton (2005) 
SAJHR 555; E Bonthuys “RH v DE: A Feminist Minority Judgment on Adultery” (2015) 31 
SAJHR 379 381; and Nedelsky Law’s Relations 20. 
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extends throughout our entire lives.90 A relational feminist perspective accordingly 
recognises the significance of relations that shape our capacity for love, creativity and 
independence, as well as our choices and our capacity to access resources.91 These 
private dynamics inevitably intersect with broader social patterns, resulting in 
constructs of rights offering varying privileges to differently situated groups.92 This 
relational reality reveals that rights are not stable givens, but that they shift as 
relationships change.93 As a result, private and public relationships give rise to 
intersecting forms of vulnerability and disadvantage. In order to protect the 
fundamental human rights of each person, the regulation of both public and private 
power needs to be sensitive to existing relational inequality and disadvantage.  
  The family law regime should be developed to serve as a tool for transforming the 
lives of female cohabitants. While the legal system alone cannot foster all of the 
necessary social change, it should play an integral part in responding to the 
experiences of cohabiting women and in contributing to the change that needs to 
occur.94 Given that the law can be a powerful tool in effecting social change, it is 
necessary to examine how the law can be developed to promote constructive relations 
that improve access to socio-economic resources for female cohabitants. The South 
African Constitution’s progressive framework of rights supports the notion that, 
regardless of the official form of a relationship, there ought to be a more humane and 
equitable division of socio-economic resources upon its dissolution. A human-rights 
based approach is in accordance with the Constitutional Court’s statement that the Bill 
of Rights requires that everyone be treated “with care and concern”.95 This study 
examines the need to develop the relevant private law rules governing the termination 
of a domestic partnership so as to address women’s poverty and infuse private 
relations with constitutional values and norms.96  
                                                          
90 Nedelsky Law’s Relations 20. 
91 20. 
92 S Joseph “Problematizing Gender and Relational Rights: Experiences from Lebanon” (1994) 
1 Social Politics 271 274; and Pieterse (2009) SAJHR 199. 
93 S Joseph “Teaching Rights and Responsibilities: Paradoxes of Globalization and Children's 
Citizenship in Lebanon” (2005) 38 Journal of Social History 1007 1008; and Pieterse (2009) 
SAJHR 199. 
94 L Artz & D Smyth “Introduction: Should We Consent?” in L Artz & D Smythe (eds) Should 
We Consent? Rape Law Reform in South Africa (2008) 1 15. 
95 Grootboom para 44. 
96 B Goldblatt “Poverty and the Development of the Right to Social Security” (2014) 10 IJLC 
460 460. In this article she refers to the right to social security under international law, pointing 
out that the public law right to social security has been given “limited attention as a vehicle for 
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1 2 Research question, research aims, hypotheses and methodology 
 
 1 2 1 Primary research question 
 
 The primary research question this study seeks to answer is what a relational 
feminist interpretation of socio-economic rights can contribute to the development of 
a family law system that is more responsive to women’s socio-economic disadvantage 
following the termination of a domestic partnership. In order to answer this research 
question, a number of ancillary research aims need to be addressed. 
 
1 2 2 Supplementary research aims and hypotheses 
 
 In order to achieve the primary research question, four subsidiary research aims 
are pursued in this dissertation. The first research aim is to examine how a relational 
feminist lens resonates with the project of transformative constitutionalism and how it 
can overcome the constraining influence of classic liberalism. The central hypothesis 
informing this research aim is that a relational feminist approach to cohabitation can 
be utilised to ensure that the law is more responsive to the socio-economic needs of 
female cohabitants. In this regard, a relational feminist framework can be employed to 
develop guidelines informing the application of socio-economic rights between 
cohabitants upon the termination of their relationship. 
 The second research aim of this study is to analyse the South African legal 
framework governing cohabitation through a relational feminist lens. Relevant 
jurisprudence, legislation and common law rules are examined in terms of their 
capacity to promote constructive relations that empower cohabitants to access socio-
economic resources. The hypothesis is that the current legal framework governing 
cohabitation is fragmented, while informed by formal notions of equality, patriarchal 
norms, marriage fundamentalism, contractual principles and a liberal conception of 
choice. This fragmented framework ultimately exacerbates existing patterns of gender 
inequality and disadvantage. 
                                                          
addressing women’s poverty”. Under South African law, the socio-economic rights have also 
been given insufficient attention as potential vehicles for addressing women’s poverty, 
particularly in the private sphere. 
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 The third research aim of this study is to analyse relevant comparative law, focusing 
on developments in Canadian family law and Dutch family law, pertaining to the 
protection of cohabiting women. The strengths and weaknesses underlying these 
foreign legal approaches are examined against the standards developed under the 
relational feminist theoretical framework. The hypothesis guiding this research aim is 
that a comparative analysis of Canadian family law and Dutch family law, can aid in 
identifying normatively attractive approaches for protecting the needs of cohabiting 
women. A normative approach can also utilise both Dutch and Canadian family case 
law to illustrate approaches that are antithetical to a relational feminist approach. 
These antithetical approaches can emphasise developments that the South African 
legal system, based on a Constitution dedicated to non-sexism and justiciable socio-
economic rights, should avoid.97  
 The final research aim is to examine the implications of a relational feminist 
interpretation of socio-economic rights, in conjunction with lessons gained from the 
Canadian and the Dutch context, for the development of the South African legal 
framework governing cohabitation. This dissertation aims to develop 
recommendations for the legal regulation of domestic partnerships to improve the 
socio-economic outcomes for female cohabitants upon the termination of their 
relationship.    
 
1 2 3 Methodology 
 
 This dissertation primarily relies on South African jurisprudence, relevant feminist 
critiques on family law and academic literature pertaining to socio-economic rights, to 
address the research aims conveyed above. Through an overview of the literature, as 
well as the legislative and common law framework, this study analyses the intersecting 
elements of family dissolution, high levels of poverty and gender inequality. This 
analysis is followed by an examination of the literature and debates on the 
transformative potential of sections 8 and 39 of the Constitution as the primary vehicles 
for raising and protecting socio-economic rights in family law jurisprudence and 
legislation. Following from this, is a comparative study of Canadian family law and 
                                                          
97 KL Scheppele “Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying Cross 
Constitutional Influence through Negative Models” (2003) 1 IJCL 296 296. 
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Dutch family law. The methodology to be followed in the comparative chapter is 
elaborated on next. 
Section 39 of the Constitution expressly permits the judiciary to consider foreign law 
when interpreting the Bill of Rights.98 In accordance with this provision, this dissertation 
provides a comparative perspective by critically evaluating relevant jurisprudence and 
legislative developments under Canadian family law. The study undertakes a 
normative and functional comparative analysis of Canadian legal developments, 
particularly those pertaining to the protection of female cohabitants’ socio-economic 
needs. While the justification for examining Canadian family law is set out in detail in 
part 4 2 of this dissertation, one reason for focusing on the Canadian jurisdiction is 
that it has gone further than most jurisdictions in protecting the socio-economic well-
being of unmarried cohabitants.99 Dutch family law has also been noteworthy for 
significantly developing the family law regime in previous decades, in accordance with 
human rights norms.100 Relevant Dutch developments will also be critically examined 
through a relational feminist lens. 
Methodologies underlying constitutional comparison vary in a number of ways. One 
example of this is in terms of what they aim to do and who is engaged in the 
comparison.101 Vicki Jackson has broadly defined the different methodologies as 
classificatory, historical, normative, functional and contextual.102 While all of these 
methodologies interact and overlap to varying degrees, for the purposes of this study, 
the focus is primarily on the normative and functional comparative approaches. In 
accordance with the normative approach, the aim is to search for universally 
applicable, just or “good” principles.103 An example of this is the search for essential 
jurisprudential characteristics underlying the horizontal application of a Bill of Rights 
to private law.104 In this regard, comparative study can focus on reform by identifying 
                                                          
98 S 39(1)(c) of the Constitution.  
99 C Rogerson “Canada: A Bold and Progressive Past but an Unclear Future” in E Sutherland 
(ed) The Future of Child and Family Law: International Predictions” (2012) 77 77. 
100 P Vlaardingerbroek “The Netherlands: The Growing Role of the Judge in Child and Family 
Law” in E Sutherland (ed) The Future of Child and Family law: International Predictions (2012) 
235 235. 
101 V Jackson “Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodologies” in M Rosenfeld & A Sajo (eds) 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (2012) 54 54; and M Tushnet 
Advanced Introduction to Comparative Constitutional Law (2014) 1 6. 
102 Jackson “Comparative Constitutional Law” in The Oxford Handbook 54. 
103 60. 
104 M Tushnet “The Issue of State Action/Horizontal Effect in Comparative Constitutional Law” 
(2003) 1 IJCL 79 90. 
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normatively more attractive and justice-seeking approaches. This research can also, 
however, identify “averse precedent”.105 In accordance with this approach, the study 
explores Canadian and Dutch family law developments as providing potentially 
attractive approaches to achieving substantive justice for female cohabitants. Foreign 
law developments will also be analysed to determine whether they offer examples of 
approaches that are inconsistent with a constitutional order committed to justiciable 
socio-economic rights.106  
The functional approach to comparative constitutional law focuses on functional 
comparisons and questions of causation.107 This approach attempts, for instance, to 
identity one or more functions performed by constitutional institutions or doctrines in 
one jurisdiction, while comparing how this function is achieved elsewhere through a 
different method. A functional approach is more focused on specific functional 
comparisons, as opposed to moral and principled searches for universally applicable 
principles. Accordingly, the comparative law chapter in this study aims to examine how 
the Canadian and Dutch family law systems have extended certain forms of protection 
to cohabitants and whether these developments can serve as positive lessons, or 
potential warnings, for South African lawmakers. 
 
1 2 4 Scope of the study 
 
 This dissertation investigates the potential of adopting a relational feminist 
approach to regulating the socio-economic consequences of terminated domestic 
partnerships. While a relational feminist approach to family law adjudication and 
legislation may render our family law regime more responsive to women’s specific 
needs in general, that is not where the focus of this dissertation lies. For the purposes 
of this study, the focus is on the vulnerability of women in unregulated relationships 
and, particularly, on the socio-economic needs of female cohabitants. In this study, I 
refer to domestic partners, domestic partnerships and cohabitants interchangeably. 
 This dissertation briefly examines legal developments pertaining to customary 
marriages and religious marriages, to the extent that they emphasise the need for a 
relational feminist response to women’s socio-economic disadvantage upon family 
                                                          
105 Scheppele (2003) IJCL 296. 
106 296. 
107 Jackson “Comparative Constitutional Law” in The Oxford Handbook 60. 
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dissolution. The focus of this study remains however, on unregulated domestic 
partnerships.  
 While both heterosexual and same-sex cohabitants require protection, the focus of 
this study is on heterosexual cohabitants due to the legal regime currently providing 
greater protection to same-sex cohabiting relationships than heterosexual 
cohabitants. The focus is also on examining the need to foster substantive gender 
equality, as opposed to sex equality. The emphasis is on legislative provisions and 
jurisprudential modes of reasoning affecting care-giving partners who are usually left 
socio-economically vulnerable upon the termination of their domestic partnership. 
Male cohabitants who fulfil this role and who are left vulnerable also require protection. 
The reality is, however, that women remain disproportionately responsible for this 
care-giving role.108 Women also experience socio-economic deprivation in unique 
ways due to gendered social norms.109 Given the interconnection between gendered 
family roles and socio-economic disadvantage, the focus of this study is on the need 
for a relational feminist response to the socio-economic consequences of terminated 
domestic partnerships. 
  
1 3 Overview of chapters 
 
Chapter two commences by setting out the justification for adopting a relational 
feminist framework for the interpretation of socio-economic rights. It focuses on the 
elements underlying classic legal liberalism that constrain the transformative potential 
of socio-economic rights. This is followed by an examination of the underlying 
theoretical basis of relational feminism and how it deconstructs elements of classic 
liberalism, such as the traditional public/private law divide and the liberal conception 
                                                          
108 See the discussion by Mokgoro and O’Regan JJ in Volks, para 110. The secondary 
literature on this issue is also extensive, with empirical evidence confirming that women 
continue to perform most of the household and caregiving labour within the family. For 
example, see the international survey by I Ellman “Marital Roles and Declining Marriage 
Rates” (2008) 41 Family LQ 455 478. In relation to the South African context, see: E Bonthuys 
“Gender and Work” in E Bonthuys & C Albertyn (eds) Gender, Law and Justice (2007) 244 
244-247; Clark & Goldblatt “Gender and Family Law” in Gender, Law and Justice 205; and D 
Budlender, D Chobokoane & Y Mpetsheni A Survey of Time Use: How South African Women 
and Men Spend Their Time (2001) 49 79; STATSSA Income and Expenditure of Households 
2010/2011 (2011) 216. 
109 DM Chirwa & S Khoza “Towards Enhanced Citizenship and Poverty Eradication: A Critique 
of Grootboom from a Gender Perspective” in A Gouws (ed) (Un)thinking Citizenship: Feminist 
Debates in Contemporary South Africa  (2005) 137 210. 
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of choice. It also examines how this theoretical framework facilitates the interrogation 
of the socio-economic implications of private law rules governing cohabitation. Chapter 
two concludes by setting out key concepts underlying a relational feminist 
interpretation of socio-economic rights to reconceptualise relevant family law rules. 
This is in order to render the law more responsive to women’s ability to gain and retain 
access to socio-economic resources on an equitable basis in the context of 
cohabitation. 
 Chapter three provides a detailed analysis of the current legal framework governing 
cohabitation in South Africa, through a relational feminist lens. It commences with an 
overview of the South African family law regime before the advent of democracy. It 
then examines the jurisprudence on the interaction between the Bill of Rights and 
family law, focusing on how the Bill of Rights has been utilised to develop certain 
aspects of the family law system. Following from this, it sets out the applicable 
legislative and common law framework. The chapter concludes by highlighting that, 
despite certain progressive developments, the socio-economic rights of women have 
been neglected within the context of family law. There is, therefore, a need for further 
transformation in accordance with a relational feminist interpretation of the socio-
economic rights of cohabiting women. 
 Chapter four examines promising Canadian and Dutch family law developments 
pertaining to the protection of unmarried cohabitants through a relational feminist lens. 
It commences with a brief background to the Canadian family law regime and the 
historical advances relating to the protection of social rights in Canadian law. The 
focus of this chapter is on a functional and normative comparative approach to 
Canadian family law, concentrating on leading legislative and jurisprudential 
developments concerning female cohabitants. This is followed by an analysis of the 
Dutch family law regime through a relational feminist lens. Relevant Dutch legislation 
is first examined. This is followed by an examination of Dutch jurisprudential 
developments pertaining to unregistered cohabitants. This chapter concludes by 
emphasising the potential lessons and warnings that can be gained from a 
comparative analysis of Canadian and Dutch family law. 
Chapter five utilises the normative guidelines underlying a relational feminist 
framework set out in chapter two, in addition to the lessons provided by Canadian and 
Dutch family law in chapter four, to outline recommendations for the development of 
South African family law. The emphasis is on developing rules to fulfil the socio-
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economic rights of women in the context of terminated domestic partnerships. Chapter 
five provides recommendations on how to transform the rules governing terminated 
domestic partnerships to protect and fulfil the socio-economic rights of cohabiting 
women. 
 The purpose of the concluding chapter is to highlight important recommendations 
and reflections relating to specific gaps within the South African family law regime. The 
final chapter also summarises the nature of the positive steps required by the South 
African state to protect and promote the socio-economic rights of women upon the 
termination of their domestic partnership.  
 
1 4 Conclusion 
 
 Inequality in the family continues to serve as a central cause of women’s poverty.110 
While all intimate relationships need to be regulated to protect the rights of its 
members, cohabiting women are particularly vulnerable to destitution and 
homelessness upon the dissolution of their relationship. Given the constitutional 
commitment to non-sexism111 and justiciable socio-economic rights, the state is 
constitutionally required to examine how the family law regime can be transformed to 
structure more equitable socio-economic relations between cohabiting men and 
women. This obligation is emphasised by the fact that all areas of law are subject to 
the Bill of Rights,112 as well as the constitutional duty on the state to “respect, protect 
and promote”113 the rights in the Bill of Rights. This dissertation examines the potential 
of a relational feminist interpretation of the socio-economic rights of female cohabitants 
to transform the socio-economic consequences of terminated domestic partnerships 
for women in accordance with the transformative aspirations of our Constitution.114 
                                                          
110 Nath We were Never meant to Survive” (2012) 25. 
111 S 1(b) of the Constitution. 
112 S 8(1). 
113 S 7(2). 
114 S 39(2). 
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Chapter 2: Developing a relational feminist framework for interpreting the 
socio-economic rights of female cohabitants 
 
2 1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the transformative potential of developing a relational 
feminist framework for interpreting the socio-economic rights of female cohabitants. 
The paradigmatic shift is necessitated by the reality that cohabitants often access the 
objects of socio-economic rights through private relationships.1 Relational feminism is 
scrutinised in terms of its potential to develop a framework for recognising and 
regulating the socio-economic consequences of terminated domestic partnerships.2 In 
particular, this framework is examined for its capacity to render the application of 
socio-economic rights more responsive to the needs of female cohabitants upon the 
termination of their relationships. 
The justification for adopting a relational feminist framework is set out first. 
Relational feminist theory is examined in terms of how it resonates with the project of 
transformative constitutionalism,3 particularly in relation to the horizontal application of 
the Bill of Rights. Following this, the main elements of relational feminism as a theory 
are set out in detail, focusing on the four-step approach informing a relational feminist 
framework. In accordance with this approach, legal rules are examined to determine 
whether they are structuring relations consonant with constitutional values. Relevant 
South African constitutional provisions pertaining to the socio-economic 
consequences of terminated domestic partnerships are examined through this four-
step approach. Relational feminism is also employed as a basis for critiquing the 
constraining elements underlying South Africa’s traditional legal culture.4 In particular, 
                                                          
1 M Pieterse “Relational Socio-Economic Rights” (2009) 25 SAJHR 198 203. 
2 There are a number of theories on relational feminism. For the purposes of this study, the 
focus is on the theory as developed by Jennifer Nedelsky. The underlying tenets of this theory 
and the manner in which it resonates with the ethos underlying transformative 
constitutionalism, are discussed under part 2 2 of this chapter. See J Nedelsky Law’s 
Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (2011). 
3 KE Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 150. 
4 Karl Klare defines liberal legalism as:  
“Closely related to the classical liberal political tradition, exemplified in the work of Hobbes, 
Locke and Hume. The metaphysical underpinnings of liberal legalism are supplied by the 
central themes of that tradition: the notion that values are subjective and derive from 
personal desire, and that therefore ethical discourse is conducted profitably only in 
instrumental terms; the view that society is an artificial aggregation of autonomous 
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a relational feminist lens is utilised to explore the extent to which the “choice 
argument”,5 informing South Africa’s legal response to cohabitation, structures socio-
economic inequality between cohabitants. This chapter concludes by setting out key 
concepts underlying a relational feminist approach to socio-economic rights. The 
potential of relational feminism to catalyse a significant shift in terms of the current 
paradigms informing the regulation of cohabitation is also explored.   
 
2 2  Justification for a relational feminist framework 
 
There are various theories of relational feminism,6 many of which have made 
significant contributions to developing the law to be more responsive to women’s lived 
realities.7 For purposes of this study, the focus is on the theory as developed by 
                                                          
individuals, the separation in political philosophy between public and private interest, 
between state and civil society; and a commitment to a formal or procedural rather than a 
substantive conception of justice.”  
See K Klare “Law-making as Praxis” (1979) 40 Telos 123 123.  
5 Referring to the decision in Volks NO v Robinson (2005) 5 BCLR 446 (CC) (“Volks”), Bradley 
Smith describes the Court’s line of reasoning as embodying the “choice argument”. This 
argument is that unmarried partners cannot claim spousal benefits, because they have chosen 
not to marry. See BS Smith “Rethinking Volks v Robinson: The Implications of Applying a 
‘Contextualised Choice Model’ to Prospective South African Domestic Partnerships 
Legislation” (2010) PELJ 238 238. See also B Coetzee Bester & A Lou “Domestic Partners 
and the ‘Choice Argument’: Quo Vadis?” (2014) 17 PELJ 2951 2952. 
6 N Noddings Women and Evil (1989); M Minow Making All the Difference: Exclusion, Inclusion 
and American Law (1990); C Gilligan In a Different Voice (1992); and CM Koggle Perspectives 
on Equality: Constructing a Relational Theory (1998). 
7 While there have been a number of relational feminist theories, one particularly important 
strand of work in this field constitutes the research undertaken by Carol Gilligan. In accordance 
with her research, she essentially identifies two distinctive methods of analysis in moral 
reasoning. The first is what she refers to as an “ethic of rights”. This approach is very much in 
accordance with traditional South African legal culture, in that it approaches problems through 
ranking priorities, the formation of rules and the abstract application of rules to facts. In sharp 
contrast to the ethic of rights approach, is the approach defined as an “ethic of care”, which 
analyses moral problems contextually, focusing on the particular rather than the abstract. This 
approach also recognises the importance and reality of social relationships involved in a legal 
dispute. Gilligan’s controversial claim was that these two ethics are gendered, in the sense 
that girls and women tend to adopt the ethic of care, while boys and men are more likely to 
reason in terms of rights. Her research is regarded as ground-breaking and controversial in 
that it specifically highlights the one-sided and gendered nature of traditional psychological 
research. The lived experiences and psychological reasoning adopted by women has 
therefore, been predominantly ignored within the field of psychology. The neglect of the 
specific experiences and perspectives of women has also been a characteristic of traditional 
legal systems. For example, through predominantly reflecting the ethic of rights approach, the 
liberal legal tradition has essentially ignored certain truths about the human condition and 
about social life in general, which has been to the detriment of modern societies. See C 
Gilligan In a Different Voice (1992) 5-23. 
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Jennifer Nedelsky. The primary reason for adopting her theory is that it recognises the 
role of relationships, both personal and institutional, in enabling cohabitants to 
exercise their rights in a manner that gives effect to constitutional values.8 In this 
regard, relational feminism focuses on how private law rules intersect with gendered 
dynamics to structure relations that either hinder or facilitate access to resources.9 
Nedelsky’s theory is transformative, as it examines how alternative interpretations of 
rights can structure more equitable relations. Given the reciprocal connection between 
constructive relationships and the capacity to exercise rights, these dynamics should 
inform interpretations of family law rules. Relational dynamics should, similarly, inform 
the formulation of state legislation and policy aimed at giving effect to the socio-
economic rights of cohabitants.  
While substantive equality, which is aimed at achieving equality of outcome, has 
certain similarities with a relational feminist approach, there are important distinctions 
that need to be illuminated. Under South African law, Cathi Albertyn has identified the 
elements of the judicial approach to substantive equality as requiring recognition of 
the social context, the impact of the discrimination on the complainant, a positive 
recognition of difference and the need to give effect to transformative constitutional 
values.10 The ultimate goal of substantive equality is to respond to discrimination in a 
manner that achieves equality of outcome. 
While substantive equality recognises the social context and the impact of 
discrimination in considering the choice argument, liberal individualism remains a 
dominant mode of thought within our equality jurisprudence. Calls for substantive 
equality have not therefore, shifted the liberal choice argument within South African 
jurisprudence, particularly in family law cases.  
Relational feminism however, calls for a paradigmatic shift whereby a relational 
analysis is more deeply integrated into everyday legal analysis and interpretation. For 
example, when examining the social context and impact in an equality case, a 
relational feminist analysis requires a relational lens to become central. A relational 
feminist lens shifts the focus towards how cohabiting men and women relate to one 
                                                          
8 Nedelsky Law’s Relations 87. 
9 S Chant “Re-thinking the Feminisation of Poverty in Regard to Aggregate Gender Indices 
(2006) 7 Journal of Human Development 201 205; and D Budlender “Women and Poverty” 
(2005) 64 Agenda 30 35. 
10 C Albertyn “Substantive Equality and Transformation in South Africa” (2007) 23 SAJHR 253 
253. 
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another and the socio-economic consequences of these patterns of relating. In doing 
so, a relational feminist approach fosters an expanded view of harm. For example, a 
relational feminist lens reveals how relations based on dominance and exploitation are 
intrinsically harmful to both cohabiting men and women and to society in general.11  
A relational feminist lens emphasises how relational dynamics either constrict or 
improve access to socio-economic resources between cohabiting men and women. If 
we are to take the socio-economic rights of cohabiting women seriously, we therefore 
need to undertake a more robust examination of gendered relations in family law. An 
expanded view of harm further recognises how gender and socio-economic well-being 
are deeply interconnected, particularly within family law. As gendered relations have 
socio-economic consequences, socio-economic rights need to be interpreted in a 
manner that addresses and transforms these relations. A relational feminist lens 
further enriches the examination of dignity in discrimination cases. For instance, 
without a relational understanding of dignity, the courts tend to adopt an individualistic 
approach to dignity and difference, which perpetuates a formalistic approach to 
equality.12  
Given the dominance of the choice argument and its negative impact, the 
constitutional values and rights implicated in cohabitation disputes are best analysed 
through a relational feminist lens. Relational feminism can thus be described as an 
institutional and transformative project aimed at finding a new language and new 
concepts to address relational dynamics in family law. From a relational feminist 
perspective, legal rules can either support or challenge exploitative patterns of relating 
within the family law sphere.  
With regard to relational feminism as applied to law, Nedelsky distinguishes 
between values and rights. In terms of her theory, rights are the rhetorical and 
institutional means to give effect to core values. Rights are best analysed in terms of 
whether they structure relations that give effect to values, such as equality, dignity and 
autonomy. With regard to our family law jurisprudence, the issue concerning the 
regulation of cohabitation is primarily constructed as equality versus autonomy.  
                                                          
11 Nedelsky Law’s Relations 26. 
12 C Barclay “Substantive Equality: A Feminist Critique of the notion of Difference in the 
Canadian and the South African Equality Test” (2001) 5 IJDL 167 188. 
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While the socio-economic rights have not been analysed in cases concerning 
cohabitation,13 they are frequently implicated. An example of this is provided when a 
female cohabitant is evicted by her partner when their relationship ends. A strictly 
private law lens, allows one to ignore her socio-economic rights, focusing on property 
law and autonomy. In this case, interpretations of her right of access to adequate 
housing should however, be examined. Her right of access to adequate housing 
should also be informed by an intention to structure constructive relations between 
cohabitants that foster autonomy and equality. A relational feminist lens emphasises 
the notion that socio-economic rights do not simply entail access to commodities. 
These rights play an important role in structuring more just and equitable inter-
personal and social relationships in our society. A relational feminist lens thus clarifies 
the debate and reveals the relational nature of access to adequate housing, health 
care services and social security, particularly in domestic partnerships. In this manner 
a relational feminist approach exposes a potential avenue for expanding relational 
access to socio-economic resources so as to give effect to constitutional values. In 
terms of this framework, Nedelsky sets out a four-step analysis, which is expanded 
upon below. 
A relational feminist framework allows for a wider range of relevant social, material 
and inter-personal issues to be considered when determining how to regulate 
domestic partnerships. It emphasises, for instance, the influence of gendered family 
roles in shaping both men and women’s choices.14 Relational feminism’s sensitivity to 
gendered relations also has the potential to shift private dynamics in a manner that 
empowers women to access the resources necessary to free their potential.15 
Various provisions in the South African Constitution are particularly compatible with 
a relational feminist approach to gender inequality and poverty,16 such as the 
                                                          
13 Examples of these cases include Volks and Butters v Mncora 2012 4 SA 1 (SCA); 2012 2 
All SA 485 (SCA) (“Butters”), which are discussed in detail in part 3 3 5 and part 3 5 3 of this 
study respectively. 
14 Nedelsky Law’s Relations 19. 
15 Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the “Constitution”).  
16 For example, in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC); 2004 
12 BCLR 1268 (CC) (“PE Municipality”), para 37, Justice Sachs (as he then was) specifically 
stated that: 
“The spirit of Ubuntu, part of the deep cultural heritage of the majority of the population, 
suffuses the whole constitutional order. It combines individual rights with a communitarian 
philosophy. It is a unifying motif of the Bill of Rights, which is nothing if not a structural, 
institutionalised and operational declaration in our evolving new society of the need for 
human interdependence, respect and concern.”  
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mechanism for the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights,17 the commitment to 
fostering substantive equality,18 and the inclusion of justiciable socio-economic 
rights.19 The Constitution is also committed to healing the divisions of the past and 
establishing a society based on non-sexism and fundamental human rights.20 
Collectively, these provisions justify examining whether the law structures relations 
that reflect the rights and values protected in the Bill of Rights.  
As a result of these progressive provisions, the transformative potential of the South 
African Constitution has been widely discussed and celebrated.21 While the exact 
meaning of transformation is contested, this study proceeds from the understanding 
that transformation entails a significant shift (both in terms of public and private 
relations) towards an egalitarian society premised on a more equitable division of 
resources.22 Given the constitutive power of the family, the constitutional goal to 
construct a “society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental 
human rights”23 should extend to the family law regime. In order to give effect to this 
social vision, greater attention needs to be paid to the current regulation of socio-
economic rights within the private sphere. In particular, the manner in which the family 
law regime structures socio-economic responsibility between cohabitants requires a 
relational feminist analysis. 
                                                          
17 S 8(1) of the Constitution states that the Bill of Rights applies to “all law”, while s 8(2) states 
that a provision in the Bill of Rights binds a natural or juristic person to the extent that it is 
applicable. 
18 S 9(2) of the Constitution provides that in order to “promote the achievement of equality, 
legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of 
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.” This provision has been held 
to entail a commitment to substantive equality and not formal equality. This was emphasised 
by Justice Sachs in the case of Volks with the statement that:  
“This Court has on numerous occasions stressed the importance of recognising patterns 
of systematic disadvantage in our society when endeavouring to achieve substantive and 
not just formal equality.” (Para 163). 
19 Socio-economic rights are specifically protected under ss 26, 27 and 28 of the Constitution. 
20 Preamble to the Constitution. 
21 P de Vos “Grootboom, the Right of Access to Housing and Substantive Equality as 
Contextual Fairness” (2001) 17 SAJHR 258 259; P Langa “Transformative Constitutionalism” 
(2006) 3 Stell LR 351 352; and C Albertyn & B Goldblatt “Equality in the Final Constitution” in 
S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (Original 
Service, June 2008) 35-1 35-5.   
22 Langa (2006) Stell LR 352; and Albertyn & Goldblatt “Equality” in Constitutional Law of 
South Africa 35-5.   
23 Preamble to the Constitution.  
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An innovative approach to interpreting the Constitution is further necessitated as 
South Africa is considered one of the most unequal countries in the world.24 The 
feminisation of socio-economic burdens has also deepened since democracy.25 In 
addition, the courts have not yet fully utilised the Constitution’s transformative 
potential, including its textual openness to a relational feminist approach, when 
deciding on family law issues. Following from this, it becomes necessary to analyse 
the possibility of developing a relational feminist framework to achieve the 
Constitution’s transformative vision, particularly in relation to domestic partnerships. 
This imperative is underscored by Karl Klare, who notes that the Constitution clearly 
intends to infuse the private sphere, particularly the market, the workplace and the 
family, with constitutional norms and values.26 This project of “constitutionalising”27 the 
family law regime is primarily meant to be achieved through the vehicles of sections 8 
and 39 of the Constitution.28 Given that relational feminism is consonant with the 
transformative aspirations of the South African Constitution, this chapter commences 
with a description of Nedelsky’s four-step analysis. Her four-step approach examines 
whether relevant legal rules structure relations based on constitutional values. The 
four-step process is utilised to scrutinise how rules interpreted through a liberal lens 
structure inequitable relations between cohabiting men and women. 
 
                                                          
24 South Africa has been described as one of the most unequal countries in the world. See F 
Wilson & V Cornell “Investing in People: Nurture, Education and Training” in F Wilson & V 
Cornell (eds) Guide to Carnegie 3: Strategies to Overcome Poverty and Inequality, 
Conference Report (2014) 68 <http://www.carnegie3.org.za/docs/Carnegie3_April13_ 
WEB.pdf> (accessed 15-08-2015); and National Planning Commission (NPC) Diagnostic 
Overview (2010) 8. Statistics South Africa (STATSSA) Poverty Trends in South Africa: An 
Examination of Absolute Poverty between 2006 and 2011 (2014) 12. For earlier data, see: 
The Presidency Towards a Fifteen Year Review (2008) 18 <www.info.gov.za/view/ 
DownloadFileAction?id=89475> (accessed 02-07-2015), which estimates that 47.99% of 
South Africa’s population lived below a poverty line of R 322,00 per month in 2005. 
25 Chant (2006) Journal of Human Development 206; and M Rogan Poverty and Headship in 
Post-apartheid South Africa 1997-2008 (2012) 2 ERSA <http://www.econrsa.org/system/ 
files/publications/ working_papers/wp288.pdf> (accessed 05-06-2015). See also National 
Development Agency (NDA) State of Poverty and its Manifestation in the Nine Provinces of 
South Africa (2014) <http://www.nda.org.za/docs/Research%20Report%2020State%20 
of%20poverty%20in%209%20provinces%20of%20SA.PDF> (accessed 05-06-2015). 
26 Klare (1998) SAJHR 150. 
27 D Bhana “The Development of a Basic Approach for the Constitutionalisation of our 
Common Law of Contract” (2015) 26 Stell LR 1 3. 
28 See part 2 7 of this chapter for a discussion of ss 8 and 39 of the Constitution. 
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2 3 Four-step analysis of relational feminism 
 
In accordance with Nedelsky’s relational feminist approach, the human subjects of 
law and politics are not best thought of as independent, freestanding individuals who 
simply require protection from one another.29 She accordingly rejects the formalistic 
“rights as boundaries”30 approach. Rather, interdependence and interaction are valued 
not only because people’s interests may collide, but because each individual is in basic 
ways constituted by a network of relationships.31 In terms of Nedelsky’s theory, legal 
rights such as socio-economic rights should be interpreted and implemented with this 
relational reality in mind. The application of Nedelsky’s relational feminist approach 
focuses on recognising the existing social and relational context. A value-sensitive 
approach to rights is also adopted, while sections 8 and 39 of the Constitution are 
employed to develop a relational conception of socio-economic responsibility between 
cohabitants. A relational feminist approach comprises four steps that are utilised to 
determine whether the legal regime structures equitable socio-economic relations 
between cohabitants in a manner that is consonant with constitutional values.  
The first step entails a context-sensitive examination of the rights dispute to 
determine how the law currently structures the relations that engender the specific 
problem.32 This first step is used in this chapter to analyse how the theoretical 
framework governing cohabitation exacerbates socio-economic vulnerability for 
female cohabitants. This aspect of Nedelsky’s approach resonates with the 
constitutional sections providing for the horizontal application of the Constitution. For 
example, section 8 of the Constitution, states that the rights in the Bill of Rights – which 
includes the socio-economic rights – now apply to all areas of law.33 Adopting a 
relational feminist lens emphasises the socio-economic consequences of terminated 
domestic partnerships. This first step is utilised to examine how certain aspects 
underlying traditional South African legal culture constrain the transformative potential 
of the Constitution. One example of this is the traditional public/private law divide, 
which obscures the importance of private dynamics in shaping women’s access to 
                                                          
29 Nedelsky Law’s Relations 19. 
30 19. 
31 Nedelsky Law’s Relations 19; and Pieterse (2009) SAJHR 198. 
32 Nedelsky Law’s Relations 19. 
33 S 8(1) of the Constitution. 
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resources. Liberal conceptions of this divide need to be transcended and the socio-
economic implications of terminated domestic partnerships need to be recognised. 
Recognising relational socio-economic vulnerability is also necessary in order to foster 
context-sensitive interpretations of socio-economic rights that respond to private 
gendered dynamics.34 Moreover, failing to scrutinise this underlying normative concept 
runs the risk of leaving private gendered abuses of power intact.35 Revealing how 
family law rules engender detrimental socio-economic consequences emphasises the 
need to fundamentally shift our mode of thinking about private socio-economic 
responsibilities.36  
The second aspect of Nedelsky’s approach entails establishing the particular 
competing values that are at stake in determining how to regulate cohabitation.37 This 
aspect also resonates with the horizontal commitments in the Constitution. For 
example, section 39 of the Constitution, provides that the courts must promote the 
values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom.38 This step is value-sensitive and counters the traditional formalistic 
conception of rights prevalent under a classic liberal lens.39 It recognises the potential 
of the values underlying socio-economic rights to inform the legal response to 
cohabitation to be more reflective of the specific needs of female cohabitants. This is 
necessary, as one of the policy arguments against regulating cohabitation is the 
protection of autonomy, but without taking into account the socio-economic conditions 
that ensure the meaningful exercise of choice in the circumstances of autonomy. 
Through setting out the specific values at stake, this element elucidates the norms that 
should guide the state’s regulation of cohabitation, in order to be more responsive to 
women’s specific needs. 
                                                          
34 Pieterse (2009) SAJHR 198. 
35 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 34. 
36 D Bhana “The Horizontal Application of the Bill of Rights: A Reconciliation of Sections 8 and 
39 of the Constitution” (2013) 29 SAJHR 351; and E Bonthuys “RH v DE: A Feminist Minority 
Judgment on Adultery” (2015) 31 SAJHR 379 381. 
37 Nedelsky Law’s Relations 74. 
38 S 39(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
39 S Liebenberg “Socio-Economic Rights Beyond the Public-Private Law Divide” in M Langford, 
B Cousins, J Dugard & T Madlingozi (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: Symbols 
or Substance? (2015) 63 64. 
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The third step of a relational feminist analysis considers the kinds of relationships 
that truly foster the constitutional values enumerated above.40 It entails interpersonal 
relations, as well as the broader social and legal relations existing between the state 
and cohabitants. This third step is utilised to emphasise the need to recognise and 
regulate private socio-economic responsibility between cohabitants. If gendered 
patterns of relating are learned within the family, it is necessary to examine the 
relational patterns that are being structured by family law rules. Enforcing private 
socio-economic responsibilities includes developing a legislative framework that 
regulates the socio-economic consequences of terminated domestic partnerships. A 
proactive response includes interpreting existing common law rules in a manner that 
protects the socio-economic rights of female cohabitants. Actively protecting the socio-
economic rights of cohabitant’s, stands in sharp contrast to the state’s current passive 
response.41 This third element of relational feminism calls for a shift from a liberal 
conception of individualism towards greater state responsibility for regulating the 
relational aspects of socio-economic rights between cohabitants.  
The fourth step is transformative in that it examines how sections 8 and 39 of the 
Constitution can be utilised in accordance with a relational feminist interpretation of 
socio-economic rights. This step focuses on applying a relational feminist 
interpretation of socio-economic rights to transform the socio-economic consequences 
of terminated domestic partnerships for vulnerable cohabitants. In doing so, relational 
feminism is responsive to the gendered patterns of disadvantage currently 
exacerbated by our family law regime. Relational feminism also focuses on how to 
utilise the law to transform gendered relations in accordance with the Bill of Rights. 
The emphasis of a relational feminist approach is on fostering socio-economic 
transformation through structuring constructive relations between cohabitants. 
After examining these four steps, this chapter concludes by highlighting key 
concepts that should inform the state’s development of accountability structures for 
regulating the socio-economic consequences of terminated domestic partnerships. 
Through an examination of this four-step approach, the constraining aspects 
underlying our traditional legal culture are explored.  
 
                                                          
40 Nedelsky Law’s Relations 74. 
41 E Bonthuys “Institutional Openness and Resistance to Feminist Arguments: The Example 
of the South African Constitutional Court” (2008) 20 CJWL/RFD 1 13-14.   
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2 4 A context sensitive approach 
 
2 4 1 Introduction 
 
The research on cohabitation reveals that there are a number of factors 
exacerbating the vulnerability of female cohabitants.42 These factors include extreme 
levels of poverty, gender inequality, the failure to value caring work, and elements of 
classic legal liberalism. The liberal conception of the public/private law divide, for 
instance, often prevents courts from engaging with existing dysfunctional gendered 
relations in family law cases. This liberal focus also inhibits the examination of the 
potential implications of socio-economic rights to transform the socio-economic 
consequences of family dissolution. The first step underlying a relational feminist 
framework entails a context-sensitive examination of how elements of classic 
liberalism provide an inadequate framework for responding to the relational socio-
economic needs of cohabiting women.43 As highlighted above, while substantive 
equality requires recognition of the existing social context, relational feminism, 
recognises an expanded relational conception of harm. Dysfunctional or exploitative 
patterns of relating between men and women are often learned in the family and 
transferred intergenerationally.44 If we are committed to fostering substantive gender 
equality and greater socio-economic equality, we need to take a closer look at how 
family law rules are structuring gendered relations within our society. The integral link 
between gender equality and socio-economic rights further justifies the need to 
                                                          
42 B Goldblatt “Regulating Domestic Partnerships: A Necessary Step in the Development of 
South African Family Law” (2003) 120 SALJ 610 611; B Meyersfeld “If you can See Look: 
Domestic Partnerships and the Law” (2010) 3 Constitutional Court Review 271 310; B 
Goldblatt, C Yose, & S Mills Cohabitation and Gender in the South African Context: 
Implications for Law Reform (2001) 1 (research report prepared by the Gender Research 
Project of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand); 
Bonthuys (2008) 13-14; and B Smith “The Dissolution of a Life or Domestic Partnership” in J 
Heaton (ed) The Law of Divorce and Dissolution of Life Partnerships in South Africa (2014) 
390-391. 
43 C Albertyn “Substantive Equality and Transformation in South Africa” (2007) 23 SAJHR 
253 253; and Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 317.   
44 D Nath (One in Nine Campaign) We were Never meant to Survive: Violence in the Lives of 
HIV Positive Women in South Africa (2012) 25 <http://www.oneinnine.org.za/58.page> 
(accessed 04-06-2012). 
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address the socio-economic implications of how men and women relate to one 
another.45 
The following section underscores the need to transcend the public/private law 
divide through a context-sensitive examination of the relational socio-economic 
consequences of terminated domestic partnerships.46 Deconstructing this divide is 
necessary, as private law rules currently exacerbate the socio-economic vulnerability 
experienced by female cohabitants.  
 
2 4 2 Deconstructing the public/private law divide 
 
Under classic liberalism, there is a tendency to deny the influence of state power in 
structuring inequitable private relations,47 resulting in a strict conceptual division 
between public and private law. When discussing this divide, it needs to be 
emphasised that this concept is both ambiguous and “socio-historically variable”.48 
This divide is also used to refer to different theoretical and empirical distinctions over 
time.49 A single dichotomous definition of the public/private law divide fails to express 
the full institutional complexity of this term. For purposes of a feminist critique of family 
                                                          
45 See para 1 1 1 of chapter 1 of this study, which discusses the interconnection between 
socio-economic rights and gender inequality. In the case of Government of the Republic of 
South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) (“Grootboom”), in 
para 23, Yacoob J pointed out that: 
“The realisation of these rights is also key to the advancement of race and gender equality.” 
46 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 317. 
47 Liebenberg “Socio-Economic Rights” in Symbols or Substance 62. 
48 J Weintraub & K Kumar (eds) Public and Private in Thought and Practice (1997) xiv. 
49 Weintraub and Kumar on page xi specifically highlight how: 
“[P]ublic and private have long served as key organising categories in social and political 
analysis, in legal practice and jurisprudence and in moral and political debates…While the 
relationship between the ‘public sector’ and ‘privatisation’ has become a prominent issue 
of economic policy and political debate, there has also been an intensified interest in the 
history and transformation of ‘private life’”. On page xii Weintraub & Kumar go on to state:  
“The public/private divide is not unitary but protean. It comprises, not a single paired 
opposition, but a complex family of them, neither mutually reducible nor wholly unrelated.” 
Following this, they discuss the four broad fields that have been identified under the 
public/private divide. The first field comprises the liberal-economic model, the second the civic 
perspective, the third as conceptualising the public realm as a sphere of fluid and 
polymorphous sociability. The fourth field comprises those tendencies in feminist scholarship 
that see the distinction between the family and the larger political order, with the market 
economy often becoming the paradigmatic public realm. Weintraub & Kumar therefore point 
out that a single dichotomous definition of the public/private divide fails to capture the 
institutional and cultural complexities of modern societies. See Weintraub & Kumar Public and 
Private xi & xii. 
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law, the domestic sphere and the market place are understood to comprise the private 
domain where theoretically free and autonomous individuals interact with one 
another.50 As the private sphere is where sexuality, reproduction and family life 
reside,51 women are associated with this sphere. In contrast, the public sphere is 
associated with activities such as politics and law, which have traditionally been 
dominated by men.  
Private institutions, such as the family, are regarded in liberal theory as the natural 
institutions for distributing social and economic resources.52 The generally accepted 
starting point of rights within the sphere of family law is primarily composed of property 
law and contract law rules. As a result of this private designation, the detrimental socio-
economic consequences of these rules are regarded as natural consequences of 
autonomy.53 One result of this liberal approach is that existing gendered imbalances 
are depoliticised and seen as unimportant peripheral aspects.54 One of the major 
paradigms in which human rights law is currently embedded is, therefore, the view that 
the main purpose of public law is to restrain state institutions from interfering in the 
private sphere.55 The human rights implications of this approach can, however, be 
severe for women.56  
As a result of the harm caused by this perceived division, there is a need for a shift 
in terms of how we respond to private socio-economic abuse and neglect. Relational 
feminism emphasises the need for the state to respond to gendered dynamics within 
family law. For example, family law rules currently result in women predominantly 
bearing the risk of life events such as disability, family dissolution and poverty.57 Given 
                                                          
50 SB Boyd “Introduction” in SB Boyd (ed) Challenging the Public/Private Law Divide: 
Feminism, Law and Public Policy (1997) 1 4; and Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 59. 
51 E Bonthuys “The Personal and the Judicial: Sex, Gender and Impartiality” (2008) 24 SAJHR 
239 240.  
52 Liebenberg “Socio-Economic Rights” in Symbols or Substance 64. 
53 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 317; and N Fraser “From Redistribution to Recognition: 
Dilemmas of Justice in a “Post-socialist” Age?” in N Fraser (ed) Justice Interruptus: Critical 
Reflections on the Post-Socialist Condition (1997) 11 20.   
54 Nedelsky Law’s Relations 19. 
55 A Cockrell “Can You Paradigm? Another Perspective on the Public/Private Law Divide” 
(1993) Acta Juridica 227 227; Liebenberg “Socio-Economic Rights” in Symbols or Substance 
64; and C Romany “Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in 
International Human Rights Law” (1993) 6 Harvard Human Rights Journal 87 89. 
56 R Copelon “Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture” 
(1994) 25 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 291 292; and Liebenberg “Socio-Economic 
Rights” in Symbols or Substance 63. 
57 A Alstott “Private Tragedies? Family Law as Social Insurance” (2009) 64 Harvard Law and 
Policy Review 1 26; E Bonthuys “Gender and Work” in E Bonthuys & C Albertyn (eds) Gender, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
35 
 
the particularly gendered nature of traditional family roles and their impact on socio-
economic well-being, the rules governing cohabitation often implicate constitutionally 
protected socio-economic rights.58 
A context-sensitive recognition of this socio-economic impact from a relational 
feminist perspective is important, as the infringement of socio-economic rights by 
family members should not be seen as arbitrary incidents detached from existing 
systems of gender oppression. Rather, these rights should be seen within the broader 
social context comprising the feminisation of poverty. Cohabiting women’s 
vulnerability to eviction intersects, for instance, with the broader social factors of 
familial abandonment and internalised notions of women’s traditional gender roles.59 
Recognition of these underlying dynamics is necessary in order to interpret and create 
laws that are responsive to this reality. The manner in which a relational feminist 
approach deconstructs the public/private law divide is thus valuable.  
A relational feminist approach reveals that it is public power (in the form of 
legislation or the lack thereof) and judicial interpretations of existing legal rules that 
creates, exacerbates and legitimates socio-economic responsibility or freedom 
between cohabitants.60 Family law rules can also legitimate or challenge gendered 
ideological paradigms that shape how men and women interact with one another. As 
an example of how rules can shape relations, Nedelsky explains that when countries 
provide decent maternity leave to both women and men, or well-funded child-care, 
they shape the families within them. Well-funded child care can also shape gendered 
relations between family members. Countries that value caring work also provide 
constructive models for other countries.61 It is thus possible to restructure relations 
that respect and protect nurturing work, while facilitating female caregiver’s equal 
participation within the public sphere.  
 Nedelsky expands on the relational power of law by stating that the common law 
has historically been informed by particular conceptions of fairness and freedom. 
These supposedly “neutral rules of the game” give advantages to some players over 
                                                          
Law and Justice (2007) 244 244-247; and Clark & Goldblatt “Gender and Family Law” in 
Gender, Law and Justice 205. 
58 See part 1 1 2 of chapter one of this study. 
59 Nath We Were Never Meant to Survive: Violence in the Lives of HIV Positive Women in 
South Africa (2012) 25. 
60 Liebenberg “Socio-Economic Rights” in Symbols or Substance 65. 
61 Nedelsky Law’s Relations 22. 
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others in systematic ways that are hard to ignore.62 These patterns of inequality are 
illustrated through the state’s enactment of family law legislation, which shapes and 
legitimates certain family forms, to the exclusion of others.63 The power of the state is 
further evinced by the fact that the failure to regulate cohabitation reinforces the 
marginalised position of women who are unable to gain access to resources through 
the usual market mechanisms.64 Focusing on the relations that are currently being 
structured by legal rules foregrounds the reality that the state already structures 
inequitable socio-economic relations between cohabitants.65 The legal regime also 
structures inequitable relations between different groups of women. An example of this 
is state legislation which recognises certain relationships, such as civil marriages, 
while excluding others, such as Muslim marriages and domestic partnerships. While 
a woman married according to the Marriage Act 25 of 1961, has certain automatic 
benefits, regardless of the length of her marriage, a woman who has lived in a long-
term domestic partnership has to approach a court to utilise private law mechanisms 
in an attempt to gain access to these benefits. In this manner the law is structuring 
hierarchical relations that offer different benefits to different groups. A relational 
feminist approach reveals, however, how rights “construct, reflect, or express 
relationships”.66  
In spite of its fallacy, the persistence of the public/private divide is evinced through 
the courts’ general reluctance to engage with the potential implications of the Bill of 
Rights in family law cases.67 While there have been judgments that have resulted in 
discernible positive change,68 a significant number of family law decisions have 
maintained a private law perspective, while failing to interrogate the socio-economic 
                                                          
62 J Nedelsky “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities” (1989) 1 Yale 
Journal of Law and Feminism 7 10. 
63 Liebenberg “Socio-Economic Rights” in Symbols or Substance 65. 
64 Liebenberg “Socio-Economic Rights” in Symbols or Substance 57; Meyersfeld (2010) 
Constitutional Court Review 310; and Alliance for the Legal Recognition of Domestic 
Partnerships (ALRDP) Submission to the Department of Home Affairs (2008) 3. 
65 Nedelsky Law’s Relations 238.  
66 Nedelsky Law’s Relations 208. 
67 E Bonthuys “The South African Bill of Rights and the Development of Family Law” (2002) 
119 SALJ 748 748. For an in-depth discussion of these cases, see part 3 3 of chapter three 
of this study. 
68 This is evinced by the judgment of Butters, where the Supreme Court of Appeal extended 
the application of the tacit universal partnership to cohabitants. This case is discussed in part 
3 3 5 of chapter 3 of this study. 
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implications of relevant private law rules.69 This private law lens prevents the judiciary 
and the legislature from engaging with the potential power of constitutional rights to 
dislodge many of the underlying causes of gender inequality.70 It also undermines the 
constitutional provision that the Bill of Rights applies to all law.71  
The influence of the public/private law divide is further evident in the development 
of theories relating to the enforcement of socio-economic rights. For example, the 
focus has traditionally been on developing “state-centred theories” for measuring 
compliance with these rights.72 This is demonstrated through a discussion of the 
ground-breaking case of Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 
(“Grootboom”),73 where the Constitutional Court adopted a reasonableness model of 
review to assess whether the state complied with its positive duties in terms of section 
26(2) of the Constitution. In accordance with this model of review, a court examines 
whether a government programme is flexible, coherent, comprehensive and capable 
of effectively realising a particular socio-economic right.74 One particularly important 
factor that a court considers is the degree to which provision has been made for the 
most vulnerable members of society.75 In the Grootboom case, the Court also pointed 
out that section 26 of the Constitution is concerned with ensuring a more equitable 
distribution of land in general.76  
Despite the celebrated judgment of Grootboom, the case has been criticised for 
reinforcing the public/private law divide. This is evinced by the Court’s statement that 
the primary obligations imposed by section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution, which provides 
every child with the right to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and 
                                                          
69 For example, the case of Volks NO v Robinson 2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC) (“Volks”) has been 
criticised for the Constitutional Court’s limited recognition of the reality that the structural 
dependence of women in such relationships often leaves them destitute. This judgment further 
reinforces a formalistic conception of choice and equality that was detrimental to vulnerable 
members of families. See part 3 3 5 of chapter three of this study. 
70  Albertyn (2007) SAJHR 254. 
71 S 8(1) of the Constitution. 
72 Pieterse (2009) SAJHR 198. 
73 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC). 
74 Para 44. 
75 Para 44. 
76 In Grootboom, in para 93, Yacoob J pointed out that: 
“The state must also foster conditions to enable citizens to gain access to land on an 
equitable basis.”  
See also, S Liebenberg “Towards an Equality-Promoting Interpretation of Socio-economic 
Rights in South Africa: Insights from the Egalitarian Liberal Tradition” (2015) 132 SALJ 411-
437; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 205; Liebenberg & Goldblatt (2007) SAJHR 335; and 
De Vos (2001) SAJHR 259. 
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social services, rests upon the parents. The Court cautioned that a finding that this 
obligation rested on the state could create the dangerous situation of children being 
used as “stepping stones” by their parents to gain access to housing.77 The Court held 
that children have the right to parental care first and only have a right to access 
alternative state assistance when parental care is absent.78 This finding by the Court 
entrenches a limited perception of the state’s duty to intervene within the private 
sphere when human rights are violated.79 This is a dangerous line of reasoning, as 
individuals within the private sphere are also capable of limiting access to socio-
economic resources. The exercise of power, whether public or private, is furthermore, 
now subject to the Constitution. In the subsequent decision of Minister of Health v 
Treatment Action Campaign (“TAC”),80 the Court did qualify the reasoning in 
Grootboom concerning section 28 of the Constitution. In TAC, the Court held that the 
state is required to ensure that children are accorded the protection contemplated by 
section 28, where parental or family care is present but lacking.81 While the primary 
obligation to give effect to socio-economic rights remains on the state, it is however, 
also under a duty to develop and regulate private socio-economic responsibilities. 
Despite the positive developments emanating from Grootboom, as well as the 
positive outcome of TAC,82 certain socio-economic rights decisions have been 
criticised for emphasising procedural criteria, in contrast to the substantive values and 
interests that socio-economic rights are intended to protect.83 Socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence has further been criticised for failing to address private gendered 
                                                          
77 Grootboom para 71. 
78 Para 77. 
79  C Mbazira & J Sloth-Nielsen “Incy-wincy Spider Went Climbing Up Again- Prospects for 
Constitutional (Re)interpretation of Section 28(1)(c) of the South African Constitution in the 
Next Decade of Democracy (2007) 2 Speculum Juris 147 152. Sloth-Nielsen J “The Child's 
Right to Social Services, the Right to Social Security, and Primary Prevention of Child 
Abuse: Some Conclusions in the Aftermath of Grootboom” (2001) 17 SAJHR 210-232. 
80 (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) (“TAC”). In TAC, the Constitutional Court found that the State’s 
limited and inflexible provision of Nevirapine to public hospitals did not comply with its 
obligations under ss 27(1) and 27(2) of the Constitution and made both declaratory and 
mandatory orders against the government. 
81 TAC, paras 78 & 79. The Court held that even where parental care is present, if the children 
are cared for by parents who are destitute, or unable to provide this care, then the children 
are entitled to state assistance. 
82 See footnote 80 above. 
83 D Brand “What are Socio-Economic Rights For?”’ in H Botha, A van der Walt & J van der 
Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2004) 33 36; M Pieterse 
“Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights” (2004) 20 SAJHR 
383 410; and Liebenberg Socio-economic Rights 175-176.   
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barriers to accessing these rights. As emphasised by Albertyn, “poverty is always, 
also, a matter of gender inequality”.84  
The jurisprudence on socio-economic rights has paid insufficient attention to the 
socio-economic implications of gender inequality. In order to be more responsive to 
gendered relations, private law rules need to be interpreted in accordance with 
constitutionally entrenched socio-economic rights, particularly where private entities 
deprive people of existing access to socio-economic resources.85 While section 26(3) 
of the Constitution,86 has catalysed the introduction of legislation which altered the 
common law governing evictions,87 certain areas of private law still require 
development. In particular, there has been an insufficient focus on the need to develop 
private law rules governing the dissolution of domestic partnerships, in accordance 
with socio-economic rights. 
The need to further develop private law rules is evinced by the fact that the abuse 
of private power can have serious human rights consequences. For example, parents 
can deny their children access to essential resources, such as food and water. 
Entrepreneurs can also set the price of necessities to ensure a greater profit for 
themselves, while denying poorer members of society access to essential goods.88 
                                                          
84 C Albertyn “Gendered Transformation in South African Jurisprudence: Poor Women and 
the Constitutional Court” (2012) 22 Stell LR 591 600; and L Chenwi & K McLean “A Woman’s 
Home is her Castle? Poor Women and Housing Inadequacy in South Africa” in B Goldblatt 
and K McLean (eds) Women’s Social and Economic Rights (2011) 105 110. 
85 Liebenberg “Socio-Economic Rights” in Symbols or Substance 71; and Pieterse (2009) 
SAJHR 198. 
86 Section 26(3) provides that:  
“No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order 
of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit 
arbitrary evictions. 
87 For example, s 1(xi) read with s 2 of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE), provides that PIE applies to unlawful occupiers in 
respect of all land in South Africa. There has also been jurisprudence which has developed 
the common law rules pertaining to evictions in accordance with the Constitution. For example, 
in Ross v South Peninsula Municipality 2000 1 SA 589 (C), on page 595G, the Western Cape 
High Court held that s 26(3) of the Constitution altered the common law by providing the courts 
with an equitable discretion to determine who bears the onus in an ejectment application. In 
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC); 2004 12 BCLR 1268 
(CC) (“Port Elizabeth”) concerned an eviction application by the Port Elizabeth municipality 
against 68 occupiers. This judgment confirmed that occupiers are the bearers of constitutional 
rights that confers on them procedural and substantive protections in the context of evictions. 
See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 277. 
88 Liebenberg “Socio-Economic Rights” in Symbols or Substance 71.  
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Given the socio-economic implications of traditional gendered family roles,89 socio-
economic rights are particularly important for the development of family law in South 
Africa.  
With regard to cohabitants, caregiving partners are often forced to sacrifice their 
equal participation in the labour market to allow their partner the freedom to pursue 
their vocation. This results in the majority of family assets being registered in the name 
of the working partner. Consequently, cohabitants who accumulate property are able 
to invoke their property rights to evict their partner upon the termination of their 
relationship. This eviction has implications for the caregiver’s right of access to 
adequate housing, as well as section 26(3) of the Constitution. This reveals that in 
order to give effect to the right of access to adequate housing, section 26 of the 
Constitution needs to be interpreted in a manner that transcends traditional 
conceptions of the public/private law divide.90 Sensitivity to the gendered dynamics 
implicating this right may also require the development of applicable common law rules 
or legislative provisions. This is explored in detail in chapter five of this study. 
The legal rules governing cohabitation need to be examined to ascertain the extent 
to which they entrench inadequate state responsibility for private human rights 
violations. This is vital, as leaving these rules intact undermines the horizontal 
commitments within the Bill of Rights.91 It has been pointed out that perceiving existing 
inequitable distributions of resources as “natural” is a dangerous line of reasoning,92 
given South Africa’s excessive levels of domestic violence93 and poverty.94 It is thus 
imperative that the state undertakes a more proactive human rights-based approach 
to regulating domestic partnerships.  
                                                          
89 Nath We were Never meant to Survive (2012) 23; and R Kaddaria & MA Freeman “Economic 
Consequences of Marriage and its Dissolution: Applying a Universal Equality Norm in a 
Fragmented Universe” (2012) 13 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 323 323. 
90 S 26(1) of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to have access to adequate 
housing. 
91 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 340-341. 
92 FE Olsen “The Myth of State Intervention in the Family (1984) 18 University of Michigan 
Journal of Law Reform 835 836. 
93 N Abrahams, S Mathews, R Jewkes, LJ Martin & C Lombard Every Eight Hours: Intimate 
Femicide in South Africa 10 Years Later! (2012) 5 Medical Research Council Policy Brief, 
available at <http://www.mrc.ac.za/policybriefs/everyeighthours.pdf> (accessed 06-06-2014). 
94 Stats SA Poverty Trends in South Africa: An examination of absolute poverty between 2006 
and 2011 (2014) 12; see also JP Landman, H Bhorat, C van Aardt & S van der Berg Breaking 
the Grip of Poverty and Inequality in South Africa 2004 – 2014 (2003) 1 
<http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000649/index.php> (accessed 20-04-2012). 
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The first step of a relational feminist approach reveals that the failure to scrutinise 
the socio-economic implications of relevant private law rules exacerbates socio-
economic inequality between cohabitants. One reason for failing to engage with the 
socio-economic implications of private relationships is the judicial tendency to neglect 
sections 8 and 39 of the Constitution. While both these provisions have been ignored 
in family law cases concerning cohabitants, section 39 has been given some measure 
of consideration. The first step under a relational feminist approach thus underscores 
the need for more robust engagement with the socio-economic rights of female 
cohabitants. The potential role of sections 8 and 39 of the Constitution in transforming 
the rules governing cohabitation, is explored later in detail in part 2 7 of this chapter. 
 
2 4 3 Conclusion 
 
Given that the legal system already structures relational access to socio-economic 
resources, a context-sensitive relational feminist response to the socio-economic 
implications of cohabitation is required. This is necessary to develop responsive 
accountability measures for enforcing socio-economic duties between cohabitants. A 
relational feminist lens that is sensitive to the existing relational social context is 
valuable, as it fosters a more compassionate response to the socio-economic plight of 
female cohabitants.95  
While the exact nature and scope of private socio-economic responsibilities is not 
yet clear, this section emphasises the detrimental impact of failing to address the 
socio-economic rights of female cohabitants. When developing accountability 
structures, or when interpreting legal rules, it needs to be kept in mind that cohabitants 
are predominantly a socio-economically vulnerable group. The status of cohabitants 
is currently governed by private law rules, which were not formulated to protect socio-
economic rights. Collectively, these factors highlight that, to protect and fulfil the socio-
economic rights of cohabitants, both the courts and the legislature need to undertake 
a more proactive regulatory role in ensuring that cohabitants take steps to protect and 
promote the socio-economic rights of their partners.  
The above discussion of the first step of Nedelsky’s approach reveals that the failure 
to recognise and interpret socio-economic rights in a relational feminist manner 
                                                          
95 Nedelsky Law’s Relations 223. 
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exacerbates the feminisation of poverty, particularly for cohabitants. The second step 
entails investigating the constitutional values at stake when deciding how to regulate 
cohabitation. In determining how to regulate the socio-economic consequences of 
terminated domestic partnerships, the courts and the legislature must consider these 
values. Existing common law rules and legislation affecting cohabitants should also 
be evaluated to determine whether they are structuring relations that give effect to 
constitutional values.  
An evaluation of the implicated values is necessitated by the reliance on the choice 
argument for failing to regulate cohabitation. This choice argument is problematic, as 
it prioritises the value of freedom, while failing to protect the material aspects 
underlying the values of freedom, dignity and equality for female cohabitants. The 
values at stake are thus examined in order to counter the abstract conception of rights 
prevalent under classic liberalism. The values and norms protected under socio-
economic rights are examined in the following section. 
 
2 5 A value-sensitive approach: Countering an abstract conception of rights   
 
2 5 1 Introduction 
 
Under classic liberalism, rights are perceived as having an objective and fixed 
meaning.96 The result of this approach is that private law rules are abstracted from 
their existing social context, as well as the detrimental human rights consequences 
flowing from their enforcement.97 While there are certain trends under liberalism that 
address the existing social context,98 the jurisprudence on family law reveals a 
predominantly abstract, private law focus.99 Ignoring the values and purposes 
                                                          
96 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 59. 
97 59. 
98 An example of this is the human capabilities approach as developed by Amartya Sen and 
Martha Nussbaum. This theory considers the extent to which human beings are able to be, do 
and have what they have reason to value, and the degree to which material deprivation hinders 
such freedom. See A Sen “Human Rights and Capabilities” (2005) 6 Journal of Human 
Development 151 152; and M Nussbaum “Introduction: Feminism and International Law” in 
Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (2000) 1 2. See also S Van 
der Berg A Capabilities Approach to the Judicial Review of Resource Allocation Decisions 
Impacting on Socio-economic Rights LLD dissertation Stellenbosch (2015). 
99 Bonthuys (2015) SAJHR 380. See the discussion on South African family law jurisprudence 
under part 3 3 of this study. 
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underlying rights is problematic, as it tends to promote formal rather than substantive 
justice, particularly for vulnerable groups. When a cohabitant evicts his partner upon 
the termination of a long-term relationship, for instance, this abstract approach permits 
us to avoid thinking about the connection between her socio-economic plight and his 
private law privilege.100  
Due to the gendered disadvantage perpetuated by this liberal response, family law 
rules require development, particularly in terms of sections 8 and 39 of the 
Constitution. While sections 8 and 39(2) are discussed in detail in part 2 7 of this 
chapter, it is important to highlight that section 39(2) enjoins the courts to develop 
interpretations of the Bill of Rights that promote the values of human dignity, equality 
and freedom.101 While these values are specifically listed in the Constitution, they are 
not the only values associated with socio-economic rights. The values of Ubuntu, 
democracy, accountability, responsiveness, care and openness all represent 
important dimensions of socio-economic rights.102 It has also been pointed out that the 
South African Constitution illustrates a decisive commitment to establishing a “caring 
and aspirationally egalitarian ethos”.103  
This project of examining the specific values at stake when protecting the socio-
economic rights of female cohabitants is necessary to give effect to the underlying 
purposes informing these rights.104 In accordance with this goal, one of the broader 
purposes underlying socio-economic rights is the state’s responsibility to progressively 
improve access to these resources.105 The positive duty to give effect to socio-
economic rights should shape interpretations of private socio-economic obligations. 
Analysing the values at stake for cohabitants has the potential to highlight the 
contested meanings of rights, while bringing their philosophical dimensions to the 
forefront.106 Examining these values also reveals that litigation is a process of 
deliberation,107 while fostering a participatory dialogue on the interaction between 
                                                          
100 Nedelsky Law’s Relations 223. 
101 S 39(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
102 Liebenberg (2008) Acta Juridica 160. 
103 S v Makwanyane 1995 2 SACR 1; 1995 6 BCLR 665; 1995 ZACC (“Makwanyane”), para 
262. 
104 Liebenberg “Socio-Economic Rights” in Symbols or Substance 64.  
105 70.  
106 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 44. 
107 C Albertyn “Religion, Custom and Gender: Marital Law Reform in South Africa Family law” 
(2013) 9 International Journal of Law in Context 386 387. 
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theoretical understandings of rights and the lived realities of cohabitants.108 
Highlighting the values at stake, further forces the courts to focus in a more principled 
and systematic way on the values implicated in a particular case and the impact of the 
denial of socio-economic rights on cohabiting women.109  
When determining whether a right requires restraint or positive action, or a 
combination of these actions, one should not depend on an abstract analysis of the 
essential nature of the relevant right and the duties it imposes.110 Instead, what is 
required is a contextual evaluation of the measures required to generate outcomes 
consonant with the values and interests promoted by the Bill of Rights. An in-depth 
examination of the underlying values is similarly important to guard against 
interpretations of socio-economic rights that run counter to the values that inform our 
constitutional order.111 While all of the values referred to above are integral, given the 
state’s reliance on a negative conception of autonomy to justify leaving domestic 
partnerships unregulated, this section first focuses on the need to develop a 
substantive conception of freedom. 
 
2 5 2 Developing a substantive conception of autonomy 
 
The family law regime’s primary focus on form over function often deprives 
vulnerable cohabitants of access to integral socio-economic resources.112 When this 
occurs, the freedom of cohabitants to shape their lives, their socio-economic well-
being and that of their families, is compromised. It is necessary to reconceive socio-
economic obligations between cohabiting partners as enforceable in certain instances. 
In order to give effect to socio-economic rights, strict interpretations of common law 
rules relating to contractual autonomy, jurisdiction and precedent will sometimes need 
to be relaxed or developed.113 
                                                          
108 387. 
109 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 165. 
110 59. 
111 S Woolman “The Amazing, Vanishing Bill of Rights” (2007) 124 SALJ 762 763. 
112 This reference to form over function refers to the tendency to predominantly focus on 
whether strict formalities have been adhered to (such as the formalities pertaining to the 
registration of customary marriages). In contrast to this, the functional approach to families 
emphasises the need to focus on the nature of the relationship. See the judgment of Mokgoro 
and O’Regan JJ in Volks, paras 106-108. 
113 E Bonthuys “Realising South Africa’s Children’s Basic Socio-Economic Rights” (2008) 22 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 333 333. 
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Despite the negative impact of failing to regulate cohabitation, this non-recognition 
is primarily justified on the basis of a liberal conception of autonomy.114 To allow the 
law to intervene and attach consequences to domestic partnerships is perceived as 
legal paternalism and an infringement on the freedom of cohabitants.115 This approach 
is premised on a particularly negative conception of autonomy, which is criticised.116 
One criticism for maintaining this negative notion of autonomy is that it is not 
conducive to fostering the substantial social change required under our transformative 
Constitution.117 Adopting a negative interpretation of choice also resonates with the 
liberal tendency to distinguish between positive and negative rights. This distinction 
influenced the neglect of socio-economic rights in family law, with freedom and 
equality traditionally seen as negative rights requiring abstention from specific 
behaviour.118 In contrast, socio-economic claims are seen as positive rights, 
necessarily entailing the allocation of resources, and thus as inappropriate decisions 
for courts to make. This liberal assumption is, however, inaccurate as civil and political 
rights (such as the right to equality and the right to vote) do have resource implications. 
This is illustrated by the fact that the right to vote necessarily requires resources, such 
as personnel needed to set up and run voting stations, in order to be realised.119 In 
addition, the neglect of socio-economic rights undermines the enjoyment of civil and 
political rights, particularly for vulnerable groups. This is illustrated by the reality that 
substantive gender equality requires abused women to have access to adequate 
health care services.120 In order to transform our society to allow each person the 
opportunity to lead a full and dignified human life, the state needs to undertake a range 
of interconnected social, economic and political steps. 
                                                          
114 B Coetzee Bester & A Lou “Domestic Partners and the Choice Argument: Quo Vadis?” 
(2014) 17 PELJ 2951 2958. 
115 Goldblatt (2003) SALJ 615. 
116 See for example, D Bilchitz & M Judge “For Whom does the Bell Toll: The Challenges and 
Possibilities of the Civil Union Act for Family Law in South Africa” (2007) SAJHR 466-499; H 
Kruuse “‘Here’s to you, Mrs Robinson’: Peculiarities in Determining the Treatment of Domestic 
Partnerships” (2009) 25 SAJHR 380 385; and J Heaton “Striving for Substantive Gender 
Equality in Family Law: Selected Issues” (2005) 21 SAJHR 547 552. 
117 Klare (1998) SAJHR 150. 
118 Fredman (2007) SAJHR 217. 
119 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 318. 
120 T Bannister The Right to have Access to Health Care Services for Survivors of Gender-
based Violence (2012) LLM Thesis, University of Stellenbosch 172. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
46 
 
A negative conception of autonomy is problematic, as it ignores the fact that it is the 
state’s duty to protect vulnerable and weak members of our society.121 While each 
person should be held responsible for optimising their available options, this should 
be balanced with the state’s positive duty to develop accountability structures for 
reinforcing private socio-economic responsibilities. In relation to caregiving work, a 
relational feminist approach emphasises the substantial difference between choosing 
to “do nothing” and undertaking the caring work in a relationship so that a partner can 
participate in the labour market.122 A negative conception of autonomy undervalues 
the importance of caring work and the impact it has on the capacity to exercise rights 
on an equitable basis. Robin West argues that when it comes to caregivers, they do 
not require rights that falsely presuppose their autonomy and independence. Rather, 
they require rights that realistically acknowledge their relational reality, while effectively 
responding to it.123 
The approach of perceiving legal subjects as simply free atomistic individuals is 
also based on a faulty assumption. As articulated by Beth Goldblatt, gender inequality 
specifically prevents women from freely and equally setting the terms of their 
relationships.124 It is precisely because less powerful parties (which are predominantly 
women) are unable to persuade their partner to enter into a contract, or to register 
their relationship, that they require state assistance.125 A negative conception of 
autonomy also often promotes the stereotypical idea that the poor are lazy, dishonest 
and incompetent.126 It further reinforces a discourse that denies the social complicity 
involved in structuring inequality. This stereotyping is detrimental to the constitutional 
project of aiming to transform our society. 
                                                          
121 Goldblatt (2003) SALJ 616. 
122 Heaton (2005) SAJHR 552. 
123 R West “Rights, Capabilities and the Good Society” (2001) 69 Fordham LR 1901 1913. 
124 Goldblatt (2003) SALJ 616. 
125 616. 
126 See T Ross “The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, our Helplessness” (1991) 79 The 
Georgetown Law Journal 1499 1522, where he discusses the rhetoric of poverty in the context 
of American jurisprudence. See also B Goldblatt “The Right to Social Security- Addressing 
Women’s Poverty and Disadvantage” (2009) 25 SAJHR 442 464, where she discussed the 
stereotypes facing young women accessing social grants in South Africa:  
“Many young women are also said to be taking the grant money for themselves and leaving 
their children in the care of grandparents and others. This is a common discourse 
internationally where welfare mothers are labelled as scroungers and undeserving of state 
support.” 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
47 
 
The point of departure is, therefore, that the legal focus should not be exclusively 
centred on protecting a negative conception of autonomy. Instead, legal rules should 
be shaped to recognise underlying gender dynamics and how they shape women’s 
choices. In accordance with a transformative constitutional conception of autonomy, 
the role of the law is to open up avenues for cohabitants to exercise their freedom in 
ways that improve the quality of their lives.  
The argument that choosing not to enter into a civil marriage is an indication that 
cohabitants elected to have zero state regulation over their relationship is inaccurate. 
One reason for this inaccuracy is that choosing to avoid a traditional civil marriage 
does not sufficiently indicate the choice to be exploited or left destitute upon the 
termination of a relationship.127 The choice argument can also be countered by the 
point that sharing socio-economic resources during a relationship illustrates an 
acceptance of a certain level of socio-economic responsibility.  
This liberal conception of autonomy has been criticised, particularly in terms of the 
manner in which it predominantly protects the freedom and autonomy of powerful 
family members.128 Research on cohabitation reveals, for instance that partners who 
choose to stay at home or to subordinate their career for their families very rarely make 
that choice entirely freely. Jacqueline Heaton notes that in the majority of relationships, 
decisions on employment, role divisions and domestic and family-care responsibilities 
are based on social expectations, the partner’s stronger economic position and what 
                                                          
127 In the case of Gundwana v Steko Development CC and Others 2011 3 SA 608 (CC); 2011 
8 BCLR 792 (CC), the Constitutional Court criticised the bank’s argument that obtaining a 
mortgage bond from the Bank indicated that the applicant had waived her right of access to 
adequate housing. The Court pointed out in paragraph 44 that: 
“The voluntary placing at risk argument runs into difficulty. It is true that a mortgagor willingly 
provides her immovable property as security for the loan she obtains from the mortgagee 
and that she thereby accepts that the property may be executed upon in order to obtain 
satisfaction of the debt. But does that particular willingness imply that she accepts that 
(a) the mortgage debt may be enforced without court sanction;  
(b) she has waived her right to have access to adequate housing or eviction only under 
court sanction under section 26(1) and (3); and 
(c) the mortgagee is entitled to enforce performance, in the form of execution, even when 
that enforcement is done in bad faith? 
I think not.”  
The Court goes on to argue in para 46, that agreeing to a mortgage bond, without more, does 
not entail agreeing to forfeit one’s protection under section 26(1) and (3) of the Constitution. 
A cohabitant agreeing to live in a domestic partnership, without more, does not therefore 
necessarily entail agreeing to forfeit the protection provided by the rights protected in the 
Constitution, including socio-economic rights. 
128 C Lind “Domestic Partnership and Marital Status Discrimination” (2005) Acta Juridica 
108 123; and Coetzee Bester & Lou (2014) PELJ 2957. 
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is perceived to be best for the collective family unit.129 They are not purely autonomous 
decisions dictated by self-interest, as would be the case in most commercial decisions. 
It is thus patently unfair to visit the socio-economic disadvantages of these decisions 
disproportionately on caregivers (who are predominantly women).130 In addition, a 
more equitable division of family resources has been shown to enhance the 
independence and freedom of vulnerable family members.131 It is thus important to 
question exactly whose freedom is being prioritised and protected. 
A relational feminist conception of substantive autonomy necessarily recognises 
that fostering autonomy requires both restraint and positive interventions. Both actions 
are needed in order to facilitate the ability of all people to exercise their agency, make 
choices and pursue their life plans.132 It is thus necessary to examine, within a 
particular political, economic, social and cultural context, which social relationships 
enhance rather than undermine people’s capacity for self-determination.133 Finally, a 
commitment to fostering the substantive autonomy of female cohabitants requires 
putting in place a range of measures that enable meaningful participation in decisions 
that affect their lives. In South Africa, the value of autonomy cannot neglect the 
material conditions on which the experience of autonomy depends. However, these 
material resources need to be extended in a manner that acknowledges a “real and 
enduring tension between the individual and the collective”.134 Nedelsky expands upon 
this complexity by pointing out that people desire to enjoy both independence and 
intimacy,135 and that any good political system will effectively strive to recognise this 
tension.136 
Recognising and responding to this relational aspect of autonomy is essential, as 
choosing to leave cohabiting women and children unprotected undermines their 
capacity to exercise a number of their other human rights. This is emphasised by 
research which reveals that women’s poverty reinforces their social subordination, 
                                                          
129 Heaton (2005) SAJHR 552. 
130 552. 
131 M Makwane & L Berry “Towards the Development of a Family Policy for South Africa”                    
(2013) Human Sciences Research Council Policy Brief 4 <http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/ 
page Content/3337/2013febFamily%20Policy.pdf> (accessed 24-07-2013). 
132 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 319; and Nedelsky (2009) AJ 149-176. 
133 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 160. 
134 Nedelsky Law’s Relations 131. 
135 157. 
136 Nedelsky (1989) Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 21; and Nedelsky Law’s Relations 131. 
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making them vulnerable to violence and exploitation.137 It is accordingly necessary to 
acknowledge the relational nature of autonomy, as well as the interrelationship 
between individual and communal socio-economic welfare in protecting human 
agency. Mokgoro J specifically underscored this need in Khosa, where she wrote that: 
 
“Sharing responsibility for the problems and consequences of poverty equally as a 
community represents the extent to which wealthier members of the community view the 
minimal well-being of the poor as connected with their personal well-being and the well-
being of the community as a whole. In other words, decisions about the allocation of public 
benefits represent the extent to which poor people are treated as equal members of 
society.”138 
 
Decisions about how private law rules structure cohabiting women’s access to 
socio-economic resources reflect the extent to which we take their constitutional rights 
seriously.139 The traditional tendency to favour negative responsibilities over positive 
duties, when it comes to human rights, fails to recognise that policy choices are made 
when judges and law-makers decide to protect only negative liberties. These policy 
choices should, however, be informed by the values and ethos underlying our 
Constitution. 
A negative approach to autonomy fails to respond to the claims of those who lack 
the resources needed to participate in our society as equals. Characterising rights as 
inherently negative or positive is problematic, as it ignores the potential need for 
positive measures, often from more than one actor.140 A commitment to developing a 
substantive understanding of autonomy is consequently required when regulating 
cohabitation, as it recognises the need for a balanced approach between restraint and 
positive social interventions to allow people to exercise their agency.141  
In seeking to develop a substantive conception of autonomy, a context-sensitive 
approach should be adopted in determining the exact scope and content of private 
socio-economic responsibilities. Regulating cohabitation to allow both partners the 
                                                          
137 International Federation for Human Rights (IFHR) Montreal Principles on Women’s 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2002) 2. 
138 Khosa para 74.   
139 Liebenberg (2008) Acta Juridica 160. 
140 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 56. 
141 319. 
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freedom to direct their lives is closely interconnected to the need to protect the human 
dignity of both cohabitants, a value that similarly requires further consideration. 
 
2 5 3 Developing a relational conception of human dignity 
 
The South African Constitutional Court has specifically recognised that those who 
have no access to food, clothing or shelter are denied the value of human dignity.142 
In Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs (“Dawood”),143 the Court held that human dignity 
is a value that “informs the interpretation of many, possibly all, other rights”.144 It also 
held that the right to family life is a crucial component of the right to human dignity. 
The concept of Ubuntu resonates with this reasoning in that “our humanity is forged 
and moulded by our relationships with others”,145 with the implication that these 
relationships are worthy of both social and legal protection.146 The Constitutional Court 
has also affirmed the important relationship between dignity and social assistance.147  
Human dignity is therefore of particular constitutional significance in our post-
constitutional family law system. The value of human dignity is subsequently examined 
in terms of its capacity to enrich our understanding of the need to develop family law 
rules to protect and fulfil the socio-economic rights of female cohabitants. This value 
should guide the development of legislative and policy interventions aimed at 
regulating cohabitation. This is important, as human dignity in the context of family law 
seeks to reject stereotypes attached to difference, while balancing exploitative 
gendered hierarchies.148 
                                                          
142 Grootboom para 23.   
143 2000 3 SA 936 (CC); 2000 8 BCLR 8 37 (CC). 
144 Para 35. 
145 Dawood para 35. 
146 Bonthuys (2015) SAJHR 394. 
147 Khosa para 74. See also A Chaskalson, “Human Dignity as a Foundational Value for Our 
Constitutional Order” (200) 16 SAJHR 193 204, where former Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson 
stated that: 
“[T]he social and economic rights . . . are rooted in respect for human dignity, for how can 
there be dignity in a life lived without access to housing, healthcare, food, water or in the 
case of persons unable to support themselves, without appropriate assistance?” 
148 Albertyn explains that dignity in this sense concerns: 
“Questions of status and recognition. It imputes tolerance and respect, a non-hierarchical 
approach to groups and individuals that should condemn unequal power relations, and their 
manifestations in unequal status and recognition. It rejects violence, prevents stereotype 
and stigma and requires us to see the value of people’s identities and personal choices.”  
See Albertyn (2009) CCR 188. 
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While certain progressive judgments have recognised a more substantive notion of 
human dignity149 a significant number of judgments have adopted a formalistic 
approach to this value. The need to redress systematic patterns of inequality and 
disadvantage has, for instance, often been obscured by the Court’s tendency to focus 
on individual personality issues related to subjective feelings of self-worth.150 The 
reality is that both the individual and society are impoverished by our collective failure 
to ensure living conditions worthy of the dignity of cohabitants. A limited focus on 
subjective feelings will, therefore, not be enough to transform the socio-economic 
inequities pervading our society. 
For cohabitants, it is not difficult to imagine how being rendered destitute after a 
lengthy relationship (because you did not ensure that your partner formalised it) 
infringes upon one’s dignity. Leaving caregiving cohabitants destitute also articulates 
the low value our society tends to attach to caregiving work. The tendency of the courts 
to focus on subjective notions of dignity in family law cases has resulted in the judicial 
neglect of the negative socio-economic consequences of certain family law rules. The 
value of dignity needs to be analysed in a more holistic manner, to effectively allow for 
the redistribution of the socio-economic consequences of family dissolution.151 
Genuine respect for human dignity requires that society create an environment that 
provides cohabitants with the basic socio-economic support required to live a dignified 
life.152 
A relational conception of human dignity requires society to respect the equal worth 
of all women,153 while ensuring that women are not seen as a means to an end.154 
However, allowing caregivers to make socio-economic sacrifices for their families, 
while failing to place concomitant socio-economic obligations on their partners, 
enforces the underlying assumption that women are simply a means to ensuring the 
                                                          
149 In the Volks case, para 181, the minority judgment of Justice Sachs specifically held that 
by failing to regulate cohabitation, the law effectively relegates cohabiting women to a life of 
poverty, “coupled with the imputation of having been a lawless interloper”. He was therefore 
able to specifically recognise that this approach severely infringes upon the human dignity of 
the survivor of a cohabiting relationship. This case is discussed in detail in part 3 3 5 of chapter 
three of this study. 
150 Albertyn (2007) SAJHR 275. 
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152 S Liebenberg “The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights” (2005) 
21 SAJHR 1 1. 
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socio-economic survival of their families. Adopting this approach also reinforces an 
individualistic notion of human dignity and places all of the responsibility on the 
caregiver. Developing a relational conception of human dignity could improve the 
status of cohabiting women, while requiring a heavier burden of justification for 
infringements upon their socio-economic rights. While the value of human dignity 
requires that each citizen be seen as an end in themselves, protecting the dignity of 
all cohabitants is also interconnected to the constitutional value of equality. 
 
2 5 4 The values of non-sexism and equality 
 
Part of our Constitution’s transformative capacity includes its responsiveness to the 
specific needs of women. It is committed to establishing a society based on non-
sexism,155 while providing for the promotion of substantive equality.156 In terms of 
giving effect to a substantive conception of equality, the test for unfair discrimination 
requires analysing the social position of the complainant, the impact of the 
discriminatory provision on the complainant and the need for a positive recognition of 
difference and the transformative values in the Constitution.157 Given this expansive 
range of factors, a number of scholars have argued that the substantive and contextual 
nature of this test provides sufficient scope for considering the social and economic 
implications of family law rules.158 Sandra Fredman argues that underlying the right to 
equality are the principles of dignity, identity, redistribution and participation.159 Despite 
the potential of the equality test to be more holistic, as proposed by a number of 
scholars,160 the courts have yet to develop a balanced normative framework in which 
                                                          
155 Preamble to the Constitution. 
156 S 9(2) of the Constitution.   
157 Albertyn (2007) SAJHR 253. 
158 Albertyn argues that: 
“The idea of substantive equality contemplates both social and economic change and is 
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the purposes and values of socio-economic rights are considered within family law 
cases.161 While the need to address the context, the impact of discrimination, a 
positive recognition of difference and transformation inform the test for unfair 
discrimination, the distributive element underlying equality, has been neglected under 
jurisprudential conceptions of equality.162  
As a result of the failure to sufficiently recognise and address the material aspects 
of gender inequality, socio-economic rights are particularly significant to women.163 
The effective fulfilment of these rights is integral to empowering women. Accordingly, 
the Constitutional Court has affirmed that socio-economic rights are key to achieving 
gender equality and establishing a society in which men and women are equally able 
to achieve their full potential.164 
The Constitutional Court has held that the value of non-sexism is foundational to 
our Constitution, requiring a hard look at the reality of the lives that women have been 
compelled to lead by existing laws.165 Family law rules governing cohabitation need to 
be infused with the constitutional goal of achieving substantive gender equality 
between men and women. Part of this necessarily requires interpreting family law rules 
to recognise the gendered dynamics underlying traditional conceptions of family roles. 
An approach aimed at fostering non-sexism and substantive equality also requires 
recognising that women are essentially “resourceful, exercising agency and rational 
choices within particular contexts of vulnerability”.166 A constitutional approach further 
requires the law to respond to women as complex beings with shifting identifies and 
multifaceted needs.167 Family law rules should therefore be developed to protect the 
socio-economic rights of women, while refraining from only focusing on women as 
mothers and caregivers. 
The failure to regulate cohabitation constitutes an infringement of the right to be 
treated equally before the law. This failure is due to the fact that the lack of access to 
socio-economic security upon the dissolution of a domestic partnership reinforces 
broader social patterns of privilege and marginalisation.168 The hierarchical system 
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created by our family law regime, with civil marriage perceived as the norm, reinforces 
relations that undermine the value and well-being of women who deviate from this 
system. Their socio-economic rights are also undermined, whether they deviate from 
the norm truly by choice or as a result of intersecting relational dynamics.169 It is thus 
necessary to develop interpretations of socio-economic rights that offer protection to 
all women.  
One example of a legal development that recognises the values of equality and 
non-sexism is the legal protection of a cohabiting caregiver’s right to occupy the family 
home. This should be done in a way that recognises the socio-economic value of 
caregiving work, while taking care to refrain from reinforcing stereotypes.170 An 
approach that recognises the significance of caring work, as well as the need to protect 
vulnerable members of our society, is more aligned with the transformative aspirations 
underlying our Constitution. Through effectively taking account of existing power 
relations, while supporting the values of interdependence, Ubuntu, solidarity, care and 
human dignity, the family law regime can assist in transforming existing relations 
between cohabiting men and women. The statement that poverty is intertwined with 
gender inequality171 elucidates the importance of the value of non-sexism in regulating 
the socio-economic consequences of cohabitation. 
 
2 5 5 Conclusion 
 
Deciding whether to regulate the socio-economic consequences of terminated 
domestic partnerships clearly has implications for the freedom, human dignity and 
equality of cohabitants. To date, a liberal conception of freedom has been utilised to 
justify the failure to regulate these relationships. In order to broaden cohabiting 
women’s freedom of choice, it is necessary to integrate a substantive conception of 
autonomy into accountability structures aimed at regulating the socio-economic 
consequences of domestic partnerships.172 
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In addition to developing a substantive conception of autonomy, the value of human 
dignity in relation to cohabitants needs to be enriched by recognising the material 
dimensions of well-being that are implicated by the non-recognition of domestic 
partnerships. The human dignity of female cohabitants also requires greater judicial 
and legislative acknowledgement of the integral value of caring work and its gendered 
implications for cohabitants. In addition, substantive gender equality requires that 
social recognition be coupled with redistributing the socio-economic consequences of 
family dissolution between men and women on a more equitable basis. Given that 
equality is particularly responsive to group-based forms of disadvantage, this value is 
especially significant in shaping the legal regulation of cohabitation.  
While classic liberalism tends to ignore the values of interdependence and 
connection, relational feminism highlights their significance for women, as well as their 
importance to society in general. The problematic dimensions of an individualistic 
approach to family law are emphasised by the Constitutional Court’s statement that 
the initiation and development of constructive relationships are integral for all 
individuals to be able to reach their full human potential.173 Given the importance of 
relationships to individuals, it is necessary to explore relational interpretations of socio-
economic rights to better reflect constitutional values.  
The above analysis reveals that the constitutional triad of human dignity, freedom 
and equality have significant potential to enrich the state’s response to domestic 
partnerships. In order to give effect to the transformative potential of these values, 
both the courts and the legislature need to engage more effectively with these values 
and their implications for cohabitants.  
In accordance with the second step underlying Nedelsky’s approach, it is clear that 
the current choice argument neglects the material aspects underlying the 
constitutional values of human dignity, equality and freedom. Following from this, the 
next step in Nedelsky’s approach entails analysing the kinds of relations that would 
give effect to constitutional values. It is thus necessary to examine the patterns of 
relations that the law should be structuring in terms of these values. 
 
2 6 Structuring relations that give effect to constitutional values 
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The third step in Nedelsky’s approach entails determining the kinds of relations that 
give effect to the core constitutional values enumerated above. In this regard, 
Nedelsky points out that the values that matter to individuals, such as freedom, dignity 
and equality, cannot exist without supporting constructive relationships.174 Currently, 
the choice argument informing the regulation of cohabitation burdens the vulnerable 
cohabitant with the socio-economic consequences of a terminated domestic 
partnership. The current approach to domestic partnerships also allows partners who 
own the family home to evict partners regardless of whether they contributed to the 
family home. A liberal conception of choice, dignity and difference is therefore, 
insufficient, in terms of shifting relations in an egalitarian and participatory direction. In 
order to provide substantive protection to the socio-economic rights of cohabitants, 
relational responsibility for socio-economic rights needs to be developed. The state 
needs to enforce these obligations through formulating responsive legislation and 
interpreting rights in a gender-sensitive manner. The legal focus should therefore shift 
from blaming cohabitants who have made certain choices to examining how the law 
can respond to their needs in accordance with the Constitution. 
With regard to the South African family law regime, one of the challenges is the 
preoccupation with blaming the disadvantaged party (usually the woman) for making 
certain choices. This includes blaming women for staying in abusive relationships, 
signing unfair contracts or staying in unregulated relationships.175 This blame often 
occurs without an in-depth examination of the exploitative relational norms influencing 
these choices. Choosing to enforce these ‘choices’ without examining their broader 
relational impact also undermines the constitutional goal to establish a society based 
on fundamental human rights. Focusing on the vulnerable party’s actions only 
represents one side of the legal story. The focus should instead be on developing the 
rules governing cohabitation to align them with the rights and values protected in the 
Constitution. 
Given the gendered nature of socio-economic disadvantage, the state needs to 
develop accountability measures that enable cohabiting women to enforce their socio-
economic rights against their partners. Developing this relational responsibility is 
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necessary, as adopting a neutral response to cohabitation currently legitimates norms 
of exploitation while undermining sections 8 and 39 of the Constitution. 
Moreover, a proactive response is required, as the current liberal response allows 
organs of state and private individuals to avoid seeing the social relationships of which 
they are in fact a part.176 This individualistic approach supports the psychological 
process of “othering” which facilitates separation and cruelty, leading to a failure of 
human compassion.177 While “othering” is an extremely complex process, the 
prevailing conception of rights as boundaries plays a role in facilitating this approach. 
As further highlighted by Nedelsky, the manner in which this abstraction has 
developed, and the norms of thinking associated with it, has unfortunately fostered the 
capacity for distancing ourselves from others. Our current conception of rights 
“insulates us from the pain of the poverty around us”, and allows us to let this cruelty 
continue.178 Nedelsky offers an example of this by pointing out that if we pass a 
homeless woman on the street, we can often dismiss our unease with the perception 
that her condition is not our fault, as we personally have not violated her rights.179 
Placing the responsibility for her situation completely on the vulnerable individual 
renders us unaccountable. Unfortunately, as pointed out by Meyersfeld, it is when we 
adopt a stance of apathy that human rights violations are made possible.180  
In contrast to this liberal approach, Nedelsky points out that the liberal tradition has 
been dangerously biased in its emphasis.181 By placing the primary responsibility on 
unmarried women, the constitutional responsibility of the judiciary and other organs of 
state to develop the law is undermined. Legal rules should however, be developed in 
a manner that dislodges many of the underlying causes of gender inequality.182 The 
constitutional entrenchment of socio-economic rights requires more than merely 
acknowledging women’s socio-economic vulnerability. It requires an in depth scrutiny 
of the manner in which the law reinforces socio-economic vulnerability between 
cohabitants, particularly for female cohabitants. It also requires the development of the 
offending private law rule to reflect the “spirit, purport and objects”183 of the Bill of 
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Rights. Adopting a relational feminist approach would, at the very least, direct attention 
to the potential power of socio-economic rights to improve the feasible options of 
cohabiting women. A conception of socio-economic rights that directs our attention 
towards existing structures of relationships, as opposed to boundaries and 
individualism, is better suited to fostering social justice based on non-sexism.  
A shift from an individual psychological analysis (which centres on why the 
individuals did not enter into a contract) to a systemic relational analysis is also 
required in the legal response to cohabitation. A relational feminist analysis 
underscores the reality that the current passivity of the South African family law regime 
creates an environment conducive to the socio-economic exploitation of cohabiting 
women. A liberal individualistic response thus structures relations that encourage 
apathy and socio-economic inequality. 
Part of the emphasis of a relational feminist approach is on why society has 
structured systems of power in a way that encourages exploitation and separation 
between cohabiting partners. Instead of expecting vulnerable parties to persuade their 
partners to enter into a contract, or to formalise their relationship, the emphasis should 
be on interpreting the socio-economic rights of female cohabitants in a manner that 
enforces socio-economic responsibility between cohabitants.184 A relational feminist 
analysis also reveals the broader extent of harm that is perpetuated by enforcing an 
individualistic conception of autonomy, human dignity and equality. It is thus necessary 
to focus on developing relations that are infused with a positive conception of socio-
economic responsibility. In order to transform our family law regime, the unequal 
power relations between the sexes must be acknowledged and changed, while the 
socio-economic disadvantage caused by these power imbalances must be addressed. 
This approach of recognising and addressing the social context of gender inequality 
is essential if women are to achieve the ability to exercise their rights on an equitable 
basis.185  
A relational feminist interpretation of rights that focuses on the dynamics between 
men and women, as opposed to simply perceiving women as passive victims or men 
as lawless perpetrators, is conducive to fostering this change. In accordance with her 
relational feminist approach, Jennifer Nedelsky refers to the capacity for creative 
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interaction that we all possess, something that is enabled by the constellation of 
personal relations of which we are a part.186 She states that this creativity has the 
potential to transform relations and to generate something new from that which already 
exists.187 People are able to utilise this capacity within existing relations, to behave 
differently and to induce a shift, which then calls on the creative capacities of others 
to respond to it. The legal regime can play a role in encouraging and shaping these 
more constructive relations. An example of this entails interpreting a cohabitant’s right 
of access to adequate housing within the context of gender inequality and the specific 
cohabiting relationship. This example is explored in further detail in chapter five of this 
study.  
The power of the state to reinforce or undermine constructive identities is further 
illustrated through Sally Engle Merry’s discussion on the shifting identities that women 
experience in relation to domestic violence cases. She points out that on the one hand, 
women are defined by family, kin and work relationships.188 On the other hand, by 
seeking to rely on the legal system women are defined as autonomous and reasonable 
beings entitled to certain protections from the state. If they are, however, undermined 
by the state, they often withdraw from asserting their rights through the legal system. 
One example of how the law can undermine women is through trivialising the 
economic or physical abuse that they experience. Failing to recognise the socio-
economic rights of female cohabitants and failing to remove obstacles frustrating 
access to resources, further undermines women. As a result of the state’s failure to 
regulate cohabitation, many women will remain with an abusive partner in order to 
satisfy their basic material needs and appease their family. The legal system can, 
however, intervene in a manner that reconfigures subjective identities, while affirming 
autonomous conceptions of the self as entitled to human rights.189 When cohabiting 
women’s relational socio-economic needs are recognised and protected as legitimate 
obligations enforced by legal mechanisms, women will have a greater opportunity to 
shift their relational identity. This relational shift has the potential to draw a 
corresponding shift from their male partners.  
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This process has been described by Rachel Jewkes, who points out that while 
women are subjected to certain patriarchal constraints they are not passive victims. In 
fact, women are constantly making strategic choices within the limited options 
available to them.190 While there are limits to this creative capacity, the law can play a 
proactive role in fostering constructive relations, through improving the feasible options 
available to women.191 One potential avenue for empowering women is through 
removing constraints preventing women from independently accessing socio-
economic resources. An example of this is provided through the state removing 
obstacles to vital health care services in the public health care system.192 This would 
free women from having to rely on their partner to access health care services. A 
further example would be innovatively interpreting property law rules so as to allow a 
woman to access the family home she shared with her ex-partner. This is explored in 
detail in chapter five of this study. 
A relational feminist interpretation of socio-economic rights highlights that socio-
economic rights should not be seen as boundaries or constraints between individuals. 
Socio-economic rights should instead be recognised as the relational threads linking 
cohabitants.193 In accordance with a relational feminist perspective, both cohabitants 
have certain duties in terms of socio-economic rights. This relational feminist 
conception is important, as it emphasises connection and responsibility to others, 
while focusing on fostering relationships that protect the dignity, autonomy and 
equality of female cohabitants. Legal rules should also encourage private parties to 
treat each other with care and concern. Accordingly, it is necessary to reimagine 
current conceptions of power, responsibility and trust between cohabitants.  
While the law supports, in certain respects, a gender-sensitive approach to 
unrecognised relationships,194 the state has not yet done enough in terms of 
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transforming existing inequities within the family law system. This is evinced by the 
fact that South Africa has one of the highest rates of father absence in the world,195 
with women remaining disproportionately responsible for child care. 
In order to develop interpretations of socio-economic rights that are more conducive 
to fostering equitable relations between cohabitants, the reality that rights structure 
relationships needs to inform interpretations of socio-economic rights between 
cohabitants.196 Nedelsky points out that we will do a better job of making difficult 
decisions involving rights if we rather focus on the kinds of relationships that we want 
to foster, what the values at stake are and how different concepts and institutions will 
best contribute to that fostering.197  
From the above analysis, it is clear that the legal regime currently places the 
responsibility for enforcing relational socio-economic rights on the vulnerable 
cohabitant.198 In order to give effect to sections 8 and 39 of the Constitution, it is 
necessary for the state to improve accountability structures so as to allow female 
cohabitants to enforce their relational socio-economic rights. One potential avenue of 
shifting relations is in terms of interpreting socio-economic rights to broaden the 
feasible options available to women.199  
 
2 7 Interpreting socio-economic rights to structure socio-economic equality 
between cohabitants  
 
2 7 1 Introduction 
 
In accordance with the need to transcend the public/private law divide and develop 
a theoretical framework that enforces private socio-economic responsibilities in 
accordance with constitutional values, this section examines the content of sections 8 
and 39 of the Constitution. While section 39(2) of the Constitution is utilised as the 
main channel through which the normative values of the Bill of Rights influences the 
sphere of private law,200 section 8 is the primary provision governing the horizontal 
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application of the Bill of Rights.201 Both of these provisions are subsequently examined 
below. 
 
2 7 2 Developing a framework for the horizontal application of socio-economic rights 
between cohabitants  
2 7 2 1 Introduction 
 
Both sections 8 and 39 of the Constitution govern the horizontal application of the 
Bill of Rights. There remains however, a degree of confusion concerning their 
application.202 In certain cases, these provisions may overlap when developing areas 
of law in accordance with the Constitution. This section first examines section 8 and 
then moves on to discuss section 39(2) of the Constitution. Section 8 is considered 
first as it states that the rights in the Bill of Rights, which includes the socio-economic 
rights, apply to all areas of law. Given the detrimental socio-economic consequences 
of family law dissolution, there is an urgent need to give substantive content to the 
specific socio-economic rights of cohabiting women. The interconnection between 
socio-economic rights and furthering gender equality also requires that the specific 
socio-economic rights of women are recognised and addressed. A context-sensitive 
relational feminist approach that recognises and addresses the socio-economic 
impact of cohabiting relations is thus justified by section 8 of the Constitution.   
 
2 7 2 2 Section 8 of the South African Constitution 
 
Section 8(1) states that the rights in the Bill of Rights applies to all law and that they 
bind the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.203 In this 
context, “all law” refers to all forms of legislation, common law and customary law. The 
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Constitutional Court’s recognition that we only have “one system of law,”204 further 
requires that all spheres of government proactively promote the “spirit, purport and 
objects” of the Bill of Rights.205  
Section 8(2) governs the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights between private 
persons. This section has been described as somewhat “clumsy,”206 as it states that 
a provision in the Bill of Rights “binds” a private party “if, and to the extent that, [the 
provision] is applicable”. This reveals that the rights protected in the Bill of Rights apply 
directly to legal disputes between private parties, where the legal rule or conduct 
complained of infringes on one of the substantive rights. Where a cohabitant evicts 
their partner, removes them from their legal aid or no longer assists them in accessing 
food, water or social security, the relevant socio-economic rights are implicated.207 It 
is apparent, however, that section 8(2) requires a context-sensitive relational analysis 
to determine the exact scope and form of this horizontal application for domestic 
partners.208 This necessarily depends on the means of the parties, the length of their 
relationship and the socio-economic needs of vulnerable family members. Currie and 
De Waal point out that when determining whether a socio-economic right is directly 
applicable, it is not necessary that the private parties exercise the exact same level of 
power as the state does.209 This position is emphasised in Khumalo v Holomisa 
(“Khumalo”),210 where the Court instead focused on the “intensity of the constitutional 
right” and the potential power of the private entity to infringe this right.211 For many 
cohabiting women, being evicted after a lengthy domestic partnership entails a serious 
infringement on their ability to access housing, health care, food and social security. 
As a result of the gendered division of labour, in many cases the male partner has 
greater economic power in the relationship. The abuse of this power often results in 
vulnerable cohabitants and their children being deprived of access to vital resources.  
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How men and women relate to one another and how this private power is exercised 
therefore requires further scrutiny. 
Section 8(3)(a) provides guidelines for how the courts must apply the Bill of Rights. 
It states that a court “must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to the 
extent that legislation does not give effect to that right”. Subsequently, in terms of 
section 8(3)(a), if the private person is so bound, the court must first apply any relevant 
legislation giving effect to the right. Currently, the family law regime is governed by a 
number of statutes, resulting in a fragmented system. The potential implications of 
relying on certain pieces of legislation to protect the socio-economic interests of 
cohabitants, are explored in detail in chapter five.212 If there is no legislation giving 
effect to the right, the court must then develop the common law to give effect to the 
constitutional right. Section 8(3)(b) further permits the courts to develop the “rules of 
the common law to limit the right”, provided that this is in accordance with section 36(1) 
of the Constitution.  
A relational feminist lens is responsive to the provisions underlying section 8 in that 
it highlights how legal rules already structure inequitable socio-economic relations 
between private individuals. In spite of section 8 of the Constitution, and the 
detrimental socio-economic implications of family law rules,213 the courts have yet to 
develop a coherent jurisprudence on the interaction between the Bill of Rights and the 
South African family law regime.214 
In the certification case, Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (“Ex parte Chairperson 
of the Constitutional Assembly”),215 the Court stressed that socio-economic rights may 
be negatively protected from improper invasion within the private sphere. It stated that 
a breach of this obligation occurs directly when there is a failure to respect the right. 
The Court went on to explain that these rights can also be breached indirectly, when 
there is a failure to prevent the direct infringement of the right by another or a failure 
to respect the existing protection of the right by taking measures that diminish that 
protection.216 The state’s failure to develop a legislative framework to prevent 
                                                          
212 See part 5 1 of chapter five of this study. 
213 Bonthuys (2002) SALJ 748. 
214 781. 
215 1996 4 SA 744 (CC); 1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC) (“Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional 
Assembly”). 
216 Para 78. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
65 
 
violations of the socio-economic rights of cohabitants therefore already indicates an 
inadequate fulfilment of its duty to protect these rights. 
In the Grootboom decision, the Court recognised the positive obligations that 
parents have towards their children in terms of section 28 of the Constitution. The 
Court also recognised the role of the state in facilitating the fulfilment of this 
responsibility by the parents.217 According to the Court, the state must utilise legislative 
and common law provisions to reinforce these obligations.218 The problem with the 
Court’s reasoning, as highlighted above, is that children would only be entitled to state 
assistance when parental care was removed or completely lacking.219 While the Court 
focused on the parent-child relationship, the reasoning in Grootboom emphasises the 
need to transform the existing legislative framework governing private socio-economic 
obligations between family members.220 The Court recognised parental 
responsibilities in providing access to socio-economic resources. However, the Court 
did not adequately address the need for more robust state regulation of the various 
ways through which private actors can abuse socio-economic power. In addition, 
where private individuals do not have the means to gain access to socio-economic 
resources, the state is under a positive duty to progressively improve public services. 
Accordingly, public services need to be improved, while the “background legal rules”221 
governing relational socio-economic provisioning,222 also need to be addressed. In 
order to structure more equitable relations between men and women, public services 
need to be improved, as well as relational access to resources. 
While this does not remove the state’s primary obligation to fulfil these rights, the 
state should develop the necessary legal infrastructure to allow cohabitants to fulfil 
their socio-economic obligations towards family members. The state’s obligation 
would normally be fulfilled by passing laws and creating enforcement mechanisms for 
claiming socio-economic resources between cohabitants. In terms of developing the 
relational aspects of the right of access to adequate housing, the Constitutional Court 
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in Grootboom has pointed out that while section 26 of the Constitution does not overtly 
say so:  
 
“There is, at the very least, a negative obligation placed upon the state and all other entities 
and persons to desist from preventing or impairing the right of access to adequate 
housing.”223 
 
This was subsequently confirmed in TAC, which stated that this obligation rests 
within the first subsection of sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution.224 It has also been 
pointed out that while sections 26(2) and 27(2) set out the state’s socio-economic 
obligations, these sections do not eliminate the potential for private responsibilities.225 
While the Court did not elaborate on the exact scope of the negative obligations 
between private parties in Grootboom and TAC,226 this was subsequently expanded 
on in Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stolz (“Jaftha”).227 This case concerned 
execution procedures provided for within the Magistrates Court Act 32 of 1944, which 
allowed for execution against state-subsidised housing for debts unrelated to the 
property. In this case, the Court held that any measure that permits a person to be 
deprived of existing access to adequate housing limits the rights protected in section 
26.228 The Court specifically stated that such a measure may, however, be justified in 
terms of section 36 of the Constitution.  
In accordance with section 36, the socio-economic infringement must be based on 
a law of general application. It must also be reasonable and justifiable in accordance 
with an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. 
The nature and importance of the implicated right, the importance and the purpose of 
the limitation, as well as whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the 
purpose, must be examined. While the right of access to adequate housing can be 
justifiably limited, the Jaftha case underscores the fact that evictions by private parties 
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can implicate both sections 26(1) and 26(3) of the Constitution.229 While Jaftha 
concerned a bank seeking to enforce a debt, many cohabitants evict their partner upon 
the termination of their relationship, regardless of whether their partner contributed to 
the family home. They often succeed with the eviction because domestic partnerships 
are not legally regulated in a coherent manner. Greater regulation of who is entitled to 
occupy and own the family home upon the termination of a domestic partnership is 
thus needed. 
In the case of Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd (“Maphango”),230 
the Court held that constitutionalism has wrought significant changes to private law 
relationships.231 This is evinced by the inclusion of socio-economic rights, which have 
created a right of access to social goods. The Court went on to emphasise that the 
main burden of fulfilling this right remains on the state, as section 26(2) obliges the 
state to take reasonable measures within its available resources to achieve the 
progressive realisation of the right. The Court did, however, emphasise that the impact 
of the right is not solely on the state; stating that it expands in two specific ways. The 
first manner in which it does this is through importing an inhibitory duty not to impede 
or impair access to housing. This obligation rests not only on public bodies but also on 
private parties.232 The second way in which the right of access to adequate housing 
ripples out to private rights is when the state itself takes measures to fulfil the right. 
These measures will then affect private relationships.233 
In terms of a relational feminist interpretation of cohabitants’ negative duties it is not 
reasonable and justifiable to allow a partner, who has assisted in building up the family 
home through years of value-added services or through caring work, to be evicted 
from the family home. Her right of access to adequate housing should be considered. 
The unjust nature of her eviction is further emphasised by the constitutional goal to 
foster relations based on non-sexism.234 
In terms of the right of access to adequate housing, it is particularly unjust to allow 
a woman to be evicted by her long-term partner, because she did not persuade her 
partner to formalise their relationship. Raising the relational feminist aspect of this right 
                                                          
229 Liebenberg “Socio-Economic Rights” in Symbols or Substance 70. 
230 2012 3 SA 531 (CC); 2012 5 BCLR 449 (CC) (“Maphango”). 
231 Para 34. 
232 Para 34. 
233 Para 34. 
234 S 1(b) of the Constitution. 
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will not solve all of the problems within this area of law. Highlighting the socio-
economic implications of relevant rules for cohabiting women does however, have the 
potential to shift the focus within these cases. A relational feminist interpretation of 
socio-economic rights may also expand the range of potential remedies available to 
female cohabitants.235 In this regard, examining the relational implications of this 
deprivation opens up a wider range of issues for both the court and legislature to 
consider. It is also possible to develop the positive dimensions of socio-economic 
rights between cohabitants, particularly as these partnerships constitute intimate 
relationships. One example would be interpreting the right of access to housing to 
entail a more equitable division of the family property between the cohabitants upon 
the dissolution of their relationship. This is discussed in more detail in chapter five. 
Another example would be interpreting the right of access to health care services to 
order a cohabitant to retain his ex-partner and children born from the relationship on 
his medical aid for a certain period of time. 
In the case of Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay NO 
(“Juma Musjid”),236 the Court considered the content of the right to education237 in the 
context of an application by a Trust to evict a public school conducted on private 
property. In the High Court, it was found that the Trust owed no constitutional obligation 
to the learners.238 This decision has been criticised, as essentially informed by a “pre-
constitutional common law lens”.239 In contrast, the Constitutional Court judgment is 
noteworthy for its specific examination of section 8 of the Constitution. In interpreting 
section 8(2), the Court held that in order to elucidate the scope of the duty owed by 
the Trust to the learners, the nature of the learner’s right to a basic education needs 
to be taken into account.240 The Court emphasised that the purpose of section 8 is not 
to impede private autonomy or to impose on the Trust the primary duties of the state 
in protecting the Bill of Rights.241 Rather, it is intended to require private parties not to 
                                                          
235 Bhana (2015) Stell LR 3. 
236 2011 ZACC 13; 2011 8 BCLR 761 (CC) (“Juma Musjid”).    
237 S 28(1) of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to a basic education, 
including adult basic education. 
238 Ahmed Asruff Essay NO v The MEC for Education KwaZulu-Natal, Case No 10230/2008, 
KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Pietermaritzburg, 16 September 2009 (unreported). 
239 Juma Musjid para 54. 
240 Para 57. 
241 Para 58. 
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interfere with or diminish the enjoyment of a right.242 The duty to refrain from 
diminishing the current enjoyment of a right could have implications for cohabitants. 
When the relationship is terminated it is often existing access to socio-economic 
resources that is removed by an individual who forces their partner to leave the family 
home. The party who evicts their partner also often has the means to ensure a more 
equitable distribution of resources. In Juma Musjid, the Court also held that the 
application of section 8 depends on the “intensity of the constitutional right in question”, 
coupled with the potential invasion of that right, which could be occasioned by persons 
other than the state.243 After examining the reasonableness of the steps undertaken 
by the Trust, the Court ultimately granted the eviction order.244 The reasonableness of 
a cohabiting partner’s eviction application could be evaluated against the need to 
protect the socio-economic rights of female cohabitants. The impact of the deprivation 
on vulnerable cohabitants should also be examined. 
In Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of 
the South African Social Security Agency (“Allpay”),245 the Court held that when an 
entity has performed a constitutional function for a significant period of time, it cannot 
unilaterally relinquish its responsibility and walk away.246 In this case, the Court dealt 
with the just and equitable remedy arising out of a tender that had been declared void 
due to being invalidly awarded. Of significance for private socio-economic 
responsibilities is the Court’s statement that, after fulfilling its obligation for some time, 
the beneficiaries of grants had grown increasingly dependent on Paymaster. The 
applicant could, therefore, not simply walk away without ensuring that a payment 
system remained in place until a new one was instituted.247 When a cohabiting partner 
has undertaken to fulfil the socio-economic needs of his partner over a significant 
period of time, the decision to simply remove his partner’s access to family resources 
should be scrutinised, particularly when the socio-economic impact is severe. 
These decisions reveal that the primary responsibility for protecting and fulfilling 
socio-economic rights remains on the state. However, they also reveal that private 
individuals do have a level of responsibility in terms of refraining from undermining 
                                                          
242 Para 58. 
243 Juma Musjid para 58; see also Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 53. 
244 Juma Musjid para 79. 
245 2014 6 BCLR 641 (CC); 2014 4 SA 179 (CC) (“Allpay”). 
246 Para 66. 
247 Para 66. 
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existing access to socio-economic resources. This is particularly appropriate when 
there is an intimate long-term relationship, with the dependence of beneficiaries 
increasing over time.248 In these instances, positive socio-economic obligations should 
be developed.249  
 
2 7 2 3 Section 39 of the South African Constitution 
 
While section 8 remains the point of departure for the horizontal application of the 
Bill of Rights, it is clear that specific rights within the Bill of Rights will not always 
engage all law and conduct.250 The independent purpose of section 39(2) is to 
empower courts to engage with law and conduct that is not covered by any of the 
specific provisions set out in chapter three of the Constitution.251 Ultimately, whether 
one applies a specific socio-economic right to develop legal rules, or whether one 
relies on the underlying values of the Constitution, both have the potential to 
significantly transform the family law regime.252 In accordance with Nedelsky’s 
approach, rights are seen as the rhetorical and institutional means to give effect to 
values. The constitutional values implicated in cohabitation cases therefore require 
attention. The effect of section 39 is that even if a court finds that no specific socio-
economic right is implicated between cohabitants, the courts are nevertheless still 
required to examine the implications of the relevant private law rules. A court is 
required to analyse whether the existing common law rules, or legislative provisions 
governing the domestic partnership, are being interpreted and enforced in a manner 
that is consistent with the broader spirit, purport and objects underlying the Bill of 
Rights. Section 39(2) allows the courts to go beyond focusing on the specific 
substantive rights between cohabitants and requires them to analyse whether existing 
rules structure relations between cohabitants that reflect the constitutional 
commitment to social justice and fundamental human rights.253 Section 39(2) of the 
                                                          
248 SR Ratner “Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility” (2001) 111 
Yale LJ 443 462; H Shue “The Interdependence of Duties” in P Alston & K Tomasevski (eds) 
The Right to Food (1984) 83 90; and Pieterse (2009) SAJHR 200. 
249 Pieterse (2009) SAJHR 200. 
250 D Davis & Klare K “Transformative Constitutionalism and the Common and Customary 
Law” (2010) 26 SAJHR 403 420. 
251 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 324. 
252 Davis & Klare (2010) SAJHR 420. 
253 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 324. 
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Constitution thus provides a mechanism for infusing all law, including the common law, 
with constitutional values.254 This also highlights the need to scrutinise how the values 
underlying socio-economic rights can restructure our conception of private 
responsibility between cohabitants. 
The danger of largely ignoring section 8 and predominantly relying on section 39 is, 
however, that the courts tend to resort to a vaguely defined normative value system 
(in terms of section 39(2)), to avoid engaging with the substantive content of specific 
rights protected within the Bill of Rights.255 Stuart Woolman argues that this typically 
“slack analysis of vaguely defined values, almost invariably substitutes a more 
rigorous interrogation of constitutional challenges,” in terms of specific substantive 
rights.256 The evasion of section 8 allows the courts to avoid the difficult task of 
balancing competing constitutional rights. For example, by evading the question of 
whether an eviction has infringed upon a cohabitant’s right of access to adequate 
housing, the court eludes the question of how to balance the property rights of the 
owner with his partner’s right of access to adequate housing. This strategy further 
enables the court to skirt the nuanced process of justification required in terms of 
section 36 of the Constitution.257  
However, if section 39(2) is applied in a sufficiently robust manner, it could play a 
role in transforming many of the background legal rules to structure greater equity 
between private parties, such as cohabitants.258 In certain cases, the courts have 
endorsed a particularly expansive interpretation of section 39(2).259 In K v Minister of 
Safety and Security,260 for instance, the Court specifically held that: 
 
“The overall purpose of section 39(2) is to ensure that our common law is infused with the 
values of the Constitution. It is not only in cases where existing rules are clearly inconsistent 
with the Constitution that such an infusion is required. The normative influence of the 
Constitution must be felt throughout the common law.”261  
 
                                                          
254 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers para 44. 
255 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 321. 
256 Woolman (2007) SALJ 762-763; and Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 336. 
257 Woolman (2007) SALJ 763. 
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In terms of the current family law regime, the tendency to disproportionately protect 
a negative conception of autonomy, structures family relations based on individualistic 
values. Examples of this include judicial decisions that emphasise and protect self-
interest, self-serving behaviour and independence. It is however, necessary to develop 
a substantive conception of autonomy that resonates with the transformative 
aspirations underlying our Constitution. Simultaneously, the values of Ubuntu, 
accountability and care underlying socio-economic rights need to be further integrated 
into the family law regime.  
The values implicated within the family law system have expanded significantly 
since the advent of the Constitution. We now live in an open and democratic society 
in which pluralism and diversity are valued.262 These changes are reflected in the 
recognition of customary marriages and same-sex unions, as well as statements by 
the Constitutional Court recognising the diversity of family forms found within South 
Africa.263 
Former Constitutional Court Justice Albie Sachs points out that the new 
constitutional dispensation steers us in the direction of establishing a legal landscape 
consistent with the values of diversity, tolerance of difference and a concern for human 
dignity.264 In Volks, he held that this requires a shift from locating conjugal rights and 
responsibilities exclusively within the framework of formalised relationships. Rather, it 
envisions embracing a wider array of rights and responsibilities to include all 
“marriage-like”, intimate and permanent relationships.265 It also requires a greater 
focus on the human rights implications of private interactions as opposed to the official 
form of a relationship. It should be noted that the values enumerated above are not 
mutually exclusive, but instead enhance and reinforce one another.266  
                                                          
262 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home 
Affairs 2006 1 SA 524 (CC) (“Fourie”); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Home Affairs 1999 1 SA 6; 1998 12 BCLR 1517 (“National Coalition v Minister of 
Home Affairs”), para 60; and MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC); 
2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) (“Pillay”), para 65. 
263 Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister 
of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC); 2000 8 BCLR 8 37 (CC) (“Dawood”), para 31, where 
Justice O’Regan pointed out that: 
“Families come in many shapes and sizes. The definition of the family also changes as 
social practices and traditions change. In recognising the importance of the family we must 
take care not to entrench particular forms of family at the expense of other forms.”  
264 Volks para 181. 
265 Para 181. 
266 Liebenberg (2005) SAJHR 5. 
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2 7 2 4 The transformative potential of sections 8 and 39  
 
While the exact nature and scope of private socio-economic responsibilities has not 
yet been elucidated by our courts, there are certain guidelines that can be distilled 
from the cases discussed in this section. The first principle is that the state is primarily 
responsible for fulfilling socio-economic rights. In this regard, the state is already failing 
to fulfil this responsibility, given the lack of a comprehensive and coherent legislative 
framework regulating the socio-economic consequences of cohabitation. The second 
principle is that regardless of the state’s primary duty, these rights do entail a measure 
of private responsibility. The human rights norms in the Constitution do explicitly apply 
to “all law” and extend to both public and private power. These private socio-economic 
responsibilities necessarily have implications for the existing “background” common 
law rules governing cohabitation.267 The scope of the horizontal application of socio-
economic rights between cohabitants is, however, dependent on a number of 
contextual factors. Examples of these factors include the nature of the rights;268 the 
means of the parties; the intensity of the violation of the right;269 the length of their 
relationship;270 the existence of any patterns of abuse within the relationship and the 
presence of any dependents.  
2 7 3 Reflections on the need to develop private socio-economic responsibility 
 
This section underscores the manner in which the failure to recognise and develop 
private socio-economic duties between cohabitants exacerbates gender inequality. In 
accordance with this, the final step under Nedelsky’s approach centres on how socio-
economic rights can be interpreted to structure constructive relations in accordance 
with constitutional values. This final step examines how a relational feminist 
interpretation of socio-economic rights can transform our law to structure more 
equitable socio-economic relations between cohabitants. Protecting and promoting 
the socio-economic rights of cohabitants is needed, as a significant number of women 
remain in exploitative partnerships in order to access resources.271 While relational 
feminism can inform interpretations of existing rights, this theoretical framework should 
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also inform family law legislation aimed at fulfilling the socio-economic rights of female 
cohabitants.272 
Through recognising socio-economic duties between cohabiting partners in 
accordance with sections 8 and 39(2) of the Constitution, the state has a powerful role 
to play in supporting more constructive identities. This is integral when it comes to 
women’s agency and socio-economic independence. When rights are claimed and 
effectively enforced, for instance, people’s beliefs about who is entitled to what can 
shift.273  
When developing accountability structures, or when interpreting legal rules, it needs 
to be kept in mind that cohabitants are predominantly a socio-economically vulnerable 
group. The status of cohabitants is currently governed by private law rules, which were 
not formulated to protect socio-economic rights. Collectively, these factors highlight 
that, to protect and fulfil the socio-economic rights of cohabitants, both the courts and 
the legislature need to undertake a more proactive regulatory role in ensuring that 
cohabitants take steps to protect and promote the socio-economic rights of their 
partners.  
 
2 8 Conclusion: Key concepts underlying a relational feminist interpretation 
of socio-economic rights 
 
The goal of a relational feminist interpretation of cohabitants’ socio-economic rights 
is to expose the inadequacies of the liberal paradigms currently underpinning our 
family law regime. The relational feminist approach directs legal interpretations in a 
manner that is more conducive to developing the relevant rules governing cohabitation 
in accordance with our transformative Constitution.274 Through applying Nedelsky’s 
four-step approach, this chapter illustrated how the liberal choice argument governing 
cohabitation is undermining the social transformation that is constitutionally 
required.275 The liberal elements of a public/private law divide and individualism are 
also aiding in creating an environment that is conducive to the exploitation of female 
cohabitants.  
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274 Bhana (2015) Stell LR 3. 
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In contrast to this, a relational feminist interpretation of the socio-economic rights of 
cohabitants can generate alternative modes of reasoning, which are more responsive 
to the specific needs of cohabiting women. Relational feminism reflects a substantive 
conception of autonomy, a relational notion of human dignity and a commitment to 
substantive equality for female cohabitants. Relational feminism can thus aid in 
transforming the socio-economic consequences of terminated domestic partnerships 
to empower female cohabitants.  
While the specific implications of a relational feminist interpretation of the socio-
economic rights of female cohabitants are explored in detail in chapter five of this 
study,276 this section attempted to highlight key concepts that can be distilled from 
Nedelsky’s relational feminist framework. In this regard, there are four elements 
underlying the current legal approach to cohabitation that undermine the socio-
economic rights of female cohabitants and require development.  
The first key aspect underlying a relational feminist approach is the need for a 
context-sensitive relational analysis of how the family law system currently structures 
socio-economic relations between cohabitants. This context-sensitive approach 
reveals that the state’s current neutral response to cohabitation undermines the 
constitutional rights of female cohabitants, while exacerbating exploitative relations. 
The second key aspect underlying a relational feminist lens entails adopting a 
value-sensitive approach to interpreting the socio-economic rights of female 
cohabitants. This step highlights the specific values at stake and emphasises the need 
to move away from an abstract conception of rights and the tendency to focus on the 
form of a relationship. In accordance with this shift, the focus should be directed 
towards the specific values at stake and how rights can be developed to give effect to 
the underlying purposes of the socio-economic rights of cohabitants. Sensitivity to a 
value-based approach facilitates a more robust enquiry into whether a law, the judicial 
interpretation of a law or a government policy fosters the material aspects of human 
dignity, equality and freedom for female cohabitants.277 While section 8 remains the 
point of departure in terms of the horizontal application of socio-economic rights, 
section 39 of the Constitution requires the normative influence of the Bill of Rights be 
felt “throughout the common law” of South Africa.278  
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The third element underlying a relational feminist approach entails questioning the 
kinds of relations that give effect to the values informing socio-economic rights. 
Relational feminism calls for the development of private socio-economic 
responsibilities between cohabitants. The focus is particularly on the positive role of 
the state in developing and enforcing accountability structures for the socio-economic 
consequences of terminated domestic partnerships.  
The final step underlying relational feminism requires redistributive and 
transformative interpretations of socio-economic rights that structure more 
constructive relations between cohabiting men and women. While the specific 
implications of these steps are explored in detail in chapter five of this study,279 this 
step entails linking social recognition with redistributive measures grounded in the 
socio-economic rights of cohabitants.  
The key concepts underlying relational feminism can be utilised to guide the 
interpretation and development of family law rules to give effect to the socio-economic 
rights of cohabitants. These concepts can also be utilised to develop and test state 
legislation and policy aimed at governing cohabitation. A relational feminist approach 
can, for instance, provide a basis for evaluating how the absence of a comprehensive 
legislative framework regulating cohabitation leads to disparities in terms of the socio-
economic resources cohabitants are able to access. A relational feminist interpretation 
of socio-economic rights also requires more robust justifications for adopting a neutral 
response to cohabitation, if it ultimately deprives women of access to these resources.  
This chapter has revealed that the classic liberal framework currently informing 
interpretations of the rights of cohabitants is insufficiently responsive to the socio-
economic needs of cohabiting women. In contrast to this liberal framework, relational 
feminism is far more conducive to transforming the law to give effect to the socio-
economic rights of cohabiting women. The following chapter examines the South 
African legal framework governing cohabitation through applying the key concepts of 
a relational feminist lens developed in this chapter. Relevant South African 
jurisprudence, legislation and common law provisions are examined in terms of how 
they hinder or improve relational access to socio-economic resources between 
cohabitants.  
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Chapter 3: The South African legal framework through a relational feminist 
lens  
 
3 1 Introduction 
 
 The previous chapter set out key concepts underlying a relational feminist 
framework for the application of socio-economic rights between cohabitants. Utilising 
a relational feminist lens, this chapter critically examines the South African legal 
framework pertaining to cohabitants. In particular, a relational feminist framework is 
used to examine how the problematic paradigms underlying the family law regime 
exacerbate the feminisation of poverty.  
 This analysis commences with an overview of the South African family law regime 
before the adoption of the final Constitution.1 Following the advent of democracy, the 
Bill of Rights has been utilised to develop various areas of the South African family 
law regime.2 This chapter subsequently examines relevant jurisprudence concerning 
the interaction between the Bill of Rights and unrecognised relationships, focusing on 
domestic partnerships. 
 Given that South Africa has not yet developed a fully-fledged “law of life 
partnerships” to regulate domestic partnerships,3 the piecemeal legislative framework 
governing cohabitation is examined. This is followed by an analysis of the various 
forms of cohabitation that have arisen due to existing gaps within the statutory 
framework. The balance of this chapter highlights the manner in which the common 
law has been utilised to protect domestic partners, focusing on the extent to which 
private law rules exacerbate the socio-economic vulnerability of female cohabitants 
upon the termination of their relationship.4  
                                                          
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the “Constitution”). 
2 E Bonthuys “The South African Bill of Rights and the Development of Family Law” (2002) 
119 SALJ 748 748. 
3 B Smith “The Dissolution of a Life or Domestic Partnership” in J Heaton (ed) The Law of 
Divorce and Dissolution of Life Partnerships in South Africa (2014) 389 390-391. 
4 B Clark & B Goldblatt “Gender and Family Law” in E Bonthuys & C Albertyn (eds) Gender, 
Law and Justice (2007) 195 205; South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) Project 
118: Report on Domestic Partnerships (2006) 7 <http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/reports/ 
r_prj118_2006march.pdf> (accessed 20-10-2012); B Meyersfeld “If You Can See Look: 
Domestic Partnerships and the Law” (2010) 3 Constitutional Court Review 271 310; P de Vos 
“Still Out in the Cold? The Domestic Partnership Bill and the (Non)Protection of Marginalised 
Women” in J Sloth-Neilson & Z du Toit (eds) Trials and Tribulations, Trends and Triumphs: 
Developments in International, African and South African Child and Family Law (2008) 129 
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 Through employing a relational feminist lens, this chapter illustrates the South 
African legal system’s problematic tendency to focus on form over function, liberal 
conceptions of choice, and contractual principles.5 Through highlighting these 
paradigms, this chapter demonstrates the need and potential for transforming the rules 
governing cohabitation. This chapter underscores the need for transformation 
informed by a relational feminist interpretation of the socio-economic rights of female 
cohabitants.  
  
3 2 The South African family law regime before the advent of democracy 
 
Before the watershed decision of Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and 
Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs (“Fourie”),6 marriage was defined 
under the South African common law as a “union of one man with one woman, to the 
exclusion, while it lasts, of all others”.7 For decades, South African family law only 
recognised heterosexual and monogamous unions.8 Traditionally, this fixed structure 
was seen as the cornerstone of society, with procreation perceived as its primary 
function. The family law regime thus ignored families shaped by diverse religions and 
cultures, such as religious marriages and customary unions.9 Following the advent of 
democracy, there have been significant legislative and jurisprudential developments 
with regard to same-sex unions and customary marriages.10  
Historically, domestic partnerships were largely ignored by the legal system.11 This 
is illustrated by a 1972 article by Hahlo, where he highlights that there was no “law of 
concubinage” in South Africa.12 He explains that this was due to the low number of 
                                                          
129; and B Goldblatt “Regulating Domestic Partnerships: A Necessary Step in the 
Development of South African Family Law” (2003) 120 SALJ 610 611. 
5 E Bonthuys “Developing the Common Law of Breach of Promise and Universal Partnerships: 
Rights to Property Sharing for all Cohabitants?” (2015) 132 SALJ 76 76. 
6 2006 3 BCLR 355 (CC); 2006 1 SA 524 (CC) (“Fourie”). 
7 This was the definition used by Innes CJ in Mashia Ebrahim v Mahomed Essop 1905 TS 59 
at 61, as referenced by Sachs J in the Fourie case, para 2. 
8 D Meyerson “Who’s In and Who’s Out? Inclusion and Exclusion in the Family Law 
Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of South Africa” (2010) 3 CCR 295 297. 
9 Clark & Goldblatt “Gender and Family Law” in Gender, Law and Justice (2007) 205. 
10 These developments are explored below in parts 3 3 and 3 4 of this chapter. 
11 Smith “The Dissolution of a Domestic Partnership” in The Law of Divorce (2014) 399. 
12 HR Hahlo “The Law of Concubinage” (1972) 89 SALJ 321 321. 
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recorded cases of unmarried cohabitation in South Africa, emphasising the perceived 
immoral nature of these relationships.13  
Patterns of gender discrimination were simultaneously interwoven into traditional 
family law rules, exacerbating the plight of many South African women. This is 
illustrated through the extensive feminist critique of family law.14 One example of how 
gender inequality was perpetuated by family law rules is the Roman-Dutch15 rule 
governing the marital power that established the husband as the paterfamilias or the 
“head of the family”.16 This provided him with the power to determine all matters 
concerning the common life, such as where the family would reside and their standard 
of living. This power further authorised the husband to administer the joint estate, 
including his wife’s separate property, unless specifically excluded through an ante-
nuptial contract.17 Married women also had no locus standi and could not sue or be 
sued.18 
Since then, the law has significantly developed, as evinced by the abolition of 
certain aspects of the marital power in 1984,19 and its final abolition in 1993.20 Despite 
these developments, certain constraining elements in civil law (Roman-Dutch) 
tradition continue to infuse our family law system. One example of this is the 
dominance of a private law lens within family law cases, particularly in lower courts.21  
                                                          
13 321. 
14 F Kaganas & C Murray “Law and Women’s Rights in South Africa: An Overview” (1994) 
Acta Juridica 1 1; J Sinclair “The Financial Consequences of Divorce in South Africa: Judicial 
Determination or Private Ordering?” (1983) 32 ICLQ 785 786; J Heaton “Striving for 
Substantive Gender Equality in Family Law: Selected Issues” (2005) 21 SAJHR 547; and E 
Bonthuys “RH v DE: A Feminist Minority Judgment on Adultery” (2015) 31 SAJHR 379 380. 
15 Much of South Africa’s civil law is based on Roman-Dutch law. 
16 Kaganas & Murray (1994) Acta Juridica 9; HR Hahlo The South African Law of Husband 
and Wife (1953) 60. 
17 Kaganas & Murray (1994) Acta Juridica 9. 
18 9. 
19 The Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 (MPA) abolished marital power in s 11 and 
entrenched the idea that married partners are involved in an equal partnership through s 14, 
which states that: 
“Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, a wife in a marriage in community of property 
has the same powers with regard to the disposal of the assets of the joint estate, the 
contracting of debts which lie against the joint estate, and the management of the joint 
estate as those which a husband in such a marriage had immediately before the 
commencement of this Act.”  
The MPA abolished marital power in marriages contracted between whites after it came into 
force. 
20 Marital power was finally abolished in all its manifestations and for all races retrospectively 
by the General Law Fourth Amendment Act of 1993. 
21 E Bonthuys (2015) SAJHR 380, where she specifically highlights that: 
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A further example of how legal rules have exacerbated gender inequality is provided 
by the rules governing marital rape, which was legal in South Africa until its 
criminalisation under the Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993 (“PFVA”). 
Despite its abolition, many subsequent family law cases continue to trivialise marital 
rape, as well as rape within cohabiting relationships. Many of these decisions also 
demonstrate misogynistic ideas regarding women and the family.22 This inadequate 
judicial engagement with existing gendered dynamics emphasises the need for a 
relational feminist approach to family law issues.23  
These traditional family law rules and formalistic judgments illustrate the patterns of 
gender inequality established in our society. As articulated by former Justice O’Regan 
in Brink v Kitshoff (“Brink”),24 while gendered discrimination has not been as visible as 
racial inequality, it has nevertheless resulted in “deep patterns of disadvantage”.25 
Justice O’Regan specifically went on to state that a key message of our Constitution 
is the need to eradicate all such discrimination from our society.26 In order to combat 
gender inequality and to give effect to the Constitution’s horizontal commitments, a 
more robust scrutiny of whether family law rules align with the Constitution is required.   
 
                                                          
“The Supreme Court of Appeal [SCA] judgments [on family law], although advancing 
gender equality in many respects, fail to acknowledge the impact of existing rules on gender 
equality. It seems as if the SCA prefers to leave the issue of gender equality to the 
Constitutional Court, rather than engaging in its own analysis of gender. This results in legal 
developments which are too often formally rather than substantively equal.” 
22 In the case of S v Moipolai (CA 53/2004) 2004 ZANWHC 19 (20 August 2004), in 
determining the sentence for rape committed by a man against his domestic partner of seven 
years, the Court held that some of the mitigating factors included that the applicant and the 
complainant were not strangers and that they had two children together. When discussing the 
complainant’s visit to the home of the appellant’s parents, the Court stated that she must have 
known that sexual intercourse was likely to occur and that she was, given the nature of their 
relationship, willing to take part in the intercourse. In S v Modise (113/06) 2007 ZANWHC 73 
(9 November 2007), the High Court was also criticised for lowering the sentence for rape, due 
to mitigating factors such as the intimate relationship that existed between the complainant 
and the accused. The more recent Supreme Court of Appeal decision of Ndou v S 2014 1 
SACR 198 (SCA) offers a further example of the persistent and damaging nature of gendered 
stereotypes within rape decisions. In this case, the Court reduced the sentence of life 
imprisonment that the appellant had originally received after being found guilty of raping his 
15-year-old stepdaughter to a sentence of 15 years. In determining whether there were 
compelling reasons to deviate from the minimum sentence, the court specifically referred to 
the fact that the victim did not fight back during the attack and that the perpetrator had bought 
her gifts that she accepted.  
23 Bonthuys (2015) SAJHR 394. 
24 1996 4 SA 197 (CC); 1996 6 BCLR 752 (CC) (“Brink”).  
25 Para 44.   
26 Para 44.   
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3 3 Jurisprudence on the interaction between the Bill of Rights and 
unrecognised relationships  
 
3 3 1 Introduction 
 
 Since the advent of democracy, the South African family law regime has undergone 
certain progressive developments in accordance with our Bill of Rights.27 For example, 
customary unions28 and same-sex marriages29 are now legally recognised. The 
Constitutional Court has also utilised the Bill of Rights to extend many of the legislative 
benefits previously reserved for married couples to Muslim unions, both monogamous 
and polygamous.30 As a result of these advances, the Constitution has been described 
as launching South Africa into an era characterised by improved respect for human 
dignity, privacy and diversity.31 Significantly, in the context of family law, the 
Constitution requires a particular focus on protecting the most vulnerable groups in 
our society.32  
                                                          
27 E Bonthuys “The South African Bill of Rights and the Development of Family Law” (2002) 
119 SALJ 748 748. See for example, the specific cases where the Constitutional Court 
extended many of the material benefits previously reserved for heterosexual spouses to same-
sex relationships: National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 
and Others 2000 2 SA 1; 2000 1 BCLR 39; Satchwell v President of Republic of South Africa 
2002 6 SA 1; 2002 9 BCLR 986; and Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie (Doctors for Life 
International, Amici Curiae); Lesbian & Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 
1 SA 524 (CC); 2006 3 BCLR 355 (CC) (“Fourie”). 
28 Before November 2000, customary marriages were not legally recognised due to their 
polygamous nature and as a result of not fulfilling the requirements set out in the Marriage Act 
25 of 1961. This was finally changed on 15 November 2000, when customary marriages were 
given full legal recognition through the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
29 For example, the ground-breaking decision in Fourie effectively served as the catalyst for 
the recognition of same-sex unions in South Africa. See also the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 
(“CUA”).  
30 See: Daniels v Campbell 2004 5 SA 331 (CC); 2004 7 BCLR 735 (CC), which concerned 
extending the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 and the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses 
Act 27 of 1990 to monogamous Muslim unions and Hassam v Jacobs NO 2009 11 BCLR 1148 
(CC); 2009 5 SA 572 (CC) which concerned extending the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 
1987 to polygynous Mulsim unions. See also: Bonthuys (2002) 119 SALJ 748; and Meyerson 
(2010) CCR 297. 
31 J Sloth-Nielson & B van Heerden “The Constitutional Family: Developments in South African 
Family Law Jurisprudence under the 1996 Constitution” (2003) 17 International Journal of 
Law, Policy and the Family” 121 121. 
32  Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae); Shibi 
v Sithole; South African Human Rights Commission v President of the Republic of South Africa 
2005 1 SA 580 (CC); 2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC) paras 93 & 130; Gumede v President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2009 3 BCLR 243 (CC); 2009 3 SA 152 (CC) para 43; South African 
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 While these status-based developments are important, they are primarily based on 
formal33 interpretations of the constitutional right to equality.34 Certain formalistic 
interpretations of section 9 of the Constitution entrench conservative and stereotypical 
ideas on gender and marriage, while ignoring the socio-economic needs of women.35 
With regard to the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights to family law issues, the 
courts have tended to ignore section 8 of the Constitution, while primarily relying on 
the provisions underlying section 39.36 
 A recent example of the gender bias found in family law cases, as well as the 
neglect of section 8 of the Constitution, is provided in the case of RH v DE,37 which 
concerned the question whether a non-adulterous spouse has the right to delictual 
action against a third party for injury and loss of comfort.38 The legal issue was 
essentially whether this area of the common law should be developed in accordance 
with public policy, either resulting in its abolishment or its development in accordance 
with the Constitution. While the decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal, to do away 
with this claim has, for the most part, been positively received,39 the court’s approach 
has been criticised for failing to address the double standards that apply to male and 
female sexuality, particularly in the context of extra-marital affairs. These double 
standards were specifically illustrated by the High Court’s inappropriate treatment of 
the adulterous wife.40 This case underscores the judiciary’s tendency to avoid an in-
                                                          
Police Services v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC); 2014 10 BCLR 1195 (CC) para 
33. 
33 Formal equality entails the identical treatment of different groups, regardless of the outcome. 
In contrast to this, substantive equality requires addressing the specific social and economic 
circumstances of a particular group to ensure equality of outcome. For example, Catherine 
Albertyn and Beth Goldblatt describe the goal of substantive equality as embracing the idea 
of the “redistribution of power and resources and the elimination of material disadvantage”. 
See C Albertyn & B Goldblatt “Equality in the Final Constitution” in S Woolman, T Roux & M 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (Original Service, June 2008) 35-1 35-5. 
34 B Goldblatt “Case Note: Same-sex Marriage in South Africa: The Constitutional Court's 
Judgment” (2006) 14 Feminist Legal Studies 261 268. 
35 C Albertyn “Substantive Equality and Transformation in South Africa” (2007) 23 SAJHR 253 
255. See also Bonthuys (2002) 119 SALJ 754. 
36 This was discussed in detail in parts 2 4 3 and 2 5 2 of chapter two of this study. 
37 2014 6 SA 436 (SCA). (“RH v DE”).  
38 The Court had to decide whether, nowadays, the act of adultery meets the element of 
wrongfulness in order for delictual liability to attach to it. See RH v DE para 11. 
39 The Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision in RH v DE provided good policy reasons for the 
abolishment of the actions for contumelia and loss of consortium on the basis of adultery, 
which garnered significant public interest. See Bonthuys (2015) SAJHR 394. 
40 RH v DE para 39; Bonthuys (2015) SAJHR 394. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
83 
 
depth engagement with gendered issues prevalent in family law cases.41 While the 
Constitutional Court confirmed the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision to do away 
with the claim,42 the Constitutional Court only briefly touched upon the intrusive 
manner in which the wife had been questioned in the High Court.43 The Court 
discussed how this questioning infringed upon the privacy rights of the wife, without 
discussing the need to address sexism in our society.44 This decision further 
emphasises the need for a gender sensitive engagement with the potential 
implications of the Bill of Rights in family law cases.45  
 The focus of this section’s jurisprudential analysis is primarily on developments 
relating to cohabitation. Certain cases on the interrelationship between the Bill of 
Rights and other forms of unrecognised relationships are, however, relevant as they 
demonstrate aspects of liberalism,46 which continue to pervade our family law 
jurisprudence. Unless these liberal modes of reasoning are questioned and 
developed, the family law regime will continue to exacerbate the socio-economic 
vulnerability of female cohabitants. One example of this is the tendency of courts to 
focus on contractual paradigms, which has a constraining effect on the transformative 
potential of the Bill of Rights.  
 In order to render the law more responsive to the needs of domestic partners, these 
limiting aspects are examined and criticised in the following sections. A number of 
women in our society have been rendered cohabitants through their failure to adhere 
to formal legal requirements pertaining to their relationship. For this reason, relevant 
jurisprudence on customary marriages and Muslim marriages will be considered. The 
                                                          
41 394. 
42 DE v RH 2015 5 SA 83 (CC); 2015 9 BCLR 1003 (CC) (“DE v RH”). 
43 In DE v RH, in para 6, the Court stated that in terms of the affair:  
“Intimate details of it were laid bare in a very raw and intrusive way before the High Court 
and then, to a lesser extent before the Supreme Court of Appeal.” 
44 In para 54, of DE v RH, Justice Madlanga held that: 
“The delictual claim is particularly invasive of, and violates the right to privacy. This very 
case is illustrative of this. The Supreme Court of Appeal dealt with the abusive, 
embarrassing and demeaning questioning that Ms H suffered in the High Court. She was 
‘made to suffer the indignity of having her personal and private life placed under a 
microscope and being interrogated in an insulting and embarrassing fashion.’”  
45 While the Court in DE v RH, para 9, did emphasise that: “Public policy is now infused with 
constitutional values and rights contained in the Constitution,” the need to foster gender 
equality was not discussed. 
46 For example, the adoption of a formal approach to equality and a liberal conception of choice 
has often impeded the ability of the legal system to respond to the reality of women’s lives. 
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primary focus of this analysis is, however, on Volks NO v Robinson (“Volks”), the 
leading case on cohabitation.47  
   
3 3 2 Constitutional jurisprudence on same-sex relationships 
 
 The Constitutional Court has emphasised that section 9 of the Constitution entails 
a commitment to substantive equality, as opposed to formal equality.48 Certain cases 
concerning the interpretation of equality for same-sex unions have resulted in 
substantial positive social change. However, in the majority of cases a formal equality 
framework was utilised, which enabled same-sex unions to be included in the family 
law regime. As emphasised by Goldblatt, the recognition of domestic partnerships 
necessarily requires a substantive equality framework as this recognition extends to a 
novel form of legal regulation of family.49 In the majority of family law cases the courts 
have, therefore, primarily relied on a formal approach to equality.  
One positive development is the Court’s articulation of the far-reaching doctrines of 
dignity and “inclusive moral citizenship”.50 This reasoning is illustrated in National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice (“National Coalition v 
Minister of Justice”),51 where the Court recognised the equal rights of gay men by 
holding that the common law crime of sodomy discriminated unfairly on the ground of 
sexual orientation. Whilst referring to the case of Harksen v Lane NO,52 the Court in 
National Coalition v Minister of Justice53 specifically emphasised the need to place 
itself in the complainants’ position.54 Bonthuys points out the particularly progressive 
                                                          
47 2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC) (“Volks”). 
48 Justice Sachs emphasised this in Volks, para 163, with the statement that:  
“This Court has on numerous occasions stressed the importance of recognising patterns 
of systematic disadvantage in our society when endeavouring to achieve substantive and 
not just formal equality.”  
See also Brink; President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) (“Hugo”); 
and Bannatyne v Bannatyne (Commission for Gender Equality, as Amicus Curiae) 2003 2 SA 
363 (CC) (“Bannatyne”). 
49 Goldblatt (2006) Feminist Legal Studies 268. 
50 Fourie para 15. 
51 1999 1 SA 6; 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (“National Coalition v Minister of Justice”). 
52 1997 11 BCLR 1489; 1998 1 SA 300 (“Harksen v Lane NO”). 
53 National Coalition v Minister of Justice para 22. 
54 Para 22. 
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nature of this reasoning, as it indicates a shift from the traditional legal approach of 
objectivity and neutrality to one of “imaginative empathy and compassion”.55 
 National Coalition v Minister of Justice56 is particularly noteworthy for serving as the 
catalyst for the subsequent judicial extension of many of the benefits of civil marriages 
to same-sex cohabitants. These extensions include the right to inherit intestate,57 the 
right to adopt children jointly58 and the right to claim for loss of support as a result of 
the death of a breadwinner.59 In the subsequent decision of National Coalition for Gay 
and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs (“National Coalition v Minister of Home 
Affairs”),60 the Court held that gay and lesbian couples are also just as capable as 
heterosexual couples of establishing the consortium omnis vitae associated with 
marriage.61 
 In the subsequent celebrated judgment of Fourie, the Court decided that the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from the common law deﬁnition of marriage and the 
statutory marriage formula as described under the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 was 
unconstitutional.62 While the Court emphasised that the common law definition of 
marriage violated sections 9(1), 9(3) and 10 of the Constitution, by preventing same-
sex unions from enjoying the benefits accorded to heterosexual couples,63 the majority 
declined to develop the common law definition. When discussing the appropriate 
remedy to be provided, the Court pointed out that the legislature has an important, 
democratic and legitimating role to play in our society. According to Justice Sachs, it 
was therefore more appropriate and desirable to leave it to Parliament to correct the 
defect in the Marriage Act, while adding that this would have an automatic impact on 
the common law definition of marriage.64  
The majority decision of the Court therefore suspended the declaration of invalidity 
for one year in order to allow Parliament to enact new legislation to correct the defects. 
                                                          
55 Bonthuys (2002) SALJ 773. 
56 National Coalition v Minister of Justice para 22. 
57 Gory v Kolver NO 2007 3 SA 97 (CC); 2007 3 BCLR 294 (CC) (“Gory”). 
58 Du Toit v Minister of Welfare & Population Development (Lesbian & Gay Equality Project as 
Amicus Curiae) 2003 2 SA 198 (CC); 2002 10 BCLR 1006 (“Du Toit”). 
59 Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA) (“Du Plessis”). 
60 2000 2 SA 1 (CC) (“National Coalition v Minister of Home Affairs”). 
61 In National Coalition v Minister of Home Affairs, para 15, the Court refers to “companionship, 
love, affection, comfort, mutual services and sexual intercourse” as all belonging to the 
marriage state. 
62 Fourie para 135. 
63 Para 135. 
64 Fourie para 122. 
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The order specified that if Parliament failed to do so, certain words would then be read 
into the Marriage Act to accommodate same-sex marriages.65 While both the common 
law definition of marriage and section 30(1) of the Marriage Act were declared 
unconstitutional for excluding same-sex unions, upon the condition of Parliament 
failing to enact legislation, it was only the definition under section 30 of the Marriage 
Act that would have words read into it. By leaving the common law definition of 
marriage intact, the Court therefore neglected the opportunity to develop this 
construction to recognise a variety of family forms, including domestic partnerships. It 
was further stated that given that marriage involves a question of personal status, it 
would lead to greater stability if such matters were regulated by an Act of Parliament 
rather than by the Court.66  
 Justice O’Regan in her minority judgment pointed out that the case was concerned 
with the common law rule regarding the definition of marriage as developed by the 
courts. This is due to the fact that the provisions of section 30 of the Marriage Act 
rested on the common law definition. She went on to state that the development of the 
common law to comply with constitutional requirements essentially falls under the 
responsibility of the courts.67 Referring to the decision of Carmichele v Minister of 
Safety and Security (“Carmichele”),68 she elaborated that it is the responsibility of the 
courts to ensure that the common law is in conformity with the Constitution.69 This 
proactive response to developing the common law is particularly necessary when it 
comes to cohabitants, as their socio-economic interests are primarily regulated by 
private law rules. 
 While the majority judgment in Fourie declined to develop the unconstitutional 
common law definition of marriage, it did emphasise the value of diversity, with the 
statement that families can be constituted in a number of different ways and that social 
regulation of families should change in accordance with this reality.70 This judgment 
also significantly served as the catalyst for the promulgation of the Civil Union Act 17 
of 2006 (“CUA”), which is discussed in detail later.71 The potential possibility of 
                                                          
65 Fourie para 159; See also Goldblatt (2006) Feminist Legal Studies 262-270. 
66 Fourie para 165. 
67 Para 165. 
68 2001 4 938 (CC); 2001 10 BCLR 995 (CC) (“Carmichele”), para 62.   
69 Fourie para 167. 
70 Para 15. 
71 See part 3 4 6 of this chapter. 
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extending the common law definition of marriage to a broader range of relationships, 
such as unmarried cohabitants and Muslim marriages was, however, not raised before 
the court and therefore not addressed in the Court’s decision.72  
 
3 3 3 Jurisprudence on customary marriages 
 
 While the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (“RCMA”) regulates 
customary unions, certain customary wives remain vulnerable to socio-economic 
disadvantage. The RCMA is discussed in detail in section 3 4 of this study, which 
examines the legislative framework governing our family law regime.73 The RCMA is 
noted in this section as certain gaps in the RCMA have given rise to legal cases 
concerning the vulnerability of customary wives.  
 An example of the vulnerability of customary wives is provided in K v P.74 In this 
case, a customary marriage was held to be invalid due to the husband already being 
married according to civil law, while his customary “wife” was unaware of this marriage. 
In this case, the defendant initially promised to marry her in accordance with civil law. 
Once he found out that she was HIV positive though, he stated that she was not worthy 
of concluding a civil marriage with him. In terms of the social norms dictating his 
experience, a civil marriage had a higher status than a traditional customary 
marriage.75 The Court confirmed that due to the existence of the civil marriage, and in 
accordance with the RCMA, it was not possible or legally competent for the plaintiff to 
register her customary marriage.76 The result of not registering her marriage was that 
the plaintiff unintentionally became party to a domestic partnership. This is 
unfortunately a widespread problem that emphasises the need for effective regulation 
of cohabitation in South Africa. K v P also highlights the problematic issue of 
polygamous relationships, which is dealt with in further detail in chapter five of this 
study. While the plaintiff’s marriage was ultimately found to be invalid due it to not 
being registered, the court did award her damages,77 particularly as the defendant had 
                                                          
72 Fourie paras 60 and 87. 
73 See part 3 4 3 of this chapter. 
74 2010 ZAGPJHC 93 (15 October 2010) (“K v P”). 
75 P Bakker “Chaos in Family Law: A Model for the Recognition of Intimate Relationships in 
South Africa” (2013) 16 PELJ 116 116. 
76 K v P para 5. 
77 Para 13. 
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misrepresented his marital status and caused the plaintiff significant emotional and 
psychological harm. Although this case clearly implicated the right to equality, the Bill 
of Rights was not mentioned or utilised in the court’s decision.  
 A further example of the vulnerability experienced by customary wives is offered by 
the Constitutional Court case of Mayelane v Ngwenyama.78 In this case, the Court 
considered the development of the customary law relating to Tsonga marriages, in line 
with the Constitution, through relying primarily on section 39(2) of the Constitution. The 
applicant had been married to the deceased in terms of customary law since 1984. 
The deceased entered into a second marriage with the respondent in 2008 and passed 
away in 2009. The issue was whether the customary law relating to Tsonga marriages 
required the first wife’s consent to the second marriage in order for it to be valid. The 
Court developed the customary law to require the first wife’s consent.79 In essence, 
therefore, the second wife was in a domestic partnership with the deceased, 
regardless of her intentions. 
 While the Court’s decision represents a progressive line of reasoning in terms of 
protecting the constitutional rights of the first wife, the Court has been criticised for 
ruling that the second marriage is automatically rendered null and void.80 This is due 
to the fact that automatic invalidity of the second marriage could have serious 
economic and social consequences for the second wife and any children born from 
that relationship.81 While the first wife’s consent should be required, the appropriate 
remedy should depend on all the circumstances of the case, as well as the 
constitutional rights of all the parties involved, including the second wife. This is 
necessary, as she may have been in a vulnerable position when she entered into the 
relationship, where marriage exerted an “irresistible economic and social pull”.82 
Ultimately, the Court’s reliance on the right to equality and section 39(2) of the 
                                                          
78 2013 ZACC 14; 2013 4 SA 415 (CC) (“Mayelane”). 
79 Para 75. 
80 M Mamashela & Marita Carnelley “The Catch 22 Situation of Widows from Polygamous 
Marriages being Discarded under Customary Law” (2011) 87 Agenda112 112. 
81 This declaration of voidness usually occurs after the death of the husband and has 
devastating legal and emotional consequences for the “discarded” wife. See Mamashela & 
Carnelley (2011) Agenda 112. 
82 Women’s Legal Centre Trust, Rural Women’s Movement and the Commission for Gender 
Equality “Mayelane v Ngwenyama & Another: Amicus Curiae Heads of Argument” (2013) 41 
<http://www. constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/19940.PDF> (accessed 31-05-2013). 
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Constitution facilitated the failure to engage with the socio-economic rights of the 
second wife.  
 If robustly applied, the horizontal application of socio-economic rights could, 
however, facilitate the transformation of existing legislation and “background legal 
rules”83 governing cohabitation. Despite this transformative potential and the growing 
judicial acceptance of the need for the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, 
uncertainty remains as to precisely how the common law should be developed. In this 
regard, there is a degree of ambivalence in terms of the extent to which the Bill of 
Rights should apply to our traditional system of private law.84 For example, should the 
Constitution operate directly on the conduct of cohabitants, in the manner of an 
ordinary law, or should the Constitution operate directly only on the law.85 The precise 
application of a constitutional obligation within the private sphere is, therefore, 
currently determined “case-by-case through a balancing test”.86  
 The judicial failure to robustly engage with the socio-economic rights of cohabitants 
is problematic though, as rural women’s lack of access to basic services often overlaps 
with unequal rights in family structures. As a result, rural women often experience 
limited access to family resources, such as land and livestock.87  
 An examination of socio-economic rights can assist in ensuring that the legal 
analysis in a case concerning a customary marriage is more responsive to the material 
deprivation experienced by women married according to customary law. Focusing on 
the socio-economic deprivation of a woman married according to customary law can 
also shift the focus back onto group-based understandings of material disadvantage. 
Considerations of socio-economic disadvantage reveal the manner in which poverty 
exacerbates the inequality experienced by cohabiting women. Addressing the 
relational nature of poverty and gender equality prevalent in cohabiting relationships, 
as well as relationships formalised according to customary law would also facilitate a 
more responsive jurisprudence to the needs of poor women. The manner in which the 
                                                          
83 L Williams “Issues and challenges in addressing poverty and legal rights: A comparative 
United States/South Africa analysis” (2005) 21 SAJHR 436-472 440. Davis “Developing the 
Common Law of Contract” in Liebenberg & Quinot (eds) Law and Poverty 404. 
84 D Bhana “The Development of a Basic Approach for the Constitutionalisation of Our 
Common Law of Contract” (2015) 26 Stell LR 1 2. 
85 Davis & Klare (2010) SAJHR 421. 
86 420. 
87 J Kehler “Women and Poverty: The South African Experience” (2001) 3 Journal of 
International Women’s Studies 1 45. 
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RCMA is being interpreted and implemented could also be examined in terms of 
whether it is facilitating the realisation of the socio-economic rights of women. 
Customary law rules should structure relations that enhance the dignity and autonomy 
of women whose needs are urgent and who are living in intolerable conditions. Cases 
concerning customary marriages can take account of socio-economic rights as tools 
to redress issues of material disadvantage resulting from unrecognised marriages or 
family dissolution.  
 The South African customary law framework has already been criticised for not 
being sufficiently gender-sensitive.88 This section sought to utilise the case of 
Mayelane v Ngwenyama, as an example of the need to consider and balance the 
specific socio-economic rights of female partners, particularly in polygamous 
relationships. A relational feminist interpretation of the socio-economic rights of 
women in relationships governed by customary law is more conducive to protecting 
the constitutional rights of all women involved. The principles outlined in Grootboom 
pertaining to the need to progressively realise the right of access to adequate 
housing,89 could furthermore, inform the examination of the customary law framework. 
While Grootboom concerned an evaluation of the government’s housing policy, family 
law legislation could also be examined in terms of whether their provisions facilitate or 
undermine access to socio-economic rights. For example, the RCMA could be 
examined in terms of whether this framework facilitates access to socio-economic 
resources for women married according to customary law.   
 Examining the socio-economic implications of polygamous relationships can also 
foreground the underlying assumptions regarding the role of men and women in our 
society. For example, an analysis of these cases reveals that in these disputes the 
women are often pitted against each other. This underlying rhetoric therefore 
structures relations between women that are based on competition, ultimately 
undermining the dignity of the female partners. An effort should be made to consider 
and weigh the constitutional rights of all the parties involved in a manner that protects 
                                                          
88 E Bonthuys “The South African Bill of Rights and the Development of Family Law” (2002) 
119 SALJ 748 748; C Alberyn “Using Rights and the Law to Reduce Women’s Vulnerability to 
HIV/AIDS” (2001) 5 Law, Democracy & Development 179 184. 
89 See part 2 4 2 of chapter two of this study. In accordance with the reasonableness model 
of review, a court examines whether a government programme is flexible, coherent, 
comprehensive and capable of effectively realising a particular socio-economic right. One 
particularly important factor that a court considers is the degree to which provision has been 
made for the most vulnerable members of society. See Grootboom para 44. 
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their socio-economic rights and their human dignity. The potential implications of a 
relational feminist interpretation of socio-economic rights for women involved in 
polygamous relationships, is discussed further in chapter five. 
 
3 3 4 Jurisprudence on religious marriages 
 
 As a result of the law’s failure to recognise Muslim marriages,90 Muslim wives 
technically have the legal status of cohabitants. Although certain cases have extended 
some benefits underlying civil marriages to Muslim wives, it is worth noting the 
jurisprudential habits and patterns of reasoning found within these cases, as they 
further emphasise the need for a constitutional gender-sensitive approach to 
unregulated relationships.  
The need for development in accordance with our Constitution is illustrated by the 
predominant focus on contractual principles, as evinced by the case of Ryland v Edros 
(“Ryland”).91 In this case, the Cape High Court innovatively recognised some of the 
contractual obligations flowing from a monogamous Muslim marriage as valid and 
enforceable. The wife was not treated as a spouse entitled to spousal support. The 
marriage was instead recognised as a contract that could be enforced between the 
parties.92 In considering whether the contract was against public policy and invalid, the 
court specifically pointed out that the meaning of open-ended common-law concepts 
like “boni mores” and “public policy” should be informed by basic constitutional values 
such as freedom and equality.93  
 This is an important recognition in terms of the need to develop family law contracts. 
These concepts should, however, be further informed by broader constitutional values, 
such as those underlying socio-economic rights. This is due to the fact that Muslim 
women and children are often deprived of access to socio-economic resources, such 
as access to adequate housing, food, water and social security, upon the dissolution 
                                                          
90 Muslim personal law has been described as religion-based family law. Matters governing 
Muslim marriages are regulated under the prescripts of the eighth century classical Islamic 
Law (Shari’a) as established in the Qur’an and Sunna. See N Moosa “The Dissolution of a 
Muslim Marriage by Divorce” in J Heaton (ed) The Law of Divorce and Dissolution of Life 
Partnerships in South Africa (2014) 281 281, footnote 1. 
91 1997 2 SA 690 (C) (“Ryland”). 
92 Moosa “The Dissolution of a Muslim Marriage” in Law of Divorce 335. 
93 Ryland p 708.  
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of their family.94 It is also unfortunate that this case was decided primarily on the basis 
of the validity of the contract and not on the validity of Muslim marriages in general. 
The court’s emphasis on the monogamous nature of the marriage further hinted that 
this protection may not be available to polygamous marriages,95 thus limiting the ambit 
of protection provided.  
 Subsequently in Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (“Amod”),96 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal held that the surviving spouse in a monogamous Muslim 
marriage qualified as a dependant in terms of a dependant’s action for a loss of support 
claim.97 This decision was also based on contract, with the court recognising that a 
valid contractual duty flows from a Muslim marriage. While this case did afford Muslim 
wives a certain level of protection, the court has again been criticised for its narrow 
focus on contract, rather than focusing on family relationships.98  
The Court has also been criticised for its pre-occupation with the de facto 
monogamous nature of the marriages. For example, Goldblatt has indicated that this 
approach retains the traditional common-law bias in favour of monogamous family 
groups.99 In order to align our family law regime with the Constitution, a broader 
conception of the family unit is necessary. This is especially true if we are to assist the 
most disadvantaged groups of women in our society; who are often involved in 
polygamous relationships. Constitutionally-inspired development is also required as 
many Muslim women face the same socio-economic challenges as domestic partners. 
Choosing to focus on the human rights of cohabitants as opposed to contractual 
principles, or the form of the relationship, therefore has the potential to provide more 
substantial socio-economic protection to a greater number of women.   
 The courts have briefly alluded to the material impact of non-recognition in a number 
of cases. In Daniels v Campbell (“Daniels”),100 for example, the applicant had gained 
a Council house, which she occupied from 1976. After she was married according to 
Muslim Personal Law (“MPL”) in 1977, ownership of the house was transferred to her 
                                                          
94 This is evinced by the facts of the Ryland case, p 708, and Daniels v Campbell 2004 5 SA 
331 (CC); 2004 7 BCLR 735 (CC) (“Daniels”), which is discussed later.  
95 Ryland p 707. 
96 1999 4 All SA 421 (SCA) (“Amod”). 
97 Para 23. 
98 Bonthuys (2002) SALJ 763. 
99 B Goldblatt “Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender 
Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA)” (2000) 16 SAJHR 138 143. 
100 2004 5 SA 331 (CC); 2004 7 BCLR 735 (CC) (“Daniels”). 
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husband who then passed away without a will. Due to the state’s non-recognition of 
Muslim marriages, she was unable to inherit the house under the Intestate Succession 
Act 81 of 1987 (“ISA”). The Court recognised that the ISA effectively withheld 
economic protection from Muslim widows, with the statement that, as a result of her 
marriage being solemnised in terms of MPL, she stood to lose a home that “but for her 
marriage to the deceased, would have been her property”.101  
 In spite of this recognition, the Court never considered the applicant’s right to have 
access to adequate housing,102 or the potential implications of this right in developing 
the law relating to Muslim marriages.103 In contrast, the Court referred to the 
constitutional values of equality, dignity and respect for diversity.104 The Court held 
that these values ultimately required the word “spouse” as used in the ISA, to include 
the surviving partner to a monogamous Muslim marriage. The word “survivor” in 
section 1 of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 (“MSSA”) was also 
interpreted to include parties to a monogamous Muslim marriage.105 In the case of 
Hassam v Jacobs NO (“Hassam”),106 the Constitutional Court also had to decide on 
the constitutionality of the ISA for excluding widows of polygamous Muslim marriages. 
The Court specifically observed that: 
  
“The effect of the failure to afford the benefits of the Act to widows of polygamous Muslim 
marriages will generally cause widows significant and material disadvantage of the sort 
which it is the express purpose of our equality provision to avoid.”107 
 
 However, it is not only the right to equality that seeks to protect the material interests 
of women. Socio-economic rights are also aimed at protecting the social and economic 
conditions necessary for women to fully and equally enjoy their constitutional rights.108  
There is therefore a need to further scrutinise how family law rules are structuring 
inequitable relations between men and women. Giving effect to a relational feminist 
                                                          
101 Para 106. 
102 S 26 of the Constitution. 
103 C de Villiers “Daniels v Campbell NO: The Long Battle of a Woman Married According to 
Muslim Personal Rights to Acquire Ownership of her Home” (2003) 4 ESR Review 1 8-10. 
104 Daniels para 21. 
105 Para 40. 
106 2009 11 BCLR 1148 (CC); 2009 5 SA 572 (CC) (“Hassam”). 
107 Para 34. 
108 Liebenberg “Socio-Economic Rights” in Symbols or Substance (2014) 70. 
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interpretation of the socio-economic rights of women has the potential to structure 
more constructive patterns of relating between men and women.  
Despite the socio-economic implications of unrecognised relationships, the above 
cases underscore the jurisprudential trend to focus on common law contractual 
principles within family law cases. These cases also emphasise the tendency of the 
courts to protect and recognise relationships that closely resemble the traditional 
conception of a civil marriage, such as monogamous relationships. As a result of this, 
vulnerable women continue to fall through the gaps of the legal system. In the light of 
the need to further examine the socio-economic rights of cohabiting women, the 
leading case on cohabitation will now be analysed. 
 
3 3 5 Cohabitation: Volks NO v Robinson  
 
 The leading case on the status of unmarried cohabitants is Volks NO v Robinson 
(“Volks”).109 This case is particularly noteworthy for illustrating many of the 
constraining elements underlying our traditional legal culture.110 In this case, the first 
respondent (Mrs Robinson) had been involved in a long-term relationship with a 
lawyer, Mr Shandling (the deceased), which spanned over a period of sixteen years. 
During this time, she lived with him, cared for him when he was ill and accompanied 
him to work functions and on family holidays.111 She claimed that the survivor of such 
a stable and permanent relationship, who had lived a life akin to that of husband and 
wife, should be afforded the same protection that is afforded to the survivor of a civil 
marriage.112 This was in terms of the provisions of section 2(1), read with section 1, of 
the MSSA. The issue before the Court was whether the exclusion of unmarried 
cohabitants from the definition of “survivor” under the MSSA was unconstitutional. The 
case was argued on the basis of the constitutional rights to dignity and discrimination 
on the basis of marital status.  
 As marital status is included under section 9(3) of the Constitution, Skweyiya J 
(writing for the majority) was initially prepared to accept that it was presumed unfair 
                                                          
109 2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC) (“Volks”). 
110 Heaton (2005) SAJHR 555; and Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights (2010) 318. 
111 Volks para 6. 
112 Para 1. 
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discrimination.113 Ultimately, however, Justice Skewyiya found that due to the fact that 
marriage is a vital social institution, serving as the foundation of our society, it was not 
unfair to distinguish between those who were married and those who were not.114 In 
his analysis of difference, Skewiya J also pointed out that there was a fundamental 
difference between spouses and cohabitants. In deciding that it was fair to distinguish 
between those who were married and those who were not, he relied on a contractual 
paradigm, referring to the fact that there was no duty to maintain a domestic partner 
during the lifetime of the parties. He specifically went on to state that it would be 
“incongruous, unfair, irrational and undesirable” to impose this duty posthumously.115 
He further pointed out that, to the extent that any obligation would arise between 
cohabitants during the subsistence of their relationship, this would only be in terms of 
an agreement and would only be within the limits of that agreement.”116 This 
perception is evinced by the statement that: 
   
“Marriage is a matter of choice. Marriage is a manifestation of that choice and more 
importantly, the acceptance of the consequences of a marriage.”117  
 
The majority’s common law contractual reasoning in Volks was primarily based on 
a libertarian conception of choice. This is illustrated by the Court’s statement that this 
exclusion did not amount to unfair discrimination, as heterosexual cohabitants have a 
choice to marry. Accordingly, if cohabitants do not exercise this choice to marry, they 
deserve the negative consequences of failing to do so.118 In contrast to this contractual 
approach, however, there should have been a deeper engagement with whether the 
MSSA gives effect to the “spirit purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.”119  
 The majority judgment’s adoption of a liberal conception of choice as free and 
unconstrained has been extensively criticised.120 One reason for this criticism is the 
                                                          
113 Paras 52-54.   
114 Paras 52-54.   
115 Para 60. 
116 Para 58. 
117 Para 93. 
118 Para 56. 
119 S 39(2) of the Constitution. 
120 Beth Goldblatt criticised the liberal choice argument as it is applied to domestic partnerships 
in her 2003 article: Goldblatt (2003) SALJ 616. The Court’s liberal conception of choice was 
specifically criticised by Elsje Bonthuys (2008) CJWL 13-14; and C Albertyn “Substantive 
Equality and Transformation in South Africa” (2007) 23 SAJHR 253 266. 
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formalistic reasoning adopted by the Court, which ignored the existing social context 
of gendered dynamics currently shaping cohabitation in South Africa.121 The majority’s 
approach perceived a distinction between those with free will (such as the applicant) 
and those without. Even if the applicant had the “choice” to marry, the Court could 
have considered this case within its broader social context, where poor women are 
often severely disadvantaged by the non-recognition of their relationships. There are, 
furthermore, significant social and interpersonal factors that often hinder one’s 
freedom of choice within relationships. Substantial empirical evidence was submitted 
to the court by women's groups that specifically emphasised how African female 
cohabitants’ choices to enter into domestic partnerships are influenced by their dire 
socio-economic position.122 The evidence also underscored how these women were 
often left destitute upon their partner’s death.123  
 While Skewiya J was able to recognise that many cohabiting women are socio-
economically vulnerable, he held that this was not due to the under-inclusiveness of 
section 2(1) of the MSSA.124 He argued that the plight of cohabiting women is due to 
the absence of any law regulating cohabitation. From a relational feminist perspective 
this is a rather limited view of the state’s duty to address socio-economic inequality 
between cohabitants. While Skewiya J was able to concede that specific laws are 
required in order to ensure that a vulnerable cohabitant is not unfairly taken advantage 
                                                          
121 A discussion of the social inequality prevalent in cohabiting relationships is provided in 
chapter one of this study. Beth Goldblatt has also described the inadequate nature of the 
liberal choice argument to respond to this inequality in detail, see Goldblatt  (2003) SALJ 616, 
where she points out that:    
“The libertarian presumption of free choice is incorrect. It is itself premised on the idea that 
all people entering into family arrangements are equally placed. This is not so. Men and 
women approach intimate relationships from different social positions with different 
measures of bargaining power. Gender inequality and patriarchy result in women lacking 
the choice freely and equally to set the terms of their relationships. It is precisely because 
weaker parties (usually women) are unable to compel the other partner to enter into a 
contract or register their relationship that they need protection.” 
122 The Amicus Curiae in this case, the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (“CALS”), the 
University of the Witwatersrand, made submissions regarding the vulnerability of female 
cohabitants upon the termination of their relationship. See: Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
“Written Submission on Behalf of the Amicus Curiae” (2004) 1 -32. 
123 B Goldblatt, C Yose & S Mills “Cohabitation and Gender in the South African Context: 
Implications for Law Reform” (2001) 2 (research report prepared by the Gender Research 
Project of CALS at the University of the Witwatersrand); and Bonthuys (2008) CJWL 13-14. 
124 Volks para 65. 
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of, he gave no further guidance as to what constitutional principles should inform this 
legislative response under a constitutional democracy.125  
 In a separate but concurring judgment, Ngcobo J stated that the constitutional 
recognition of the right to marry and the institution of marriage are consistent with the 
obligations imposed on our country by international and regional human rights 
instruments. He shared the opinion that it is a logical consequence of the recognition 
of civil marriage that the law may, in appropriate circumstances, distinguish between 
married and unmarried people.126 He also argued that it is not the law that places legal 
impediments to heterosexual couples wishing to get married. He stated that the law 
simply provides a legal regime that regulates the rights and obligations of those who 
choose this option.127 In accordance with a relational feminist interpretation of the 
socio-economic rights of female cohabitants, the legal regime is however, only 
providing benefits to an institution that many socio-economically vulnerable women 
are unable to access. In this manner, the legal system is playing a role in entrenching 
relations based on inequality. It is also reinforcing patterns of domination and 
inequality between men and women. In order to give effect to the transformative 
aspirations of our Constitution, the law needs to respond to socio-economic inequality 
in intimate relationships. The constitutional values of equality, autonomy and dignity 
also require that the legal regime is scrutinised to determine whether it is giving effect 
to the rights of vulnerable members of our society. 
 Justices Mokgoro and O’Regan gave a dissenting opinion which agreed with the 
conclusion reached by Justice Sachs, which is discussed below, but for different 
reasons. They pointed out that only providing benefits to civil marriages does in fact 
reproduce hierarchical and unequal relations in our society. They also pointed out that 
long-term domestic partnerships can produce patterns of dependence and 
vulnerability which in the light of the high number of cohabitants, cannot simply be 
ignored by the legislature.128 Mokgoro and O’Regan JJ also agreed that the legislature 
is in the best position to determine how domestic partnerships should be regulated. 
They accordingly found that the order of constitutional invalidity should be suspended 
to give the legislature an opportunity to cure the constitutional defect.129  
                                                          
125 Para 66. 
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 The minority judgment of Sachs J was far more responsive to the existing social 
reality. For example, he clarified that the constitutional consideration of unfair 
discrimination requires an in-depth scrutiny of the manner in which the law reinforces 
gender inequality.130 His analysis was also more in line with a relational feminist 
approach to family law issues. For example, he stated that the question of the fairness 
enquiry needs to be assessed not in the narrow confines of marital rules but rather 
within the broader and more situation-sensitive framework of the [evolving] principles 
of family law. He emphasised that the investigation into unfair discrimination is 
necessitated by the ancient and entrenched nature of patriarchy and sexism,131 which 
often renders these issues invisible to certain legal officers. He went on to observe 
that the primary consideration should be whether the relationship was deserving of 
protection and whether it was unfair to leave the surviving partner without any means 
of support simply because they were unmarried.132 Justice Sachs also specifically held 
that by failing to regulate cohabitation, the law effectively relegates cohabiting women 
to a life of poverty “coupled with the imputation of having been a lawless interloper”.133 
He was thus able to specifically recognise that this approach severely infringes upon 
the human dignity of the survivor of a cohabiting relationship.134  
The majority judgment on the other hand, adopted a formalistic approach to the 
conception of dignity, stating that Mrs Robinson’s dignity was not infringed, as they did 
not think that her dignity was worth less than that of a married person.135 Instead, the 
Court claimed that the difference between her relationship and a marriage relationship 
justifiably limited her ability to access maintenance without implicating her dignity.136 
The need to redress systematic patterns of inequality and disadvantage was obscured 
by the Court’s focus on individual personality issues related to subjective feelings of 
self-worth.137 It is not difficult to recognise how her dignity was infringed, particularly 
when you examine her position in relation to protected surviving spouses. The material 
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134 Para 181. 
135 Para 62. 
136 Para 62. 
137 Kruuse (2009) SAJHR 387. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
99 
 
aspects of human dignity were also clearly ignored.138 The moral conservatism of the 
majority judgment thus resulted in the application of formal equality, while failing to 
recognise the nuances of powerlessness that many poor women experience in 
relationships. 
 The Court’s uncritical prioritisation of civil marriages ignores the diversity prevalent 
within our society. This approach essentially undermines what the High Court termed 
“the dignity of difference” in our society.139 The reality is that, regardless of the official 
form of a relationship, all intimate partnerships have the potential to become sites of 
exploitation and abuse.140 The state needs to play some form of a regulatory role in 
these relationships, irrespective of its official form. The Court’s liberal conception of 
choice thus reinforced a negative conception of autonomy that is particularly 
detrimental to vulnerable family members.  
 The reasoning in Volks illustrates the tendency to maintain a public/private law 
divide that justifies refraining from interrogating the socio-economic implications of 
private law rules. For example, while Ms Robinson was able to reside in the family 
home for a year after her partner’s death, she was ultimately forced to leave the shared 
residence and was deprived of her existing access to housing.141 This occurs for many 
poor cohabiting women upon their partner’s death, even if they contributed to the home 
through rent.142 Ms Robinson was also at an advanced age and would have needed 
to access a pension fund, which implicated her right to have access to social 
security.143 Following the deceased’s death she would have also been removed from 
his medical aid, with implications for her right to have access to health care services.144 
 During the case it was raised in evidence that the applicant had cared for the 
deceased over the course of their relationship, when he had suffered from bipolar 
disorder. The Court did not, however, consider the integral value of this caring work 
and its socio-economic worth as a contribution to the deceased’s estate. The majority 
                                                          
138 See part 2 5 3 of chapter 2 of this study, which discusses the need to develop a relational 
conception of human dignity that recognises the material dimensions underlying the value of 
human dignity for female cohabitants. 
139 Robinson v Volks NO 2004 6 SA 288 (C) at 299I; 2004 6 BCLR 671 (C) at 682H.   
140 FE Olsen “The Myth of State Intervention in the Family” (1984) 18 University of Michigan 
Journal of Law Reform 835 836.   
141 Volks para 3. 
142 See part 1 1 of chapter one of this study, where this is discussed in detail. 
143 S 27(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
144 S 27(1)(a). 
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judgment also held that the primary root of cohabiting women’s vulnerability was their 
poverty, as opposed to the law’s failure to regulate cohabitation.145 The failure to 
regulate these relationships does, however, exacerbate the socio-economic 
disadvantages facing cohabiting women. The majority’s decision reinforced the idea 
that it is constitutionally acceptable for people to enter into long-term intimate 
relationships, to allow their partner to provide caring work and then to leave them 
destitute upon the termination of the relationship. Adopting this liberal approach to 
domestic partnerships does not align with the need to treat everyone “with care and 
concern”.146 The failure to regulate cohabitation therefore plays a role in structuring 
inequitable socio-economic relations in our society. The duty on the state to “promote 
and fulfil”147 socio-economic rights also requires more than a simple acknowledgement 
of women’s socio-economic vulnerability. It requires a robust analysis of the manner 
in which the law reinforces socio-economic vulnerability for cohabitants. The lack of 
engagement with the potential implications of socio-economic rights resulted in a 
failure to allow these rights to influence the interpretation of the MSSA. This lack of 
engagement also prevented the further development of the common law to improve 
the socio-economic well-being of female cohabitants.148  
 The outcome of Volks is also surprising in that the Court had previously been willing 
to extend a number of statutory rights to same-sex unions, as well as Muslim 
marriages. In the Daniels case, for instance, the Constitutional Court was willing to 
extend the application of both the MSSA and the Intestate Act to include spouses of 
Muslim marriages.149 Despite the divided judgement in Volks, all of the judges agreed 
that some form of legal regulation of unmarried partnerships is necessary and the 
majority agreed that the legislature was the best institution to determine how these 
relationships should be regulated. 
 Academics have already criticised the choice argument and the majority’s decision 
to privilege the institution of marriage.150 This section sought to emphasise the need 
for a relational feminist lens when examining the socio-economic implications of failing 
                                                          
145 Volks paras 65-66. 
146 Grootboom para 44. 
147  S 7(2) of the Constitution, read with ss 26 and 27 of the Constitution. 
148 Goldblatt (2003) SALJ 615.   
149 See part 3 3 4 of this chapter. 
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to address cohabitation. The majority opinion in Volks expressed the sentiment that 
cohabitants must “choose” to conform or be left without protection. In contrast, a 
relational feminist analysis focuses on the exploitative relations structured between 
cohabiting men and women, through failing to regulate cohabitation.   
 A relational feminist lens reveals that a liberal conception of choice restricts 
relational access to socio-economic resources while failing to respond to the existing 
social context. Currently, our society encourages relations based on exploitation with 
gendered socio-economic implications. A relational feminist lens foregrounds this 
gender inequality. It also reveals how inequitable relations between cohabiting women 
and men undermine the autonomy and human dignity of vulnerable female 
cohabitants. In particular, this discussion sought to reveal the relational socio-
economic implications for Mrs Robinson upon the termination of her relationship. 
Examples of this include her being forced to leave the family home, her no longer 
enjoying the benefit of being listed as a dependant on her partner’s medical aid and 
her need to access a pension fund. In this case her right of access to adequate 
housing, her right of access to health care services and her right of access to social 
security, were implicated and undermined.  
 The collective outcome of the cases on same-sex unions and Volks is that 
unmarried same-sex cohabitants now have access to more of the benefits associated 
with marriage than heterosexual cohabitants. This anomaly emphasises the need for 
a relational feminist interpretation of the socio-economic rights of individuals within 
relationships, in a manner that fosters substantive autonomy, dignity and diversity. 
This relational feminist approach is also valuable in terms of how it transcends the 
current focus on contractual paradigms and moralistic debates on the form of a 
relationship. 
 
3 3 6 Jurisprudential analysis 
 
 The constitutional obligation to develop the common law to give effect to the rights 
protected in the Bill of Rights,151 and the values underlying the Constitution,152 have 
wrought fundamental changes to the family law landscape since 1994.153 It is, 
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however, evident that the majority of ground-breaking cases have been decided in 
accordance with a formal approach to equality, while the socio-economic rights of 
women have predominantly been ignored. Jurisprudential developments have 
occurred within defined “institutional, doctrinal and normative boundaries,” in a manner 
that has limited the potential of the legal system to shift gendered relations.154 Viewing 
these cases through a relational feminist lens, which focuses on socio-economic 
rights, highlights a number of formalistic elements that continue to pervade our family 
law jurisprudence.  
 The first concern highlighted by a relational feminist interpretation of socio-
economic rights is the failure of the courts to adequately scrutinise the existing social 
context governing cohabitation. In this regard, the courts have not sufficiently 
examined the patterns of relations that have been exacerbated by existing legal rules. 
As a result, there has been an inadequate engagement with the socio-economic 
impact of family law rules for female cohabitants.155 Failing to engage with existing 
hierarchies and systemic inequalities in family law cases will only entrench existing 
inequality in our society. The failure to recognise the family unit, as a socio-economic 
institution that is currently exacerbating the socio-economic disadvantages 
experienced by cohabiting women, is thus problematic.  
 The formalistic failure to engage with the relational social context is also evinced by 
the courts’ tendency to rely on a contractual paradigm, as opposed to examining the 
specific human rights implications of terminated relationships. This is illustrated by the 
jurisprudence on Muslim marriages, as well as the Court’s statement in Volks that any 
duty of support arising between cohabitants would only be in terms of an agreement 
and would be limited to that agreement.156   
 Focusing on contractual principles further limits the contextual analysis of the 
impact of underlying relational power imbalances on contractual autonomy.157 
Notwithstanding the disadvantage perpetuated by family law rules, an analysis of the 
relevant cases reveal that socio-economic rights arguments have not been raised by 
applicants, amici curiae or the courts, within our family law jurisprudence. This 
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approach is often due to strategic reasons.158 In order to foster substantive gender 
equality and social justice, it is necessary to develop relational feminist interpretations 
of socio-economic rights, particularly for cohabiting women.  
 Closely interrelated to the inadequate recognition of the existing social context is 
the judicial tendency to rely on section 39 of the Constitution, as opposed to engaging 
with the provisions underlying section 8 of the Constitution. The decision of RH v DE 
illustrates this point, as well as the jurisprudence on customary marriages. This is in 
spite of the constitutional normative framework, which clearly calls for transcending 
the traditional public/private law divide. A robust application of section 39(2) of the 
Constitution could catalyse significant development of the family law regime. Focusing 
on the specific socio-economic rights that are implicated in a cohabitation case, in 
accordance with the provisions of section 8, would however, also provide an 
opportunity to develop interpretations of socio-economic rights that are responsive to 
relational dynamics and cohabiting women’s specific needs.  
 A relational feminist lens similarly reveals the tendency of the courts to focus on the 
form of a relationship,159 as opposed to engaging with the specific constitutional values 
at stake for female cohabitants. This highlights the transformative potential of focusing 
on socio-economic rights, which evades the traditional moralistic debates concerning 
                                                          
158 With regard to family law, an example of strategic litigation is offered by the challenges 
undertaken by the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality. It chose not to attack the 
root cause of the exclusion of same-sex unions from family law, namely the common-law 
definition of marriage. Instead, it focused on separate common-law and legislative provisions 
with the aim of extending the consequences of common-law marriage to same-sex 
relationships. In this, the Constitutional Court has assisted it most manifestly by indicating that 
same-sex couples are capable of all the elements of the consortium onmis vitae traditionally 
ascribed to marriage. An example of not addressing the gendered dimensions of socio-
economic rights is provided in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 
SA 721 (CC) (“TAC”). In this case it was feared that the “choice” argument would be used 
against the applicants. In particular, it was feared that the focus would then centre on women 
as rational beings capable of making constructive choices relating to motherhood and capable 
of refusing treatment. The TAC wanted to shift the focus from motherhood to the irrationality 
of the state’s ineffective programme. This reveals the strategic challenges facing amicus 
curiae in public interest litigation, while also revealing their particular responsibility in such 
cases. This case therefore illustrates that the social and political context of litigation cannot be 
divorced from legal strategies. However, it also underscores the need for more gender-
sensitive arguments and perspectives on interpretations of socio-economic rights. See 
Albertyn (2012) Stell LR 60. 
159 The predominant focus on form over function is evinced by the Constitutional Court’s 
endorsement of a negative conception of autonomy in Volks. The majority decision in this case 
also focused on civil marriage as the norm while endorsing a limited conception of human 
dignity.  
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which relationship is more deserving of protection.160 In addition, focusing on the 
socio-economic rights of cohabitants has the potential to avoid the judicial tendency 
to conflate equality and dignity considerations.161 
In contrast to a liberal approach, relational feminism is conducive to developing the 
state’s responsibility to structure equitable relations between cohabiting men and 
women. While the role of the legislature and the executive are explored later,162 these 
cases reveal the transformative potential of progressive constitutional interpretation by 
the courts.163 They also emphasise the need to explicitly raise socio-economic rights 
arguments in family law cases to illuminate the socio-economic implications of family 
law rules.  
 Despite certain positive developments, these cases ultimately reveal that the 
jurisprudential focus on form over function, formal applications of equality and 
contractual principles undermine the constitutional goal of fostering substantive 
gender equality. The neglect of socio-economic rights in family law cases further 
reveals the need to transform the underlying causes of gendered socio-economic 
inequality.164  
 While the need for development remains, certain family law decisions have had the 
positive impact of prompting the legislature to enact legislation that recognises 
different relationships. The relevant legislative developments are examined in the 
following section. 
 
3 4  Legislative interventions following the advent of democracy 
 
3 4 1 Introduction 
 
Before 1994, the family law system was primarily governed by the Marriage Act 25 
of 1961 and its ancillary acts. These ancillary acts include the Divorce Act 70 of 1979, 
the Matrimonial Affairs Act 37 of 1953, the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 and 
the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 24 of 1987. These statutes were 
                                                          
160 Bhana (2015) Stell LR 3. 
161 Albertyn & Goldblatt (1998) SAJHR 258; Albertyn (2007) SAJHR 254. 
162 See parts 5 3 and 5 4 of chapter five of this study. 
163 Klare (1998) SAJHR 150. 
164 Albertyn (2007) SAJHR 254. 
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introduced well before the advent of the 1996 Constitution, underscoring the need for 
constitutional development in this area of law. Following the advent of democracy, 
there was a flurry of legislative activity aimed at regulating a wider variety of 
relationships in South Africa. 
This section sets out the gendered impact of the current fragmented legislative 
framework governing cohabitation in South Africa. It also seeks to illustrate how relying 
on statutory mechanisms, without engaging with whether they give effect to the Bill of 
Rights, undermines the Constitution’s horizontal commitments. For example, research 
demonstrates how certain pieces of family law legislation continue to reinforce existing 
patterns of gender inequality.165  
This section also examines the language used in relevant family law statutes in 
terms of primarily recognising relationships that resemble traditional civil marriages. 
The legislative framework should be interrogated to determine whether it positively 
recognises diversity, as well as the fundamental human rights protected in the Bill of 
Rights. After setting out the various pieces of legislation that offer piecemeal 
recognition to cohabitants, this section discusses how certain gaps in the legislative 
framework have given rise to inadvertent forms of cohabitation.  
 
3 4 2 Incremental legislative recognition to cohabitants 
 
There have been a number of ad hoc legislative extensions to conjugal relationships 
outside of marriage over the previous decades. For instance, the acknowledgment of 
domestic partnerships can be traced as far back as the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.166 
In terms of section 21(13) of this Act, the word “spouse” not only means wife or 
husband in the legal sense, but includes a wife or husband by virtue of marriage 
according to any law or custom, as well as a woman living with a man “as his wife” or 
a man living with a woman “as her husband”. Other piecemeal legislative extensions 
include the Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998,167 the Compensation for Occupational 
                                                          
165 Heaton (2005) SAJHR 547. 
166 Volks para 175. 
167 S 24(2)(e) of the Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998 states that no medical scheme will be 
registered if it discriminates on the ground of marital status. 
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Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1997168 and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
75 of 1997.169 Certain pieces of legislation are also applicable to both opposite-sex 
and same-sex life partnerships, such as the Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955, the Pension 
Funds Act 24 of 1956 and the Maintenance Act 99 of 1998. Section 2(1) of the 
Maintenance Act states that the provisions of the Act apply in respect of the legal duty 
of any person to maintain another person, regardless of the nature of the relationship. 
This duty can be overtly or tacitly undertaken. As stated in Volks, there is no automatic 
duty to maintain a domestic partner during the lifetime of the parties.170 The Court 
emphasised that a duty of support could be agreed upon and that the limits of that duty 
would be in terms of the agreement. The difficulty lies therefore, in proving that a duty 
of maintenance has been tacitly undertaken. 
In terms of extending ad hoc recognition to cohabitants, it has been argued that the 
Marriage Act and the Divorce Act could be extended to cohabitants. These Acts 
contain remedies aimed at protecting divorcing parties from becoming financially 
vulnerable upon their divorce. Specific examples of these remedies include the 
provision of on-going financial maintenance and the allocation of marital property to 
the more vulnerable spouse.171 It has been argued that these matrimonial laws could 
shed some light on the types of mechanisms that might be useful in terms of protecting 
unmarried cohabitants.172  
While this may be feasible, one problem with these statutes is that they retain a 
predominantly private law lens. Since they were enacted well before the advent of the 
Constitution, they are also informed by a very different ethos.173 While extending these 
acts to include cohabitants may achieve increased social recognition, it will not be 
sufficient to fundamentally shift inequitable gendered relations in our society.174 It has 
been pointed out that in order to transform family relations, a shift towards a more 
                                                          
168 S 1 of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1997 states 
that a dependant of an employee includes, if there is no widow or widower, a person with 
whom the employee was living as husband and wife, at the time of the employee’s death. 
169 S 27(2)(c)(i) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 provides that an 
employee is entitled to three days leave paid leave in the event of the death of the employee’s 
spouse or life partner. 
170 Volks, para 60. 
171 S 7 of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 provides for the division of assets and maintenance 
between the parties, while s 9 provides for forfeiture orders. 
172 A Barratt “Private Contract or Automatic Court Discretion? Current Trends in Legal 
Regulation of Permanent Life-Partnerships (2015) 26 Stell LR 110 111. 
173 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 378. 
174 Albertyn (2007) SAJHR 273. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
107 
 
equitable distribution of the socio-economic consequences of terminated domestic 
partnerships, between men and women, is required.175 Greater attention therefore 
needs to be paid to the socio-economic consequences of how men and women 
interact with one another. The role of the legal regime in either challenging or 
reinforcing these patterns of relating also needs to be addressed. 
In addition to the piecemeal recognition provided to cohabiting relationships 
discussed in this section, there have been certain innovative legislative developments 
that offer limited recognition and protection to cohabitants. These developments are 
discussed below. 
 
3 4 3 Protection provided by the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 
 
Within South Africa, domestic violence is a critical gendered issue.176 For female 
cohabitants, domestic violence intersects with the lack of legal regulation over their 
relationship status, exacerbating their socio-economic vulnerability.177 In turn, 
women’s poverty makes them particularly vulnerable to violence.178 The Domestic 
Violence Act 116 of 1998 (“DVA”) is thus important, as it recognises that domestic 
violence is a serious social evil, while explicitly protecting domestic partners. In 
addition, the DVA provides protection to same-sex partnerships, people who were or 
are engaged, people in a dating or customary relationship and people who are living 
together or separately. 
The DVA’s preamble highlights that the victims of domestic violence are among the 
most vulnerable members of our society, while section 1 of the Act includes a broad 
description of domestic violence.179 The Act is one of the few pieces of legislation that 
provides some form of legal regulation and protection to female cohabitants who 
experience abuse and exploitation. For example, the DVA specifically defines 
                                                          
175 Albertyn (2007) SAJHR 263; and R Leckey “Gimme Shelter” (2001) 34 Dalhousie Law 
Journal 198-228. 
176 T Bannister “Equal Access to Health Care Services for Survivors of Gender-Based 
Violence” (2014) 12 Equal Rights Review 62-76. 
177 Goldblatt (2003) SALJ 615.   
178 International Federation for Human Rights (IFHR) Montreal Principles on Women’s 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2002) 2. 
179 S 1 of the DVA.   
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“economic abuse” as unreasonably depriving a cohabiting partner180 of economic or 
financial resources to which they are entitled through law.181 It also includes the 
unreasonable deprivation of resources that the complainant requires out of 
necessity.182  
The Act also provides complainants with a broad range of remedies. In this regard, 
the DVA enables a court to tailor the terms of a protection order to the specific needs 
of an applicant.183 A protection order may therefore prohibit a respondent from 
committing any act of domestic violence or from entering a specified place. 
Cohabiting women who are victims of domestic violence thus have the power to 
evict batterers from the family home, even if the female complainant does not own the 
property herself. Police officers’ duties to assist victims and the courts’ remedial 
powers indicate an appreciation of the socio-economic aspects of domestic violence, 
even within domestic partnerships. For example, respondents can be instructed to pay 
rent or mortgage and they can be instructed to provide money for food and other 
necessary household expenses.184  
While the DVA clearly offers innovative remedies for unmarried cohabitants, it is 
restricted to cases involving domestic violence. There have also been severe 
implementation problems surrounding this Act.185 These implementation problems are 
often due to sexist responses by police officials and legal officers. These 
implementation issues underscore the need for further gender sensitivity training of 
judicial officers and policemen in the context of family matters.  
In terms of developing accountability structures for the socio-economic rights of 
cohabitants, a relational feminist framework is particularly responsive to the existing 
power dynamics within a relationship. Given the socio-economic impact of domestic 
violence, the existence of patterns of violence or exploitation within a cohabiting 
                                                          
180 Under s 1 of the DVA, a “domestic relationship” is defined broadly to include domestic 
partners. 
181 Under s 1 of the DVA, “economic abuse” is defined as the unreasonable deprivation of 
financial resources to which a complainant is entitled under law. 
182 S 1(a). 
183 S 4. 
184 S 7(4). 
185 L Vetten, T Le, A Leisegang & S Haken The Right and The Real: A Shadow Report 
Analysing Selected Government Departments’ Implementation of the 1998 Domestic Violence 
Act and 2007 Sexual Offences Act (2010) 28.   
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relationship should play a significant role in determining the socio-economic 
consequences of a terminated domestic partnership.186  
 
3 4 4 Potential relief under the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 
 
While there have been certain progressive cases based on the constitutional right 
to equality, a number of discrimination cases are criticised for ignoring the social 
context which often reveals systemic patterns of gender inequality. This is particularly 
evident in the case of Volks.187 Discrimination takes on many different forms, both in 
terms of discrimination perpetrated by the state against its citizens and in terms of 
private discrimination. In order to give effect to substantive equality, as protected in 
the Constitution, there was therefore the need to enact a more expansive legislative 
response to discrimination. Section 9(4) of the Constitution specifically requires that 
national legislation be drafted in order to prohibit unfair discrimination. The enactment 
of more expansive legislation was also necessary in order to provide more responsive 
remedies to complainants. For these reasons, the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (“PEPUDA”) was enacted.188 When 
interpreting PEPUDA, the courts must give effect to the Constitution.189 
PEPUDA is examined in terms of its potential to offer cohabitants innovative 
remedies upon the termination of their relationship. It is, in a similar vein to the DVA, 
responsive to some of the gaps within the existing legal framework. PEPUDA is 
particularly significant, as it has the potential to address some of the shortcomings of 
prior equality jurisprudence pertaining to unmarried cohabitants. While the majority of 
the ground-breaking cases have been based upon section 9 of the Constitution, future 
challenges should be brought under the provisions of PEPUDA.190 This is due to the 
fact that PEPUDA gives effect to section 9 and is now the primary mechanism 
                                                          
186 E Bonthuys “Domestic Violence and Gendered Socio-Economic Rights: An Agenda for 
Research and Activism” (2014) 30 SAJHR 133 133. 
187 Volks para 60. 
188 Preamble to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 
2000 (“PEPUDA”). 
189 S 39(2) of the Constitution. 
190 Clark & Goldblatt “Gender and Family Law” in Gender, Law and Justice (2007) 205. 
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prohibiting both public and private discrimination.191 The Act has important implications 
for cohabitants, as it applies to all persons and the state.192 Its application therefore 
extends to the private domain. Family relationships, contracts and wills are not 
excluded from its scope. A female cohabitant could potentially utilise PEPUDA to 
challenge the exploitative behaviour of her partner. This legislation could also serve 
as a powerful tool in challenging the law's traditional reluctance to penetrate the 
public/private divide.193 In seeking to rely on PEPUDA, cohabitants would need to be 
cognisant of the negative precedent created in Volks. Nevertheless, it is worth 
examining the innovative and progressive provisions in PEPUDA.  
PEPUDA has enriched the constitutional commitment to equality, in that it provides 
for a more detailed description of discrimination in section 1, whilst providing concrete 
mechanisms for promoting substantive equality. In relation to cohabitants, PEPUDA 
goes further than section 9 of the Constitution and specifically states that socio-
economic status, family responsibility and family status can be potential grounds of 
discrimination. The grounds of socio-economic status, family responsibility and family 
status were not expressly included as listed prohibited grounds of discrimination under 
PEPUDA. This was in spite of active lobbying by a range of civil society groups.194 
PEPUDA does however, recognise the “overwhelming evidence of their importance” 
and thus included these grounds by way of a directive principle.195 This facilitates an 
examination of the intersecting grounds of socio-economic and gender discrimination 
within the private sphere. Expressly addressing the interconnection between family 
responsibilities, their socio-economic impact and gender inequality has the potential 
                                                          
191 This is in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, in terms of which a litigant cannot 
circumvent legislation enacted to give effect to a constitutional right by attempting to rely 
directly on the constitutional right. Doing so would fail to recognise the import and the task 
conferred upon the legislature to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of 
Rights. See MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC); 2008 2 BCLR 
99 (CC) (“Pillay”), para 40. 
192 S 6 of PEPUDA sets out a general prohibition of unfair discrimination that applies to both 
the state and any person. 
193 Liebenberg & O’Sullivan (2001) 21 Acta Juridica 70 89. 
194 Liebenberg & O’Sullivan (2001) 21 Acta Juridica 70 95. 
195 S 34 of PEPUDA provides for directive principles on HIV/AIDS, nationality, socio-economic 
status and family responsibility and status:  
“(1) In view of the overwhelming evidence of the importance, impact on society and link to 
systemic disadvantage and discrimination on the grounds of HIV/AIDS status, socio-
economic status, nationality, family responsibility and family status- (a) special 
consideration must be given to the inclusion of these grounds in paragraph (a) of the 
definition of 'prohibited grounds' by the Minister.” 
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to foster more responsive interpretations of fundamental rights for women. In this 
regard, PEPUDA highlights the need for constitutional law to acknowledge the specific 
vulnerabilities associated with relational access to socio-economic resources. It further 
reveals the need for proper oversight of, and accountability for, the manner in which 
socio-economic obligations are recognised, defined and enforced within private 
relationships.196  
Of particular importance for cohabitants, is the definition of family responsibility as 
referring to a complainant’s “spouse, partner, dependant, child or other members of 
his or her family in respect of whom the member is liable for care and support”.197 The 
Act therefore recognises that various forms of inequality and vulnerability arise within 
family relationships. PEPUDA also recognises the discrimination that exists against 
families that do not fit into the traditional mould, as well as the disadvantage arising 
through care-giving roles.198  
In terms of its description of the prohibited grounds of discrimination, it specifically 
includes all of the grounds listed in section 9 of the Constitution, while including “any 
other ground” where that discrimination (i) causes or perpetuates existing systemic 
disadvantage; (ii) undermines the complainant’s dignity; or (iii) “adversely affects the 
equal enjoyment of a person's rights” in a serious manner.199 PEPUDA therefore 
specifically acknowledges the systemic nature of discrimination. This is important, as 
one of the key critiques against our equality jurisprudence is the tendency to focus on 
individual conceptions of dignity, as opposed to group-based disadvantage.200  
PEPUDA specifically prohibits discrimination against women on the basis of gender 
and marital status, including conduct that unfairly impairs equal access to socio-
economic resources, such as land and finance.201 In terms of its emphasis on positive 
measures, designed to protect or advance persons disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination, PEPUDA also draws an important linkage between the constitutional 
right to equality and socio-economic rights. For example, the Act specifically states 
that any law or conduct that limits women’s access to social services, including health 
                                                          
196 Pieterse (2009) SAJHR 199. 
197 S 1 of PEPUDA. 
198 Liebenberg & O’Sullivan (2001) Acta Juridica 93. 
199 S 1(xxii) PEPUDA. 
200 Albertyn (2007) SAJHR 253; and Bonthuys (2015) SALJ 76. 
201 S 8(e) of PEPUDA. 
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and social security,202 is unfair. PEPUDA also describes discrimination as any act or 
omission (including a law) that directly or indirectly withholds benefits, opportunities or 
advantages from any person, on one or more of the prohibited grounds,203 while 
prohibiting the systemic inequality of access to opportunities resulting from the sexual 
division of labour.204 
Of particular importance is the manner in which the Act has shifted the burden of 
proof when making out a claim for unfair discrimination, which is a lesser onus than 
the constitutional onus. Under the Constitution, a complainant would have to prove 
discrimination by their partner, on one of the listed grounds on a balance of 
probabilities. The burden of proof in PEPUDA was drafted, taking cognisance of the 
fact that discrimination claims are notoriously difficult to prove. Section 13 of PEPUDA 
provides for the burden of proof in relation to cases brought on a listed ground of 
discrimination in paragraph (a) under the specific prohibited grounds mentioned. 
PEPUDA also provides for cases where the alleged discrimination is on the basis of 
an unlisted prohibited ground in accordance with paragraph (b) of the definition. Under 
PEPUDA, the complainant has to make out a case that would not result in absolution 
from the instance.205 Once the complainant has made out a prima facie case of 
discrimination, the onus shifts to the state or the respondent, to prove that the 
discrimination is fair.206 In doing so, the respondent must prove either that the 
discrimination did not take place or that the conduct was not based on one or more of 
the prohibited grounds.207 The Act sets out the specific factors that will aid the court in 
determining whether the discrimination is fair or unfair.208 This list contains elements 
of section 36 of the Constitution, as well as elements of the test as developed in 
Harksen v Lane NO.209  
                                                          
202 S 8(g). 
203 S 1(viii). 
204 S 8(i). 
205 Liebenberg & O’Sullivan (2001) Acta Juridica 99. 
206 S 14(3). 
207 S 13. 
208 S 14. 
209 This case was referenced in part 3 3 2 of this study. In terms of the test for unfair 
discrimination as developed under the case of Harksen, the first aspect of the enquiry is 
whether an impugned provision differentiates between people or groups of people. The court 
then needs to determine if the differentiation amounts to discrimination and if such 
discrimination is unfair. If such discrimination is found to be unfair then it needs to be justified 
in terms of the limitations clause (s 36). 
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It is worth pausing to consider how a cohabiting woman could argue that her 
partner’s attempt to evict her after a long-term relationship, characterised by significant 
family responsibility, discriminates unfairly against her. The specific grounds that she 
could rely on include the grounds of gender,210 marital status211 and family 
responsibility,212 under the provisions of PEPUDA. Due to the shift in onus, after the 
complainant makes out a prima facie case, the onus will then shift to her partner 
seeking to evict her. He would have to prove that the eviction is justifiable and that he 
has taken reasonable steps in attempting to alleviate the detrimental consequences 
of the eviction.  
A cohabitant seeking to evict his partner from their common home would, therefore, 
have to prove that his conduct is fair in the light of the existing social context and 
patterns of gender discrimination within our society. In examining the nature and extent 
of his discriminatory conduct, section 14 of PEPUDA will aid the court in determining 
whether his decision to evict his partner is fair. Examples of the factors referenced in 
section 14, include whether the eviction has a legitimate purpose, to what extent 
evicting his partner achieves this purpose and whether there are less restrictive and 
disadvantageous means to do so.213  
                                                          
210 “Prohibited grounds” are defined in section 1(xxii) of PEPUDA to include gender. 
211  S 1(xxii) of PEPUDA also specifically refers to marital status. 
212 S 34(1). 
213 S14 of PEPUDA provides that: 
“(2) In determining whether the respondent has proved that the discrimination is fair,  the 
following must be taken into account:  
(a) The context;  
(b) the factors referred to in subsection (3);  
(c) whether the discrimination reasonably and justifiably differentiates between persons 
according to objectively determinable criteria, intrinsic to the activity concerned.  
(3) The factors referred to in subsection (2) (b) include the following:  
(a) Whether the discrimination impairs or is likely to impair human dignity;  
(b) the impact or likely impact of the discrimination on the complainant;  
(c) the position of the complainant in society and whether he or she suffers from patterns 
of disadvantage or belongs to a group that suffers from such patterns of disadvantage;  
(d)the nature and extent of the discrimination;  
(e) whether the discrimination is systemic in nature;  
(f) whether the discrimination has a legitimate purpose;  
(g) whether and to what extent the discrimination achieves its purpose;  
(h) whether there are less restrictive and less disadvantageous means to achieve the 
purpose;  
(i) whether and to what extent the respondent has taken such steps as being reasonable 
in the circumstances to-  
(i) address the disadvantage which arises from or is related to one or more of the prohibited 
grounds; or  
(ii) accommodate diversity.”  
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If the Equality Court finds that the eviction does amount to discrimination, PEPUDA 
empowers the Court with wide remedial powers under section 21. The potential 
remedies available under this section could be of particular use to cohabitants. The 
Court is empowered to make an order for damages,214 they can order a settlement 
between the parties,215 they can provide an order restraining individuals from partaking 
in discriminatory behaviour 216 and they can order that certain privileges that were 
unfairly removed be reinstated.217 One example of the potential of this latter remedy 
could be ordering a respondent to reinstate their ex-cohabiting partner on his medical 
aid scheme, which implicates her right of access to health care services.218 In the 
context of eviction, the court could order a financial settlement between the parties, or 
the court could order the evicting partner to pay damages, or to reinstate the caregiving 
partner’s use of the property. This provision, if properly interpreted and enforced, has 
significant potential to shift conceptions of power and socio-economic responsibility in 
the context of cohabiting relationships. PEPUDA could, consequently, play a role in 
structuring more equitable socio-economic relations between male and female 
cohabitants. 
In terms of its emphasis on positive measures designed to protect or advance 
persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, PEPUDA draws an important linkage 
between the constitutional right to equality and socio-economic rights. For example, 
the Act specifically states that any law or conduct that limits women’s access to social 
services, including health and social security,219 is unfair. PEPUDA also describes 
discrimination as any act or omission, including a law, which directly or indirectly 
withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages from any person on one or more of the 
prohibited grounds.220 The provisions underlying PEPUDA, therefore, have substantial 
potential to shift the focus in our law and to empower the courts to develop innovative 
remedies to assist cohabiting women. The innovative provisions in PEPUDA have, 
however, not yet been utilised optimally. 
 
                                                          
214 S 21(2)(d). 
215 S 21(2)(c). 
216 S 21(2)(f). 
217 S 21(2)(g).  
218 S 27(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
219 S 8(g). 
220 S 1(viii). 
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3 4 5 Inadvertent forms of cohabitation due to legislative gaps 
 
This section primarily focuses on women married according to customary law and 
MPL, who are technically rendered domestic partners through the gaps in our 
legislative framework. After the Bill of Rights came into force, customary unions were 
officially recognised through the RCMA. While this social recognition was necessary 
and admirable, the family law system has been criticised for creating a hierarchical 
system, with civil marriage remaining at the apex. This is illustrated through the RCMA, 
which provides that a monogamous customary marriage can be converted into a civil 
marriage.221 A civil marriage cannot, however, be converted into a customary 
marriage. This conveys the message that a civil marriage is still preferred to a 
customary marriage.222 This perception is not only an academic understanding, as 
illustrated by the case of K v P (discussed above),223 which highlights the specific 
vulnerability of customary wives in polygamous marriages. 
The failure to recognise unregistered customary marriages in the RCMA is 
acknowledged as a significant and unfortunate lacuna in our law.224 The result of this 
gap is that, in cases like K v P, the plaintiff cannot obtain the usual order concerning 
the proprietary and personal consequences accompanying a decree of divorce. In the 
event of the plaintiff seeking to claim a division of property or maintenance by virtue of 
her void marriage, she would therefore have to formulate a claim based on a breach 
of contract or on the dissolution of a tacit universal partnership.225  
The RCMA further reveals that, even if social recognition is extended through 
legislation, there is still the possibility that certain relationships will not be recognised 
due to individuals failing to adhere to prescribed formalities. Unfortunately, many of 
these women usually believe that they are officially married and only become aware 
of their legal position once it is too late.226 Instead of focusing on relationship 
                                                          
221 S 10 of the RCMA. 
222 D Bilchitz & M Judge “For Whom does the Bell Toll: The Challenges and Possibilities of the 
Civil Union Act for Family Law in South Africa” (2007) SAJHR 466-499; P De Vos (2007) 
SAJHR 462; and P Bakker (2009) JJS 31. 
223 See part 3 3 3 of this chapter. 
224 This is partially due to the fact that, according to the government, only between 4 and 8 per 
cent of customary marriages are registered at all. See RJ Kovacs, S Ndashe & J Williams 
“Twelve Years Later: How the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act of 1998 is Failing 
Women” (2013) 13 Acta Juridica 273 278. 
225 K v P para 11. 
226 Meyersfeld (2010) CCR 275. 
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formalities, recognising and developing the socio-economic rights and duties between 
domestic partners would provide protection to a greater number of women. Focusing 
on the socio-economic consequences of relationships is also more responsive to the 
needs of customary wives. This is due to the fact that customary marriages develop 
gradually, as opposed to coming into effect after one ceremony, as is the case with 
civil marriages.227 The focus should thus be on the relational socio-economic 
implications of terminated relationships. Simply extending the RCMA or the Marriage 
Act to apply to cohabitants also fails to address the fact that it is the underlying patterns 
of relating between men and women that need to be addressed. In contrast to only 
focusing on relationship formalities, these relational patterns and their socio-economic 
consequences also deserve consideration 
The RCMA is vital in South Africa, given that it affects a significant majority of the 
female population. These women are also disproportionately affected by poverty. 
Given the living nature of customary law, the drafters of the RCMA attempted to adopt 
a nuanced approach to these marriages and consequently did not provide strict 
guidelines in terms of formalising these unions. In spite of this, there is a disconnection 
between the living customary law and the administrative practices that have become 
increasingly determinative of one’s marital status.228 Research shows that many 
women married according to customary law who attempt to register their marriage 
experience bureaucratic obstacles from officials at the Department of Home Affairs.229 
This prevents women from being able to prove the existence of their unregistered 
marriage. The emphasis on form over function intersects with inequitable social norms, 
such as those pertaining to the rise in individualisation within our society. The 
previously crucial role of women in the agricultural economy has thus become less 
significant, resulting in a decrease in women’s bargaining positions.230 Increasing 
numbers of widows and deserted wives face greater vulnerability to eviction from their 
married homes. Land shortages have also increased, with the significance of 
agricultural production and women’s labour, subsequently devalued.231 
                                                          
227 Kovacs, Ndashe & Williams (2013) Acta Juridica 274; and A Classens & D Smythe 
“Marriage, Land & Custom: What’s Law Got To Do With It?” (2013) 13 Acta Juridica 1 1-2. 
228 Classens & Smythe (2013) Acta Juridica 2. 
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230 2. 
231 2. 
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Unsurprisingly, increasing numbers of African mothers are advising their daughters 
against marriage.232  
This reveals the complexity surrounding the intersection between legal rules and 
social norms, as well as the need to be cautious in terms of painting all unmarried 
women with the same brush. For example, it cannot be assumed that all unmarried 
women wish to be married. The point of departure remains, however, that regardless 
of the form of a relationship, the law needs to provide better regulation of the resources 
built up during these relationships. In particular, the law needs to be more responsive 
to the underlying gender dynamics shaping these relations to protect vulnerable 
parties from eviction and destitution upon the dissolution of their relationship. The legal 
regime therefore needs to pay closer attention to how men and women relate to one 
another. 
 A number of these vulnerabilities are shared by women married according to 
MPL.233 There is a proposed Bill in the form of the 2010 “Code” of MPL titled the 
Muslim Marriages Bill. It appears that the Bill has remained with the Commission for 
Gender Equality since 2011, without any substantial development.234 While there have 
been certain incremental developments of the law in terms of protecting Muslim wives, 
the delay in enacting the Bill is problematic.  
 One example of an incremental development is the graduation of 100 Muslim clerics 
(or imams) as marriage officers in April of 2014. This development means that when 
an imam marries a Muslim couple, they are empowered to conduct the civil ceremony 
at the same time. Simultaneously conducting a civil marriage would entitle Muslim 
women to approach the courts to dissolve their marriage or to apply for the benefits 
provided under the Marriage Act. A civil ceremony does not happen automatically 
though and must be agreed upon. The training and graduation of the imams was in 
terms of a pilot project initiated by the South African Department of Home Affairs to 
                                                          
232 D Cooper, E Moore & J E Mantell “Renegotiating Intimate Relationships with Men: How 
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enable them to officiate unions.235 The imams completed a three-day course during 
which they learned about the Marriage Act and wrote an official exam. The Director of 
the Women’s Legal Centre, Hoodah Abrahams, has pointed out that 
having Muslim clerics as official marriage officers has important implications 
for Muslim women. However, she also observed that while this entailed a step in the 
right direction, it is not the equivalent of enacting the Muslim Marriages Bill.236 Muslim 
marriages are still not officially recognised under the Marriage Act. In addition to this, 
the practices governing Muslim marriages and their dissolution still cause 
disadvantage for many women. As a result, a significant number of Muslim women are 
socio-economically vulnerable upon the termination of their relationship. 
   
3 4 6 Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 
 
Shortly after the ground-breaking decision of Fourie, same-sex unions were 
recognised through the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (“CUA”). Under the CUA, a civil 
union is a voluntary monogamous union of two persons, who are both 18 years or 
older, which is solemnised and registered by way of a marriage or a civil partnership, 
in accordance with the CUA.237 
The co-existence of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 and the CUA does, however, offer 
a further example of the hierarchical nature of our family law regime. This co-existence 
insinuates that, rather than incorporating same-sex unions into the common law 
definition of marriage, civil marriages remain the preferred form of intimate 
relationship.238 It reveals the tendency to protect form over function, as well as the 
persistent neglect of the human rights of individuals in the context of personal 
relationships. 
A further indication of inequality is that the CUA allows ex officio marriage officers 
appointed in terms of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 to object to solemnising a same-
                                                          
235 Legalbrief Today “Minister ordered to provide Nkandla documents” (2014) Issue number 
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sex union on grounds of conscience, religion and belief.239 The same Act does not, 
however, allow marriage officers to object to solemnising a union between 
heterosexual couples.240 While seeking to balance the rights to freedom of religion241 
and equality, this provision reinforces the perception that heterosexual relationships 
are the norm, while same-sex unions are the deviation.  
This hierarchy is problematic, as legal rules play a crucial role in shaping gendered 
relations and social perceptions. The CUA underscores the need to reconceptualise 
our legal response to relationships in a way that is not governed by heterosexual 
marriage norms, liberal conceptions of choice and patriarchal paradigms. These 
hierarchal social norms need to be addressed and questioned if we are to develop the 
South African family law regime in accordance with the Constitution.242  
It is thus important to utilise a relational feminist interpretation of socio-economic 
rights to illustrate the norms of behaviour that we as a society either endorse or 
challenge through the application of laws. A relational feminist framework is 
appropriate, as it questions whether these social norms are ultimately compatible with 
the core constitutional values of autonomy, dignity and equality.  
The existing hierarchy in the legislative framework further underscores the need for 
a shift in focus towards a relational feminist conception of the socio-economic rights 
of vulnerable family members, particularly female cohabitants. This relational feminist 
response is necessary if we are to undermine the heteronormative and patriarchal 
paradigms currently underlying our family law regime. 
 
3 4 7 Domestic Partnerships Bill of 2008 
 
                                                          
239 S 6 of the CUA. 
240 S 6 of the CUA. See also P de Vos & J Barnard “Same-sex Marriage, Civil Unions and 
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 The Volks case is widely regarded as disappointing in terms of extending important 
legal rights to opposite-sex cohabitants.243 Despite the disappointing outcome, 
attempts to address the lack of a coherent legislative framework governing cohabitants 
began more than a decade ago. For example, the South African Law Reform 
Commission (“SALRC”), launched an investigation into the legal position of 
cohabitation as early as 1998. This culminated in its March 2006 report.244 
 In this report the various policy arguments regarding the legal recognition of 
domestic partnerships were set out and examined. Of particular importance was the 
report’s discussion of the argument that recognising domestic partnerships would 
threaten the sanctity of marriage. The report also discussed the argument that it would 
infringe upon the private autonomy of individuals, as well as the argument that 
recognising domestic partnerships would encourage polygamy.245  
 In response to these arguments, it was pointed out, that the value of autonomy 
should not override the needs of women who suffer upon the termination of their 
relationship.246 In addition, it was said that women are often unable to enforce their 
interests and may inadvertently sign away their rights due to relational power 
imbalances.247 For example, inequitable relations reveal that private law rights and 
mechanisms are often inadequate if the relational subordination experienced by 
women is not addressed. Adopting an individualistic private law approach is therefore, 
insufficiently responsive to the socio-economic realities in our society. In order to 
prevent the reinforcement of female disadvantage, the relational implications of failing 
to regulate cohabitation need to be addressed. In order to adequately determine how 
to structure more equitable socio-economic relations between cohabiting men and 
women, a relational feminist analysis of the socio-economic consequences of 
terminated domestic relations is thus required. 
 In examining potential means of regulating cohabitation, the SALRC’s report 
considered foreign jurisdictions, focusing on how domestic partnerships are regulated 
in Canada, the USA, Australia, the Netherlands and Sweden. After canvassing the 
different legal approaches and the policy arguments for and against the regulation of 
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cohabitation, the report provided recommendations regarding law reform, which are 
expanded upon in chapter five of this study. 
 These recommendations resulted in the publication of the 2008 draft Domestic 
Partnerships Bill, where public comments were invited and received.248 In its Strategic 
Plan for 2008/2009-2010/2011, the Department of Home Affairs (“DHA”) specifically 
stated that the Bill was one of the legislative changes that was planned to occur over 
the next two to three years.249 However, this Bill has not been amended since 2008 
and as of July 2016, is still with the SALRC.250 Despite extensive pressure from the 
public, there has been no clear indication as to whether and when it will be tabled 
before Parliament. It is suggested that the significant seven-year delay is due to the 
need to set up registration infrastructure and to train officers. This has, however, not 
been confirmed by the DHA. 
In terms of content, the Bill provides for two types of partnerships (registered 
partnerships and unregistered partnerships), with chapter three of the Bill providing for 
a formal registration process. In terms of formalising a domestic partnership, parties 
enter into a public commitment through registration. This can be undertaken by two 
persons (irrespective of their sex), neither of whom is allowed to be married, in a civil 
union or other registered domestic partnership.251 After registration, many of the legal 
consequences that attach to a valid marriage are extended to the partners. For 
instance, according to the Bill registered domestic partners will be placed under an ex 
lege duty to support one another according to their respective means and needs. This 
will allow unmarried cohabitants in registered partnerships to claim maintenance.  
In terms of the property regime, registered domestic partnerships are by default out 
of community of property. The default matrimonial system of a civil marriage is, in 
contrast, in community of property. The proposed matrimonial property system for 
registered cohabitants seems inequitable, as one of the purposes of this Bill should be 
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to protect vulnerable caregivers in domestic partnerships from being exploited upon 
the dissolution of their relationship.  
One positive change that will be brought about by the enactment of the Bill is that, 
during the subsistence of the relationship, both parties in a registered domestic 
partnership are entitled to occupy the family home, regardless of who owns or leases 
the property.252 While this development is positive, it is limited to registered domestic 
partnerships. Regardless of whether the Bill is enacted, a domestic partner who is 
subjected to domestic violence during their relationship can apply to have their abusive 
partner removed from the family home through the mechanisms of the DVA.  
A further consequence of the Bill for registered domestic partnerships is that 
domestic partners are prohibited from disposing of joint property without the written 
consent of their partner. Provision is also made for registered domestic partners to 
automatically qualify as a “spouse” for the purposes of the ISA and the MSSA. 
With regard to unregistered partnerships, the Bill makes provision for judicial 
discretion in terms of regulating the consequences of these relationships.253 There are, 
therefore, no ex lege consequences in terms of these partnerships. Instead, either one 
of the parties can apply to a competent court for an order relating to maintenance, 
intestate succession and property division.254 When a court is faced with making an 
order in terms of any of these issues, the Bill provides a list of factors that the Court 
must consider.  
With regard to property division, the Court must consider the nature and duration of 
the relationship and the common residence.255 It must also consider the financial 
interdependence between the partners, the ownership of property, the degree of 
mutual commitment, the presence and care of children and the performance of 
household duties.256 While these factors are integral, there is no explicit mention of the 
need to prioritise the socio-economic needs and rights of vulnerable partners. 
 When making a maintenance order, the factors to be considered are somewhat 
similar.257 Included under these factors are the age of the parties; their standard of 
living; their respective earning capacities; and their ability to support themselves in 
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light of responsibilities for children. The list of factors also specifically refers to the 
future prospects of the parties, as well as their financial needs. 
One major criticism regarding the Domestic Partnerships Bill is that it provides very 
little protection to unregistered cohabitants, with the rights of these parties primarily 
left up to judicial discretion. Primarily focusing on registered domestic partners is 
problematic, as the individuals who will be most in need of legal protection will be those 
who have not adhered to any legal formalities. Research has emphasised this point, 
in that most socio-economically vulnerable cohabitants are unaware of their 
unregulated status or the potential remedies available to them. The most vulnerable 
cohabitants would, therefore, most likely continue to fall through the cracks in the legal 
system. The Bill’s failure to address the gendered nature of domestic partnerships and 
the socio-economic consequences of terminated relationships is also problematic. The 
predominant focus on registered partnerships and the neglect of the socio-economic 
impact of cohabitation undermines one of the central purposes of family law, which is 
to protect vulnerable family members.258 Proposed amendments to the Bill, in 
accordance with a relational feminist interpretation of the socio-economic rights of 
female cohabitants, are set out in further detail in chapter five of this study.259 
 
3 4 8 Conclusion: A separate and unequal family law system 
 
The South African family law regime is comprised of a disparate number of statutes 
and draft legislation.260 While the DVA and PEPUDA offer certain limited remedies for 
cohabitants, they emphasise the need for a more coherent and comprehensive 
legislative response to the socio-economic needs of female cohabitants upon the 
termination of their relationship. Certain rights protected within legislation have also 
been extended on an ad hoc basis through judicial decisions based primarily on the 
right to equality and non-discrimination in section 9 of the Constitution. The most 
obvious complication arising from this framework is that the average person does not 
know the legal consequences of his or her intimate relationship due to the complex 
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system of rules applicable to these various relationships.261 This is a particular problem 
when it comes to unmarried cohabitants, as these relationships are predominantly 
prevalent in the poorer and illiterate sections of our society. A further consequence is 
the creation of a hierarchy of intimate relationships in South Africa. This was not the 
intention of the legislature, which endeavoured to provide the same recognition to all 
intimate relationships. It is, however, a practical consequence of regulating intimate 
relationships by different Acts.262  
One of the biggest discrepancies with regard to developing the family law regime is 
between same-sex cohabitants and heterosexual cohabitants. While the Court has 
been willing to aid same-sex relationships, there has been an evident reluctance to 
extend protection to heterosexual cohabitants, as evinced by the Volks decision. This 
is primarily due to the reasoning that heterosexual couples have the choice to enter 
into a civil marriage. This results in same-sex cohabitants receiving more protection 
under our law than heterosexual cohabitants.263 The traditional justification for this 
position has, however, been removed by the enactment of the Civil Union Act 17 of 
2006, which now provides same-sex couples with the choice to enter into a civil union. 
In terms of the discrepancies between these two relationships, there are certain 
common law developments,264 which have reduced the legal differences between 
heterosexual and same-sex cohabitants to the context of intestate succession.265 
Discussions surrounding the privileged position of same-sex cohabitants often, 
however, result in moralistic debates regarding who is more deserving of protection.266 
While same-sex couples have undoubtedly been subjected to severe discrimination, 
which needs to be addressed, this does not justify leaving vulnerable family members 
in heterosexual domestic partnerships destitute upon the breakdown of their 
relationship. These discussions also run the risk of obscuring the need to eradicate all 
forms of discrimination from our family law system. Focusing on the socio-economic 
rights of partners may also be necessary for same-sex couples, as certain couples 
may refrain from entering into a civil union, given the high incidence of homophobia in 
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South Africa.267 The high levels of poverty facing South Africa further justify addressing 
the manner in which our society currently organises relational access to socio-
economic resources.  
An examination of the draft Domestic Partnerships Bill through a relational feminist 
lens highlights specific issues that need to be addressed. The first issue is the Bill’s 
failure to adequately acknowledge the existing social context. This is illustrated by the 
insufficient protection provided to unregistered domestic partnerships, which research 
reveals are the relationships specifically requiring protection. The Bill is also informed 
by a liberal conception of choice and is not conducive to fostering social transformation 
through its formal approach to equality. The potential implications for amending the 
Bill in terms of a relational feminist framework are explored in detail in chapter five.268 
Given that there is no comprehensive legislative framework governing the status of 
cohabitants, it is necessary to set out the applicable common law framework regulating 
these relationships. 
 
3 5 Common law framework governing cohabitation 
 
3 5 1 Introduction 
 
 The socio-economic consequences of terminated relationships are regulated 
through different statutes. Civil marriages and civil unions are, for example, terminated 
through the provisions of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979. Customary marriages are 
dissolved in terms of section 8 of the RCMA,269 while Muslim marriages are dissolved 
according to MPL. In contrast, a domestic partnership is simply terminated by the 
death of one of the parties or through their separation.270 As highlighted above, 
marriage rates are declining in South Africa, particularly amongst African women.271 
Due to formalistic administrative anomalies, even women who are married according 
to customary law often fall through the gaps in our legal system, inadvertently 
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solidifying their status as cohabitants. The point of departure remains that a domestic 
partnership should be dissolved in a manner that evinces care and concern for all 
parties involved.  
 While parties to a domestic partnership are able to enter into an agreement to 
regulate the socio-economic consequences of their separation, there is no automatic 
“common law partner” as is often believed. In relation to the family property, the 
common law makes no provision for unmarried cohabitants to share in each other’s 
property.272 If the family home is not registered in the name of both partners, or if the 
lease is not in both partners’ names, the cohabitant whose name is not registered does 
not have a right to occupy the family home. As a result, when domestic partnerships 
are terminated, it is disproportionately women and children who are forced to leave 
the family home.273 Given this legislative gap, it is necessary to examine the common 
law mechanisms that are used to protect cohabitants.274  
 
3 5 2 Contracts 
 
 One particular area of common law that cohabitants are forced to rely on is contract 
law. In this regard, cohabitants are able to enter into an express contract275 (as noted 
earlier) or they can enter into a tacit contract, such as a tacit universal partnership. 
South African law has thus progressed in that it no longer regards cohabitation 
contracts as contra bonos mores.276 
 Relying on contract law is problematic though, due to the fact that these common 
law rules are informed by liberal conceptions of freedom and fairness. These 
supposedly “neutral rules” advantage those who are already powerful, 277 entrenching 
the unequal status quo.278 When interpreting contracts, for instance, the courts often 
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formalistically equate family law contracts with commercial agreements. This is in spite 
of considerable academic scholarship recommending a distinctive approach between 
commercial contracts, usually negotiated at arms-length, and contracts involving 
intimate partners that impact upon access to basic human needs.279 This distinction is 
also necessary when it comes to family law, as these relations are complex and often 
characterised by subtle power struggles based on economic and emotional 
dependency.  
 Given that the underlying rules governing contract law have traditionally been 
formulated to favour the party with stronger bargaining power,280 these rules often 
facilitate the exploitation of less powerful family members. The strict enforcement of 
these contracts also often results in substantial gender inequality.281 The tendency to 
focus on contractual paradigms therefore allows the courts to effectively ignore other 
fundamental human rights issues within family law cases.  
 The common law’s cherished value of individual autonomy is, at times, meaningless 
in a society as unequal as South Africa.282 Scholars have warned that if these rules 
remain unquestioned and untransformed, the common law will continue to exercise an 
inhibiting effect on the Constitution’s transformative project, possibly undermining it 
altogether.283 It is necessary to pay greater attention to the manner through which the 
South African common law currently structures socio-economic responsibility within 
the private sphere. As women are socially expected to be altruistic when it comes to 
their relationships, their bargaining power is often undermined when concluding family 
contracts.284 The feminisation of poverty and the lack of adequate services also 
prevent many women from accessing socio-economic resources independently. Legal 
responses to these relationships therefore need to acknowledge and address this 
social reality. 
Employing an individualistic contractual paradigm to relationships is further 
problematic, as only those obligations that are expressly undertaken will be 
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enforced.285 An individualistic contractual paradigm neglects the broader purposes 
and values underlying socio-economic rights, such as the need to ensure a more 
humane distribution of resources and the need to protect existing access to socio-
economic resources.  
 
3 5 3 Universal partnerships 
 
 One of the most significant developments with regard to unmarried cohabitants is 
the extension of the universal partnership by the Supreme Court of Appeal. While there 
are different types of universal partnerships, the most frequently encountered form in 
family law is the societas universorum bonorum.286 In terms of this partnership, the 
partners agree to share in all current and future profits acquired individually or 
collectively from commercial undertakings or otherwise. An example is provided in 
Butters v Mncora (“Butters”),287 where the Supreme Court of Appeal utilised this 
common law construction to provide protection to a woman who had been living with 
her partner for nearly twenty years.288  
After being involved for almost two decades, the respondent had accumulated a 
significant amount of assets, while the applicant had primarily remained responsible 
for the maintenance of the family home and their children.289 As is often the case, the 
family home and other properties were all registered in the name of the respondent 
only. Due to the fact that the applicant had no right to occupy the family home,290 she 
was under an obligation to leave the family home upon the dissolution of her 
relationship. After her partner sought to evict her, the applicant claimed in reconvention 
that she and the respondent had entered into a tacit universal partnership. In terms of 
determining whether a tacit partnership had come into being, the court pointed out that 
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it must decide whether it is more probable than not, based on the conduct of the 
parties, that they had entered into a universal partnership.291 The evidentiary burden 
in this regard, rests on the party claiming that there is a tacit universal partnership. The 
socio-economic needs of cohabitants do not, therefore, play a role in determining 
whether there is a tacit universal partnership. 
 In terms of this burden of proof, cohabitation does not in and of itself provide 
sufficient evidence of a universal partnership. According to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, the first requirement that needs to be satisfied is that both parties must have 
brought something into the relationship, or bound themselves to bring something into 
the relationship.292 The second requirement is that the partnership business must be 
conducted for the joint benefit of both parties. The final requirement is that the object 
of the partnership should be to make a profit. With regard to this final requirement, the 
court in Butters specifically pointed out that the partnership need not be restricted to a 
commercial enterprise.293 For example, one party’s caring work can allow their partner 
the freedom to focus the majority of their time and energy on pursuing their career and 
increasing their earning potential. This often results in the employed partner profiting 
through improving their skills and accumulating additional assets in their name.  
The Court developed the law to recognise the commercial value of caring work and 
held that this is sufficient to constitute a contribution.294 This extension of the universal 
partnership is heralded for creating an avenue by which cohabitants can circumvent 
the formalistic approach that was adopted in Volks. Universal partnerships therefore 
allow cohabitants to lay claim to some of the financial assets that were accumulated 
during the existence of the partnership.295 The majority’s decision has also been 
heralded for establishing a precedent for a presumption that domestic partners who 
have cohabited over a significant period of time intend to deal fairly with each other.296 
The decision in Butters297 arguably establishes that a more equitable sharing of 
partnership property between cohabitants is “presumptively fair”.298  
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While the gendered value of this extension needs to be recognised, this protection 
may not be sufficient for the poorest members of our community. One reason for this 
is that this remedy requires a certain amount of legal knowledge and sophistication. It 
also presupposes equal bargaining power between the partners.299 There is, 
furthermore, a level of uncertainty as to whether a court will definitely be willing to infer 
a contract,300 while it is difficult to predict the specific terms that will be inferred.301 For 
example, in the case of Zulu v Zulu (“Zulu”),302 which involved a polygamous 
relationship, the High Court was reluctant to recognise a tacit universal partnership. 
The Court referred to the three requirements of a universal partnership, as well as the 
general requirement that all contracts must be lawful. The High Court emphasised that 
in order for the agreement to be valid all the requirements must be met.303 As the 
deceased in this case was previously married in community of property, the 
subsequent contract between himself and the applicant was held to be unlawful. The 
Court therefore found that the contract of partnership lacked an essential element, and 
was therefore invalid. The courts have furthermore, only tended to recognise universal 
partnerships where the parties were engaged, while less than half of the estate is 
always awarded to the caregiving (female) cohabitant.  
 In addition, while the court in Butters provided relief to the applicant, the manner in 
which the minority judgment analysed and evaluated the evidence to determine the 
                                                          
299 Smith “The Dissolution of a Domestic Partnership” in Law of Divorce 440. 
300 An example of a case where the court was unwilling to infer a tacit universal contract on 
behalf of the applicant is Sepheri v Scanlan 2008 1 SA 332 (C). In this case, the plaintiff and 
the defendant were involved in a lengthy relationship, which spanned almost a decade. In the 
evidence that was presented before the court, it was revealed that they become engaged in 
1998, during which time they cohabited together abroad. During their relationship the 
defendant provided economically for the plaintiff, while discouraging her from seeking 
employment, although she was qualified to do so. In 2002, the defendant purchased property 
in Cape Town which he registered in his name only. Despite frequent requests by the 
applicant, the defendant refused to register her as a co-owner of the property. The plaintiff 
specifically claimed that he repeatedly told her that the property was “theirs”. Ultimately the 
defendant was able to evict the plaintiff on the basis of his property rights. This was in spite of 
the fact that they were involved in a lengthy relationship during which she made certain socio-
economic sacrifices for the relationship. While this is not to say that he should be unreasonably 
burdened with fulfilling her socio-economic rights, given their lengthy relationship, her rights 
should at least be considered upon the termination of their relationship. The connection 
between his power to exclude and her socio-economic disadvantage should furthermore be 
given greater recognition. Even if it was ultimately decided to maintain that right of exclusion, 
the decision would then at least be made in full consciousness of the patterns of relationships 
(of power, responsibility and privilege) that the law is ultimately reinforcing in South Africa. 
301 Barratt (2015) Stell LR 117. 
302 2008 4 SA 12 (D) [2008] ZAKZHC 10 (“Zulu”). 
303 Zulu page 6. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
131 
 
existence of the tacit partnership reveals problematic modes of reasoning.304 Although 
the majority judgment was more progressive in this case, the minority judgment 
undermined the value of caring work and simultaneously approved the exploitation of 
caregivers.305 This is illustrated through the minority judgment’s statement that, when 
cohabitation occurs over a long period of time, it is likely that the principal breadwinner 
will contribute substantially to the needs of the family by providing accommodation, 
food, clothing, education, transport and healthcare.306 The minority judgment of Judge 
Heher, Judge Cachalia concurring, went on to state that the other partner, who is 
usually female, will stay home and undertake the caring work of overseeing the needs 
of the family.307 
 According to the minority judgment, these are the natural incidents of cohabitation, 
just as they are of marriage. The minority went on to state that even though this 
arrangement happened in this case, it contributed nothing to the present enquiry (of 
whether there was a tacit agreement to enter into a universal partnership). This is due 
to the fact that this arrangement is supposedly “equivocal, absent some evidential 
feature that links them to the special intention that attaches to a universal 
partnership”.308 The minority judgment concluded by stating that if a cohabitee lays 
claim to a share of his or her partner’s estate, it does not assist that person to argue 
that he or she will be left with nothing without such an order.309 In the minority’s opinion, 
the social context of power imbalances between cohabitants and how this shapes their 
feasible choices are irrelevant to determining whether the parties have entered into a 
tacit universal partnership. This reasoning by the minority also ignored how such rules 
and modes of reasoning continue to structure inequitable relations between men and 
women. In contrast to this approach, a relational feminist lens reveals how the “natural 
incidents” of cohabitation inevitably impact upon the choices and the contracts of the 
cohabiting partners. These patterns of relating are furthermore, not simply the natural 
incidents of our society. They require examination, particularly with regard to the need 
to give effect to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.310 
                                                          
304 Butters para 37. 
305 The minority judgment was decided by Judge Heher JA. 
306 Butters para 37. 
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309 Para 37. 
310 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC); 2005 9 BCLR 835 (CC) para 17. 
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 The reasoning in the minority judgment implies that the natural consequences of 
cohabitation entail one partner sacrificing their career to care for their family without 
any perceived entitlement to share in their partner’s resources if their relationship 
ends. This reasoning illustrates how sexism can be so deeply entrenched within our 
society that it appears to be natural.311 A relational feminist analysis foregrounds these 
underlying assumptions. Family law rules need to be further examined in terms of the 
gendered relational patterns they are either exacerbating or undermining. For 
example, these underlying assumptions render the contributions provided by 
caregivers as something that is simply to be expected, even if they end up with nothing 
once their relationship ends. The implication of this perspective is that exploiting 
women (or caregivers) is something that is socially acceptable and without human 
rights implications. This outlook is incorrect, as leaving cohabiting women unprotected 
often has serious consequences for their overall well-being and their survival. 
Choosing to leave women socio-economically vulnerable also has intergenerational 
reverberations that cannot be ignored.312 While this was the minority judgment in 
Butters,313 the patterns of reasoning adopted emphasise the persistent gender bias 
found within family law cases. While more progressive than the minority judgment, the 
majority judgment failed to address the need to foster substantive gender equality in 
our society. This case also reveals the need to question gendered assumptions within 
family law, particularly if we are to give effect to the Constitution’s commitment to 
transform our society. 
 With regard to the remedy provided, after finding that the applicant was able to 
prove the elements of a tacit universal partnership, the majority awarded the applicant 
30% of the defendant’s net asset value as of the date when the partnership ended.314 
This decision to only award 30% of the net asset value has been criticised for 
essentially illustrating the inequitable value still accorded to caring work.315 The 
majority judgment also contains no mention of the need to address how men and 
women relate to one another in relationships and the socio-economic impact of family 
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312 F Wilson & V Cornell Guide to Carnegie 3: Strategies to Overcome Poverty and Inequality: 
Conference Report (2014) 78. 
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315 Bonthuys (2015) SALJ 76. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
133 
 
dissolution. The Butters judgment further highlights how the socio-economic rights of 
women are consistently neglected within cases on divorce and cohabitation.  
It is argued that Butters expands the remedies available to cohabitants.316 However, 
basing the decision on contractual principles is criticised for causing a shift from 
protection based on status, to protection based on contractual principles.317 The rules 
underlying the universal partnership as articulated by the Supreme Court of Appeal 
are, therefore, inferior to the familial status associated with traditional marriage.318 A 
contractual approach also tends to be retrospective, asking what happened in the past 
and if intentions can be inferred from actual agreements or contributions. While this 
approach may aid a few cohabitants who have the means to approach the courts, it 
will not be sufficient in terms of the need to transform existing relations between men 
and women. 
The manner in which the Court created somewhat of a fusion between commercial 
and domestic partnerships creates a legal mechanism through which the caring work 
of cohabitants receive greater recognition and protection. The individualistic, 
contractual framework informing the universal partnership is, however, inadequate in 
terms of recognising that people’s relationship choices continue to be deeply 
influenced by patriarchal norms and gendered relations.319 Bonthuys explains that: 
 
“A purely contractual basis for property distribution represents a change in the law, but it 
does not actually challenge the social paradigms which expect women to provide unpaid 
family labour. Instead, it merely obscures gender inequality behind a smokescreen of 
formally equal partners concluding agreements at arms’ length.”320 
 
A purely contractual paradigm also exacerbates existing exploitative norms that 
shape how men and women relate to one another in our society.  An individualistic 
approach is further problematic, as it allows courts to ignore the social context of power 
imbalances between cohabitants and how they shape women’s choices.321 The 
rhetoric within this judgement also reveals how traditional gender roles continue to be 
taken for granted, emphasising a failure to address underlying gendered inequalities 
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pervading our society. A predominant focus on contract law thus allows the court to 
evade engaging with the human rights issues pertaining to gender inequality and 
socio-economic deprivation prevalent in intimate relationships. It also allows the Court 
to ignore patterns of socio-economic exploitation that exist between cohabitants. In 
this regard, liberal conceptions of choice and gender neutrality will not safeguard 
against the influence of pervasive and enduring symbolic constructions of male and 
female sexuality and their “normalised hierarchical binary”.322  
As a result of the developments underlying Butters, it has been argued that South 
Africa is moving towards more of a quasi-status approach in regulating cohabitation.323 
The underlying principles of this approach are expanded upon by Amanda Barrett and 
are emulated in certain American states. In accordance with this approach, the courts 
infer tacit agreements for property sharing in the context of certain long-term domestic 
partnerships,324 primarily in relationships where one partner has undertaken the 
traditional caregiving role. According to the American scholar William Eskridge, in 
those cases the courts have created “a new default rule, where the partners…are 
presumed to share property”. He argues that this connotes a shift from contract to 
“(quasi)-status”.325 Accordingly, Amanda Barratt states that the South African Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s approach in the decision of Butters creates a presumption of sharing 
family assets.326  
One problem with the South African courts’ approach is the tendency to award these 
orders to couples who are engaged or to couples who strongly resemble the traditional 
conception of a civil marriage. Relationships that resemble traditional relationships are 
thus prioritised, while the need to address the socio-economic consequences of 
gendered relations in our society continues to be neglected. The law is, therefore, still 
not assisting women who are particularly vulnerable. In cases where the courts have 
extended the tacit universal partnership, the caregiving partner also never receives an 
equal share of the family property.  
                                                          
322 C Albertyn “Judicial Diversity” in C Hoexter & M Olivier (eds) The Judiciary in South Africa 
(2014) 201. 
323 Barratt (2015) Stell LR 129. 
324 WN Eskridge “Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus, Default Rules, 
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In addition, the contractual approach ignores underlying inequitable gendered 
relations, while the burden of proof remains on the caregiving partner to prove the 
existence of the tacit universal partnership agreement. In the meantime, while 
attempting to prove that they entered into this contract, many caregiving partners will 
be forced to leave the family home, often simultaneously being deprived of access to 
food, water and social security. 
As emphasised through a relational feminist interpretation of the socio-economic 
rights of female cohabitants, there is a need for a more contextual, value-sensitive 
development of the common law in accordance with the human rights norms protected 
in the Constitution. Examining cohabitation cases through a relational feminist lens is 
necessary in order to expose and transform underlying gendered dynamics prevalent 
within family law.  
 
3 5 4 Unjustified enrichment 
 
Unjustified enrichment essentially concerns itself with an obligation that arises when 
one person’s estate has been increased at the expense of another’s estate, without a 
sufficient cause for this enrichment.327 This is a remedy that exists under Roman-
Dutch law, although it has been subsequently amended over the years through ad hoc 
judicial pronouncements. This is a popular remedy under a number of commonwealth 
jurisdictions, with the Canadian courts referring to unjustified enrichment, the 
Australian courts discussing unconscionable conduct and New Zealand courts dealing 
with reasonable expectations.328 The remedy of unjustified enrichment under 
Canadian family law is discussed further in chapter four of this study.329 As far as 
claims based on unjustified enrichment beyond traditional condictione are concerned, 
our law has yet to recognise either a traditional enrichment action or any specific 
enrichment liability within the context of life partnerships.330 
 
                                                          
327 S Eiselen & G Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment: A Casebook (2008) 3. 
328 See A Barlow “Cohabitation, Changing Family Policies and Social Attitudes: A Discussion 
of Britain within Europe” (2004) 26 Law and Policy 57 57. 
329 See part 4 5 of chapter four of this study. 
330 See Nortje v Pool NO 1966 3 SA 96 (A) as qualified by Kommissaris van Binnelandse 
Inkomste v Willers 1994 3 SA 283 (A) at 333C-333D. 
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3 5 5 Proprietary estoppel and the constructive trust 
 
 These are remedies that are particularly popular under Canadian law. Traditionally, 
proprietary estoppel is available when a partner was led to believe that they had 
acquired an interest in property, when in fact they had not.331 The remedy is used to 
estop the owner (or the executor of the estate) from relying on the truth and depriving 
the partner of their access to property. The remedy is, however, reliant on the applicant 
proving that the inference that they had relied upon was in fact reasonable under the 
circumstances of the case. The problem with utilising this remedy under South African 
law is that in our system estoppel does not give rise to a cause of action, but is instead 
a defence.332 Cohabitants would therefore only be able to utilise this action in an 
attempt to avoid eviction. Utilising estoppel would not give rise to substantive rights to 
the family home, as it does not result in the transfer of ownership in property to the 
vulnerable party. This once again highlights the need to give substantive content to 
specific socio-economic rights, such as the right of access to adequate housing for 
cohabitants. 
The constructive trust is another example of Canadian legal remedies developed 
for cohabitants. This remedy is discussed in more detail in chapter four of this study. 
With regard to South African cohabitants, this remedy has not been recognised or 
utilised in terms of cohabitants. This is primarily due to the fact that one of the 
requirements for the creation of a valid trust is that the founder must have intended to 
create the trust.333 
 
3 5 6 The extension of the common law duty of support 
 
 In the Volks decision, the Court emphasised that there is no ex lege duty of support 
between unmarried cohabitants.334 The legal regime has, however, been developed 
                                                          
331 Taylor Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd [1981] 1 All ER 897; BS Smith 
The Development of South African Matrimonial Law with reference to the Need for and 
Application of a Domestic Partnership Rubric (2009) 384 DPhil thesis, University of the Free 
State; and Smith “The Dissolution of a Domestic Partnership” in Law of Divorce 444. 
332 JC Sonnekus The Law of Estoppel in South Africa 2 (2000) 197; and Smith “The Dissolution 
of a Domestic Partnership” in Law of Divorce 444. 
333 F du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles and Practices (2007) 28; and Smith “The 
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in terms of the dependent’s action at common law for loss of support due to the death 
of the breadwinner within the family.335 Under the common law, this action allowed a 
breadwinner’s widow and children to claim damages for loss of support from the 
person who wrongfully and culpably caused the breadwinner’s injury or death.336  
The Supreme Court of Appeal has held that this common law remedy includes 
participants in a permanent heterosexual life partnership entailing reciprocal duties of 
support.337 In the decision of Paixão v Road Accident Fund, a unanimous court was 
prepared to find that the deceased had tacitly undertaken to support the female 
applicant and her daughters prior to his death. Part of this was deduced from the fact 
that the parties were engaged, after being romantically involved for a significant length 
of time. The Court highlighted that even though Volks established that no ex lege duty 
arose between unmarried cohabitants, this duty could arise contractually.338 While this 
is a positive development, it has been criticised for essentially being based on a 
contractual paradigm.339 The Supreme Court of Appeal also focused on the similarity 
between the relationship in dispute and traditional civil marriages. In addition, the 
Court managed to completely side-step the constitutional issue raised during the case. 
For example, the Court held that by finding that a duty of support had arisen 
contractually, there was no reason to examine whether it amounts to unfair 
discrimination to give protection to the duty of support arising from marriage, while not 
recognising a duty of support between cohabitants.340 
 Of particular interest is the reasoning that was adopted by the trial court. For 
example, the South Gauteng High Court refused to recognise a common law duty of 
support between cohabitants based on a tacit agreement. When referring to the facts 
of the case, it was pointed out that before his death the applicant had cared for the 
deceased after he had suffered a heart attack. During this time, the deceased moved 
in with the applicant and supported her and her children financially. When discussing 
this situation, the High Court simply held that the deceased had supported the 
appellants only out of “gratitude, sympathy and kindness” in exchange for their 
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assistance during his illness rather than from any legal duty.341 The court also held 
that it “would be an affront to the fabric of our society ... and seriously erode the 
institution of marriage” if the dependants’ action were to be extended to the 
appellants.342 The court did not consider how it would be an affront to the appellant’s 
human dignity for her relationship to be perceived as nothing more than a simple 
economic exchange, whereby her contribution was not valuable enough to justify 
socio-economic support after her partner had passed away. It has been pointed out 
that a legal regime that only protects civil and political rights only projects “an image 
of truncated humanity”.343 Symbolically, but still inhumanely, ignoring the socio-
economic rights of cohabitants excludes them from participating on an equitable basis 
in our society.344 Within family law, the value of human dignity underlying socio-
economic rights should be used to enhance the freedom and agency of caregivers, as 
opposed to ignoring how the law currently restricts their feasible options. It should also 
be utilised to recognise a minimal conception of distributive justice that would require 
satisfaction of the essential needs of all family members. 
 In sharp contrast to the judgment in the court a quo, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
stated that in determining whether the dependent’s action should be extended to 
cohabitants, one needs to have regard to the boni mores criterion or, the legal 
convictions of the community.345 In this regard, the court held that in making this policy 
decision, it needs to give effect to recent social changes, as well as legal norms that 
encourage social responsibility.346 While the outcome of this case was ultimately 
positive, it was also based on a contractual understanding of the domestic partnership. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal also failed to address the gendered dimensions of this 
case and particularly the need to foster substantive gender inequality in our society. 
In order to more effectively foster a relational conception of human dignity, it is 
necessary to further recognise existing socio-economic interconnection and 
responsibility between cohabitants. 
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3 5 7 A summary of the applicable common law developments 
 
 While certain areas of the common law have been developed to provide protection 
to cohabitants, the biggest criticism against these developments is the Supreme Court 
of Appeal’s preference for common law reasoning and the intertwined failure to 
engage fully with the interaction between the common law rules and the fundamental 
rights in the Bill of Rights.347 In addition, the tendency to adopt a private law lens results 
in the prioritisation of individualistic values and a contractual paradigm. These liberal 
paradigms are inadequate in terms of effectively addressing the underlying gendered 
power imbalances within the private sphere which shape women’s choices.  
 In order to tailor constitutional rights to be more responsive to women’s specific 
needs, it is thus necessary for the judiciary and the legislature to more proactively 
address the existing gender dynamics prevalent in South African family law. The legal 
system does have substantial power to do so, through shaping social norms and 
behaviour, whether exploitative or empowering.348 
 Despite certain common law developments, women remain (disproportionately) the 
economically weaker spouse at the end of their marriage or domestic partnership. This 
is the outcome of prevailing social, cultural and economic conditions that need to be 
effectively addressed through innovative legal responses.349 This gendered imbalance 
informing our family law regime emphasises the need for a more transformative 
response to family law issues, particularly for female cohabitants in South Africa. 
 
3 6 Conclusion: An evaluation of the family law regime through a relational 
feminist lens 
 
It is clear that the South African family law regime currently exacerbates the socio-
economic vulnerability of many women. Given that there is currently no “law of life 
partnerships” regulating cohabitation,350 vulnerable parties (usually women and 
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children) are often exploited during these relationships. They are also often left 
impoverished upon the termination of the relationship.351 
 This chapter specifically identifies certain impediments that prevent the family law 
regime from adequately responding to gendered disadvantage in our society. In terms 
of the family law jurisprudence, the predominant focus on the right to equality and the 
neglect of the socio-economic rights of cohabiting women is particularly problematic. 
As a result of the failure to engage with the existing social context, there has also been 
a disproportionate emphasis on relationship formalities, liberal conceptions of choice 
and formal equality, all of which serve as significant obstacles to transforming the 
socio-economic disadvantages facing women. The fragmented and hierarchical state 
of our legislative framework further serves to entrench the vulnerability of many women 
who are most in need of protection.  
Feminists have already pointed out the limitations of relying only on the law to 
challenge the systematic oppression of women.352 While there are limits to the 
transformative potential of the law, this chapter analysed how South African family law 
rules currently exacerbate gender inequality in our society.353 These rules should be 
developed to expand the range of socio-economic options available to women.  
 In terms of addressing the needs of cohabitants, the answer to this gendered issue 
does not lie in simply extending a formalised model of marriage to cohabitants. This 
formal extension is insufficient, as it runs the risk of simply extending the patriarchal 
and heteronormative social paradigms currently underlying our family law system. 
While domestic partnerships need to be recognised and regulated by the state,354 
substantive content must also be given to the socio-economic rights of women within 
the context of family law.  
 In addition to the lack of a coherent legal framework governing cohabitation, the 
courts have also not fully grappled with the need to address and transform the 
underlying gendered dynamics in our society. There is therefore, a need to further 
examine the socio-economic consequences of how men and women relate to one 
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another in family relationships and how we can structure more constructive patterns 
of relating. Infusing our family law regime with the values and norms underlying socio-
economic rights is thus necessary. In accordance with a relational feminist approach, 
this development necessarily entails examining the existing social context. Moreover, 
a relational feminist approach entails transposing human rights norms, such as 
substantive and relational conceptions of autonomy, freedom and equality, into our 
family law regime in a manner that empowers cohabiting women.  
Given that socio-economic rights speak directly to the material needs of 
cohabitants, the socio-economic implications of family law rules clearly need to be 
given further consideration. Socio-economic interdependence is also predominantly a 
reality for most cohabitants. Sharing the family home, as well as caring work and other 
integral resources is often what characterises these relationships.  
Socio-economic rights have the potential to reveal the material implications of 
gendered patterns of relating in our society. Socio-economic rights can also open up 
new remedies for vulnerable family members, while shifting moralistic debates 
regarding who is more deserving of protection. The complex relations between men 
and women also require an innovative approach that seeks to transform existing 
relations through addressing the socio-economic dimensions of gendered roles. The 
potential application of socio-economic rights within the context of terminated domestic 
partnerships is explored in detail in chapter five of this study.355 Chapter five also 
examines the implications of utilising sections 8 and 39 of the Constitution to further 
develop the family law regime. While this chapter specifically analysed the applicable 
legal framework governing domestic partnerships under South African law, the 
following chapter examines the relevant jurisprudential and legislative developments 
under Canadian and Dutch family law through a relational feminist lens.
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Chapter 4: An examination of Canadian and Dutch family law through a 
relational feminist lens 
 
4 1 Introduction 
 
This chapter critically evaluates the strengths and weaknesses underlying the 
jurisprudential and legislative developments pertaining to cohabitants1 under 
Canadian and Dutch family law.2 These developments are examined against the 
relational feminist framework developed in chapter two of this study.3 This comparative 
project is justified by section 39 of the Constitution, which provides that when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, the courts “must consider international law” (section 
39(1)(b)) and that they “may” consider foreign law (section 39(1)(c)).4  
This chapter commences by setting out the justification for a comparative analysis 
of Canadian family law. After setting out the lessons provided by the Canadian legal 
system, the Dutch family law framework, as it pertains to domestic partnerships, is 
examined. Given that the Dutch legislature has played a more proactive role in 
developing the family law regime than the judiciary, the focus of this section is 
predominantly on relevant Dutch legislative developments.  
The focus of this comparative chapter is to highlight positive foreign law 
developments pertaining to the protection of cohabitants. Simultaneously, this chapter 
seeks to identify potential shortcomings of jurisprudential and legislative trends within 
Canadian and Dutch family law. By evaluating these strengths and weaknesses, 
developments that enhance the socio-economic equality of female cohabitants can be 
emulated. Simultaneously, the features underlying Canadian and Dutch family law that 
have entrenched socio-economic disadvantage for female cohabitants can be noted 
and avoided. Once the comparative analysis is complete, conclusions will be drawn 
                                                          
1 In Canadian family law, reference is made to de facto partnerships. See C Rogerson 
“Canada: A Bold and Progressive Past but an Unclear Future” in E Sutherland (ed) The Future 
of Child and Family Law: International Predictions” (2012) 77 77. 
2 The focus of this chapter is on Canadian law, due to the fact that Canadian family law is 
heralded for going further than most jurisdictions in terms of protecting unmarried cohabitants. 
See Rogerson “Canada” in The Future of Child and Family law 77. The justification for this 
focus is discussed in detail under part 4 2 of this chapter. 
3 J Nedelsky Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy and Law (2012) 19. See 
also chapter two of this study. 
4 S 39(1) (c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the “Constitution”). 
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concerning the potential lessons offered by these foreign law developments, as 
evaluated through the relational feminist approach developed in chapter two of this 
study. 
 
4 2  Justification for a comparative study of Canadian family law 
 
This chapter commences with an examination of relevant Canadian family law 
developments. One reason for this comparative analysis is that Canada has gone 
further than most jurisdictions in terms of protecting the socio-economic well-being of 
unmarried cohabitants.5 While a significant number of foreign jurisdictions primarily 
rely on a contractual paradigm when it comes to regulating cohabitants, there have 
been certain Canadian developments that have adopted an inclusive and functional 
approach to family law that is congruent with South Africa’s project of transformative 
constitutionalism.6 As a result of these developments, the concepts of family, spouse 
and parent under Canadian law are amongst the broadest in the world.7 A number of 
Canadian provinces have also adopted different legislative approaches to governing 
cohabitation, offering examples of a range of regulatory possibilities for South Africa.  
Canadian scholars have also made significant contributions to the field of feminism 
and to theoretical conceptions of substantive equality as including important 
dimensions of positive socio-economic intervention.8 Access to socio-economic 
resources has primarily been extended to vulnerable groups through conceptions of 
substantive equality. The judicial recognition of the “feminization of poverty” following 
relationship breakdown has also served to initiate a half century of family law 
legislative reform across Canada.9 Progressive decisions in Canadian courts could, 
therefore, potentially spur the minds and imaginations of creative South African judges 
and law-makers.10  
                                                          
5 Rogerson “Canada” in The Future of Child and Family law 77. 
6 KE Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 150. 
7 N Bala & RJ Bromwich “Context and Inclusivity in Canada’s Evolving Definition of the Family” 
(2002) 16 IJLPF 145 146. 
8 G Brodsky & S Day “Denial of the Means of Subsistence as an Equality Violation” (2005) 
Acta Juridica 149-170. 
9 Canadian Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) Factum of the Intervener in 
Eric v Lola (2012) 2. This is illustrated by the progressive decision in the case of Moge v Moge 
[1992] 3 SCR 813 (“Moge”), which is discussed in detail in part 4 5 3 of this chapter. 
10 R Leckey “Cohabitation and Comparative Method” (2009) 72 Modern Law Review 48- 72. 
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The positive impact of gender-sensitive family law jurisprudence is illustrated by the 
fact that in Canada, married women are now entitled to spousal support and property 
sharing in a manner that recognises the economic interdependency of their 
relationships. They are also entitled to be compensated for the disadvantages suffered 
by them during their marriage and the corresponding advantages conferred on men 
by their unpaid labour in the home. In terms of cohabitants, in every province except 
Québec, unmarried partners are entitled to make claims for spousal support.11 While 
these developments include married spouses, they illustrate a gender-sensitive 
response to family dissolution.  
Canadian courts have also grappled with similar policy issues surrounding the 
debate on whether to regulate cohabitation. One example is the liberal conception of 
choice as justification for leaving de facto partners unprotected. It is thus worth 
enquiring into how Canadian scholars and judges have challenged this concept of 
choice. It is also worth examining how certain areas of Canadian family law have been 
developed to achieve greater socio-economic equality for women.12 In particular, 
certain judicial extensions of the rights of female cohabitants to the family home 
illustrate a tendency towards viewing the home in terms of socio-economic need and 
as a means to furthering social objectives in Canadian family law. These 
developments are thus analysed against the backdrop of the need to shift the current 
liberal paradigms underlying South African family law. 
As noted in the introduction, while positive Canadian developments are examined, 
many of the shortcomings and challenges facing Canadian family law13 will also be 
analysed. This is to determine the extent to which they reflect and highlight many of 
the limiting trends within the South African system governing cohabitation.14 
Retrogressive and formalistic elements within the Canadian jurisprudence and 
                                                          
11 Canadian Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) Factum of the Intervener in 
Eric v Lola (2012) 2. 
12 R Murphy “Unstable Categories: Comparing the Politics of ‘Gender’ in the Early 1990s in 
Canada and South Africa” (2002) 14 Canadian Journal on Women & Law 300 302. 
13 For an analysis of some of these challenges, see Rogerson “Canada” in The Future of Child 
and Family law” (2012) 77; and C Young & SB Boyd “Losing the Feminist Voice? Debates on 
the Legal Recognition of Same Sex Partnerships in Canada” (2006) 10 Feminist Legal Studies 
213 213. See also R Treloar & SB Boyd “Family Law Reform in (Neoliberal) Context: British 
Columbia’s New Family Law Act” (2014) 14 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 
1 24. 
14 JC Reitz “How to do Comparative Law” (1998) 46 The American Journal of Comparative 
Law 617 635. 
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legislation will be examined in terms of how they fall short of the standards of a 
relational feminist framework. For example, while Canadian family law has been 
praised for extending significant socio-economic protection to vulnerable family 
members, certain aspects of these developments are criticised for serving the 
government’s neoliberal15 agenda of privatising family responsibilities.16 This critique 
should be kept in mind when considering law reform within South Africa, as the 
constitutional goal to establish a society based on fundamental human rights 
necessarily requires holding both public and private actors accountable for failing to 
protect and promote socio-economic rights. Certain Canadian developments may, 
therefore, serve as warnings for South Africa. In this manner, a comparative project 
has the potential to enrich South Africa’s self-awareness, as well as the commitment 
to improving the socio-economic quality of life for everyone.17  
Given the South African Constitution’s receptiveness to foreign law and its goal to 
establish a society based on social justice,18 it is worth examining whether Canadian 
law has succeeded in transforming the inequitable social paradigms underlying family 
law. While progressive Canadian rules and doctrines hold comparative value for South 
African law, a nuanced and balanced consideration of the differences between 
Canada and South Africa, is required. This is due to the unique factors that shape 
gender inequality within the Canadian family law regime.19 The developments 
regarding the protection of socio-economic interests within the private sphere of 
Canada have also occurred along a very different trajectory.20 Canadian 
developments thus need to be carefully examined while taking care to avoid 
uncritically transplanting Canadian interpretations and methods that do not fit into the 
South African legal context.  
                                                          
15 Treloar & Boyd define neoliberalism as:  
“Social, economic and political framework, underpinned by a philosophy of liberal 
individualism that centres on the free market and state withdrawal from responsibility for 
social well-being or welfare.”  
See Treloar & Boyd (2014) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 1. 
16 1. 
17 Preamble to the Constitution. 
18 Preamble. 
19 This was pointed out by Justice Mohamed (as he then was) in the case of Fraser v Children’s 
Court, Pretoria North, and Others 1997 2 SA 261 (CC); 1997 2 BCLR 153 (CC) (“Fraser”), 
para 44. 
20 M Jackman & B Porter “Socio-Economic Rights under the Canadian Charter” in M Langford 
(ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law 
(2008) 209. 
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In terms of developing the South African legal framework governing cohabitation, 
there needs to be an emphasis on utilising the law to structure constructive socio-
economic relations, including both private and public relations. In order to do this, 
attention needs to be paid to the manner in which private gendered relations influence 
the capacity to exercise existing human rights. In the light of progressive Canadian 
legal developments, this chapter will commence with an overview of the Canadian 
Charter and its influence on the Canadian family law regime.  
 
4 3  The Canadian Charter 
 
4 3 1 Introduction 
 
In terms of its political and administrative makeup, Canada is described as a self-
governing dominion, made up of a confederation of ten provinces and three territories 
with parliamentary democracy.21 Nine out of the ten provinces are based on the 
English common law system,22 while Québec is governed by the civil law system.23 
This means that Canada’s family law system is fragmented in the sense that federal, 
provincial and territorial laws all come into play in the context of family dissolution. The 
family law regime is further influenced by the complex structure of the Canadian 
Charter, which requires an element of governmental action in order for it to be 
implicated in family law litigation.24  
In terms of the social context of family life, the traditional Canadian family unit is 
centred on a monogamous and heterosexual conception of the family, primarily 
                                                          
21 South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) Project 118: Report on Domestic 
Partnerships (2006).   
22 These provinces include; Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, 
Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island and Saskatchewan. 
23 SALRC Project 118: Report on Domestic Partnerships (2006) 207. 
24 Art 32 of the Canadian Charter provides that it applies to: 
“(1)(a) The Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the 
authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest 
Territories; and 
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the 
authority of the legislature of each province.” 
See SB Boyd “The Impact of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms on Canadian Family Law” 
(2000) 17 Canadian Journal of Family Law 293 297. 
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concerned with procreation.25 As highlighted in chapter three of this study, this 
traditional understanding of marriage similarly influenced South African family law and 
is criticised by feminists for its gendered and heteronormative implications.26 This 
traditional conception of marriage has also resulted in women disproportionately 
bearing the socio-economic burdens of divorce and family dissolution. Certain 
progressive Canadian judgments, which are discussed in detail later,27 have taken 
judicial notice of the feminisation of poverty associated with family dissolution.28   
Despite these developments, Canadian women and children continue to bear the 
greatest socio-economic burdens upon the dissolution of their families.29 Claire Young 
and Susan Boyd emphasise this contradiction. Despite certain progressive family law 
rules catalysed by gender-sensitive judgments, for example, gendered disadvantage 
continues to worsen in Canadian society.30 Boyd and Young reveal that one of the 
primary causes of this inequality is that many family law remedies are limited to the 
sphere of private law. The effectiveness of these remedies is thus dependent upon the 
wealth of the woman’s former partner and her ability to enforce existing rules and 
obtain an appropriate legal remedy.31 Boyd and Young point out that feminist critiques 
of marriage, familial ideology, and the privatisation of economic responsibility, have 
                                                          
25 W Holland “Intimate relationships in the New Millennium: The Assimilation of Marriage and 
Cohabitation?” (2000) 17 The Canadian Journal on Family Law 114 114. See also Layland v 
Ontario (Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations) [1993] 14 OR (3d) 658 (“Layland”). 
26 See for example F Kaganas & C Murray “Law and Women’s Rights in South Africa: An 
Overview” (1994) Acta Juridica 1 1; J Sinclair “The Financial Consequences of Divorce in 
South Africa: Judicial Determination or Private Ordering?” (1983) 32 ICLQ 785 786; and J 
Heaton “Striving for Substantive Gender Equality in Family Law: Selected Issues” (2005) 21 
SAJHR 547 547. In terms of the Canadian context, see S Gavigan & D Chunn “From Mother’s 
Allowance to Mother’s Need Not Apply: Canadian Welfare Law as Liberal and Neo-Liberal 
Reforms (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 733- 771; and SB Boyd & CFL Young 
“Feminism, Law and Public Policy: Family Feuds and Taxing Times” (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal 545 556. 
27 See part 4 5 of this chapter. 
28 See part 4 5 3 of this chapter. 
29 See for example, C Williams “Statistics Canada, Economic Well-Being” in Women in 
Canada: A Gender-based Statistical Report (2010) 6; R Finnie “Women, Men, and the 
Economic Consequences of Divorce: Evidence from the Canadian Longitudinal Data” (1993) 
30 Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 205 205; and N Bakht “A v B and Attorney 
General of Quebec (Eric v Lola): The Implications for Cohabiting Couples Outside Quebec” 
(2014) Working Paper Series 262. 
30 Young & Boyd (2006) Feminist Legal Studies 219. See also Williams “Statistics Canada” in 
Women in Canada (2010) 17, which highlighted that Canadian women continue to earn less 
than men and that they continue to have primary responsibility for child care. 
31 Young & Boyd (2006) Feminist Legal Studies 219. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
148 
 
been marginalised in recent years.32 This has resulted in “conservative and 
heteronormative discourses” on the family unit being reinforced, as well as socio-
economic vulnerabilities.33  
The lack of gender-sensitive judgments in the previous two decades, and the 
tendency to view these issues primarily through a private law lens, has the potential 
to offer useful insights when considering law reform within South Africa. One reason 
is that it highlights the need for relational socio-economic remedies that will assist the 
poorest members of our society. It also emphasises the need for a relational feminist 
framework that is responsive to gendered power imbalances and how they shape 
access to resources. The jurisprudential trends underlying Canadian family law are 
explored in further detail later.34 It is necessary to commence with the relevant rights 
pertaining to family law that are protected under the Canadian Charter. These rights 
are important as they have been utilised to extend socio-economic protection to 
women.  
 
4 3 2  Social rights under the Canadian Charter  
 
One crucial difference between the Canadian Charter and the South African 
Constitution is that the Charter does not include justiciable socio-economic rights. 
Developments pertaining to the protection of the material needs of women upon the 
dissolution of their families have therefore primarily been based upon the right to 
equality. The Canadian literature and debates on the socio-economic aspects of the 
right to equality have played a key role in emphasising the interdependent relationship 
between the right to equality and socio-economic well-being, particularly for women.35 
Developments that have enhanced the socio-economic well-being of Canadian 
women could thus potentially enrich the South African approach to cohabitation. For 
example, the interdependent nature of socio-economic rights and gender equality 
could inform legislative developments pertaining to cohabitants. 
                                                          
32 219. 
33 220. 
34 See part 4 5 of this chapter. 
35 G Brodsky & S Day “Beyond the Social and Economic Rights Debate: Substantive Equality 
Speaks to Poverty” (2002) 14 Canadian Journal on Women and Law 185 186. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
149 
 
The neglect of socio-economic rights in the Charter is surprising, given that Canada 
ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”)36 forty years ago, in 1976. The type of obligations prescribed by article 2 
of the ICESCR, in terms of taking reasonable steps within the maximum available 
resources has become a familiar aspect of the Canadian approach to protecting 
human rights.37 While the Canadian Charter does not include justiciable socio-
economic rights, it does contain the section 23 right to publicly funded minority 
language education at primary and secondary levels, which is limited to “where 
numbers warrant”.38 Other Charter rights that are particularly important in terms of 
social rights are the equality rights provided for in section 15 of the Charter and the 
right to “life, liberty and security of the person” in section 7.39 While these rights are 
traditionally classified as civil and political rights in the Canadian context, they are 
understood and interpreted to include socio-economic dimensions.40 
One of the explanations offered for the lack of socio-economic rights under the 
Charter is that most Canadian human rights experts emphasise the importance of 
framing rights, such as the right to equality, as broadly as possible.41 This is done so 
that this right can be interpreted to require that the state take positive action to address 
the needs of vulnerable groups in a manner that addresses systemic inequality.42 This 
right can also be used to require the Canadian state to maintain and improve existing 
socio-economic programmes providing for basic needs.43 
An additional reason for the lack of socio-economic rights in the Charter is that 
Canada is an inherently affluent society. As a result, violations of social and economic 
rights are perceived as primarily violations of the right to equality. As elucidated by 
                                                          
36 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966), UN Doc A/6316 
(“ICESCR”). 
37 Jackman & Porter “Socio-Economic Rights under the Canadian Charter” in Social Rights 
Jurisprudence 209. 
38 S 23(3) of the Charter. See also Jackman & Porter “Socio-Economic Rights under the 
Canadian Charter” in Social Rights Jurisprudence 209. 
39 S 7 of the Charter states that:  
“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” 
40 M Jackman & B Porter “Women’s Substantive Equality and the Protection of Social and 
Economic Rights under the Canadian Human Rights Act” in Status of Women Canada, 
Women and the Canadian Human Rights Act (1999) 43. 
41 Jackman & Porter “Socio-Economic Rights under the Canadian Charter” in Social Rights 
Jurisprudence 229. 
42 211. 
43 211. 
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Canadian scholars, the central issue is not a lack of resources,44 but rather an 
infringement of the right to equally enjoy the existing rights under the Charter. This 
inequality is emphasised by the fact that in Canada, homelessness, hunger and 
poverty disproportionately affect aboriginal people, women,45 people with disabilities 
and racial groups. These issues therefore constitute severe human rights failures, 
because they are unnecessary in a country experiencing high levels of economic 
prosperity.46 These social crises are the aftermath of misdirected state funds, the rise 
in neoliberalism and an increasingly retrogressive approach to social rights.47 This also 
reveals that even though Canada is known as a first world country, it suffers from 
patterns of poverty and inequality.  
As a result of the wide formulation of the rights in the Charter, the Canadian 
Supreme Court developed a notion of substantive equality, which incorporates 
important dimensions of socio-economic rights, in its early jurisprudence on the 
Charter’s right to equality (section 15). This interpretation placed positive obligations 
on governments to remedy disadvantage,48 as illustrated in Eldridge v Attorney 
General of British Columbia (“Eldridge”),49 where the Court held that substantive 
equality requires the provincial government to provide sign language interpreters for 
deaf patients. 
Despite this promising development and existing socio-economic inequalities, the 
lower courts have rejected these challenges when approached to rule on socio-
economic rights claims under section 7 of the Charter. The reasoning adopted by the 
courts is that economic rights are beyond the scope of section 7 of the Charter, as well 
                                                          
44 Jackman & Porter “Women’s Substantive Equality” in Status of Women in Canada 112. 
45 See Nedelsky Law’s Relations (2012) 19; and Brodsky & Day (2002) 14 Canadian Journal 
on Women and Law 186, where they specifically point out that: 
“In recent years, governments in Canada have been withdrawing social and economic 
benefits and protections, leaving gaps in the programs and services that people need, and 
reducing benefits to inadequate levels.”  
46 Jackman & Porter “Socio-Economic Rights under the Canadian Charter” in Social Rights 
Jurisprudence 211. 
47 211. 
48 For a detailed elaboration of the courts’ interpretative approach in this regard, see M 
Jackman “The Protection of Welfare Rights under the Charter” (1998) 30 Ottawa Law Review 
257-338; B Porter “Judging Poverty: Using International Human Rights Law to Refine the 
Scope of Charter Rights” (2000) 15 Journal of Law and Social Policy 117 117; and Jackman 
& Porter “Socio-Economic Rights under the Canadian Charter” in Social Rights Jurisprudence 
215. 
49 (1997) 151 DLR (4th) 577 (SCC) (“Eldridge”). 
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as the judiciary’s legitimate powers of review.50 Subsequent interpretations of the right 
to equality have also undermined the redistributive potential of this right. 
At the Canadian Supreme Court level, however, the question of the status of the 
ICESCR under section 7 of the Charter was specifically left open in the case of Irwin 
Toy Ltd v Québec (Attorney General) (“Irwin”).51 Almost two decades later, in Gosselin 
v Québec (Attorney General) (“Gosselin”),52 the Supreme Court considered a 
challenge to grossly inadequate levels of social assistance benefits being paid to 
individuals under 30 years of age, who were not participating in work experience 
employment programmes.53 
In this case, Louise Gosselin attempted to challenge the reduction of her welfare 
entitlement to one third of the amount that had been established as necessary to 
satisfy basic human needs. Gosselin’s case emphasises the vulnerability of 
cohabitants, as she was forced to live in an intimate relationship with a man she did 
not wish to live with, in exchange for accessing shelter and food. In spite of her dire 
situation, the majority of the Court dismissed her claim, stating that due to insufficient 
evidence before the court, they could not substitute the role of the legislature in 
determining how to give effect to social needs in accordance with the Charter.54 In a 
significant dissenting judgment, which was supported by the honourable Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé, Justice Arbour found that the section 7 right to “security of the 
person” clearly places positive obligations on governments to provide those in need 
with a minimal amount of social support.55 This decision reveals how formalistic 
notions of judicial deference play a role in stunting the development of social rights 
jurisprudence in Canada.56 The failure to engage with feminist arguments regarding 
gendered socio-economic disadvantage also resulted in an unresponsive judgment. 
 
4 3 3 Application of the Canadian Charter to family law 
 
                                                          
50 Jackman & Porter “Socio-Economic Rights under the Canadian Charter” in Social Rights 
Jurisprudence 211. 
51 Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General) [1989] 1 SCR 927 (“Irwin”). 
52 [2002] SCC 84; [2002] SCR 429 (“Gosselin”). 
53 Paras 45 & 82.  
54 Para 264. 
55 Para 312. 
56 Jackman & Porter “Women’s Substantive Equality” in Status of Women Canada 112. 
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The Charter does not include any specific provisions on the right to family or the 
right to privacy. As highlighted above, it contains a provision on equality. While marital 
status is not included as a listed ground within article 15 of the Charter,57 the Supreme 
Court of Canada has expressly developed the law in order to recognise marital status 
as an analogous ground of prohibited discrimination.58 One positive aspect of not 
having defined “family” within the Canadian Charter is that Canada has developed the 
traditional conception of marriage to recognise a broader range of families, including 
same-sex unions.59 Much of this development has, however, been initiated by 
progressive judicial decisions, which have then prompted legislative reform.60 
Canadian scholars have consequently praised much of the family law jurisprudence 
for having “redrawn and redefined the legal vision of family itself”.61  
The move to recognise same-sex marriages has, unfortunately, occurred in a 
manner that has had (unexpected) gendered implications.62 As emphasised by Boyd, 
notwithstanding the importance of this development, much of the debate surrounding 
these unions took place within a paradigm that reinforced existing gendered 
                                                          
57 S 15 of the Charter provides that: 
“(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental 
or physical disability. 
(2) Affirmative action programs; subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or 
activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or 
groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” 
58 In the decision of Miron v Trudel [1995] 2 SCR 418; 23 OR (3d) 160 (“Miron”) , a challenge 
was brought against the definition of “spouse” in the province of Ontario's Insurance Act RSO 
1980 c 218 ss 231-233, which prevented an unmarried opposite-sex couple access to the 
benefits available to legally married couples. The Court found that marital status was an 
analogous protected ground of discrimination for the purposes of s 15(1) and the impugned 
definition of spouse was found to violate this section.  
59 With regard to Canada, after the progressive Supreme Court decision of M v H [1999] 2 
SCR 3 (“M v H”), the Federal government legalised civil same-sex marriage across Canada 
in July of 2005. 
60 R Leckey “Family Law as Fundamental Private Law” (2007) 86 La Revue Du Barreau 
Canadien 86 72. 
61 Rogerson “Canada” in The Future of Child and Family law (2012) 77; Leckey (2007) La 
Revue Du Barreau Canadien 72; and SB Boyd “The Impact of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms on Canadian Family Law” (2000) 17 Canadian Journal of Family Law 293 297. 
62 Young & Boyd (2006) state that:  
“The story of the legal recognition of same-sex relationships is less than fully positive, in 
the sense that it has proceeded in a way that has rendered invisible important feminist 
critiques of marriage, familial ideology and the domestication of lesbian and gay 
relationships.” 
See Young & Boyd (2006) Feminist Legal Studies 217. 
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hierarchies while exacerbating socio-economic vulnerability.63 This reinforces the 
need for a gender-sensitive approach to regulating the socio-economic consequences 
of terminated domestic partnerships, while retaining equal respect for different family 
forms. 
The majority of Canadian family law developments are based on judicial 
interpretations of the right to equality, the rights to freedom of religion and freedom of 
expression (section 2), and the right to security of the person (section 7).64 The rights 
and freedoms set out in the Charter are guaranteed “subject only to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society”.65  
When examining how the Canadian Charter has influenced Canadian family law, 
Boyd explains its influence in three specific ways. The first is through Canadian 
governments reviewing and amending legislative provisions in order to ensure that 
statutory provisions comply with the Charter.66 Direct constitutional challenges have 
also been brought against statutory provisions on the basis that they violate specific 
Charter guarantees, such as the right to equality. Finally, the Charter has been invoked 
indirectly to argue that, even in the absence of the required element of government or 
state action,67 judges must nevertheless consider the fundamental values (such as 
equality) protected in the Charter.68 It has also been pointed out that the introduction 
of the Charter into Canadian law led to an initial increased invocation of the language 
of rights and the use of contextually sensitive social science research in family law 
decisions.69 In the previous two decades, judicial reliance on this gendered evidence 
has, however, decreased. 
 
4 3 4 Conclusion 
 
Canada’s particular social and legal history has resulted in a unique framework of 
rights protected in the Charter. While one of the central differences between the 
                                                          
63 213. 
64 Boyd (2000) Canadian Journal of Family Law 297. 
65 S 1 of the Charter. 
66 Boyd (2000) Canadian Journal of Family Law 295. 
67 S 32(1) of the Charter. 
68 Leckey (2007) La Revue Du Barreau Canadien 72. 
69 Boyd (2000) Canadian Journal on Family Law 295. 
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Canadian Charter and the South African Constitution is the lack of justiciable socio-
economic rights in the Charter, Canadian courts have at times interpreted the equality 
rights under the Charter to require positive measures to address social disadvantage. 
Although these developments are vitally important, jurisprudence from the previous 
two decades reveals a rise in judicial deference, as well as neoliberalism, which has 
impeded much of this development. Debates surrounding private versus public 
obligations for social rights, and formal interpretations of equality, emphasise the need 
to give substantive content to the socio-economic rights of women.70 Canadian 
scholars have thus emphasised the limitations of an equality framework, while urging 
the state to include social and economic rights in the Canadian Human Rights Act of 
1985 (“CHRA”).71 Within the context of this framework of Charter rights, it is necessary 
to examine relevant Canadian legislation that seeks to regulate cohabitation. 
   
4 4 Canadian legislation 
 
4 4 1 Introduction 
 
While the courts have played an integral role in developing the family law regime in 
Canada, the legislature has also played a key role.72 A legislative response to 
cohabitation is also required to ensure consistency, fairness and cost-effectiveness.73 
The substantial financial and psychological burden placed on those who have to 
approach the courts to make Charter-based claims was explicitly recognised by the 
Canadian Supreme Court in M v H.74 A comprehensive and coherent legislative 
framework that clearly governs the rights of cohabitants is thus necessary.75 
Canadian legislatures have predominantly introduced guiding principles to inform 
the family law regime, enabling Canadian courts to interpret and define how these 
                                                          
70 J Fudge “Substantive Equality, the Supreme Court of Canada and the Limits to 
Redistribution” (2007) 23 SAJHR 235 235. 
71 Canadian Human Rights Act RSC 1985 c H-6. See Jackman & Porter “Women’s 
Substantive Equality” in Status of Women Canada 112. 
72 In Canada, the Charter applies to both federal and provincial legislatures. 
73 N Bala “Alternatives for Extending Spousal Status in Canada” (2000) 17 Canadian Journal 
of Family Law 169 171. 
74 [1999] 2 RCS 3 (“M v H”). 
75 R Leckey “Contracting Claims and Family Law Feuds” (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law 
Journal 1 2. 
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principles should be applied in specific cases before them.76 The legislative framework 
informing Canadian family law is complex in that both federal and provincial or 
territorial laws come into play in terms of regulating families.  
The spectrum of protection within Canada runs from one extreme of according no 
matrimonial rights and duties to unmarried spouses, such as in the province of 
Québec, to total assimilation with married spouses, as exemplified by the approaches 
in the provinces of Manitoba and Saskatchewan.77 In addition, despite many promising 
extensions of the family law regime to unmarried cohabitants, much of the family law 
legislation remains centred upon the traditional conception of a civil marriage. 
 
4 4 2 Provincial legislation: Ascription (status) versus contract 
 
As noted above, certain elements of the progressive family law jurisprudence within 
Canada served as a catalyst for positive legislative developments regarding the 
protection of unmarried cohabitants. From an analysis of Canadian family law it can 
therefore be observed that over the previous three decades there have been 
incremental changes brought about by the different legislatures concerning the rights 
of heterosexual cohabitants in Canada.78 Carol Rogerson highlights that these 
developments occurred after the abolition of illegitimacy, which nullified the necessity 
of formal marriage for parental status.79 Following this development, many of the 
Canadian provinces imposed spousal support obligations on unmarried cohabitants, 
while also sometimes regulating cohabitation agreements in the seventies.80  
The extension of support obligations in Canada was followed by the courts 
incrementally developing the private law principles of unjustified enrichment, and the 
rules underlying the constructive trust, to provide property rights to cohabitants in the 
eighties and nineties.81 Statutory benefits were extended during this period too.82  
                                                          
76  MJ Mossman “Conversations about Families in Canadian Courts and Legislatures: Are 
there “Lessons” for the United States?” (2003) 32 Hofstra Law Review 171 172. 
77 R Leckey “Gimme Shelter” (2001) 34 Dalhousie Law Journal 198 198. 
78 Rogerson “Canada” in Future of Child and Family law 77. 
79 77. 
80 Rogerson 77; Holland (2000) The Canadian Journal on Family Law 127. An example of this 
can be found in the Family Law Reform Act of 1978 SO 1978 c 2. 
81 Holland (2000) The Canadian Journal on Family Law 114. 
82 114. 
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As a result, all of the Canadian provinces, except for Québec, currently recognise 
a duty of support between cohabitants. In doing so, the different provinces utilise 
different approaches and, at times, different terminologies in referring to cohabitants. 
For example, in the province of Alberta, unmarried cohabitants are expressly 
recognised as partaking in an “adult interdependent relationship” in the Adult 
Interdependent Relationship Act of 2002.83 This Act expressly defines a “relationship 
of interdependence” as meaning a relationship outside of marriage, whereby two 
people (i) share in each other’s lives, (ii) are “emotionally committed” to each other 
and (iii) perform as an “economic and domestic unit”. In this regard, the method of 
acquiring rights and obligations is through ascription.84 The Adult Interdependent 
Relationship Act also prohibits polygamous relationships.85  
In Manitoba, the Family Maintenance Act states that spouses and common-law 
partners have the mutual obligation to contribute reasonably to each other's support 
and maintenance.86 The Act defines common-law partners as cohabitants who have 
registered their relationship with the Vital Statistics Agency, cohabitants who have 
lived together for one year and have a child together, or cohabitants who have lived 
together for three years. Under New Brunswick’s Family Services Act,87 spousal 
support88 is also possible for what the Act refers to as “common-law couples”, who 
have lived together for a period of three years. Under Newfoundland and Labrador’s 
                                                          
83 SA 2002 c A-4.5 
84 The South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) uses the term “ascription model” 
throughout its report on domestic partnerships. Ascription refers to certain rights and benefits 
automatically attaching to a relationship, once it fulfils certain minimum requirements. See A 
Barratt “Private Contract or Automatic Court Discretion? Current Trends in Legal Regulation 
of Permanent Life-partnerships (2015) 26 Stell Law Review 110 116. 
85 S 5(1) of the Act SA 2002 c A-4.5, states that:  
“A person cannot at any one time have more than one adult interdependent partner.” 
86 S 4(1) of the Family Maintenance Act CCSM c F20. 
87 SNB 1980 c F22. 
88 S 112(1) of the Family Services Act provides that: 
“Every spouse has an obligation to provide support for himself or herself and for the other 
spouse, in accordance with need, to the extent that he or she is capable of doing so. 
112(2) Every father of a child has an obligation, to the extent he is capable of doing so, to 
provide support, in accordance with need, to the mother of his child, where she is not his 
spouse, in relation to the birth of the child. 
112(3)Two persons, not being married to each other, who have lived together;  
(a) continuously for a period of not less than three years in a family relationship in which 
one person has been substantially dependent upon the other for support, or  
(b) in a family relationship of some permanence where there is a child born of whom they 
are the natural parents, and have lived together in that relationship within the preceding 
year, have the same obligation as that set out in subsection (1).” 
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Family Law Act of 1990,89 partners are entitled to support if they have cohabited for at 
least two years or for a period of one year, where they are, together, the biological or 
adoptive parents of a child.90  
In Ontario, the Family Law Reform Act of 199091 provides rights through ascription, 
with a “dependant” defined as a person to whom another has a duty to provide support. 
A “spouse” is defined as either of two persons who are not married to each other, but 
who have lived together, (a) continuously for a period of not less than three years, or 
who are (b) in a relationship of some permanence, while also being the natural or 
adoptive parents of a child.92  
Certain provinces and territories also include cohabitants in their regimes for the 
division of family property or for the equalisation of its value. These provinces include 
Manitoba,93 Saskatchewan, British Columbia and the Northwest Territories, Nunavut 
and Yukon. Nova Scotia allows unmarried couples to opt into the property regime, but 
specifically through registration. The benefits and drawbacks of the opt-in system are 
discussed further in part 4 5 6 of this study. 
The Province of Québec therefore stands out in sharp contrast to the other 
provinces and territories, as its civil code attaches no spousal rights and duties to 
unmarried cohabitants. Saskatchewan is on the opposite end of the legal spectrum, 
as it is one of three provinces and territories that have opened their matrimonial 
property regime to unmarried cohabitants without requiring de facto partners to 
register their relationship.  
As highlighted above, these legislative developments were effectively prompted by 
judicial activity. This is evinced by the example of the Saskatchewan government 
amending and renaming the Matrimonial Property Act94 following a decision of a 
Saskatchewan court.95 In Watch v Watch,96 the court found that the Matrimonial 
Property Act violated article 15(1) of the Charter. The Matrimonial Property Act was 
                                                          
89 Family Law Act RSNL 1990 c F2. 
90 Section 35 of the Family Law Act of 1990. 
91 RSO 990 c F3. 
92 S 1 of the Family Law Act RSO 1990. 
93 In Manitoba, the Family Maintenance Act of 1987 recognises a mutual obligation of support 
between spouses and de facto partners, providing that they have a mutual responsibility to 
reasonably contribute to each other's support. 
94  SS 1979 c M-61. 
95 Watch v Watch [1999]182 Sask R 237. 
96 [1999]182 Sask R 237. 
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subsequently renamed the Family Property Act97 and was amended to include 
unmarried spouses that have cohabited together for a minimum of two years.98 Section 
20 of this Act states that its purpose is to recognise that the responsibility for child care 
and managing the home are the “joint and mutual responsibilities of spouses.” It goes 
on to state that the assumption of these responsibilities entitles each spouse to an 
equal distribution of the family property, subject to certain exceptions set out in the 
Act. Section 20 recognises the integral link between socio-economic contribution and 
entitlement and caring work. Recognition of this interconnection in family relationships 
is integral if we are to transform the manner in which men and women relate to one 
another in the private sphere.  
Both Nunavut and the Northwest Territories have expanded their definition of 
spouse in their Family Law Act99 to include unmarried cohabiting persons that have 
cohabited for a minimum of two years or, where there has been a relationship of some 
permanence coupled with being the natural or adoptive parents of a child. One of the 
most recent Canadian legislative amendments has been the new Family Law Act of 
British Columbia, which provides that unmarried cohabitants can now also share in 
family property and debts.100  
With regard to polygamous relationships, one of the requirements of a valid 
marriage in British Columbian law is that both spouses must be unmarried at the time 
of their marriage.101 Polygamous marriages are also a Criminal Code offence under 
Canadian law. However, British Columbian authorities have tended to not enforce the 
prohibition on polygamy on the basis that the legislation prohibiting it is regarded as 
unconstitutional.102 Notably, the legislation that included domestic partnerships under 
the definition of spouse did not limit the status of “marriage-like” partners to those in 
monogamous relationships. Subsequently, British Columbia has gained a reputation 
as being a haven for polygamists.  
                                                          
97 SS 1997 c F-63. 
98 S 2 of the Family Property Act SS 1997 c F-63; A Mohs Choice v Equality: The Legal 
Recognition of unmarried Cohabitation in Canada LLM thesis the University of British 
Columbia (Vancouver) (2010) 1 27. 
99 SNWT 1997 (Nu) 1997 c 18. 
100 Family Law Act SBC 2011 c 25. 
101 South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) Project 118: Report on Domestic 
Partnerships (2006) 7 <http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/reports/ r_prj118_2006march.pdf> 
(accessed 20-10-2012) 94. 
102 94. 
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4 4 3 Conclusion: The debate between status and contract 
 
In the twentieth century, a patchwork of legislative provisions was introduced across 
Canada to provide some legal recognition to unmarried couples. In many ways, the 
Canadian family law system mirrors the fragmentation found within the South African 
family law regime. Despite its patchy legislative framework, Canada has gone further 
than South Africa in terms of extending legislative protection to cohabitants. The 
debate between regulating domestic partnerships in terms of status or contract, or an 
approach based on both, is particularly evident within Canadian family law. This is 
evinced through certain Canadian provinces providing protection through ascription 
(status), while other provinces provide protection through registration. The province of 
Nova Scotia is also noteworthy for providing protection through both ascription and 
registration. In essence, the contract-based approaches rely on the partners to register 
their relationship or to conclude private contracts between themselves. The partners 
have the freedom to decide and agree on the specific economic consequences of their 
relationship. The ascription models, in contrast, are not based on agreement, with 
consequences arising through the automatic operation of law subject to certain 
minimum conditions being fulfilled.  
Canadian family law is currently in a state of flux, as legislators utilise a variety of 
approaches towards regulating cohabitation. This analysis does, however, highlight 
that Canadian legislatures have gone further than most jurisdictions in terms of 
ameliorating the economic hardships experienced by women after familial 
breakdowns.103  
An examination of Canadian legislation emphasises the need for statutes that 
recognise and address the existing socio-economic context experienced by cohabiting 
women. Canadian legislative developments also reveal the need to eschew the liberal 
conception of choice and instead transpose a conception of substantive autonomy into 
regulatory mechanisms. Interconnected to a more substantive conception of 
autonomy is the need to recognise the state’s particular duty to regulate these 
relationships and enforce private socio-economic obligations. Legislative provisions 
also need to address the exploitative norms that shape how men and women relate to 
                                                          
103 Rogerson “Canada” in Future of Child and Family law (2012) 77. 
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one another. While a number of Canadian provinces have recognised this positive 
duty through enacting regulatory legislation, they have failed to do so in a manner that 
is truly transformative. This is emphasised by feminist scholarship, which emphasises 
that the patriarchal and heteronormative paradigms underlying traditional marriage are 
simply being extended through these legislative provisions.104 It is necessary to 
examine the underlying gendered dynamics within family law and to respond to these 
private power imbalances in a manner that transforms gendered relations. In this 
regard, it needs to be kept in mind that the normal rules for men and women are 
shaped by gendered norms and patriarchal exploitation.105 This background reality 
should be kept in mind when determining how to regulate cohabitation in South Africa. 
The following section examines how the Canadian courts have interpreted the rights 
of cohabitants. 
 
4 5 Canadian jurisprudence 
 
4 5 1 Introduction 
 
The Canadian government’s approach to the regulation of cohabitation is similar to 
the South African approach in that the rights of cohabitants are currently comprised of 
a patchwork of private law rules and legislative remedies.106 A further similarity is that 
the majority of the progressive changes that have occurred within Canadian family law 
have been catalysed by progressive Charter based-cases. Accordingly, legislatures in 
Canada tend to initiate legal change when judicial decisions compel them to do so.107 
As a result, the courts are heralded for primarily shaping and expanding the legal 
definition of “family” in Canada.108 
                                                          
104 Young & Boyd (2006) Feminist Legal Studies 216; Holland (2000) Canadian Journal on 
Family Law 127; and Fudge (2007) SAJHR 235. 
105 Bonthuys (2015) SALJ 76; C Albertyn “Judicial Diversity” in C Hoexter & Olivier (eds) The 
Judiciary in South Africa (2015) 284. 
106 H Conway & P Girard “No Place like Home: The Search for a Legal Framework for 
Cohabitants and the Family Home in Canada and Britain” (2005) 30 Queen’s Law Journal 
715 715. 
107 Mossman (2003) Hofstra Law Review 191. 
108 191. 
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In spite of the importance of the legislature, the period of active and consistent 
legislative engagement with family law issues ended primarily in the 1990s.109 Since 
then, Canadian society has entered into an era of fiscal constraint, polarised politics 
and decreased legislative activism in family law issues.110 As a result of the importance 
of the jurisprudence, leading Canadian decisions will be analysed to determine their 
comparative value for South African case law. While certain progressive trends are 
able to offer guidance to the South African judiciary, problematic aspects identified in 
the Canadian jurisprudential approach also highlight issues that should be avoided by 
the South African courts. In this regard, a critical comparison can lead the South 
African courts to fundamentally re-assess previous judgments and initiate 
transformative legal change where necessary.111 
 
4 5 2 Gender-sensitive Canadian jurisprudence from the 1980s to the early 1990s 
 
Within Canadian family law, the position of unmarried cohabitants is governed by a 
patchwork of legal rules. In accordance with this patchy framework, the courts have 
sometimes used the law of trusts, laws relating to contract or the law governing 
unjustified enrichment to address the vulnerability of unmarried cohabitants.112 When 
it comes to obligations of support, most of the Canadian provinces have already 
imposed spousal support duties on un-married cohabitants through legislative 
amendments. As a result, much of the jurisprudence on cohabitation is focused on 
their rights relating to property division upon the dissolution of their relationship.  
Two Supreme Court cases that offer examples of the judicial development of the 
private law mechanisms of unjustified enrichment and the constructive trust include 
Pettkus v Becker113 (“Pettkus”) and Peter v Beblow (“Peter”).114 While these cases are 
considered landmark decisions, the courts have unfortunately not always followed 
these decisions in subsequent cases.115 In Pettkus, Mr Pettkus and his partner (Mrs 
                                                          
109 Rogerson “Canada” in Future of Child and Family Law 76. 
110 Young & Boyd (2006) Feminist Legal Studies 218. 
111 S Choudhry “Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative 
Constitutional Interpretation” (1999) 74 Indiana LJ 819 858. 
112 Mohs Choice v Equality (2010) 27. 
113 [1980] 2 SCR 834, 1980 CanLII 22 (SCC) (“Pettkus”). 
114 [1993] 1 SCR 980 (“Peter”). 
115 J Flood “Share the Wealth? Kerr v Baranow and the ‘Joint Family Venture’” (2011) 27 
Canadian Journal of Family Law 361 362. 
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Becker) lived together for almost 20 years from 1955 to 1974. During the first five years 
of their relationship, Mrs Becker financially supported Mr Pettkus by paying for their 
living expenses, such as rent and food. Her support allowed Mr Pettkus to save his 
entire income, which he deposited in a bank account in his name. In 1961, he 
purchased a farm using this money, registering the property in his name only. Upon 
the dissolution of their relationship, the Supreme Court of Canada specifically awarded 
the respondent a one-half interest in the farm property. According to the Court, Mr 
Pettkus had been enriched as a result of her unpaid labour, while she had received 
almost nothing in return. The Court further found that the respondent had a reasonable 
expectation of receiving an interest in the property, while Mr Pettkus freely accepted 
the benefits of her labour and knew (or should have known) of these expectations.116 
The Court specifically pointed out that “it would be unjust to allow the recipient of the 
benefit to retain it”.117 In Pettkus the Canadian Court was therefore able to recognise 
that simply leaving the property in Mr Pettkus’ name would result in the exploitation of 
the caregiving partner. While many elements of the Pettkus decision are progressive, 
Justice Dickson (as he then was) did not create an automatic presumption of equal 
sharing of the family property between de facto partners. In his decision, Dickson 
stressed that the respondent was awarded a share equivalent to her contribution, 
which in this case happened to be a one-half interest in the property. He further 
emphasised that in order for this remedy to be applicable, the contribution has to be 
substantial and directly related to the property.118 The socio-economic implications of 
how men and women relate to one another and share the division of labour in 
relationships, was therefore not addressed by the Court. While recognising the 
property entitlements of the care-giving partner, the remedy provided was primarily 
based on an equitable division of economic resources rather than a gender-sensitive 
interpretation of human rights norms within the context of Canadian family law.  
In the 1993 Peter case,119 the Supreme Court of Appeal expanded the application 
of the constructive trust in terms of property claims between cohabitants by 
recognising the economic value of caring work. In this case, the applicant (Catherine 
Peter) had lived with the respondent (William Beblow) for twelve years, during which 
                                                          
116 [1980] 2 SCR 835. 
117 834. 
118 Mohs Choice v Equality: The Legal Recognition of unmarried Cohabitation in Canada 1 40. 
119 Peter v Beblow [1993] 1 SCR 980.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
163 
 
time she had taken care of the domestic work, while also caring for their children. While 
this case did not concern Charter-based arguments, this judgment is noteworthy for 
recognising the socio-economic value of caring work as sufficient to make out a claim 
under the constructive trust. The Court emphasised that the applicant had unfairly 
undertaken the domestic work within this relationship without any compensation.120 
The Court, however, limited the remedial constructive trust by holding that it is only 
available if a monetary award would be inadequate and if there is a clear link between 
the caregiver’s contributions and the family property.  
Under Canadian law, unjustified enrichment and the constructive trust do not 
include an automatic presumption of equal sharing of the property. The actual share 
of property that is given to the claimant depends on judicial discretion. Furthermore, it 
has been pointed out that the constructive trust is generally more difficult to prove than 
the legislative remedy,121 while proving that there is a connection between the property 
and traditional family contributions can be particularly difficult.122 These cases 
therefore reveal that while the constructive trust can be used for unmarried 
cohabitants, as a remedy for the division of property at the breakdown of the 
relationship, cohabitants are still not being treated on an equal basis with married 
persons. Even if these relationships are not regulated in precisely the same manner, 
the gendered implications of these relationships need to be acknowledged and 
addressed. While recognising the value of caring work, the private law framework 
informing these cases reinforces the need for a greater focus on the human rights of 
vulnerable cohabitants, particularly a relational feminist interpretation of the socio-
economic interests of female cohabitants. 
An example of a Charter-based case initiated by unmarried cohabitants is the 1995 
decision of Miron v Trudel (“Miron”),123 which is considered a watershed case. Of 
                                                          
120 980.  
121 For example, under British Columbia’s Family Relations Act RSBC 1996, section 56 
provides a spouse with the right to an equal share of family assets upon the breakdown of the 
marriage. Section 60 then provides that the onus rests on the spouse opposing a property 
claim, stating that this spouse must prove that the property in dispute is not used for traditional 
family purposes. See also: Mohs Choice v Equality The Legal Recognition of Unmarried 
Cohabitation in Canada 32 
122 Mohs Choice v Equality: The Legal Recognition of Unmarried Cohabitation in Canada 32. 
123 Rogerson “Canada” in The Future of Child and Family Law 97. See also: The case of Miron 
v Trudel [1995] 2 SCR 418 in which the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the right to 
equality within the Charter of Rights included protection from discrimination on the basis of 
marital status.   
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particular interest, is the manner in which the Supreme Court of Canada initially 
grappled with the choice argument. This element of the judgment provides a 
comparative basis for South African family law. In this case, unmarried cohabitants 
challenged their exclusion from the definition of “spouse” in a standard automobile 
insurance policy prescribed by provincial legislation. They claimed that their exclusion 
infringed upon the right to equality as protected in the Canadian Charter. The exclusion 
of cohabitants prevented John Miron, who was unable to work due to an automobile 
accident, from claiming accident benefits under his insurance policy. He was therefore 
unable to provide for his family, because he and his partner were not married. While 
marital status is not expressly recognised in section 15 of the Charter, in Miron the 
Supreme Court of Canada developed the law to recognise marital status as a 
prohibited analogous ground of discrimination.124  
The Court recognised that both married and unmarried couples are involved in the 
kind of economically interdependent relationships that the legislation is intended to 
benefit.125 The Court also recognised that cohabitants have historically suffered 
significant social disadvantage, including “social ostracism” and the denial of 
traditional marital benefits.126 While these relationships have slowly become more 
accepted in Canadian society, the Court pointed out that the historical disadvantage 
associated with cohabitation should not be underestimated.127  
In addition to recognising the need for social recognition of cohabitation, Madam 
Justice L'Heureux-Dubé proceeded to criticise the disproportionate focus on the 
choice argument by stating that the “decision of whether or not to marry is most 
definitely capable of being a very fundamental and personal choice”.128 She went on 
to point out that for a significant number of persons in “non-traditional” relationships, 
the notion of “choice” may be completely illusory. She highlighted that it is 
inappropriate to condense the complex factors that shape personal choices into a 
simple dichotomy between “choice” or “no choice”.129  
Her judgment also acknowledged the diversity within Canadian society, by 
recognising that family means very different things to different people. The failure to 
                                                          
124 Rogerson “Canada” in The Future of Child and Family Law (2012) 97.   
125 Miron para 44. 
126 Para 152. 
127 Para 152. 
128 Para 22. 
129 Miron v Trudel [1995] 2 SCR para 22. 
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adopt the traditional conception of a family may therefore be due to a range of reasons, 
all deserving of equal social recognition.130 She noted that since the object of the 
legislation in question is to assist families when one of their members is injured in an 
accident, the focus should be on fulfilling this underlying purpose, as opposed to what 
their official marital status is.131 The Court therefore adopted a context-sensitive 
analysis of how the law structures relations and how it intends to structure these social 
relations. This approach allowed the Court to recognise the social importance of 
cohabiting relationships and the need to extend socio-economic benefits to their 
participants.   
In a subsequent decision by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Taylor v Rossu 
(“Taylor”),132 the court specifically drew from the functional approach adopted in Miron. 
In the Taylor case, the Court held that it was a discriminatory violation of section 15 of 
the Charter to exclude unmarried cohabitants from the definition of “spouse” in 
Alberta’s family support statute.133 Prompted by this decision, the province of Alberta 
became the last common law province to amend its legislation to include heterosexual 
cohabitants in a “marriage-like” relationship. 
The Miron decision reveals that, in the earlier Supreme Court jurisprudence of the 
1990s, the primary focus was initially on recognising a more functional conception of 
“family”.134 While the focus on functional families is invaluable, much of this 
development is undermined through the state’s subsequent move towards privatising 
socio-economic needs. Mary Jane Mossman elucidates that, while these Canadian 
decisions clearly recognise economic need on the part of former spouses (mostly 
women), these decisions primarily place this need within the responsibility of (former) 
family members. This neoliberal approach effectively neglects the state’s duty to 
regulate the socio-economic consequences of these relationships, while also being 
required to provide adequate public services.135 As a result, much of Canada’s recent 
family law development has been shaped by the neoliberal agenda of the 
government.136 To the extent that feminist critiques of marriage, family law and the 
                                                          
130 Para 22. 
131 Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v Walsh [2002] 4 SCR 355. 
132 [1998] ABCA 193 (“Taylor v Rossu”). 
133 Domestic Relations Amendment Act 1999 SA 1999 c 20 s 2. 
134 Rogerson “Canada” in The Future of Child and Family law” 77. 
135 Mossman (2003) Hofstra Law Review 186. 
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privatisation of economic responsibility are neglected, conservative and patriarchal 
discourses on marriage are further entrenched.137 This neoliberal trend therefore 
raises the need to focus on the socio-economic consequences of family dissolution 
and the specific socio-economic needs of individuals in relation to one another, as 
opposed to primarily focusing on the form of a relationship. It also raises the need for 
gender-sensitive interpretations of family law rules that strengthen the state’s duty to 
develop private accountability measures for human rights violations. Interconnected 
to the initial jurisprudential concern with a functional conception of family are certain 
watershed judgements relating to the economic impact of family dissolution on women. 
 
4 5 3 Feminist trends in Canadian family law in the 1990s 
 
Both the Canadian courts and the South African courts are grappling with similar 
issues and debates when it comes to infusing family law rules with human rights 
norms.138 In this regard, Canadian family law is worth examining, given the remarkable 
and progressive changes that have occurred in relation to spousal support in the 
previous two decades.139 In particular, the manner in which feminist interpretations of 
human rights norms have expanded certain family law rules so as to be more 
responsive to the socio-economic impact of caring work, has the potential to offer 
useful insights.  
  In spite of the Charter’s lack of socio-economic rights, certain progressive 
decisions on family law recognised the integral interconnection between socio-
economic vulnerability and inadequate family law rules.140 As further pointed out by 
Leckey, much of this transformation was due to scholars working within a feminist 
tradition.141 Particular judgments that stand out are progressive decisions by the 
                                                          
137 Young & Boyd (2006) Feminist Legal Studies 216; and Mossman (2003) Hofstra Law 
Review 184. 
138 J Fudge “Substantive Equality, the Supreme Court of Canada and the limits to 
Redistribution” (2007) 23 SAJHR 235 235. 
139 S Gavigan “Something Old, Something New? Re-Theorizing Patriarchal Relations and 
Privatization from the Outskirts of Family Law” (2012) 12 Theoretical Inquiries into Law 
271 271:  
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policy in relation to Canadian family forms.” 
140 S B Boyd & CFL Young “Feminism, Law and Public Policy: Family Feuds and Taxing Times” 
(2004) 42 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 545 556. 
141 Leckey (2007) La Revue Du Barreau Canadien 72. For an in-depth discussion on the role 
of the sociological concept of ‘functional family’ in developing Canadian family law, see J 
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Supreme Court of Canada (that took place in the early 1990’s) relating to the 
recognition of gender inequality within family law. These decisions are noteworthy for 
providing fairly generous socio-economic relief to the spouse in the weaker socio-
economic position upon the dissolution of their marriage. While this was primarily in 
terms of divorce, the Court’s contextual approach was particularly responsive to 
existing patterns of vulnerability and disadvantage within Canadian society. The 
Court’s mode of reasoning also facilitated an examination of the gendered nature of 
family law, as well as the need for transformation.   
The decision of the famous case of Moge v Moge,142 is thus considered a watershed 
case. In this decision, the Supreme Court of Canada took judicial notice of the unequal 
economic impact of divorce on women and how it entrenches the feminisation of 
poverty.143 This case concerned an appeal against the decision to set aside a spousal 
support order, sixteen years after the divorce had been granted. The majority decision 
by Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dubé,144 recognised that a former spouse had an 
obligation to provide support to a dependent spouse to compensate for disadvantages 
experienced both during the marriage and after marriage breakdown.145 Her judgment 
is thus noteworthy for recognising the disproportionate impact of child care, marriage 
and divorce on women, while emphatically rejecting the self-sufficiency model of 
divorce, substituting it instead with a compensatory framework.146  
Her judgment has been praised for acknowledging the social reality that even 
modern women tend to assume more responsibility than men for caring work and child 
care and that this often has negative socio-economic consequences.147 She also 
recognised the integral link between this fact and women’s inequality in the labour 
force.148 This recognition is integral to a relational conception of rights, as developed 
by Jennifer Nedelsky and discussed in chapter two of this study. In terms of this 
                                                          
Millbank “The Role of "Functional Family" in Same-Sex Family Recognition Trends” (2008) 20 
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approach, a just structure of household relationships is crucial for the full and equal 
enjoyment of all human rights.149 
The importance of questioning how the law is structuring gendered relations was 
further recognised by Justice L'Heureux-Dubé when she interpreted the Divorce Act 
through primarily analysing its underlying purpose. She pointed out that the purpose 
of this Act is to ensure a fair and equitable distribution of resources between ex-
spouses so as to alleviate the detrimental socio-economic consequences of divorce. 
She went on to state that it would be: “perverse in the extreme to assume that 
Parliament’s intention in executing the Act was to penalise women”.150 Her decision is 
therefore renowned for having transformed spousal support law in a manner that 
protected the socio-economic interests of vulnerable care-giving spouses. In terms of 
relational feminism, this judgment is noteworthy for effectively recognising the integral 
links between legal rights, core values and the manner through which private relations 
impact upon the capacity to exercise one’s rights.151 
Justice L'Heureux-Dubé’s judgment has thus been praised by feminists for 
providing a context-sensitive and realistic perspective on the experiences of women, 
and for ensuring that legal rules pertaining to spousal support are responsive to 
women's needs and realities. This relational feminist approach is in contrast to a 
neutral acceptance of the gendered assumptions underlying family roles that 
perpetuate the exploitation of women.152 The decision of Justice L'Heureux-Dubé in 
Moge has thus been heralded for placing the individual within her gendered, familial 
context, at least in terms of her existing private law remedies against her ex-spouse.153 
An analysis of Moge and certain subsequent family law decisions reveal an 
enduring tension between atomistic liberalism and socially contextualised feminism 
within Canadian family law.154 As highlighted in chapter two,155 liberalism assumes 
that citizens are simply autonomous beings with equal bargaining power.156 In 
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contrast, relational feminism aims to recognise the complex manner in which 
individuals are enmeshed in relationships, with their capacity to exercise their rights 
constrained by ideology, gender, and broader socio-economic forces.157 Canadian 
scholars working within the feminist tradition have adopted this contextually sensitive 
criticism of “autonomy” and “choice”, as a framework to analyse family law matters 
such as spousal support and child custody issues.158 Given the extensive inequality 
found within South African society, as well as the reality that women are 
disproportionately affected by poverty, a relational feminist conception of family law 
rights is imperative. 
Following the decision of Moge, in Bracklow v Bracklow (“Bracklow”),159 the 
Supreme Court of Canada developed the divorce law further by stating that a former 
disabled spouse could apply for ongoing financial support based on financial need 
alone.160 In this decision, the wife, who had worked for some time during the marriage 
while also contributing through providing caring work within the household, eventually, 
became physically and mentally disabled after her divorce. The severity of her 
disability ultimately prevented her from working. The Court held that there was a “basic 
social obligation”161 between spouses, which meant that the husband in this 
relationship owed a duty of spousal support to his ex-wife. This was held to be the 
case even though it was not through his actions that his wife’s economic prospects 
had suffered a further decline after their divorce. The reasoning in Bracklow162 has 
been criticised for focusing less on the gendered nature of economic disadvantage 
within marriage, and more on privatising the basic social obligations between marital 
partners.163 
An analysis of these cases reveals that much of the earlier Canadian jurisprudence 
was shaped by the value of gender equality, as well as a concern for the caregiving 
partner upon the termination of the marriage. It is also clear, however, that there has 
been a subsequent shift towards the privatisation of familial responsibilities in Canada. 
The Moge decision provides an example of a relational and gender-sensitive analysis 
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of Canadian family law rules and the gendered socio-economic consequences flowing 
from family dissolution. It is, however, necessary to analyse how the Canadian courts 
have dealt with these issues in cases specifically dealing with unmarried cohabitants. 
 
4 5 4 Innovative judicial development in Québec in the 1990s 
 
In the province of Québec, socio-economic rights are explicitly included under the 
Québec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms (“QCHRF”).164 With the adoption of 
the QCHRF, Québec provided for the protection of the right to free public education165 
and an acceptable standard of living.166 It is, therefore, surprising that Québec is the 
Canadian province that provides the least amount of socio-economic protection to 
unmarried cohabitants in terms of its legislative framework. While certain courts have 
provided innovative legal remedies to female cohabitants, the civil law system 
underlying Québec is informed by a liberal conception of choice. This liberal approach 
undermines further developments regarding the legislative regulation of 
cohabitation.167 Québec thus offers a particularly appropriate example of the danger, 
for a country committed to fundamental human rights,168 of maintaining a liberal 
conception of choice when regulating cohabitation.  
Québec is the only Canadian province that has not recognised a duty of support 
between cohabitants. In spite of these drawbacks, the Superior Court of Québec has 
made certain innovative decisions in cohabitation cases relating to access to the family 
home. Through doing so, the Court has extended socio-economic protection to female 
cohabitants upon the dissolution of their relationship. An example of this is provided 
by a Superior Court case which granted exclusive possession of the family home to a 
child and, by extension, to the female parent assuming care of that child.169 This 
extension was based upon the “best interests of the child” principle. While this is an 
innovative approach by the court, it has been pointed out that this remedy is not found 
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under the Civil Code of Québec.170 It is also uncertain, and in every case requires the 
presence of children. This case is important in terms of recognising the interests of 
children in these families, and in terms of developing the civil law in accordance with 
the Charter’s underlying values and norms. Protection was however, extended to the 
cohabitant in terms of her role as a mother. In spite of the limitations of this remedy, 
this case does emphasise the importance of the family home in pursuing social 
objectives and protecting vulnerable family members.171 This is in contrast to the 
traditional approach of only recognising the family home through a property law lens. 
 
4 5 5 The danger of neoliberalism and the liberal choice argument: Nova Scotia v 
Walsh 
 
One of the more interesting elements of the early Canadian family law jurisprudence 
is that the choice argument did not initially play a significant role in the family law 
jurisprudence. As pointed out above, the focus was initially on a more functional 
conception of relationships, with the emphasis on the socio-economic 
interdependence of the parties. This functional approach illustrated its responsiveness 
to the needs of women through catalysing progressive legislative developments 
pertaining to spousal support in Canada. In spite of this initial focus on functional 
families, an analysis of the jurisprudence illustrates that the choice argument has 
recently taken centre-stage within the Canadian family law discourse. Interconnected 
to this liberal trend is the increasing marginalisation of feminist voices within the family 
law jurisprudence. Adding to this issue, is the growing economic inequality within 
Canada, as well as the rise of neoliberalism.172 The previous two decades have thus 
been characterised by an increasingly retrogressive trend in terms of the manner in 
which the Canadian government and courts are addressing violations of social 
rights.173  
                                                          
170 Canadian Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF), Factum of the Intervener in 
Eric v Lola (2012) 2. 
171 R Leckey “Gimme Shelter” (2001) 34 The Dalhousie Law Journal 220. 
172 Boyd & Young (2004) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 556. 
173 B Porter & M Jackman “Introduction: Advancing Social Rights in Canada” in Porter B & 
Jackman M (eds) Advancing Social Rights in Canada (2014) 1 1-3; and M Jackman and B 
Porter “Socio-Economic Rights Under the Canadian Charter” in Social Rights Jurisprudence: 
Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law 209. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
172 
 
This shift towards a liberal conception of choice within family law is illustrated 
through the 2002 Supreme Court case of Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v Walsh 
(“Walsh”).174 In this case Susan Walsh had lived with Wayne Bona for ten years during 
which time they had two children together. They also shared a home as joint tenants. 
At the time of separation Bona had assets with a net value of $66,000. Upon their 
separation, Walsh claimed support for herself and their two children. In addition, she 
sought an equal division of “matrimonial assets”. Under the Nova Scotia Matrimonial 
Property Act, (the “NSMPA”)175 matrimonial property is defined, with “spouses” entitled 
to an equal share of these assets, regardless of who owns them. The NSMPA also 
provides for spousal support, a right which was already extended to cohabitants at the 
time of the case. Nova Scotia courts are also given judicial discretion in terms of 
conferring on one spouse exclusive possession of a matrimonial home for life or for a 
short-term period.176 In this case, Walsh argued that the exclusion of unmarried 
cohabitants from the definition of “spouse” in the NSMPA was a violation of the equality 
rights of de facto spouses under section 15 of the Charter.177 Although successful in 
the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held, however, that 
marriage is a relevant difference upon which justifiable distinctions may be drawn.178 
The Supreme Court went on to find that while inequality may exist in cohabiting 
relationships, resulting in unfairness between the parties on relationship breakdown, 
there was no Charter-based requirement that the NSMPA be extended to protect 
cohabitants.179 
A major line of reasoning found within the judgment was that it is an individual 
choice regarding whether or not to marry, and that autonomy should be respected 
through not imposing the marital property regime on those who did not choose it. One 
judge, agreeing with the majority that excluding unmarried couples from a matrimonial 
property regime was permissible, distinguished between the respective legal bases 
for spousal support and matrimonial property.180 For Justice Gonthier, spousal support 
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is legislatively imposed and needs-based. On the other hand, the division of 
matrimonial property is contractual, in that it arises from the free exchange of consent 
illustrated by entering into a marriage. In accordance with this, the aim of dividing 
assets is contractual, whether done directly in terms of an express contract or indirectly 
by the act of marriage. Spousal support, however, according to Gonthier, seeks to fulfil 
a social objective in that it is meant to satisfy the material needs of vulnerable ex-
spouses and their children.181  
 In spite of Gonthier’s distinction, the majority disagreed and primarily relied upon 
contract and property law as opposed to a more gender-sensitive analysis of the socio-
economic needs of female cohabitants.182 The majority decision in Walsh is therefore 
referred to as a surprising disappointment for many scholars, running counter to the 
quarter-century-long trend in Canada of reducing the hierarchical status of 
marriage.183 Canadian scholars have extensively criticised this case, pointing out that 
the main focus should rather be on the protection of the weaker party.184 The emphasis 
should therefore primarily be on promoting the rights of the socio-economically 
vulnerable party, in a manner that structures relations based on care and concern. 
The decision in Walsh, therefore, not only reflected a gender imbalance, but also 
the traditional imbalance with regard to human rights (in terms of the tendency to focus 
on civil and political rights while ignoring their socio-economic dimensions). In contrast 
to the majority judgments, the dissenting judgment in this case clearly points out the 
complexity of choice in personal relationships. In doing so, the dissenting judgment 
specifically highlighted the problems of inequality in bargaining power, which have 
been well-documented in feminist analyses of family negotiations.185 It was also 
argued that choice in the context of intimate relationships is often complicated by 
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family loyalties, dependency and responsibility for child care.186 A specific example of 
this is Justice L'Heureux-Dubé’s dissenting opinion in Walsh187 where she stated that: 
 
“[T]he choice not to marry is not a matter belonging to each individual alone. The ability to 
marry is inhibited whenever one of the two partners’ wishes to marry and the other does 
not. In this situation, it can hardly be said that the person who wishes to marry but must 
cohabit in order to obey the wishes of his or her partner chooses to cohabit. This results in 
a situation where one of the parties to the cohabitation relationship preserves his or her 
autonomy at the expense of the other ... Under these circumstances, stating that both 
members of the relationship chose to avoid the legal consequences of marriage is patently 
absurd.”188 
  
It was further pointed out that many heterosexual unmarried cohabitants cohabit 
out of necessity. For many, choice is thus denied to them simply by virtue of the wishes 
of their partner.189 She emphasised that married couples are often unaware of the 
legal consequences of marriage and thus cannot be said to consciously choose a 
specific form of matrimonial property division. Many unmarried cohabitants have also 
not made an informed decision to avoid the legal consequences of marriage.190 Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé expressly questioned the distinctive approaches between the division 
of property and spousal support. As she argued, both mechanisms help individuals to 
satisfy basic financial needs following the end of an intimate, economically 
interdependent relationship.191  
Both property and support obligations can thus be conceived in terms of a relational 
feminist interpretation of socio-economic need. This is particularly necessary when it 
comes to property that is the shared home of dependents within the family. 
Determinations on how to divide family property should be informed by the broader 
socio-economic context, such as the availability of social assistance by the state. 
Simultaneously, the reality of gendered norms and their impact upon one’s capacity to 
access spousal support and family property should be taken into account. The 
decision in Walsh, thus reinforced the need to focus on the socio-economic rights and 
needs of vulnerable family members.  
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In Walsh, Justice L'Heureux-Dubé also examined the exclusion of cohabitants from 
the matrimonial property system in more detail pointing out that the section 15(1) 
analysis does not only entail the conferral of an economic benefit. As she further 
pointed out, without the legislative presumption in their favour, unmarried cohabitants 
are left with the burden of proving their entitlement to share in family property. This is 
an evidentiary burden that is not easily discharged without incurring litigation costs 
and expending time and energy.192 This once again highlights the unfairness of 
completely excluding cohabitants from the matrimonial property system while failing 
to enact a statutory framework to regulate their status. Justice L'Heureux-Dubé 
therefore recognised the relational impact of excluding cohabitants from available 
matrimonial remedies, in that this denial facilitates exploitation while entrenching 
disadvantage.193 It was pointed out by Justice L'Heureux-Dubé that even if research 
showed that cohabitants chose to avoid marriages so as to avoid the legal 
consequences of marriage, those findings would be irrelevant as the MPA seeks to 
address the consequences of a relationship at its termination and not the intentions 
prevalent at the beginning of a relationship. The above analysis of these cases clearly 
reveals the shift within Canadian family law from a functional conception of the family 
in the 1990s to a more liberal conception of choice in the previous two decades, with 
this retrogressive trend continuing. 
 
4 5 6 The retrogressive trend continues: Kerr v Baranow and Eric v Lola 
 
In 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down an important decision in the 
case of Kerr v Baranow (“Kerr”).194 This case concerned, Margaret Praticia Kerr (“K”) 
and Nelson Dennis Baranow (“B”), a couple in their late 60s, who had parted ways 
after living together for more than 25 years. Both parties had worked during the 
relationship and they had both contributed to the family home. In the trial court in British 
Columbia, K claimed support and a share of property that was registered in B’s name, 
based on resulting trust and unjustified enrichment. B counterclaimed that K had been 
unjustly enriched by his housekeeping and personal assistance services he provided 
after K suffered a stroke. The trial judge in the court a quo awarded K $315,000, which 
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equated to a third of the value of the home in B’s name that they had shared. The trial 
judge found that K had provided $60,000 worth of equity and assets at the beginning 
of their relationship. K was also awarded $1,739 per month in spousal support. B then 
appealed to the Appeal Court of British Columbia. The Appeal Court dismissed K’s 
claim for support, resulting in K appealing to the Supreme Court of Canada.  
In the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court allowed the appeal on the spousal 
support issue and restored the order of the trial judge’s decision in terms of support. 
The appeal from the order dismissing K’s unjust enrichment claim was also allowed 
and a new trial was ordered. The Supreme Court of Canada set out guidelines of what 
K must prove in order to succeed with her unjustified enrichment claim.195 
The appeal from the order dismissing K’s claim in resulting trust was also dismissed 
while the order for a new hearing of B’s counterclaim was affirmed.196 The most 
notable aspect of the Supreme Court decision is the manner in which the court 
discussed and developed the available remedies for an unjustified enrichment claim. 
Under Canadian law, the doctrine of unjustified enrichment imposes burdensome 
requirements on claimants, while simultaneously providing the courts with very broad 
discretionary powers. In this case however, the Court confirmed that a monetary award 
need not be calculated on a “fee-for-services basis”, but may reflect a share of the 
wealth that was accumulated during the relationship proportionate to the claimant’s 
caregiving contributions.197 This remedy is however only available upon proof that the 
partners were engaged in what the court described as a joint family venture (a “JFV”).  
It has been pointed out that cohabitation with a partner does not automatically give 
rise to a presumption of a JFV, signifying a substantial difference from certain 
legislative provisions which automatically ascribe rights after cohabiting for a specific 
period of time.198 In discussing the requirements of a JFV, the Court listed four criteria 
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through which to analyse the relationship, including mutual effort, economic 
integration, actual intent, and priority of the family.199 Missing from the JFV is an 
examination of the social context and the socio-economic consequences of how men 
and women relate to one another. The closest that the Court comes to this relational 
analysis under the JFV is in its analysis of the “priority of the family,” where the Court 
specifically looks at whether a partner sacrificed certain career prospects or 
educational advancement for the well-being of their family.200 This factor is linked to 
recognising exploitative relations within families and the role of legal rights in either 
exacerbating or alleviating these inequitable relations. In this regard, the Canadian 
approach to the JFV is slightly more relational than the current construction of the tacit 
universal partnership under South African family law, which was discussed in detail in 
chapter three.201 The JFV has however, also been criticised, given its uncertainty, 
particularly as none of the factors that the court listed are necessarily required for a 
finding of a JFV.202 The JFV also places the legal analysis of cohabiting relationships 
within the contours of a private law paradigm. 
Under the heading of “actual intent”, the Court emphasised the importance of 
autonomy in domestic relationships. As stated by the court, since partners may make 
a deliberate choice not to marry, their actual intent whether to be economically 
intertwined must be given considerable weight.203 Relevant factors that a court will 
look at to determine this intention include acceptance that the relationship is equivalent 
to marriage, conduct indicating a desire to share wealth, and testamentary provisions 
made for each other in their wills.204 Procedurally, making out a claim in unjustified 
enrichment remains a difficult exercise for cohabitants. Furthermore, such a monetary 
claim does nothing to address the needs for shelter and socio-economic stability, 
which is recognised in legislation governing married spouses. 
Following the Kerr decision, in January 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada handed 
down its decision in the case commonly referred to as Eric v Lola.205 In this case Eric 
and Lola met in 1992 when she was 17 and he was 32 years of age. After staying 
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together for seven years, during which time Lola gave birth to three children, they 
separated. Given that they were never married, Lola claimed support, a lump sum of 
money, a share in the family property and the legal matrimonial regime of partnership 
of acquests. She also sought to reserve her right to claim a compensatory allowance. 
Her claim concerning the family home was later settled in a private agreement. 
The Charter-based issue raised by the parties was whether the exclusion of de facto 
spouses in the province of Québec from property division and spousal support benefits 
violated the equality rights guaranteed by section 15 of the Canadian Charter. The 
Canadian Legal Education and Action Fund (“LEAF”) provided written submissions to 
the Court on behalf of Lola and cohabiting women in general. In its submission, LEAF 
stated that the total exclusion of de facto spouses from the spousal support provisions 
in the Civil Code of Québec (CCQ) violated the guarantee of substantive equality 
under section 15 of the Charter.206 They also pointed out, that while spousal support 
is of vital importance, it remains insufficient when remedying constitutional 
violations.207 They went on to recommend a general presumption of equal 
contributions and equal sharing of property upon relationship dissolution, in order to 
effectively recognise and redress the gendered contributions and roles in de facto 
unions.208  
Unfortunately, in this case, the majority of the Court drew heavily on the majority 
decision in Nova Scotia v Walsh.209 In deciding whether the Civil Code of Québec 
(“CCQ”) violated the right to equality, the discrimination analysis was posed as a two-
part enquiry. The first question was whether the differential treatment between de facto 
partners and married couples found in certain articles of the CCQ210 amounted to 
discrimination. The second question was whether this was justifiable in terms of 
section 1 of the Charter.  
In the majority opinion of McLachlin, Deschamps, Abella, Cromwell and 
Karakatsanis, it was held that the differentiation did amount to discrimination. The 
separate opinion of LeBel, Fish, Rothstein and Moldaver found that the exclusion of 
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de facto partners from the operation of the Civil Code, did not create a disadvantage 
by expressing or perpetuating prejudice or through stereotyping. They accordingly 
found that these provisions did not violate the right to equality under the Canadian 
Charter.211 Given that the differentiation did not infringe upon the right to equality, they 
held that it was unnecessary to consider whether the differentiation was justifiable 
under the Charter. While McLachlin, Deschamps, Cromwell and Karakatsanis found 
that the discrimination was ultimately justifiable, Justice Abella, found that the blanket 
exclusion of de facto spouses did violate the equality right and that it was not justified 
under the Charter. 
The majority decision in Eric v Lola was primarily influenced by the liberal choice 
argument, much like the Walsh decision. As pointed out earlier, the Walsh decision 
has been criticised by scholars for its focus on a liberal conception of freedom of 
choice.212 This is in spite of research which has revealed that when relationships end, 
women continue to bear the greatest socio-economic burden.213  
Legislative schemes providing for property sharing and spousal support were 
primarily enacted to alleviate some of the socio-economic difficulties that arise for 
women and children upon the breakdown of their family. The reality remains however, 
that when entering into a long-term cohabiting relationship, de facto spouses may also 
be sacrificing economic advancement, opportunity or even self-support.214 Where 
people in de facto relationships do not have access to the entire “economic 
readjustment” package215 that is provided to ex-spouses, patterns of gender inequality 
are exacerbated.216 The dissenting opinions in both Walsh217 and Eric v Lola offered 
convincing reasons (such as equal need) as to why no legislative distinction ought to 
be maintained between married and de facto partners. 
In the decision of Eric v Lola,218 Justice Abella did furthermore, concede that 
legislative recognition of a mutual choice not to assume obligations in a de facto 
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partnership might be constitutionally permissible. In this regard she highlighted that a 
regulatory option could be the presumption in favour of inclusion, subject to a 
consensual (and express) opting out. Justice Abella went on to state that given the 
vulnerability and lack of legal information available to many unmarried cohabitants, the 
complete absence of any protective legislative framework, infringes upon the right to 
equality.219 She went on to state that:  
 
“[T]he needs of the economically vulnerable... require presumptive protection no less in de 
facto unions than in more formal ones. The evidence discloses that many de facto spouses 
simply do not turn their minds to the eventuality of separation. This lack of awareness 
speaks to the relative merit of a system of presumptive protection, under which they would 
be protected whether aware of their legal rights or not, while leaving de facto spouses who 
wish to do so, the freedom to choose not to be protected.”220  
 
In discussing the benefits and the drawbacks of the opt-in system, Justice Abella 
went on to point out that the current opt-in protections may well be adequate for some 
de facto spouses who enter their unions with sufficient financial security, legal 
information, and the intention to avoid the consequences of a more formal union. The 
opt-in system is thus particularly suitable when parties are on equal terms, which is 
very rarely the case. While autonomy is important, there remains a need to protect 
vulnerable parties upon the termination of their relationship. 
Additional weaknesses of this contractual opt-in approach include its inability to 
recognise that the choice to marry is often a complex relational decision, as already 
pointed out in the case of Miron.221 Where one member of a couple refuses to marry 
or enter into a civil union, their partner is unable to derive the traditional socio-
economic benefits that arise when these relationships end. The harmful effect of 
completely excluding all de facto spouses, who comprise a growing segment of the 
Canadian population,222 from the protection of spousal support and division of 
matrimonial property systems, should not be taken lightly. Being excluded may require 
vulnerable de facto spouses, to expend time, energy and resources in attempting to 
obtain some form of socio-economic assistance. If a de facto spouse is unable to take 
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these steps, either through ignorance of the law or an uncooperative or abusive 
partner, he or she remains vulnerable. The opt-in system therefore neglects the human 
rights issues in family dissolution and retains a contractual approach. The opt-in 
system for cohabitants treats domestic partners differently to economically dependent 
spouses in formal marriages, by allowing former spouses automatic access to the 
possibility of socio-economic remedies, albeit through private law mechanisms.223  
 
4 5 7 Conclusion: Overview of the trends in Canadian jurisprudence 
 
An analysis of the leading Canadian family law decisions through a relational 
feminist lens reveals that certain elements of the earlier jurisprudence provide useful 
insights for South African case law. For example, early Canadian jurisprudence 
illustrated a context-sensitive approach to gender issues within family law cases, 
emphasising the clear link between gender disadvantage and the negative socio-
economic consequences of family dissolution. These judgements224 were particularly 
responsive to the specific socio-economic needs of women and served to catalyse 
progressive family law legislative developments in a number of Canadian provinces. 
In particular, as a result of the decisions in Moge and Bracklow, Canada now has a 
broader approach to spousal support entitlement than any other jurisdiction, especially 
when compared to the United States, England and Australia.225 This reveals that 
gender-sensitive and contextual judgments are more likely to foster legal 
developments conducive to structuring socio-economic equality between men and 
women. However, in recent years, there has been an increasing failure in Canadian 
law to sufficiently engage with the existing social context in terms of the gendered 
dynamics implicated within family law. Recent jurisprudential trends also reveal how 
feminist voices have become progressively marginalised over the years.  
In terms of relational feminism’s need for a value-sensitive approach to the 
regulation of cohabitation, earlier Canadian decisions illustrate the value of critically 
questioning the liberal choice argument. The court’s initial substantive conception of 
autonomy thus catalysed legislatures to develop the family law regime so as to provide 
                                                          
223 Bakht (2014) Working Paper Series 266. 
224 Miron v Trudel [1995] 2 SCR 418; Moge v Moge [1992] 3 SCR 813. 
225 DA Thompson “Ideas of Spousal Support Entitlement” (2014) 34 Canadian Family Law 
Quarterly 1 3. 
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protection to a broader range of families. After certain progressive decisions in the 
1990s, one can, however, detect a significant shift within the jurisprudence towards a 
liberal conception of choice that undermined much of the previous progress that had 
been achieved.226 The divergent approaches towards spousal support and the division 
of family property between cohabitants also undermined much of the initial 
transformation that occurred. The policy debates concerning the protection of 
cohabitants (particularly relating to the division of the family home) have also revealed 
the inherent reluctance to grant cohabitants the same legal entitlements as spouses. 
These cases have furthermore, retained a private law lens. 
These developments reveal that despite certain statutory and judicial developments 
in relation to occupation of the family property, ownership of the family home as 
between unmarried couples is predominantly determined through a private law 
paradigm. An example of this is the protection provided through the law of trusts, with 
its evidential difficulties, inherent gender bias and its unpredictable nature.227 It is clear 
that human rights challenges pursuant to the Charter have succeeded in expanding 
the legal definition of families within Canada. The challenge of determining precisely 
how to protect the socio-economic well-being of de facto partners remains however, 
deeply contested.228 Many of the developments that have occurred have also not been 
sufficiently transformative.  
4 5 8 Lessons from a comparative analysis of Canadian family law 
 
This section sought to critically examine Canadian legislative and jurisprudential 
developments pertaining to cohabitants. An analysis of Canadian family law reveals 
some of the shared policy debates surrounding the regulation of cohabitation, such as 
the tendency to protect a negative conception of autonomy. In terms of the functional 
comparative analysis, certain Canadian provinces have extended protection to 
cohabitants through ascription and registration models provided for in legislation. 
While these approaches offer viable options for the regulation of cohabitation, they 
have been criticised for giving effect to a formal conception of equality.229 They have 
                                                          
226 Treloar & Boyd (2014) Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 3. 
227 Bakht (2014) Working Paper Series 261 266. 
228 Mossman (2003) Hofstra Law Review 191. 
229 Fudge (2007) SAJHR 235; Canadian Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF), 
Factum of the Intervener in Eric v Lola (2012) 2. 
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also simply extended many of the patriarchal paradigms underlying marriage to 
cohabitants.  
This reveals that extending legislative recognition without simultaneously dislodging 
the underlying relational gendered inequalities in family law, will not be sufficient to 
eradicate systemic gender inequality. It further underscores the need for a relational 
feminist approach to regulating cohabitation, particularly in terms of protecting the 
socio-economic well-being of female cohabitants. 
In terms of the jurisprudence, in spite of the lack of justiciable socio-economic rights 
in the Canadian Charter, family law decisions on divorce and cohabitation in the 1980s 
and the 1990s were able to engage with the gendered nature of the socio-economic 
disadvantages flowing from family dissolution. The value of a gender-sensitive 
approach was specifically emphasised by the progressive legislative reform that was 
catalysed by these decisions. This reform emphasises that a relational feminist 
framework for interpreting cohabitants’ rights is capable of structuring relations that 
improve access to socio-economic resources for women. 
In spite of these early progressive trends, subsequent family law cases reveal a 
retrogressive movement characterised by a liberal conception of choice which 
coincided with the rise in neoliberalism. The danger of this approach is revealed in the 
manner in which it reinforced the traditional liberal conception of the public/private law 
divide. In particular, the increasing reliance on a negative conception of choice has led 
to debates on public versus private responsibility for vulnerable family members. A 
liberal approach does furthermore, prevent the judiciary and the legislature from 
engaging with the existing social context and the manner in which the state is 
reinforcing the socio-economic vulnerabilities of cohabiting women. As feminists have 
noted, the assumption that individuals should rely on their families for support is 
especially problematic for women, as they tend to have less income and wealth.230 
The lack of justiciable socio-economic rights in the Canadian Charter has also 
resulted in complainants relying on the right to equality to challenge and develop 
private family law rules. The equality framework, which requires a comparison 
between the advantaged group and the disadvantaged group, tends to encourage 
claimants to adopt a formal equality approach.231 This formalistic approach has been 
                                                          
230 Fudge (2007) SAJHR 235; Canadian Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF), 
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exacerbated by the lack of a relational feminist approach that recognises the existing 
social context and the gendered dynamics exacerbated by family law. The extent to 
which complex social relations structuring gendered inequality can be challenged 
under a formal equality framework is limited.232 These limitations further highlight the 
transformative potential of giving substantive content to the socio-economic rights of 
cohabitants.233  
Collectively, these Canadian trends illustrate that in spite of the legislative 
developments that have occurred, the Canadian state’s regulation of cohabitation has 
been insufficiently transformative. This is due to heteronormative and patriarchal 
paradigms associated with marriage simply being extended to cohabiting 
relationships. The extent, to which the Canadian discourse of the last two decades 
has privatised socio-economic needs, while being informed by patriarchal ideology, 
also serves as a warning for the South African system. South Africa’s commitment to 
social justice and fundamental human rights emphasises the need for a transformative 
response to cohabitation.234 In the light of these lessons gained from an examination 
of Canadian family law, the following section examines relevant Dutch family law 
developments.  
4 6 The Dutch family law system 
 
4 6 1 Introduction 
 
The South African legal system shares certain unique historical ties with the 
Netherlands. These similarities are evinced by our common law, which is based upon 
a mixture of Roman-Dutch law and English law.235 There are however, a number of 
differences between South Africa and the Netherlands. One difference is that since 
1815, the Dutch legal system has been based upon a constitutional monarchy. A 
                                                          
232 235. 
233 Symes v Canada [1993] 4 SCR 695. See also: M Liu “Prophet with Honour”: An 
Examination of the Gender Equality Jurisprudence of Madam Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dube 
of the Supreme Court of Canada” (2000) 25 Queens Law Journal 417 432. 
234 Gavigan (2012) Theoretical Inquiries into Law 275. 
235 Our unique common law system was founded upon the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck at the 
Cape of Good Hope and the English hegemony during the Napoleonic wars, which resulted 
in the British conquests of 1795 and 1806 at the Cape. See: T van der Merwe Stoop Historical 
Foundations of South African Private Law (2000) 3 7-8. 
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subsequent revision of the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1848, 
allowed for the establishment of a system of Parliamentary democracy.  
One significant difference between South Africa and the Netherlands is that the 
Dutch Constitution does not provide the judiciary with the power to review the rights 
protected in the Constitution. The social and economic rights contained in the Dutch 
Constitution cannot therefore, be utilised to test and challenge government legislation 
and policies in the courts.236  
Socio-economically speaking, the Netherlands is a first-world country, with 
seemingly progressive policies espousing a commitment to fostering gender 
equality.237 Given that the Netherlands has been given a high rating on the global 
gender inequality index,238 it is worth examining the extent to which, existing gender 
policies have had a positive impact upon the Dutch family law system.  
Certain South African scholars have described the Dutch family law regime 
pertaining to registered cohabitants as clearly demarcated and the product of “well-
conceived and carefully considered Parliamentary procedures”.239 In this regard, the 
Dutch legislature has played a more proactive role in reforming the family law rules 
regulating registered domestic partnerships, than the Dutch judiciary.240 The focus of 
this comparative section is therefore, primarily on relevant Dutch legislation. 
In spite of certain differences between South Africa and the Netherlands, as 
highlighted above, the Dutch family law regime is worth examining given the number 
of progressive developments that have occurred in this jurisdiction over recent 
decades.241 For example, in the Netherlands, the legal incapacity of married women 
was abolished as early as 1957. While a provision that the husband was the “head of 
                                                          
236 In the first chapter of the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, articles 19 to 23 
contain provisions on employment, social security, education, the environment and public 
health. The practical meaning of these articles has, however, been very limited, because they 
have allegedly not had a significant influence on the government’s policy considerations. See 
H Reiding The Netherlands and the Development of International Human Rights Instruments 
LLD dissertation Utrecht University (2007) 131.  
237 S 2(3) of the Equal Treatment Act, 1994. 
238 United Nations Development Programme Human Development Reports Gender Inequality 
Index (2014) 1 1 <http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/GII> accessed 12-02-2016. 
239 BS Smith & JA Robinson “The South African Civil Union Act 2006:  Progressive Legislation 
with Regressive Implications?” (2008) IJLPF 376-377. 
240 Smith & Robinson (2010) PELJ/PER 35. 
241 P Vlaardingerbroek “The Netherlands: The Growing Role of the Judge in Child and Family 
Law” in E Sutherland (ed) The Future of Child and Family law: International Predictions (2012) 
235 235. 
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the household” was retained in the Dutch Civil Code (“DCC”) until 1970, this 
abolishment occurred before the marital power was abolished in South Africa.242 
With regard to cohabitation, the Dutch government has adopted a unique approach 
to these relationships. For example, moral judgments against cohabitants disappeared 
during the 1970s.243 The Netherlands is also noteworthy for officially recognising 
registered domestic partnerships in 1998. While this does constitute a progressive 
development, the DCC has only been extended to apply to registered domestic 
partnerships. Cohabitants are thus expected to register their relationship in 
accordance with the DCC or to enter into a formal cohabitation contract in order to 
protect their socio-economic interests.  
In contrast to the position of registered domestic partners, the rights of Dutch 
partners in unregistered relationships are regulated in a piecemeal fashion, through 
different pieces of legislation and ad hoc judicial decisions. As a result, the existing 
legal framework regulating unregistered cohabiting relationships has been described 
as “haphazard”.244 While there have been certain positive developments in Dutch law, 
the areas of family law, inheritance law, criminal law and criminal procedural law have 
remained unresponsive to the needs of unregistered cohabitants.245  
In a similar manner to South African cohabitants therefore, vulnerable partners in 
unregistered relationships tend to fall through the gaps of the Dutch legal system. This 
lack of regulation is somewhat surprising, given the consistent rise in unregistered 
relationships in the Netherlands since 2000.246 In spite of this increase, the Dutch 
family law system’s approach to cohabitants is primarily centred upon a contractual 
paradigm, as well as a liberal conception of autonomy.247 The developments regarding 
the recognition of registered partnerships in the Netherlands was also initially aimed 
at addressing the needs of partners in same-sex relationships. Following the 
                                                          
242 See part 3 2 of chapter three of this study. 
243 W S Schrama “National Report: The Netherlands” Informal Relationships- The Netherlands 
(2015) 1 2. <http://ceflonline.net/wp-content/uploads/The-Netherlands-IR.pdf> (accessed 03-
03-2016). 
244 Schrama “National Report: The Netherlands” (2015) 1 2. 
245 W M Schrama “The Dutch Approach to Informal Lifestyles: Family Function over Family 
Form?” (2008) 22 International Journal of Law, Policy & the Family 311 312. 
246 Schrama National Report: The Netherlands” (2015) 12. 
247 K Boele-Woelki & B Braat “Autonomy in the Netherlands” in J M Scherpe (ed) Marital 
Agreements & Private Autonomy in Comparative Perspective (2012) 230 230; Schrama 
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recognition of registered partnerships in 1998, in April 2001 the Netherlands became 
the first country in the world to fully recognise same-sex marriages.248  
While there have been promising developments in the Netherlands, certain limiting 
and retrogressive aspects of the Dutch family law system will also be analysed. For 
example, socio-economic inequality between Dutch men and women persists.249 
Research has revealed that this inequality is linked to the gendered division of labour 
and the subsequent impact upon women’s participation in the labour market.250 As a 
result of these inequitable relations, Dutch women continue to disproportionately bear 
the socio-economic burdens of divorce and family dissolution.251 The Dutch approach 
to cohabitation is examined to determine the extent to which it protects the socio-
economic interests of vulnerable cohabitants in unregistered domestic partnerships. 
This comparative analysis is informed by a relational feminist interpretation of the 
socio-economic rights of female cohabitants.  
4 6 2 The Dutch Constitution 
 
Over the centuries, the Dutch Constitution has undergone many amendments. With 
regard to family law, the latest version of the Dutch Constitution does not expressly 
protect marriage or married families.252 By not protecting a right to marriage, the Dutch 
Constitution is said to have facilitated the legal recognition of non-marital 
relationships.253  
                                                          
248 Smith & Robinson (2010) PELJ/PER 35. 
249 In the field of family dissolution the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice found in 2009 
that approximately 20000 women with children suffer serious financial difficulties after a 
relationship breakdown. This was in terms of Dutch couples who were married under a 
separation of property regime without a duty to net income or capital. See Schrama “National 
Report: The Netherlands” (2015) 1 8, where she discussed the report by the Ducth Ministry of 
Security and Justice. See MV Antokolskaia, B Breederveld, JE Hulst, WD Kolkman, FR 
Salomons and LCA Verstappen “Koude uitsluiting, Materiële problemen en onbillijkheden na 
scheiding van in koude uitsluiting gehuwde echtgenoten en na scheiding van ongehuwd 
samenlevende partners, alsmede instrumenten voor de overheid om deze tegen te gaan”, 
WODC, Netherlands Institute for Law and Governance (2010). See also United Nations 
Development Programme Human Development Reports Gender Inequality Index (2014) 1 1 
<http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/GII> (accessed 12-02-2016.) 
250 Important policy issues that have been emphasised are the high part-time rate which 
translates in a relatively low participation rate in full time employment and the low number of 
women in top positions. 
251 H J Andreß & D Hummelsheim “Introduction” in HJ Andreß & D Hummelsheiem (eds) When 
Marriage Ends: Economic and Social Consequences of Partnership Dissolution (2009) 1 5.  
252 The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 2008 (“Dutch Constitution”). 
253 W M Schrama “The Dutch Approach to Informal Lifestyles: Family Function over Family 
Form?” (2008) 22 International Journal of Law, Policy & the Family 311 315. 
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The Dutch Constitution is also noteworthy for protecting a wide range of progressive 
civil and political and socio-economic rights. Initially these rights were spread out in 
different sections of the Constitution. After the amendments of 1983, the Bill of Rights 
was however, included in chapter one of the Constitution. This placement has been 
said to demonstrate the importance accorded to human rights within the 
Netherlands.254 Examples of these rights include the right to be treated equally in equal 
circumstances, as provided for in article 1.255 Article 1 also specifically prohibits 
discrimination on the grounds of race and sex. While the ground of gender is notably 
absent, article 1 is formulated rather broadly.256 In order to give effect to these 
provisions and to expand upon article 1 of the Dutch Constitution, the Equal Treatment 
Act of 1994 was subsequently enacted. The Dutch Constitution goes on to provide 
that everyone has the right to have their privacy respected, without prejudice to 
restrictions laid down by an Act of Parliament.257  
With regard to the development of social and economic rights, the right to relief for 
the indigent and the right to care for orphans were already incorporated into Dutch law 
in the eighteenth century.258 One example of early socio-economic developments, is 
the Van Houten Act on Child Labour of 1874,259 which is considered to be the starting 
point for the development process for protecting social and economic rights in the 
Netherlands.260  
The Dutch government’s official stance on socio-economic rights has been that 
these rights are, together with civil and political rights, indivisible, interdependent, and 
equally important.261 The Dutch government also signed the ICESCR262 and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)263 on the same date.264 
                                                          
254 H Reiding “The Netherlands and Social and Economic Rights” in H Reiding (ed) The 
Netherlands and the Development of International Human Rights Instruments (2007) 131. 
255 A 1 of the Dutch Constitution. 
256 A 1 of the Dutch Constitution provides that: 
“Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex or on any 
other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted.” 
257 A 10 of the Dutch Constitution. 
258 Reiding “The Netherlands and Social and Economic Rights” in The Netherlands 131. 
259 The Kinderwetje- Van Houten (The Van Houten Child Labour Act of 1874) prohibited 
children younger than 12 from working in factories. 
260 Reiding “The Netherlands and Social and Economic Rights” in The Netherlands 131. 
261 Reiding “The Netherlands and Social and Economic Rights” in The Netherlands 131. 
262 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) 993 UNTS 3. 
263 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 999 UNTS 171. 
264 The Dutch government signed both the ICESCR and the ICCPR on the 25th of June 1969. 
See: United Nations Treaty Collection Status of ICESCR (2016)  
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When it comes to giving effect to these rights, however, the Dutch government’s main 
argument has been that socio-economic rights and civil and political rights are in fact 
different in nature, and that they accordingly require dissimilar means of 
implementation.265 The Dutch government has also, to date, not ratified the Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR.266 
Following the ratification of the ICESCR and the ICCPR in 1978, the Dutch 
Constitution was amended in 1983. Part of these amendments entailed incorporating 
a number of social and economic rights into the Constitution. These rights have 
nevertheless, been formulated differently from their ICSECR counterparts. For 
example, article 20 (1) of the Dutch Constitution provides that it shall be the “concern 
of the authorities” to secure the means of subsistence of the population and to achieve 
the distribution of wealth. Section 20(2) goes on to provide that rules concerning 
entitlement to social security shall be laid down by an Act of Parliament. Section 20(3) 
further states that Dutch nationals who are unable to provide for themselves, shall 
have a right to aid from the authorities. Article 21 is also noteworthy for containing a 
section protecting the environment, stating that it shall be the concern of the authorities 
to keep the country habitable and to protect and improve the environment. Article 22 
goes on to provide that the Authorities shall take steps to promote the health of the 
population and article 23 states that education shall be the “constant concern of the 
government.”  
Given that there is no provision for the judicial review of these social and economic 
rights, it is clear that the Dutch Constitution has left the implementation of these rights 
to the legislature and the executive.267 In contrast to the South African legal system, 
there is furthermore, no Constitutional Court in the Netherlands, with the task of 
adjudicating constitutional matters. The two highest national courts in the Dutch legal 
system are the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, which is the Supreme Court of the 
                                                          
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-> (accessed 15-03-
2016); United Nations Treaty Collection Status of ICCPR (2016)  
265 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, (1979) 96; H Reiding “The 
Netherlands and Social and Economic Rights” in H Reiding (ed) The Netherlands and the 
Development of International Human Rights Instruments (2007) 131. 
266 While the Netherlands signed the Optional Protocol on the 24th of September 2009,                    
they have  not   ratified it.   See:   United     Nations     Treaty    Collection (2009)   
<https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=ind&mtdsg_no=iv-3-
a&chapter=4&lang=en> (accessed 15-03-2016). 
267 B Oomen “Giving Effect to Social Rights” in B Oomen Rights for Others: The Slow Home-
Coming of Human Rights in the Netherlands (2013) 146. 
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Netherlands (“Hoge Raad”) and the Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van der Raad van 
State, which is the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State.268 
Furthermore, while the Dutch Constitution applies to all public authorities, any judicial 
review concerning the constitutionality of Dutch legislation is prohibited.269 
Accordingly, article 120 of the Constitution provides that the constitutionality of Acts of 
Parliament and treaties shall not be reviewed by the courts. Although attempts have 
been made to amend the Constitution to provide for judicial review of legislation, these 
attempts have been unsuccessful.270 
In contrast to the lack of provision for judicial review of constitutional provisions, 
international law enjoys prominence in the Dutch legal system. The importance 
accorded to international law is due to the Netherlands having a monist legal order.271 
Given that the doctrine of monism is deeply entrenched in the Dutch legal culture, all 
national law, including the Constitution, is perceived as inferior to international law.272 
For example, article 94 of the Constitution states that statutory regulations in force in 
the Netherlands shall not be applicable if their application is in conflict with “provisions 
of treaties or of resolutions by international institutions.” As a result, international law 
has had a significant impact on the Dutch family law regime, more so than the Dutch 
Constitution. In spite of the importance accorded to international law, at the time of the 
ratification of the ICESCR, the Netherlands’ government stated that the rights included 
in it, were not, directly applicable provisions, but rather policy objectives.273 There has 
furthermore, been a noticeable imbalance in Dutch human rights policies, in that civil 
and political rights, tend to be prioritised over social and economic rights.274 
                                                          
268 E Mak “Globalisation of the National Judiciary and the Dutch Constitution” (2013) 9 Utrecht 
Law Review 36 37. 
269 C Mak Fundamental Rights in European Contract Law: A Comparison of the Impact of 
Fundamental Rights on Contractual Relationships in Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and 
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270 Mak Fundamental Rights in European Contract Law (2008) 323. 
271 Traditionally, there have been two theoretical approaches to international law. The first 
approach has been referred to as the monist approach, which perceives international law and 
municipal law as part of a single conception of law. The second approach has been referred 
to as the dualist approach which is based on the premise that international law and municipal 
law are separate entities. J Dugard “Sources of International Law” 
 in International Law: A South African Perspective (2007) 27 29. 
272 G v d Schyff & A Meuwese “Dutch Constitutional Law in a Globalising World” (2013) 9 
Utrecht Law Review 1 1. 
273 H Reiding The Netherlands and the Development of International Human Rights 
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Nevertheless, the Dutch government has made significant and progressive 
developments pertaining to advancing social and economic rights in accordance with 
international law.275 
The influence of international law in Dutch family law is clear, in that in recent 
decades, Dutch judges have ranked international human rights and treaty obligations 
as superior to domestic law.276 This has predominantly been in terms of children’s 
rights and same-sex marriages.277 Of particular importance is article 8 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(“European Convention”),278 which requires respect for private and family life.279  
In the case of Johnston and Others v Ireland,280 the European Court on Human 
Rights specifically interpreted section 8 of the European Convention as not only 
relating to family life on the basis of marriage. This case opened up the possibility for 
the regulation of a broader range of family relationships in Europe. In subsequent 
decisions by Dutch courts however, article 8 of the European Convention has been 
                                                          
Action Plan on Human Rights of 2014, distinguishes between classical human rights and 
social rights. 
275 An example of this is provided by the approach to education. In the Netherlands, primary 
and secondary education are provided free of charge to all young people living in the 
Netherlands who are of compulsory school age. The obligation to remain in school terminates 
at the age of 18. Even if a minor alien is residing in the Netherlands unlawfully, he or she 
attends school under the same conditions as all other young people in the Netherlands: 
everyone has equal access to education. See page 56 of the Dutch National Action Plan on 
Human Rights: The protection and promotion of human rights within the Netherlands of 2014. 
276 Vlaardingerbroek “The Netherlands” in Sutherland The Future of Child and Family law 235. 
277 Vlaardingerbroek 235; J M Scherpe “Introduction to European Family Law Volume iii: 
Family Law in a European Perspective” in European Family Law Volume iii: Family Law in a 
European Perspective (2015) 1 2. 
278 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the 
European Convention) (1950) 213 UNTS 222. 
279 A 8 of the European Convention provides that:  
“1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.  
2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
280 Johnston and Others v Ireland ECHR (1986) application no 112, para 156. This case 
concerned a cohabiting Irish couple who had a daughter together. They were unable to get 
married as they were still married to previous partners and the Irish Constitution did not at the 
time of the case permit divorce.  
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utilised as justification for distinguishing between married couples and domestic 
partnerships.281  
Against this constitutional and international law background, the following section 
will examine the overarching framework of the Dutch family law regime. Given that the 
Dutch legislature has played a more proactive role in developing the family law regime, 
the following discussion will first examine the legislative developments that have 
occurred in the field of family law. This will be followed by an analysis of the Dutch 
jurisprudential developments. 
 
4 6 3 The Dutch family law regime 
 
4 6 3 1 Introduction 
 
Given that the Dutch legal system does not have a strong constitutional law 
tradition, the family law regime is primarily rooted in a codified civil law system. As a 
result, the Dutch judiciary has played a less active role in developing the sphere of 
family law as it pertains to cohabitants. In contrast to this, the Dutch legislature has 
significantly paved the way for the expansion of Dutch family law. The rules on family 
law are found in Book 1 of the DCC, which dates back to 1838. The legislative 
developments pertaining to same-sex marriages and registered partnerships will be 
examined first. This legislative framework will then be followed by an examination of 
the piecemeal recognition that has been granted to unregistered partnerships. 
 
4 6 3 2 The recognition of same-sex marriages and registered domestic 
partnerships 
 
In 1996, the Dutch Parliament passed a resolution demanding that civil marriage be 
extended to same-sex couples. The DCC was subsequently amended five years later 
so as to provide full legal recognition to gay and lesbian marriages.282 While Book 1 of 
                                                          
281 An example of the Dutch decisions that adopted a restricted interpretation of article 8 of the 
ECHR is discussed in part 4 6 3 4 of this study. 
282 This was achieved by amending article 1:30 of the DCC to state “1. A marriage may be 
entered into by two persons of a different or of the same sex.” See: I Sumner & H Warendorf 
“Marriage” in Family Law Legislation of the Netherlands: A Translation including Book 1 of the 
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the DCC now recognises same-sex marriages, religious marriages are not recognised 
under Dutch law, if they are solemnised by way of a religious ceremony only.  
In 1997, the Dutch Parliament approved two separate Acts relating to registered 
domestic partnerships.283 These Acts came into effect on 1 January 1998 and 
amended the DCC, as well as a number of other Dutch statutes. Together, they 
established a system of registered domestic partnerships for same-sex couples and 
heterosexual couples. These two Acts provide that the provisions relating to civil 
marriages in the DCC are automatically applicable to registered partnerships. Article 
1:80a of the DCC provides that all of the provisions relating to civil marriage are 
automatically applicable to registered partnerships. Article 80b of the DCC specifically 
states that titles 6, 7 and 8 of the DCC apply mutatis mutandis to registered 
partnerships. While the Netherlands recognises registered partnerships, the Dutch 
system does not recognise polygamous relationships, with article 1:80a and 2:80a 
stating that a person may not already be involved in a registered partnership when 
they register their relationship. A person may also not be married to someone else 
when they register a partnership. 
 The extension of the matrimonial system applies to a wide range of fields of law, 
including the areas of social security law, taxation law and criminal law. The Dutch 
approach of recognising registered partnerships has therefore created a legal status 
analogous to that of marriage. There is however, no separate regime specifically 
catering for registered partners. 
In accordance with these developments, from 1 January 1998, parties of the same 
or opposite sex, who are 18 years of age, have been able to enter into a registered 
partnership with one another. The DCC provides that the partnership comes into 
existence as soon as the partners have signed and registered an “instrument of 
registration of partnership.”284 Registered partners owe each other a duty of fidelity, 
support and assistance and must provide for each other’s needs.285 Under the DCC, 
                                                          
Dutch Civil Code, Procedural and Transitional Provisions and Private International Law 
Legislation (2003) 54 54. 
283 These two acts included the Registered Partnership Act 324 of 1997 and the Registered 
Partnership Adjustment Act 660 of 1997. 
284 A 80a 3 of the DCC. 
285 A 81 of the DCC. 
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a general community of property also exists between spouses and registered 
partners.286 
While all of the consequences of a marriage attach to a registered partnership, there 
are differences that need to be mentioned. One difference is that terminating a 
registered partnership entails a very simple procedure, by way of mutual agreement. 
Another anomaly is that the automatic presumption of parentage does not apply 
mutatis mutandis to registered partners.287 In a heterosexual partnership, the male 
partner is thus required to formally recognise his child.288  
Collectively, these legislative developments provide same-sex and heterosexual 
couples with three choices when it comes to solemnising their unions. These options 
include entering into a civil marriage, a registered partnership or a cohabitation 
agreement.289 While providing a clearly delineated system for registered cohabitants, 
the Dutch approach of assimilating registered partnerships into the existing 
matrimonial regime can be criticised. One reason for this is that the Dutch system 
embodies a contractual approach to domestic partnerships, as well as a liberal 
conception of choice. This contractual paradigm is evinced by the regime requiring 
cohabitants to regulate their own affairs, either through registration or through entering 
into a formal contract. If cohabitants do not register their relationship or enter into a 
contract, they are left socio-economically vulnerable.  
Instead of examining whether the existing legal regime needs to be transformed, 
responsibility has been placed upon cohabitants to fulfil prescribed legal formalities, in 
order to access existing marital rights and responsibilities. The Dutch legal regime fails 
to actively interrogate the gendered socio-economic impact of existing family law rules 
on female cohabitants. In particular, the Dutch approach has failed to examine the 
Dutch family law regime in the light of existing human rights principles. While 
protecting the autonomy of cohabitants is important, it is nevertheless difficult for 
cohabitants to foresee all of the changes their relationship will undergo. A contractual 
                                                          
286 A 93: 1 of the DCC. 
287 Partners are able to adopt, regardless of whether they are married, but they must have 
been living together for three years and they must have cared for and educated the child for 
at least one year. 
288 Book 1, title 12 of the DCC provides the general framework for adoptions in the 
Netherlands. The Netherlands has also signed and ratified the Hague Convention on the 
Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Inter-Country Adoption but they have 
yet to join the European Convention on the Adoption of Children 1967 CETS 58. 
289 Smith & Robinson (2010) PELJ/PER 35. 
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paradigm is therefore not always able to provide adequate protection to cohabitants.290 
Given that Dutch women also continue to disproportionately bear the socio-economic 
burdens of divorce and family dissolution, the Dutch family law regime requires further 
examination and development. 
The Dutch approach places a high value on the autonomy of cohabitants. Simply 
assimilating registered domestic partnerships into the existing private law marriage 
model is however, insufficient in terms of the need to transform the underlying 
dynamics that shape how men and women relate to one another in intimate 
relationships.  
The Dutch method of assimilation thus embodies a formal approach to equality, with 
the risk of simply extending existing patriarchal paradigms within the family law regime. 
The Dutch approach fails to undertake a deeper interrogation of the patterns of 
gendered relationships that family law rules are either exacerbating or challenging.291 
Given that Dutch society also experiences patterns of gender inequality, this section 
emphasis the potential value of a relational feminist analysis of the socio-economic 
consequences of family law rules.   
As mentioned above, if Dutch cohabitants do not register their relationship or if they 
do not enter into a cohabitation contract, they are forced to rely on various areas of 
private law in order to protect their interests. The following section examines the 
piecemeal developments that have occurred in relation to unregistered partnerships. 
 
4 6 3 3  Unregistered partnerships: Legislative developments 
 
While the Dutch government officially recognised registered domestic partnerships 
in 1998, there have only been piecemeal developments with regard to unregistered 
partnerships since the 1970s.292 The first area of significant development was in the 
field of maintenance law and was retrogressive in nature. The Dutch government’s 
aim was to limit the maintenance rights of divorced parties who then entered into 
cohabiting relationships with new partners. In 1971, article 1:160 of the DCC was 
amended to provide that couples living together as if they were married resulted in the 
immediate loss of their right to maintenance from an ex-spouse. As this amendment 
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was made in the early seventies (1971), cohabiting relationships were referred to in a 
derogatory manner, as concubinage.293  
In 1979, the legal position of cohabitants living together with a tenant was 
significantly improved. In accordance with these changes, article 7:267 of the DCC, 
provides that a person living in a “stable household” with a tenant for a minimum of 
two years is now entitled to certain rights in relation to the landlord.294 In accordance 
with these changes, the tenant and their cohabiting partner are able to request the 
landlord treat him or her as a co-tenant. If the landlord refuses, the tenant and co-
resident can apply to the courts.295 Providing cohabitants with the status of co-tenant 
is important, since this allows them to take over the rental contract if the current tenant 
wishes to terminate the lease. Even more important is that in the case of separation, 
the co-tenant may request that the court decide who is entitled to occupy the family 
home.296 
In 1982 the DCC was subsequently amended to provide that a life partner could 
apply to a court to have the property of their partner placed under administration. This 
was followed by the Dutch government providing cohabitants with certain tax 
concessions in the 1980s. Following this, there were progressive assimilations in 
terms of social security and pension provisions.297 For example, under Dutch social 
security law, cohabiting couples now qualify as married couples if they share a joint 
household. The decisive criterion in the legislation turns on the actual needs and 
means of the applicant, so that marriage is no longer perceived as a prerequisite. Non-
marital partners with a joint household are thus legally presumed to share economic 
and social responsibilities.298 
Article 304 of the Dutch Criminal Code has also increased the maximum penalty for 
the infliction of domestic violence by a spouse by one third. According to article 304, 
since February 2006, this provision also applies to a “life companion”. Recognising 
cohabiting relationships in this manner is progressive, in that it illustrates the 
legislature giving more weight to the social function of relationships, as opposed to the 
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297 D Bradley “Regulation of Unmarried Cohabitation in West-European Jurisdictions-
Determinations of Legal Policy” (2001) 15 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 
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legality principle in criminal law.299 While these legislative developments have been 
significant, there have been certain changes brought about by judicial decisions. 
These developments are examined below. 
4 6 3 4 Unregistered partnerships: Judicial developments 
 
In addition to piecemeal legislative changes, there have been a number of ad hoc 
judicial developments over the years. The advances pertaining to registered 
partnerships were initially driven by the need to recognise same-sex marriages. As a 
result, the debate informing much of these modifications lacked a distinctive feminist 
perspective. The Dutch courts were therefore, first approached on the issue of 
extending civil marriage to same-sex couples in 1990. Two arguments were raised 
before a District Court in Amsterdam and the Hoge Raad. The first argument was that 
due to Article 30 of the DCC not referring to gender, it could possibly be interpreted to 
include same-sex marriages. The District Court of Amsterdam agreed with the 
petitioners that the statutory language in Article 30, of Book 1 of the DCC did not limit 
marriage to heterosexual individuals. However, the court relied on the legislative 
history of the statute, and found that, at the time the law was enacted, marriage was 
only possible for heterosexual couples. Consequently, the district court held that it was 
the legislators’ intention to limit marriage to heterosexual couples when they enacted 
the marriage laws.300   
On appeal, the Hoge Raad relied upon a traditional conception of marriage and 
found that article 30 was enacted with a view to protecting heterosexual marriages. 
The second argument that was posed before the courts was that the limitation to 
heterosexual marriage infringed certain individual rights and discriminated against 
same-sex couples. This argument was rejected by the courts, with both courts 
deferring to the legislature, finding that it was the legislature’s duty to address any 
differential treatment. The Hoge Raad thus found that while the limitation of 
matrimonial benefits to heterosexual couples could in principle be unjustifiable, it 
should be left to the legislature to rectify this situation.301 
Following these decisions, over recent decades, the courts have at times come to 
the aid of vulnerable cohabitants. There is however, very little certainty in terms of how 
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the courts will respond to these relationships.302 According to the Dutch scholar van 
Burght, in certain cases, the courts have recognised the legal significance of the 
emotionally-based relational dynamics, while in some cases the courts have simply 
ignored it.303 This haphazard approach is problematic though, as the emotional 
dynamics of the relationship often constitute the framework from which socio-
economic decisions are made. This further reveals the need to proactively scrutinise 
the relational dynamics within cohabiting relationships. Although most women in the 
Netherlands substantially reduce or give up labour participation after having children, 
the question of whether a caregiving partner whose earning capacity has been 
considerably diminished should be compensated upon the termination of their 
relationship has not yet been raised in the courts.304  
While the status of a spouse brings about important legal effects in both criminal 
and criminal procedural law, partners in unregistered cohabiting relationships are not 
protected in this sphere of law. In general terms, the nature of criminal law (such as 
the principle of legality) is often invoked as justification for drawing a clear line between 
registered and unregistered relationships. This is demonstrated by a decision of the 
Hoge Raad in which the principle of equality and the right to family life as contained in 
article 8 of the European Convention were both invoked by a partner who did not want 
to testify against her non-marital cohabiting partner. In this case, the Court held that it 
was justifiable to distinguish between registered cohabitants and unregistered 
cohabitants.305 This decision was confirmed by the European Court on Human 
Rights.306 
Under Dutch criminal procedural law, spouses and registered partners have a right 
to refuse to testify against their spouse or registered partner. In this case, the Dutch 
Hoge Raad refused however, to extend this provision to the unmarried cohabiting 
partner, who had lived with the accused man for over 15 years and with whom she 
had two children. The Hoge Raad invoked the principle of legal certainty and the nature 
of the provision as being an exception to the general principle of discovering the truth, 
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which prevails over other interests.307 This case is noteworthy as it undermines the 
argument that the functional nature of family relationships should be prioritised over 
its official form.  
In spite of this retrogressive decision, the Dutch courts have at times come to the 
aid of unregistered partners. For example, in determining property claims, certain 
courts have assessed what the legal content of the relationship is, in a manner that 
borrows from existing rules on matrimonial property law. In doing so, the Dutch courts 
have however, been careful to emphasise and protect the autonomy of parties who 
deliberately avoid entering into a civil marriage.308 Apart from that, a distinction has 
also been made between couples who have the option to marry and those who do not, 
emphasising the liberal choice argument.  
When examining the nature of cohabiting relationships, the Dutch courts have at 
times found that even though there was no written contract, a tacit contractual 
relationship can be inferred based on the reasonable expectations of the parties and 
their conduct.309 The courts then utilise this tacit contract to determine whether money 
or assets should be redistributed between the parties. The courts also sometimes 
recognise claims based on unjustified enrichment310 or undue payments.311 There is 
a great deal of legal uncertainty however, with the courts often providing divergent 
approaches and opinions.312 While the Hoge Raad laid down certain legal norms 
concerning implicit contracts between cohabitants, legal uncertainty prevails. 
It has been pointed out that, in general, the courts are reluctant to infer that a total 
community of property exists between unregistered cohabiting parties.313 Depending 
on the degree of socio-economic interdependence, the courts may however, find that 
a limited community of property does exist. When the acting partner also acted on 
behalf of the other, he may be seen as a representative of his partner. On the other 
                                                          
307 HR 31 May 2005 ECLI NL HR 2005 AS2748. 
308 Van der Burght (2000) De Jure 78-79; Schrama “National Report: The Netherlands” (2015) 
4. 
309 Van der Burght 78-79; Schrama “National Report: The Netherlands” (2015) 4.  
310 Van der Burght (2000) De Jure 78-79, these decisions are based on A 6:212 of the DCC. 
311 A 6:203 of the DCC. 
312 For example, in Rb Rotterdam 27 January 2010, LJN BM7429, the court decided that upon 
the termination of a relationship that had lasted 22 years, the parties had entered into an 
implicit contract, which required one partner to pay the other € 35000.00. In contrast to this, in 
Hof Den Haag 2 November 2010, the Court ruled that the female partner who had stopped 
working after giving birth, had to pay almost € 50000.00 to her partner for the costs of the 
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hand, the lack of evidence of private ownership could indicate that the asset involved 
is their common property, as provided for in article 1:131 of the DCC.  
What is clear is that there remain considerable differences between the legal 
position of a registered cohabitant and an unregistered cohabitant, with potentially 
significant socio-economic implications. Reducing the gap between their legal 
positions has not been considered or discussed in the Dutch Parliament. The 
differences between registered cohabitants and unregistered cohabitants have also 
not been challenged in the courts as a possible infringement upon the principle of 
equality.314  
4 6 3 5 Conclusion 
 
While the Dutch legislature has extended the existing matrimonial regime to 
registered domestic partnerships, Dutch law only provides piecemeal recognition to 
unregistered domestic partnerships.315 Previously, this piecemeal recognition 
provided more protection to cohabitants than the South African system. This difference 
was due to the fact that previously, the existence of a tacit cohabitation contract was 
more readily inferred by the Dutch courts. Since the developments pertaining to the 
tacit universal partnership, under South African law, South African cohabitants can 
however, utilise this mechanism in an attempt to protect their interests.316 
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Smith, there is an important similarity between the 
position of unregistered cohabitants in the Netherlands and cohabitants in South 
Africa.317 This parallel is that there is currently no specific legislation that caters for 
such unions. Consequently, unregistered cohabitants in the Netherlands and South 
African cohabitants face legal uncertainty and considerable socio-economic 
vulnerability. Even where Dutch parties have entered into a cohabitation contract, 
these contracts do not solve many of the problems faced by cohabitants, upon the 
termination of their relationship.318 Many of the limitations underlying a contractual 
regime were discussed in detail in chapter three of this study.319 While a contract can 
offer limited protection to a cohabiting couple, there is a need to further develop the 
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family law regime. Part of the problem with a contractual paradigm is that the general 
rules governing Dutch private law are “primarily designed to regulate economically- 
based relations.”320 These rules have therefore, not been shaped and interpreted in 
the light of the complex emotional and socio-economic dynamics that shape choices 
in family relationships.  
An additional problem is that the Dutch courts have not been consistent in their 
approach towards regulating unregistered cohabiting relationships. It is also parties 
who undertake the caring work in these relationships who are predominantly left socio-
economically vulnerable upon the termination of their relationship. As a result, the 
Dutch courts have had to grapple with a number of difficult legal issues, with divergent 
results. Examples of these legal challenges include determining which partner is 
entitled to which property, whether compensation is required for money invested in the 
other partner’s property or for non-financial contributions. The courts have also had to 
determine who will continue to occupy the family home, once the relationship ends 
and who is liable for debts incurred during the relationship.321 
The above discussion reveals that the legal framework regulating unregistered 
partnerships under Dutch law is both complex and haphazard. There is furthermore, 
a distinction in the approach towards unregistered cohabitants who have undertaken 
the caring work in the family and care-givers in registered partnerships and marriages. 
Legal certainty for unregistered cohabitants is therefore at stake in these disputes, 
since no clear pattern of interpretation can be discerned, despite a growing body of 
Dutch case law.322  
This comparative section reveals that the act of simply assimilating registered 
cohabitants into the legal framework governing marriages is not enough to transform 
the relational dynamics between men and women, particularly upon the breakdown of 
their relationship. The vulnerability of unregistered cohabitants under Dutch law further 
reveals the need to regulate informal relationships. Given the persistence of socio-
economic inequalities between Dutch men and women, the Dutch family law system 
emphasises the need for a more proactive feminist response to remedying the socio-
economic consequences of family dissolution. In order to do so, the relational 
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dynamics between men and women need to be addressed. A relational feminist 
interpretation of socio-economic rights is thus necessary. In a similar vein to the 
Canadian developments, the Dutch developments pertaining to family law were 
primarily shaped by the need to recognise same-sex marriages in accordance with the 
principle of equality. While these developments were necessary, feminist voices have 
tended to be marginalised during this process, along with the need to regulate 
unregistered domestic partnerships. There has therefore, been an insufficient focus 
on the need to address gender inequality in Dutch family law. 
4 6 4 Conclusion: Lessons from a comparative analysis of Dutch family law 
 
An examination of Dutch family law reveals the complex issues at stake in seeking 
to regulate cohabiting relationships. While substantive equality seeks to achieve 
equality of outcome, the Dutch approach of simply extending marital rights to 
cohabitants has only served to foster a formal approach to equality. An equality 
framework on its own in this context is insufficiently transformative. This is due to the 
reality that the feminisation of poverty is directly linked to how men and women relate 
to one another, particularly in intimate relationships. Unless these patterns of relating 
are effectively challenged and transformed, the equality approach will only serve to 
treat one of the symptoms of gender inequality. It is however, necessary to address 
and transform the underlying relational dynamics, as well as the ideological paradigms 
that inform socio-economic inequality between men and women.323  
The persistence of gender inequality in the Netherlands, in spite of the legislative 
reform that has occurred, further underscores the need to effectively address relational 
dynamics in family law from a feminist perspective. Moreover, the Dutch approach to 
cohabitation demonstrates that simply extending the matrimonial system to 
cohabitants only serves to extend existing patriarchal paradigms currently underlying 
the family law system. Given that the Dutch legal system does not permit the courts to 
scrutinise the constitutionality of acts of Parliament, the Dutch Constitution has not 
played a role in developing this area of family law. With regard to the comparative 
value of this section, the need to utilise the socio-economic rights protected in the 
South African Constitution to develop the South African family law regime is 
emphasised. In particular, socio-economic rights have potential to highlight the socio-
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economic implications of relational dynamics between men and women. These rights 
can also be utilised and interpreted in a manner that directly challenges and ultimately 
transforms these patterns of relating. 
The Dutch comparative analysis thus reveals that the gendered socio-economic 
consequences of terminated domestic partnerships will not be transformed unless the 
relational dynamics in these relationships are proactively interrogated and addressed. 
This further reveals the need to effectively utilise socio-economic rights to further 
transform family law rules, as well as the relational dynamics between cohabiting men 
and women.  
4 7  Concluding remarks: Lessons from Canadian and Dutch family law 
 
A comparative analysis of Canadian and Dutch family law clearly reveals the 
panoply of issues that need to be considered when examining how to regulate 
cohabitation. An overview of both Canadian and Dutch family law illustrates the 
disadvantages associated with extending legislative recognition to cohabitants without 
adopting a relational feminist lens. Simply extending legislative recognition to 
cohabitants, without seeking to transform how men and women relate to one another 
in the context of family law, will therefore not be enough to transform the inequitable 
socio-economic consequences of family dissolution in South Africa. In addition, judicial 
interpretations of private law rights pertaining to cohabitants, which lack a relational 
feminist lens, will not be sufficient in terms of the need to address patterns of gender 
inequality.  
In particular, this comparative study emphasises the need for a relational feminist 
engagement with family law issues pertaining to cohabitants. A relational feminist 
interpretation of the socio-economic rights of female cohabitants is required in both 
legislative and judicial developments, if we are to transform the inequitable relations 
that underlie many family law regimes. Drawing on the lessons offered by Canadian 
and Dutch family law, the following chapter examines the implications of a relational 
feminist interpretation of socio-economic rights for transforming the socio-economic 
consequences of terminated domestic partnerships in South Africa. 
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Chapter 5: The implications of a relational feminist interpretation of socio-
economic rights for South African cohabitants 
  
5 1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters illustrated the need for a relational feminist interpretation of 
socio-economic rights in the context of cohabiting relationships, with the focus on 
female cohabitants. This chapter utilises the relational feminist framework developed 
in chapter two,1 as well as lessons from Canadian and Dutch family law, to address 
South African legislative and jurisprudential shortcomings pertaining to cohabitation. 
One justification for transforming the current legal framework is that cohabitants make 
up a large and significant portion of the South African population.2 The constitutional 
commitment to establish a society based on “fundamental human rights”,3 along with 
the provision for the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights4 also illustrates a 
commitment to addressing systemic inequality within the family unit. The inclusion of 
the right to equality in conjunction with the duty to “progressively realise”5 socio-
economic rights, further evinces a commitment to transforming the gendered nature 
of the socio-economic consequences of family dissolution.  
The detrimental consequences of family dissolution cannot be avoided completely. 
This chapter does however, examine how the socio-economic consequences of 
terminated domestic partnerships could be ameliorated through a comprehensive 
legal response informed by a relational feminist interpretation of the socio-economic 
rights of female cohabitants. This examination commences with an investigation into 
the theoretical shift that is required in terms of the framework informing the regulation 
of domestic partnerships in South Africa. Following this, the necessary executive, 
legislative and jurisprudential developments that are required to give effect to the 
transformative aspirations of our Constitution, are set out in detail.  
 
                                                          
1 See chapter two of this study. 
2 B Smith “The Dissolution of a Life or Domestic Partnership” in J Heaton (ed) The Law of 
Divorce and Dissolution of Life Partnerships in South Africa (2014) 389 392. See part 1 1 1 of 
chapter 1 of this study. 
3 S 1(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”). 
4 As contained in ss 8 and 39 of the Constitution. 
5 This duty is included in ss 26(2) and 27(2) of the Constitution. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
205 
 
5 2  Shifting the theoretical lens informing the regulation of cohabitation 
 
Chapter two illustrated that classic legal liberalism provides an inadequate 
theoretical framework for conceptualising and responding to the needs of cohabiting 
women. For example, the liberal choice argument emphasises form over function. A 
liberal conception of choice also ignores the deeper relational factors that shape 
women’s choices. As discussed in chapter three, the jurisprudential reasoning 
encouraged under a liberal framework tends to ignore the socio-economic implications 
of family dissolution for women. The socio-economic implications of private law rules 
do however, need to be more robustly interrogated in order to give effect to the socio-
economic rights of women. In particular, a relational feminist interpretation of socio-
economic rights is necessary in order to transcend the problematic liberal and 
patriarchal paradigms currently informing our family law regime.6 It is necessary to 
transcend these liberal underpinnings and to re-shape our family law regime in 
accordance with the Bill of Rights.7  
In debating how to reformulate the legal response to cohabitation, academics have 
discussed the contextualised choice model,8 the function over form approach9 and the 
putative marriage model10 as developed by Bradley Smith.11 While the contextualised 
choice model recognises that choices are rarely if ever completely free, it does not 
sufficiently recognise that family relationships are also socio-economic institutions, 
currently exacerbating inequitable gendered relations. The contextualised choice 
                                                          
6 C Albertyn “Substantive Equality and Transformation in South Africa” (2007) 23 SAJHR 253 
273. 
7 D Bhana “The Development of a Basic Approach for the Constitutionalisation of Our Common 
Law of Contract” (2015) 26 Stell LR 1 3. 
8 Smith BS “Rethinking Volks v Robinson: The Implications of Applying a ‘Contextualised 
Choice Model’ to Prospective South African Domestic Partnerships Legislation” 2010 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/ Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 238-300; 
Goldblatt B “Regulating Domestic Partnerships: A Necessary Step in the Development of 
South African Family Law” (2003) 120 South African Law Journal 610-629.  
9 Goldblatt (2003) SALJ 610-629. 
10 A putative marriage occurs when one or both of the spouses believe, mistakenly but in good 
faith, that a valid marriage exists between them. In this case, even if the marriage did not fulfil 
strict formal requirements, the spouses can be entitled to the protections offered by a civil 
marriage. 
11 BS Smith “The Interplay between Registered and Unregistered Domestic Partnerships 
under the Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill, 2008 and the Potential Role of the Putative 
Marriage Doctrine” (2011) 128 SAJL 560-593; B Coetzee Bester & A Lou “Domestic Partners 
and “the Choice Argument: Quo Vadis?” (2014)17 PER / PELJ 2951 2958. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
206 
 
model also fails to adequately address the socio-economic consequences of how men 
and women relate to one another in intimate relationships. 
The function over form approach has substantially developed certain areas of family 
law, in the Netherlands and Canada. However, the focus on the nature of family 
relationships, over their official form, does not sufficiently address the need to structure 
more equitable socio-economic relations between cohabiting men and women. In 
South Africa, the focus is predominantly on the form of a relationship. A functional 
approach to family relationships is needed. It is however, also necessary to address 
and transform how men and women relate to one another, as well as the ideological 
paradigms informing this behaviour. Giving effect to the socio-economic rights of 
women is furthermore, required in order to address these relations and foster 
substantive gender equality. 
The putative marriage model as envisioned by Smith to regulate cohabitation has 
been positively received by certain academics.12 The primary issue with this model is 
that it retains a predominantly private law paradigm in terms of regulating cohabitation. 
In contrast to this, a relational feminist interpretation of the socio-economic rights of 
female cohabitants allows for the infusion of our family law regime with the human 
rights norms and values underlying the Bill of Rights. A relational feminist interpretation 
of socio-economic rights also allows for the interrogation of family law rules in the light 
of socio-economic rights. The socio-economic consequences of how cohabiting men 
and women relate to one another is open to interrogation and potential transformation. 
The hierarchical nature of our family law regime and the manner in which this regime 
continues to exacerbate gender inequality emphasises the need for substantial 
transformation. Significant change within family law, is necessary in order to give effect 
to the constitutional goal to establish a society based on “democratic values, social 
justice and fundamental human rights”.13  
The implications of a relational feminist framework as developed in chapter two, 
which focuses on the existing social context, a value-sensitive approach to the rights 
                                                          
12 The academics B Coetzee Bester & A Lou discuss Smith’s model as a viable alternative to 
challenging the choice argument prevalent in our family law jurisprudence: B Coetzee Bester 
& A Lou “Domestic Partners and “the Choice Argument: Quo Vadis?” (2014) 17 PER / PELJ 
2951 2958. While they ultimately argue that the contextualised choice model is the most 
feasible response to regulating cohabitation, they provided an in-depth discussion of Smith’s 
model as a potential viable response. 
13 Preamble to the Constitution. 
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of cohabitants, a relational conception of responsibility and ultimately social 
transformation, is examined in detail in the following sections. This relational feminist 
framework is utilised, along with the lessons provided by Canadian and Dutch family 
law, to recommend executive, legislative and jurisprudential developments needed to 
give effect to the socio-economic rights of female cohabitants. These South African 
developments are aimed at transforming the socio-economic consequences of 
terminated domestic partnerships for female cohabitants. 
5 3 Improved public provisioning of socio-economic rights 
 
While the judicial interpretation of rights is an integral aspect of providing 
substantive content to the socio-economic rights of women,14 the legislature and the 
executive also have an important role to play in translating socio-economic rights into 
meaningful individual entitlements.15 In particular, the legislature and the executive 
have a duty to provide the structures and resources necessary for people to exercise 
their constitutional rights.16 In accordance with this responsibility, one of the most 
evident ways of alleviating relational access to socio-economic resources would be 
through the state improving existing access to public services.17 While direct access 
to quality public services needs to be improved, there are also gendered barriers18 that 
need to be addressed when designing social programmes and delivering services. 
Simply extending private law remedies, without adequately considering the underlying 
gendered dimensions of poverty may therefore reinforce existing inequalities.19 It is 
                                                          
14 KE Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 150. 
15 M Pieterse “Legislative and Executive Translation of the Right to Have Access to Health 
Care Services” (2010) 14 Law, Democracy & Development 1 2. 
16 Pieterse (2010) Law, Democracy & Development 2. See also: Government of the Republic 
of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) paras 40-41.   
16 Pieterse (2009) SAJHR 200. 
17 205. 
18 Examples of gendered barriers to access to adequate housing include:  
“Women’s greater vulnerability, when inadequately housed, to gender-based violence; their 
particular vulnerability to forced eviction; and the disproportionate burden they bear to 
provide childcare”  
See L Chenwi & K McLean “A Woman’s Home is her Castle? Poor Women and Housing 
Inadequacy in South Africa” in B Goldblatt and K McLean (eds) Women’s Social and Economic 
Rights (2011) 105 107. 
19 B Goldblatt “Poverty and the Development of the Right to Social Security” (2014) 10 IJLC 
460 460. 
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important to acknowledge that access to socio-economic resources is not only 
hindered though the denial of welfare responsibility.20  
Designing programmes to address relational dynamics is necessary if we wish to 
infuse our family law system with the constitutional ethos of Ubuntu and equal concern 
for every individual. As underscored by the state's obligations to protect and fulfil socio-
economic rights, in terms of section 7(2) of the Constitution, the law must recognise 
and respond to the often significant obstacles associated with relational access.21 
Removing these relational obstacles should be done while taking steps to 
progressively improve public provisioning of socio-economic resources. This is 
necessary as exclusive reliance on relationships for access to socio-economic 
resources may significantly “diminish, or even obstruct”, their enjoyment.22 Improved 
provision of quality public services would diminish the pressure on private relationships 
to provide for the socio-economic needs of dependant family members. It would 
mitigate the need for economically vulnerable persons to enter into and sustain 
abusive private relationships in order to retain access to social goods and services.23  
The need for sufficient and quality public services was underscored by the 
comparative study of Canadian family law undertaken in chapter four of this study. 
This was emphasised by the detrimental consequences of the Canadian state’s recent 
neoliberal approach towards families, culminating in the privatisation of socio-
economic responsibilities.24 The retrogressive measures by the Canadian government 
emphasise the value and the importance of the express entrenchment of socio-
economic rights in the South African Constitution.  
Socio-economic programmes needs to be designed in a manner that ensures that 
they are comprehensive, coherent and capable of facilitating the realisation of socio-
economic rights for female cohabitants.25 As further underscored in the South African 
decision of Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom and Others 
                                                          
20 Pieterse (2009) SAJHR 206. 
21 S Fredman “Engendering Socio-Economic Rights” (2009) 25 SAJHR 410 414; Pieterse 
(2009) SAJHR 215. 
22 Pieterse (2009) SAJHR 205. 
23 G Brodsky & S Day “Denial of the Means of Subsistence as an Equality Violation” (2005) 
Acta Juridica 149 162. 
24 S B Boyd & CFL Young “Feminism, Law and Public Policy: Family Feuds and Taxing Times” 
(2004) 42 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 545 556. 
25 Grootboom para 44. 
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(“Grootboom”),26 retrogressive socio-economic measures by the state require 
particularly robust justification. This justification is required due to the specific 
obligation to “progressively realise”27 the socio-economic rights as protected in the 
Constitution.28 The South African state needs to take positive steps towards improving 
public services while simultaneously developing private accountability structures for 
socio-economic rights.  
5 4 Towards a transformed legislative framework for cohabitation 
 
5 4 1 Introduction 
 
Traditionally, when it comes to the further development of private law, the focus has 
been on the role of the courts. While the judiciary has an integral role to play in 
mobilising social transformation, they cannot however, achieve this goal in isolation.29  
Potential legislative developments, under the overarching framework of relational 
feminism and the lessons provided by Canadian and Dutch family law will be examined 
first, before proceeding to examine the necessary jurisprudential developments. 
5 4 2 Utilising a relational feminist framework to develop a legislative framework  
 
As highlighted in chapter three, there is currently a significant lacuna within our 
family law regime, in that there is no comprehensive legislative framework governing 
the status of cohabitants.30 There is the draft Domestic Partnerships Bill of 2008, which 
makes provision for registered domestic partnerships and unregistered domestic 
partnerships. In the SALRC’s report on domestic partnerships, they recommended two 
legislative options in dealing with unregistered domestic partnerships. The first option 
is referred to as the ascription model, which automatically ascribes certain rights and 
obligations during the existence of the relationship. The second option is referred to 
as the judicial discretion model. This option allows partners in former relationships to 
apply to the Court for a property division or maintenance order in the event that they 
                                                          
26 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC). 
27 S 26(2) and 27(2) of the Constitution. 
28 Para 45. 
29 S 8(1) of the Constitution states that the Bill of Rights binds the legislature, the executive, 
the judiciary and all organs of state. 
30 Smith “The Dissolution of a Life or Domestic Partnership” in The Law of Divorce and 
Dissolution of Life Partnerships in South Africa 392. 
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cannot come to an agreement after the relationship has ended. The Domestic 
Partnerships Bill of 2008 includes the judicial discretion model for regulating 
unregistered domestic partnerships. This Bill has yet to be enacted.  
While it remains the responsibility of the legislature to address the existing 
legislative gap, civil society and human rights organisations have the power to apply 
to the courts to determine whether the government and the legislature are fulfilling 
their obligations. This is in essence what occurred in the 2009 case of Women's Legal 
Trust v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others.31 In this case, the 
Women’s Legal Centre, working with a number of amici curiae applied to the 
Constitutional Court for an order declaring that the President and Parliament had failed 
to fulfil their obligations in terms of enacting and implementing a legislative framework 
for the recognition of Muslim marriages.32 The Constitutional Court ruled on the 
jurisdictional issues raised by it being the court of first instance in this case. The Court 
did not therefore, decide on the substantive issues in this case. In spite of the Women’s 
Legal Centre’s admirable attempt to catalyse legislative change, the Bill on Muslim 
Marriages has yet to be enacted. 
Given the absence of existing legislation governing cohabitation, civil society could 
bring an application for the legislature to enact legislation to coherently deal with the 
status of cohabitants. In terms of the state’s responsibility to give effect to the Bill of 
Rights, the South African Constitutional Court has not yet found that a failure to take 
positive measures to ensure that disadvantaged groups enjoy the benefit of a law 
amounts to unfair discrimination. The Court has however, affirmed that such measures 
are integral to our understanding of equality. Thus, in National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice,33(hereafter “National Coalition”) Ackermann J 
stated that: 
 
“Neither section 8 of the interim Constitution nor section 9 of the 1996 Constitution 
envisages a passive or purely negative concept of equality; quite the contrary.”34 
 
Intertwined with the need to give effect to a more substantive conception of equality, 
is the state’s express constitutional duty to take “reasonable legislative and other 
                                                          
31 ZACC 20; 2009 6 SA 94 (CC) (22 July 2009). 
32 ZACC 20; 2009 6 SA 94 (CC) (22 July 2009). 
33 1999 1 SA 6 (CC); 1998 12 BCLR 1517 (CC). 
34 Para 16. 
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measures”, within its available resources, to achieve the “progressive realisation” of 
the rights to adequate housing, health care services, sufficient food and water, and 
social security.35 Furthermore, there is an important interconnection between the 
duties imposed by socio-economic rights on private parties and the state’s duty to 
protect these rights. This duty specifically requires the state to enact and enforce 
necessary legislation so as to enable private parties to fulfil their socio-economic 
duties.36 The failure by the state to take such steps thus amounts to an infringement 
upon the duty to progressively realise the socio-economic rights for a significant 
number of South African women.37  
 In determining the most beneficial form of statutory regulation, Canadian family law 
offers examples of the alternative methods available to South Africa. Canadian 
legislatures have either relied on status (ascription) or contract (autonomy) to regulate 
cohabitation.38 The comparative analysis of Canadian family law also revealed that 
simply enacting regulatory legislation without adopting an appropriate relational 
feminist approach, will not be sufficient to dislodge the systemic patterns of gender 
inequality underlying the family law regime.  
While the Dutch family law system has been praised by South African scholars for 
offering a clearly delineated legislative framework,39 this system also has its 
challenges. For example, the Dutch family law system revealed that simply extending 
the consequences of marriage to unmarried cohabitants, without seeking to transform 
the underlying gendered socio-economic relations in family law, will not be enough to 
transform inequitable relations between men and women. Through neglecting 
unregistered domestic partnerships, many cohabiting women fall through the gaps of 
the Dutch legal system, emphasising the need for an inclusive human-rights based 
response to all relationships.  
In the light of the relational feminist framework developed in chapter two and the 
lessons from the comparative analysis in chapter four, the South African Domestic 
Partnerships Bill should be infused with a relational feminist approach, focusing on 
                                                          
35 Liebenberg & O’Sullivan (2001) AJ 75. 
36 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 332; Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) para 35.   
37 Pieterse (2009) SAJHR 200. 
38 See chapter four, part 4 4 of this study. 
39 BS Smith & JA Robinson “The South African Civil Union Act 2006:  Progressive Legislation 
with Regressive Implications?” (2008) IJLPF 376-377. 
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protecting the socio-economic rights of ex-cohabiting partners. The need for a 
transformative approach to family law is underscored by the high levels of gender 
inequality and domestic violence in South Africa.40 While domestic violence is the most 
extreme manifestation of dysfunctional gendered relations in our society, socio-
economic exploitation is also a symptom of dysfunctional patterns of relating. Every 
exercise of power, whether public or private, is now subject to the Constitution. 
Choosing to ignore inequitable private relations, based on a liberal conception of 
choice, also undermines the constitutional commitment to establish a society based 
on fundamental human rights. 
In accordance with the state’s responsibility to promote the rights in the Bill of 
Rights, the legislature is under a duty to enact a (revised)41 Domestic Partnerships Bill, 
as informed by a relational feminist interpretation of the socio-economic rights of 
cohabitants. The need for revision is emphasised by the fact that the Bill is insufficiently 
responsive to the socio-economic vulnerabilities experienced by cohabitants. 
Examining the Bill through a relational feminist framework reveals additional issues 
that need to be addressed. 
The first issue is the need for a relational feminist approach to cohabitation. 
Legislative recognition requires domestic partnerships to be addressed in terms of 
their social and historical context. It is important to examine the patterns of gendered 
relations that the Bill is either perpetuating or undermining. The Bill should therefore 
be informed by existing gendered hierarchies and dominant social norms that structure 
how men and women interact with one another. The socio-economic impact of these 
patterns of relating should also be addressed.42 Any exercise of judicial discretion 
under the Bill should furthermore, be informed by the high prevalence of gender 
inequality within South Africa. While the preamble to the Bill43 refers to section 9 of the 
                                                          
40 N Abrahams, S Mathews, R Jewkes, LJ Martin & C Lombard “Every Eight Hours: Intimate 
Femicide in South Africa 10 years later” (2012) Medical Research Council Policy Brief 4. 
41 The current version of the Domestic Partnerships Bill has been criticised for adopting a 
contractual paradigm to cohabitation, while failing to provide protection to the most vulnerable 
members of our society (who will most likely not enter into a contract). This Bill is analysed in 
detail in chapter three. 
42 Albertyn (2007) SAJHR 273. 
43 The Preamble to the Bill specifically states:  
“Section 9(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, provides that 
everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the 
law; AND NOTING that there is no legal recognition or protection for opposite-sex couples 
in permanent domestic partnerships, BE IT ENACTED by the Parliament of the Republic 
of South Africa, as follows.” 
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Constitution, it does not address the gendered dynamics prevalent within cohabiting 
relationships. Clause 2 provides that the objectives of the Bill include ensuring the 
rights of equality and dignity for domestic partners. It also states its objective to reform 
family law in accordance with the Bill of Rights. This development is sought through 
recognising cohabitation, regulating the rights and obligations of cohabitants and 
determining the financial consequences of a terminated partnership.44 
Given the interconnection between patterns of socio-economic disadvantage and 
gender inequality, the objectives underlying the Bill should be amended. The 
objectives should include the underlying aim of seeking to ensure a more equitable 
distribution of socio-economic resources between ex-cohabiting partners. A central 
objective of the Bill should include seeking to structure more constructive relations 
between cohabiting men and women, in accordance with section 9 of the Constitution. 
The Bill should also be revised in the light of the need to design legislation that is 
reasonably capable of facilitating access to socio-economic rights.45 Fostering 
substantive gender equality ought to be interlinked to this need to progressively realise 
the socio-economic rights of female cohabitants. 
Closely interrelated to the need for a relational approach is the need to transcend 
the public/private law divide prevalent within the Bill.46 For example, the Bill is primarily 
informed by a private law lens, with the language used referring to maintenance,47 
property law48 and contract law.49 The Bill is also predominantly shaped by a 
contractual paradigm, with the focus on registered domestic partnerships. The only 
                                                          
44  Clause 2(d) of the Bill. 
45 Grootboom para 44. 
46 Smith “The Dissolution of a Life or Domestic Partnership” in The Law of Divorce and 
Dissolution of Life Partnerships in South Africa 390-391. 
47 For example, clause 18 provides for the regulation of maintenance after termination of 
registered domestic partnership. Clause 18(2) states that when deciding whether to order the 
payment of maintenance and the amount and nature of such maintenance: 
“the court must have regard to:  
(a) the respective contributions of each partner to the registered domestic partnership; 
(b) the existing and prospective means of each of the registered domestic partners;  
(c) the respective earning capacities,  
(d) future financial needs and obligations of each of the registered partners  
(e) the age of the registered partners;  
(f) the duration of the registered domestic partnership;  
(g) the standard of living of the registered domestic partners prior to the termination of the 
registered domestic partnership;  
(h) and any other factor which in the opinion of the court should be taken into account.” 
48 For example, clause 7 refers to the “property regime”. 
49 Clause 8 of the Bill refers to a registered domestic partnership agreement. 
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reference to the Constitution is the brief mention of the Bill of Rights in clause 3, with 
the focus on the constitutional rights to equality and dignity. In spite of the reference 
to the constitutional right to dignity, the Bill’s failure to sufficiently recognise the 
constitutional rights of unregistered domestic partnerships runs the risk of 
exacerbating existing patterns of disadvantage for women in these relationships. 
Socio-economic rights are also completely omitted from the Bill.  
The second issue underscored by a relational feminist framework is the need for a 
value-sensitive approach to regulating cohabitation. Examining the values at stake 
emphasises the Bill’s problematic contractual paradigm. For example, the Bill fails to 
extend automatic rights, such as a right to occupy the family home, to unregistered 
domestic partnerships. While unregistered cohabitants are given the option to apply 
to a court to decide on property and maintenance rights, no automatic benefits ascribe 
to them. The onus will also be on the vulnerable party (which tend to be women) to 
approach the courts. Placing this onus on vulnerable women will only serve to 
reinforce inequitable gendered relations.  
Through primarily protecting registered partnerships the Bill retains a predominantly 
contractual paradigm, in that only partners who expressly enter into an agreement or 
register their relationship, are given automatic benefits. Instead, the Bill should be 
reformulated in terms of seeking to structure relations that give effect to the 
constitutional values. In accordance with this transformative approach, the Bill should 
recognise and address the relational socio-economic impact of terminated cohabiting 
relationships. A relational feminist approach also recognises the broader relational 
impact of the failure to address cohabitation. A relational feminist lens reveals that 
sometimes, protecting vulnerable family members requires proactive state action, 
even if cohabiting parties have not formalised their relationship.  
The Bill should be amended to automatically recognise and give effect to certain 
socio-economic rights for unregistered cohabitating partners once their relationship 
fulfils minimum requirements. Examples of this include automatically ascribing the 
right to occupy the family home after being involved in a relationship for a minimum of 
two years.50 The primary focus should be on the contextual socio-economic nature of 
                                                          
50 Two or three years is the length of time relied upon in a number of foreign law statutes, such 
as the Canadian provinces discussed in chapter 4 of this study. A period of two years provides 
a minimum amount of time to allow for socio-economic interdependence and to demonstrate 
commitment. While the socio-economic consequences of the relationship will also depend on 
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the relationship. The prevalence of socio-economic interdependence and socio-
economic need should thus be paramount in determining the socio-economic 
consequences of terminated domestic partnerships. Relationships characterised by 
substantial socio-economic interdependence, and severe socio-economic 
disadvantage upon dissolution, should furthermore, give rise to a general presumption 
of equal contributions and equal sharing of socio-economic resources, at relationship 
breakdown.51 While parties could apply to a court to determine the patrimonial 
consequences of their relationship, the exercise of judicial discretion should be infused 
with “judicial realism”.52 Specific consideration should be given to the socio-economic 
needs of caregivers with dependents. This is necessary in order to recognise and 
redress the gendered contributions and roles prevalent in domestic partnerships and 
in family law in general.53   
In its current form, unregistered partnerships are regulated through judicial 
discretion under the Bill. In exercising this discretion, the courts are not guided to 
consider the socio-economic impact of gender inequality in these relationships. 
Judicial discretion is however, often influenced by gender bias against caregivers.54 
There is therefore, the need for an express obligation to foster substantive gender 
equality between cohabitants. As indicated by the SALRC’s report on domestic 
partnerships, the value of autonomy is paramount in the Domestic Partnership Bill. 
There is however, the need to give effect to a relational and substantive conception of 
autonomy and human dignity within the context of family law. 
The private law emphasis is evident in the guidelines provided for determining the 
property and maintenance consequences of registered domestic partnerships. For 
example, when determining a property dispute, the Bill directs the court to focus on 
who owns the family property. While there is specific mention of the need to consider 
who undertakes the caring work within the domestic partnership, the right of access to 
adequate housing, access to health care, food, water or social security, is not included 
                                                          
the context of the specific relationship, two years offers a minimal requirement for the 
enforcement of socio-economic responsibilities.  
51 Canadian Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF), Factum of the Intervener in 
Eric v Lola (2012) 2. 
52 J Heaton “Striving for Substantive Gender Equality in Family Law: Selected Issues” (2005) 
21 SAJHR 556. 
53 Canadian Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF), Factum of the Intervener in 
Eric v Lola (2012) 2. 
54 E Bonthuys “Family Contracts” (2004) 121 SALJ 879 879. 
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under the list of factors55 for the court to consider. The need to recognise and address 
the specific socio-economic consequences of a terminated domestic partnership is 
omitted.  
The factors that a court must consider in accordance with clause 26, which 
concerns property division after the termination of an unregistered domestic 
partnership, should thus be amended as follows, with the insertion of (j), (k) and (l):  
(a) the duration and nature of the relationship; (b) the nature and extent of common 
residence; (c) the degree of financial dependence or interdependence and any 
arrangements for financial support between the unregistered domestic partners; (d) 
the ownership, use and acquisition of property; (e) the degree of mutual commitment 
to a shared life; (f) the care and support of children of the unregistered domestic 
partnership; (g) the performance of household duties; (h) the reputation and public 
aspects of the relationship; (i) the relationship status of the unregistered domestic 
partners with third parties;  (j) the relational dynamics between the cohabiting partners, 
including whether there is any evidence of domestic violence, or exploitation, (k) the 
socio-economic implications of the relationship for cohabitants and the need to 
progressively realise the right of access to adequate housing, the right of access to 
health care services, food, water and social security and (l) the need to protect 
vulnerable groups in our society, such as women and children and the duty to give 
effect to substantive gender equality. 
In accordance with these amended factors, the need to promote and fulfil the socio-
economic rights of cohabitants is interconnected with the need for the courts to 
address systemic patterns of gendered disadvantage within the family law regime. In 
exercising judicial discretion, the courts should consider the gendered nature of 
                                                          
55 When deciding on an applications for an order on property division under clause 26, a court 
must have regard to all the circumstances of the relationship, including the following:  
“the duration and nature of the relationship; 
(b) the nature and extent of common residence;  
(c) the degree of financial dependence or interdependence and any arrangements for 
financial support between the unregistered domestic partners; 
(d) the ownership, use and acquisition of property;  
(e) the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life;  
(f) the care and support of children of the unregistered domestic partnership;  
(g) the performance of household duties;  
(h) the reputation and public aspects of the relationship;  
(i) and the relationship status of the unregistered domestic partners with third parties.” 
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relationships, as well as the potential of socio-economic rights to foster substantive 
gender equality.56 
The third issue underscored by a relational feminist interpretation of the socio-
economic rights of female cohabitants, is the need to emphasise the state’s positive 
duty to enforce private socio-economic responsibilities between cohabitants, whether 
registered or unregistered. Socio-economic equality should also be fostered in a 
manner that structures constructive relations between cohabiting men and women.  
The final aspect underscored by a relational feminist interpretation of socio-
economic rights is the need for innovative and transformative remedies that give effect 
to the socio-economic rights of cohabitants while seeking to transform the manner in 
which men and women relate to one another. The Bill therefore needs to be infused 
with transformative conceptions of autonomy, dignity, diversity, Ubuntu and gender 
equality. Through automatically ascribing certain rights to cohabitants, the Bill can shift 
existing relations between cohabitants. 
The SALRC has pointed out that the ascription model could give rise to an increase 
in polygamous relationships, more so than under a registration system. An example 
of this is when a married individual enters into a domestic partnership with someone 
else, with socio-economic consequences. The fact remains however, that polygamous 
relationships are a reality in our society. The decision to not afford these relationships 
any recognition often results in socio-economic hardships for vulnerable women. A 
relational feminist interpretation of socio-economic rights emphasises the relational 
nature of equality, dignity and autonomy, highlighting the need to protect the 
fundamental rights of all parties involved in a cohabiting relationship. The focus should 
thus be on the human rights (and particularly the socio-economic rights) of the parties 
involved. While dealing with competing claims from different partners may be 
complicated and give rise to difficulties with enforcement, the rights of these partners 
do require protection and need to be addressed.  
Under a relational feminist approach, the focus shifts to the relational socio-
economic impact of each relationship. A relational feminist approach also questions 
the kinds of relations that we would like to structure between men and women and 
between women themselves. Women should not be encouraged to see each other as 
competition for survival. All of the parties should be treated in a manner that seeks to 
                                                          
56 J Nedelsky Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (2011) 208. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
218 
 
protect and foster their human dignity and autonomy. While absolute equality is not 
possible, the legal system should seek to recognise and protect the socio-economic 
rights of all parties.  
In the case of Zulu v Zulu57 (“Zulu”), the High Court held that where a cohabiting 
party’s behaviour was mala fide, she would not be able to share in the property of her 
partner. Even though the Court found that the applicant’s behaviour in this case was 
in fact bona fides, the Court held that she and the deceased had not entered into a 
lawful partnership. The High Court’s reasoning was due to the fact that the deceased 
had already entered into a civil marriage before entering into a relationship with the 
applicant. Judicial discretion informed by a relational feminist interpretation of the 
socio-economic rights of female partners in polygamous cases could be utilised to 
provide a more balanced and fair outcome for all parties. The partner who suffers the 
greatest socio-economic impact and sacrifice should have access to a significant 
share in the family’s socio-economic resources. Attention should also be paid to the 
manner in which the relationship came into being, as well as the relational dynamics 
of the relationship. The emphasis should be on transformation as opposed to 
maintaining the status quo. Mediation in these cases would also be desirable, with the 
focus on ensuring a fair socio-economic outcome for all parties concerned.58 
Automatically ascribing rights furthermore, does not prevent the parties from 
entering into a contract themselves. Partners could therefore, have the additional 
option of contracting out of certain obligations. However, the party seeking to opt out 
of the statutory obligations should bear the burden of proof in seeking to enforce this 
contract. Decisions on whether to enforce the contract should be guided by 
                                                          
57 2008 4 SA 12 (D) [2008] ZAKZHC 10 (“Zulu”). 
58 The importance of seeking to mediate in legal disputes, so as to try and find a solution that 
balances the rights of all parties involved was emphasised by Justice Sachs in the case of 
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC); 2004 12 BCLR 1268 
(CC). This case concerned an eviction application brought under s 6 of PIE by the Port 
Elizabeth Municipality against 68 unlawful occupiers. In para 39, Justice Sachs pointed out 
that: 
“In seeking to resolve the above contradictions, the procedural and substantive aspects of 
justice and equity cannot always be separated. The managerial role of the courts may need 
to find expression in innovative ways. Thus one potentially dignified and effective mode of 
achieving sustainable reconciliations of the different interests involved is to encourage and 
require the parties to engage with each other in a pro-active and honest endeavour to find 
mutually acceptable solutions. Wherever possible, respectful face-to-face engagement or 
mediation through a third party should replace arms-length combat by intransigent 
opponents.” 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
219 
 
considering the kinds of relations we would like to foster between cohabiting men and 
women.59  
Courts are empowered to make orders that are just and equitable in terms of 
maintenance or property disputes. The range of specific remedies should however be 
broadened. For example, the courts could be guided by the values underlying socio-
economic rights, to set aside or approve settlement agreements or provide restraining 
orders, if necessary. Given the high levels of gender-based violence in South Africa, 
greater attention needs to be paid to the relational dynamics that exist within 
cohabiting relationships. 
In conjunction with expanding the property and maintenance rights of women in 
unregistered partnerships, the prevalence of domestic violence therefore, also needs 
to be recognised as an important factor in determining the socio-economic 
consequences of these relationships.60 The prevalence of domestic violence should 
be included as a factor to guide judicial discretion, while cohabiting women should be 
assisted in bringing evidence on this issue to the court. Further training of judicial 
officers on the impact of these relational dynamics, is necessary in order to 
appropriately determine the socio-economic consequences of domestic 
partnerships.61 
5 4 3 Conclusion 
 
The Constitution clearly requires the state to take positive measures to protect, 
promote and fulfil the socio-economic rights.62 This necessarily requires developing 
accountability structures for enforcing private socio-economic responsibilities between 
cohabitants. One avenue of fulfilling this duty is through infusing the Domestic 
Partnership Bill with a relational feminist approach. The need for this approach was 
emphasised through the comparative study on Canadian and Dutch family law. For 
example, Canadian and Dutch family law legislation revealed that simply extending 
legislative rights without adopting a relational feminist approach will not be sufficient 
                                                          
59 Nedelsky Law’s Relations 2. 
60 E Bonthuys “Domestic Violence and Gendered Socio-Economic Rights: An Agenda for 
Research and Activism” (2014) 30 SAJHR 133. 
61 133. 
62 S 7(2) of the Constitution states “the state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights 
in the Bill of Rights.  
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to transform existing patterns of gender disadvantage.63 The Domestic Partnerships 
Bill thus needs to be suffused with transformative relational conceptions of autonomy, 
human dignity and equality. Ultimately, the Domestic Partnerships Bill needs to give 
effect to the transformative aspirations underlying our Constitution in terms of 
structuring more equitable socio-economic relations between cohabitants.  
The Bill’s current contractual paradigm should be transposed with a relational 
feminist interpretation of the socio-economic rights of cohabitants, through 
automatically ascribing certain socio-economic benefits to cohabitants whose 
relationships are characterised by socio-economic interdependence. For example, a 
couple that has lived together for at least two years, should obtain certain benefits, 
particularly for caregivers. The private law language that is used in the Bill ought to be 
amended so as to include a constitutional law focus, while the socio-economic rights 
should be explicitly referred to.  
A single piece of legislation will not solve all of the problems within our family law 
regime. Amending and enacting the Domestic Partnerships Bill will however, provide 
increased legal certainty to a greater number of women. It is necessary to also 
examine the potential of jurisprudentially developing existing legislation and common 
law rules pertaining to cohabitants. Developing existing legal rules is required as 
currently, the common law rules are primarily structuring the socio-economic well-
being of cohabiting women.   
 
5 5 Jurisprudential developments to protect the rights of disadvantaged 
cohabitants 
 
5 5 1 Introduction 
 
The South African judiciary in its entirety is subject only to the Constitution and the 
law.64 The South African courts consequently fulfil a significant function in the 
constitutionally mandated effort to effect societal transformation by interpreting and 
enforcing constitutional rights. The duty to transform our society does not rest on the 
                                                          
63 See part 4 6 of chapter four of this study. 
64 S 165 of the Constitution.  
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courts alone. As highlighted above, it is primarily the task of the state to implement 
laws and policies aimed at far-reaching transformation.  
While the judiciary is not tasked with transforming our society in isolation, it has a 
significant role to play, particularly as the Constitution clearly requires human rights-
inspired reforms of existing private law rules.65 It also authorises an independent 
judiciary to test the validity of all law against the Constitution.66 The responsibility of 
the judiciary is emphasised by the reality that the family law regime retains many 
archaic common law rules. In the face of recent legislative inactivity, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal has been particularly active in developing private law rules relating to 
tacit universal partnerships between cohabitants.67 
In spite of certain positive developments in accordance with these decisions, clarity 
on the interaction between the Bill of Rights and private law rules has yet to emerge.68 
One reason for this lack of progress is a lack of concrete guidelines relating to how 
this change should be facilitated.69 This chapter therefore examines the implications 
of a relational feminist framework for guiding the horizontal application of socio-
economic rights between cohabitants.  
 
5 5 2  Utilising a relational feminist lens to foster gender-sensitive family law decisions   
 
An overview of the family law jurisprudence emphasises the need to construct a 
judicial response to cohabitation that is more caring, feminist and authentically 
reflective of the Constitution’s transformative aspirations.70 A relational feminist 
interpretation of socio-economic rights will not solve all of the problems within our 
family law regime. However, given that these rights are often accessed privately, 
highlighting the distributional consequences of family law rules may assist in 
                                                          
65 AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) 19. 
66 19. 
67 Bonthuys (2015) SAJHR 380. 
68 E Bonthuys “The South African Bill of Rights and the Development of Family Law” (2002) 
119 SALJ 748 781. While the family law regime is still primarily seen through a private law 
lens, on the occasions that the Bill of Rights has been applied to family law, the focus has 
traditionally been on the constitutional right to equality. While this right has great 
transformative potential, the high levels of poverty plaguing South Africa and the unique 
manner in which women experience poverty further justifies a shift in focus.  
69 D Bhana “The Development of a Basic Approach for the Constitutionalisation of Our 
Common Law of Contract” (2015) 26 Stell LR 1 3. 
70 G Brodsky, R Cox, S Day & K Stephenson “Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General)” (2006) 
18 CJWL 189 190. 
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developing interpretations of these rights that are more responsive to existing private 
gendered power imbalances.71 Furthermore, raising the relational nature of these 
rights would reveal the need to develop relational feminist remedies that are sourced 
within the socio-economic rights. Socio-economic rights could also open up space for 
increased creativity within traditional private law arguments and remedies.72 In 
addition, extending recognition and protection to cohabitants on the basis of their 
constitutionally entrenched socio-economic rights has the potential to protect a 
broader range of their human rights and interests. Socio-economic rights also have 
significant potential to empower women and to structure more constructive relations 
between men and women on a broader scale.73 
Interrogating the socio-economic implications of cohabitation is further justified 
given South Africa’s high levels of poverty and our insufficient social welfare system.74 
Increased socio-economic cooperation between family members is further defensible 
as research on poverty within families indicates that cooperation between generations 
and between family members facilitates the accumulation of resources. This has been 
described as a “potentially powerful avenue for economic empowerment within South 
Africa”.75 Utilising a relational feminist interpretation of socio-economic rights to 
develop the family law regime is also required in order to transition from the current 
liberal approach to cohabitation,76 to a transformative approach that is more aligned 
with the progressive framework of rights in the Bill of Rights. It has been pointed out 
that in the context of structural inequalities, transformative adjudication should strive 
for the most effective and substantive vindication of the values and interests protected 
by socio-economic rights.77 In this manner the law could re-shape cohabiting relations 
so as to foster socio-economic equity between cohabitants.  
 
                                                          
71 M Pieterse “Relational Socio-Economic Rights” (2009) 25 SAJHR 198 198. 
72 Bonthuys (2008) SAJHR 240. 
73 For example, gender-sensitive housing, such as state housing provided to survivors of 
domestic violence can significantly empower women to leave abusive relationships. 
74 Goldblatt (2003) SALJ 618. 
75 M Makwane & L Berry “Towards the Development of a Family Policy for South Africa”                    
(2013) Human Sciences Research Council Policy Brief 1 4 
<http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/3337/2013febFamily%20Policy.pdf> (accessed 
24-07-2013). 
76 See part 3 3 of chapter three of this study. 
77 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 58. 
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5 5 2 1 Utilising relational feminism to inform the horizontal application of socio-
economic rights 
 
One could utilise the facts of Butters v Mncora78 as an example of how sections 8 
and 39 of the Constitution could be utilised, through a relational feminist lens, to test 
and develop applicable private law rules and legislation against the socio-economic 
rights of vulnerable cohabitants. The facts of Butters79 were discussed in detail in 
chapter three.80 As is often the case, upon the termination of the domestic partnership, 
the respondent sought to evict the applicant. As the applicant had no right to occupy 
the family home,81 she was ultimately forced to leave the family home.  
In this regard a female cohabitant could use section 8(2) of the Constitution to argue 
that the non-recognition of her relationship infringed upon her right to have access to 
adequate housing, particularly as the law gave her partner the power to evict her 
(which is often what occurs).82 She could also argue that the lack of a legislative 
framework to ensure the fulfilment of socio-economic obligations between cohabitants 
undermines her ability to access adequate housing,83 health care, food and water84 
and social security, often for herself and any children born from the relationship. She 
could point out that the law’s failure to regulate domestic partnerships has intersected 
                                                          
78 2012 4 SA 1 (SCA); [2012] 2 All SA 485 (SCA). 
79 For example, as highlighted in chapter three, after twenty years of living together, the 
respondent had accumulated a significant amount of assets, while the applicant had primarily 
remained responsible for the maintenance of the family home and their children 
80 2012 4 SA 1 (SCA); [2012] 2 All SA 485 (SCA) para 8. 
81 These are rights that are conferred under the common law definition of marriage, which 
excludes cohabitants. 
82 Meyersfeld (2010) Constitutional Court Review 275; The Alliance for the Legal Recognition 
of Domestic Partnerships “Submission to the Department of Home Affairs” (2008) 3. 
83 S 26(1) of the Constitution specifically provides that: “Everyone has the right to have access 
to adequate housing.” S 26(3) goes on to state that  
“No- one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order 
of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances.”  
84 S 27 of the Constitution specifically states that:  
“(1) Everyone has the right to have access to 
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care;  
(b) sufficient food and water; and  
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, 
appropriate social assistance. (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within it available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of 
these rights. (3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.” 
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with existing relational patterns of gender inequality, resulting in many cohabiting 
women being denied access to vital socio-economic resources.85  
In determining the extent to which the Bill of Rights is applicable to the applicant’s 
situation, the court will need to recognise the historical and current social context 
governing cohabitation, as well as its gendered implications. This context-sensitive 
approach to domestic relations should be guided by section 8 of the Constitution. 
Examining the socio-economic consequences of cohabiting relations will assist in 
transcending traditional conceptions of the public/private law divide.86 A realistic 
recognition of the current social context reveals how various areas of private law are 
located within existing social systems of inequality, domination and control for female 
cohabitants.87 Given the constitutional requirement to progressively realise socio-
economic rights and to foster substantive gender equality, the Bill of Rights is clearly 
applicable to this case. 
In determining the exact scope of the applicant’s right of access to adequate 
housing, the court would need to address the nature of her specific relationship and 
the intensity of the infringement.88 The gendered norms and inequities that have been 
constructed by the relationship should also be addressed. 
In this regard, the considerable means of the respondent, the caregiving work that 
was undertaken by the applicant and the significant length of their relationship, would 
justify a substantive engagement with sections 26(1) and 26(3) of the Constitution and 
their importance to female cohabitants. As held by the Constitutional Court, the right 
of access to adequate housing necessarily entails more than just “bricks and mortar”.89 
In accordance with this statement, it needs to be recognised that the family home is of 
particular significance for dependant family members. The Court will thus need to 
acknowledge the rise in cohabitation and the fact that it is predominantly prevalent 
within poorer communities. This socio-economic vulnerability emphasises the need to 
give substantive content to the socio-economic rights of female cohabitants.  
                                                          
85 Meyersfeld (2010) Constitutional Court Review 275; The Alliance for the Legal Recognition 
of Domestic Partnerships “Submission to the Department of Home Affairs” (2008) 3. 
86 Juma Musjid Primary School case, & Others v Essay N.O. and Other [2011] ZACC 13; 2011 
8 BCLR 761 (CC) (“Juma”) para 54. 
87 Nedelsky Law’s Relations 300. 
88 Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401; 2002 8 BCLR 771 para 33. 
89 Grootboom para 35.   
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In seeking to give substantive content to section 26, it is necessary to enquire 
whether legal rules that implicate this right are giving effect to a substantive and 
relational conception of autonomy, a relational understanding of human dignity and a 
commitment to substantive equality between cohabiting men and women. The court 
must examine whether the respondent’s private property rights and the lack of 
legislative regulation are being utilised to perpetuate the marginalisation, material 
inequality, and subordination experienced by female cohabitants. Given the particular 
vulnerability of female cohabitants upon relationship breakdown, as underscored by 
empirical evidence,90 greater effort must be made to give effect to the socio-economic 
rights of cohabitants. 
Relational feminism emphasises that in order to develop the substantive content of 
socio-economic rights for female cohabitants, the reality of rights structuring 
relationships needs to become the central focus of the interpretive exercise.91 
Accordingly, interpretations of socio-economic rights will be more responsive to the 
needs of cohabiting women if we focus on the kinds of gendered relationships that we 
want to foster.92  
Adopting this relational feminist approach would lead to a more relational balancing 
act between the applicant’s right to have access to adequate housing and the 
respondent’s property and contractual rights. In seeking to determine whether a 
negative infringement of section 26(1) is reasonable and justifiable, the court will also 
need to apply section 36 of the Constitution.93 Section 36 requires the court to consider 
the founding constitutional values for cohabitants, the purpose of the limitation and 
                                                          
90 B Goldblatt, C Yose, & S Mills “Cohabitation and Gender in the South African Context: 
Implications for Law Reform” (2001) (research report prepared by the Gender Research 
Project of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of the Witwatersrand); E Bonthuys 
“Institutional Openness and Resistance to Feminist Arguments: The Example of the South 
African Constitutional Court” (2008) 20 CJWL/RFD 1 13-14.  See also: The Women’s Legal 
Centre Trust & The Centre for Applied Legal Studies “Written Submission on Behalf of the 
Amicus Curiae” (2005) <http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/3296.PDF> 
(accessed 09-03-2011). 
91 Nedelsky Law’s Relations 251. 
92 251. 
93 S 36 of the Constitution states that:  
“The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to 
the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, 
including (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) 
the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its 
purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” 
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whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. Section 26(3) of the 
Constitution also requires that no-one may be evicted without an order of court made 
after considering all of the relevant circumstances. 
In Butters94 the majority judgment did point out that the respondent’s claim that he 
had intended to accumulate all of the family assets for his sole benefit, was 
“remarkable”.95 The Court went on to elucidate that this approach would mean that the 
applicant intended to contribute her everything for almost twenty years to assist the 
defendant in acquiring assets for himself only.96 This would have the inequitable result 
of leaving her entirely dependent in her old age on the generosity of the defendant, 
implicating her right of access to social security.97 Allowing her to be left with no 
remedy would also contribute to existing patterns of exploitation that exist between 
cohabiting men and women. In accordance with the disadvantage experienced by the 
applicant, allowing her eviction without giving effect to her socio-economic rights would 
not be constitutionally reasonable and justifiable. Given that the Constitution is 
implicated within this case, the next step concerns determining the most effective 
means of giving effect to the Constitution. 
 
5 5 2 2 Interpreting legislation 
 
In accordance with section 8(3)(a) of the Constitution, the courts are required to first 
rely on any applicable legislation when constitutional rights are horizontally 
applicable.98 The potential of interpreting legislation to include cohabitants is first 
examined. While there is no legislation giving effect to the private socio-economic 
duties between cohabitants, one could argue that the closest piece of legislation falling 
under this category is the Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 (“the Maintenance Act”). 
Section 2(1) of the Maintenance Act provides that the provisions of the Act “shall apply 
in respect of the legal duty of any person to maintain any other person, irrespective of 
the nature of the relationship”. The Maintenance Act therefore extends to include a 
                                                          
94 For example, as highlighted in chapter three, after twenty years of living together, the 
respondent had accumulated a significant amount of assets, while the applicant had primarily 
remained responsible for the maintenance of the family home and their children. 
95 Butters v Mncora 2012 (4) SA 1 (SCA); [2012] 2 All SA 485 (SCA) para 26. 
96 Para 26. 
97 Para 26. 
98 Juma Musjid Primary School case, & Others v Essay N.O. and Other [2011] ZACC 13; 2011 
8 BCLR 761 (CC). 
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contractual duty of support between cohabitants who have agreed upon a duty of 
support, whether overtly or tacitly. The difficulty arises in proving that a duty of support 
has been tacitly agreed upon.99 In determining whether there has been a decision to 
undertake a duty of support, the interpretive approach adopted by the lower courts 
should be informed by a relational feminist interpretation of the socio-economic rights 
of female cohabitants. 
The applicant could therefore argue that her eviction and loss of access to 
household goods, infringes upon her rights to have access adequate housing, health 
care, food, water and social security. This exclusion further infringes upon her rights 
to equality and human dignity. The unfairness of leaving cohabitants vulnerable is 
highlighted through the decision of Kahn v Kahn,100 where the Transvaal provincial 
division extended the application of section 2(1) of the Maintenance Act to women 
married under Muslim Personal Law.101 
While one could argue that this piece of legislation should be extended to explicitly 
include cohabitants, the fact that it does not explicitly provide for private socio-
economic obligations between cohabitants emphasises the need for the legislature to 
enact specific legislation regulating cohabitation. The Maintenance Act does also not 
address the need to examine and transform the socio-economic consequences of how 
men and women interact with one another. The court could however, also interpret 
existing family law legislation to include cohabitants.  
Within Canada, the courts have adopted this incremental approach, through 
extending certain legislative provisions to include different family forms, including 
same-sex relationships and unmarried cohabitants. One benefit of this approach is 
that judicial decisions often prompt the legislature to enact progressive legislation. 
Incrementally developing areas of family law through strategic cases was also the 
approach adopted within Australia. As highlighted by Goldblatt, this approach allows 
                                                          
99 This is evinced by the decision in Volks para 58, where Justice Skewija stated that there 
was no automatic duty of support between cohabitants. He further pointed out that, to the 
extent that any obligation would arise between cohabitants during the subsistence of their 
relationship, this would only be in terms of an agreement and would only be within the limits 
of that agreement. As discussed in part 3 5 6 of chapter three of this study, the South African 
legal regime has, however, been developed in terms of the dependent’s action at common law 
for loss of support due to the death of the breadwinner within the family. In the decision of 
Paixão v Road Accident Fund, a unanimous court was prepared to find that the deceased had 
tacitly undertaken to support the female applicant and her daughters prior to his death.  
100 2005 2 SA 272 (T). 
101 Kahn v Kahn 2005 2 SA 272 (T) page 283. 
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for a comprehensive set of laws to be put into place, without being too politically 
contentious.102 This approach has allowed legal reform to occur in Australia without 
an overwhelming degree of public debate or opposition.103  
Within South Africa, this was also the strategy employed in seeking to extend legal 
protection to same-sex relationships. The strategic potential of this route was revealed 
through the success achieved by the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 
(in terms of developing the law to protect same-sex partnerships). Bonthuys has 
pointed out that their strategy of focusing on incrementally developing the law, as 
opposed to expressly attacking the common law definition of marriage, was part of 
what led to their numerous judicial successes.104   
While a coherent and comprehensive legislative framework governing cohabitation 
is preferable, in its absence, the courts can develop the law by interpreting family law 
legislation that confers socio-economic benefits, to include cohabitants. For example, 
interpreting the definition of “spouse” in the MSSA to include cohabitants, would 
extend a form of social support to cohabitants. Existing family law legislation can 
therefore be interpreted in a manner that gives greater effect to the socio-economic 
rights of cohabitants.  
It must be pointed out however, that the Court in Volks v Robinson (“Volks”)105 was 
reluctant to extend the MSSA to cohabitants, preferring to defer to the legislature as 
the appropriate authority to develop the law in this regard.106 While the legislature has 
a constitutional obligation to give effect to the socio-economic rights of cohabitants, 
the courts are obliged to carefully interrogate current family law rules to determine 
whether they sufficiently protect the fundamental human rights protected in our 
Constitution.107 The courts should accordingly examine how existing rights could be 
expanded so as to protect a broader range of families. A proactive judicial engagement 
with legislation would also assist the legislature in terms of developing the human 
                                                          
102 B Goldblatt “Different Routes to Relationship Recognition Reform: A Comparative 
Discussion Of South Africa And Australia” Law and Society Association                                             
Australia and New Zealand (LSAANZ) Conference (2008) 6 
<http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstream/2123/4043/1/LSAANZ%20Goldblatt%20Relationshi
p%20Recognition%20LSAANZ%20final%20paper.pdf.> (accessed 04-07-2015). 
103 Goldblatt (2003) SALJ 610-629. 
104 Bonthuys (2002) SALJ 756. 
105 2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC). 
106 Volks para 66. 
107 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 71. 
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rights framework applicable to these relationships. Articulating this human rights 
framework could furthermore, guide the development of future legislation. 
When a court is interpreting legislation, section 39(2) of the Constitution specifically 
states that the court must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.108 
Using the example of Butters,109 the applicant could therefore argue that the MSSA 
should be interpreted and extended in accordance with a relational feminist 
interpretation of the socio-economic rights of cohabitants. While one could argue that 
the focus should rather be on developing the common law definition of marriage, it is 
important to examine the need to develop legislation and common law provisions.  
While the MSSA could be interpreted in a manner that protects the socio-economic 
rights of female cohabitants, this would not be sufficient on its own, to transform our 
family law regime. One reason for this insufficiency is that the MSSA does not directly 
protect the socio-economic rights of vulnerable family members. The MSSA is 
furthermore, informed by a private law lens, indicating the need for a shift in our law 
towards protecting fundamental human rights norms and developing constitutionally-
inspired transformative remedies. Given the lack of a legislative framework governing 
cohabitation, potential common law developments should also be considered. 
 
5 5 2 3 Developing the common law 
 
One potential avenue of development could be the extension of the common law 
definition of marriage, which was traditionally described as; “the union for life of one 
man and one woman to the exclusion of all others while it lasts.” This definition has 
been criticised for excluding a vast array of family forms, including cohabitants.110  
Developing the common law to recognise relational socio-economic obligations based 
on a more functional conception of family relationships, will not solve all of the 
problems facing cohabitants. It is however, necessary to examine and develop all 
areas of law in light of our multicultural society. Developing the common law while 
simultaneously developing a legislative framework would also foster a greater level of 
social transformation, as opposed to the current piecemeal approach to regulating 
relationships. 
                                                          
108 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC); 2005 9 BCLR 835 (CC) para 17. 
109 2012 4 SA 1 (SCA); [2012] 2 All SA 485 (SCA). 
110 Pieterse (2009) SAJHR 212; 
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Section 8(3)(a) of the Constitution requires a court, when a provision of the Bill of 
Rights binds a natural or juristic person (and the legislative framework does not 
sufficiently protect this right) to develop the common law, where necessary, so as to 
fill gaps in the existing legislative framework. Section 8(3)(a) does raise “separation of 
powers” issues. Karl Klare and Dennis Davis point out however, that the courts 
regularly fill gaps in statutes and that they often do this in order to give effect to the 
legislature’s true goals and intentions.111  
The courts often incrementally develop the common law within an overall duty of 
deference to the superior competence of the legislature.112 In spite of the express 
mandate within section 8(3)(a) to develop the common law, the courts have been 
reluctant to develop the common law definition of marriage.113 For example, in National 
Coalition,114 which was discussed in chapter three,115 the Court held that same-sex 
partners could establish all the elements of the consortium omnis vitae, which in terms 
of the common law define a family. The Court went on to state that they should 
therefore be afforded the same legal protection available to other families. The Court 
was however, careful to limit the implications of this for the validity of Muslim marriages 
and for the rights of cohabitants.116 Instead of developing the common law definition 
of marriage, the Court held that the appropriate remedy was to read the words, “or 
partner in a permanent same-sex partnership” into the Aliens Control Act 96 of 
1991.117  
Amending the common law would not solve all of the problems facing female 
cohabitants in South Africa. It is however, necessary to highlight the gendered socio-
economic challenges caused by existing rules, including common law rules. Through 
utilising section 8(2) to raise the distributional consequences of common law rules, the 
applicant would draw attention to the fact that the current legal framework governing 
cohabitation fails to protect the socio-economic rights of women. Even in cases when 
                                                          
111 D Davis and K Klare “Transformative Constitutionalism and the Common and Customary 
Law” (2010) 26 SAJHR 403 422. 
112 Davis & Klare (2010) SAJHR 411. 
113 Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 6 SA 1 (CC), Counsel for the 
President also argued that the common-law definition of marriage, rather than the content of 
the Act, caused the discrimination in this instance and should have been the focus of attack. 
However, following the Minister of Home Affairs case, the court did not address this issue. 
114 1999 1 SA 6; 1998 12 BCLR 1517. 
115 See part 3 3 of chapter three of this study. 
116 1999 1 SA 6; 1998 12 BCLR 1517, paras 60 and 87. 
117 Para 87. 
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the specific socio-economic rights of cohabitants are not implicated, significant 
transformation of the common law may still be required in order to align our family law 
system with the “spirit, purport and objects” of the Constitution. This illustrates a 
potential overlapping between sections 8 and 39(2) of the Constitution. While both of 
these provisions have significant potential to transform the family law regime, 
substantive content needs to be given to the specific socio-economic rights of female 
cohabitants. Specific areas of the common law can also be further developed in 
accordance with socio-economic rights, as well as the broader ethos and values 
underlying the Constitution in accordance with section 39(2) of the Constitution.  
One example of an area of law that requires significant development is contract law. 
Currently, cohabitants are free to sign contracts or cohabitation agreements. They can 
therefore agree on spousal support or the equal division of property after the 
breakdown of their relationship through an express agreement. These agreements 
can also be reviewed by the courts. In general, all contracts between cohabitants have 
to conform to the common law and statutory provisions that regulate the validity and 
enforceability of contracts. While family contracts have been heralded for ensuring 
legal certainty and for protecting the autonomy of cohabitants,118 there are however, 
limitations to such contracts. Many of these limitations were highlighted in chapter 
three,119 as well as in chapter four, under the discussion on Dutch family law.  
 The interpretation of family contracts is also subject to judicial discretion which is 
often influenced by sexism.120 Goldblatt has echoed this criticism stating that instead 
of providing a way to extend the rights of members of non-traditional families, contract, 
as currently conceived, holds the potential of limiting rights and may also circumscribe 
the rights of members of families based on marriage.121 The courts have already been 
criticised for inadequately responding to gendered power imbalances within 
relationships. This study pointed out that the courts have also failed to consider the 
socio-economic rights implicated in family contracts, particularly for women. The 
broader socio-economic relations (between men and women) that are perpetuated or 
undermined through exploitative family contracts have also not been examined. While 
contractual mechanisms do not offer the most ideal form of regulation, the 
                                                          
118 Barratt (2015) Stel LR 129. 
119 See part 3 5 of chapter three of this study. 
120 E Bonthuys “Family Contracts” (2004) 121 SALJ 879 879. 
121 879.  
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“background legal rules” governing cohabitation within South Africa need to be further 
developed.  
An example of a specific type of contract that requires development would be the 
rules relating to a tacit universal partnership, which was developed in the case of 
Butters. While the Supreme Court of Appeal did develop this contract, its approach 
was primarily informed by common law reasoning, with no mention of the Bill of Rights. 
As argued by Bonthuys, the imperative for social and legal transformation aimed at 
advancing substantive gender equality is however, a vital part of the constitutional 
project.122 Given the gendered nature of cohabitation, consideration of the influence 
of the Bill of Rights is thus pivotal in a case like Butters. Legal development of contracts 
relating to families should take account of the gendered contexts in which these rules 
function. The socio-economic implications of these contracts should also be 
considered, in the light of the commitment to foster substantive gender equality.123 
Directing attention to the need to develop tacit universal partnerships in accordance 
with the applicant’s socio-economic rights would foster an analysis on how to develop 
these rules to give effect to the Constitution. Scrutinising family contracts is required 
in order to ensure that cohabiting parties truly have equal bargaining power, which 
requires access to sufficient socio-economic resources. 
The rules relating to the evidentiary burden of proving the existence of a tacit 
universal partnership, should be developed to ease the burden on caregivers. For 
example, a caregiver who is facing eviction should only need to make out a prima facie 
case that a tacit universal partnership exists. The onus then shifts to the respondent 
seeking to infringe upon their partner’s socio-economic rights, to prove that there is no 
contract.  
When deciding upon the extent of redistribution that is required, the court should 
consider the right of access to adequate housing for vulnerable family members. 
Access to health care services, food, water and social security should also be 
considered. Given that the applicant in Butters had undertaken the caring work in the 
relationship, building up the family home and caring for her partner’s children from 
another relationship, her right of access to adequate housing could have played a role 
in determining who should get what portion of the family home. A relational feminist 
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interpretation of the socio-economic rights of female cohabitants requires the court to 
consider the values of autonomy, dignity and equality as it pertains to the socio-
economic consequences of terminated domestic partnerships. The courts need to 
examine the kinds of relations that would best give effect to these values. Failing to 
recognise the sacrifice that went into the relationship would ultimately undermine the 
dignity of the applicant. It would also give effect to a negative conception of autonomy, 
while exacerbating gender inequality. The final transformative step underlying 
relational feminism requires redistributive and transformative interpretations of socio-
economic rights that structure more constructive relations between cohabiting men 
and women. 
In Butters, the court could have redistributed the family property on a more equitable 
basis, so as to give effect to the socio-economic rights of the applicant. At the very 
least, raising socio-economic rights within cohabitation cases would emphasise the 
need to further infuse the private law sphere with human rights norms. Analysing these 
rights and the values they protect is necessary to ensure that the normative influence 
of the Bill of Rights is felt “throughout the common law”.124 
While the courts have yet to develop a coherent jurisprudence on how to develop 
the common law when it is deficient, they have at times proactively developed this 
area of law so as to extend obligations of support. For example, in Petersen v 
Maintenance Officer, Simon's Town Maintenance Court (“Peterson”),125 the Cape High 
Court declared that the common-law rule excluding paternal grandparents from the 
obligation to support extra-marital children is unconstitutional for infringing upon the 
child’s right to dignity, as well as the best interests of the child. While the court did not 
analyse the socio-economic rights of the children within this case, this case illustrates 
the potential to transform the common law to provide better protection to the material 
needs of vulnerable family members. 
Developing the area of contract law does not mean that the sanctity of contract 
should be completely disregarded. The area of contract law should however, be 
evaluated in terms of a relational feminist interpretation of the socio-economic rights 
of family members. For example, deciding whether to give effect to a family contract 
should be balanced with the need to protect the socio-economic rights of vulnerable 
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family members. A court should also consider whether the contract is structuring 
exploitative relations or if it is structuring relations based on substantive gender 
equality.126 A relational feminist interpretation of socio-economic rights in the context 
of family contracts also requires courts to differentiate between familial contracts and 
commercial contracts between strangers who are competing with one another.127 
When interpreting family contracts, the courts need to exercise a measure of “judicial 
realism”.128 The principles of public policy and fairness need to be informed by the 
normative framework underlying our Constitution, including the commitment to 
progressively realise the socio-economic rights. This is also necessary due to the fact 
that public regulation of these contractual relationships is absent. In this regard section 
39(2) of the Constitution specifically requires the courts to align their application of the 
“normal” rules of contract law with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.129  
 
5 5 2 4 Developing a new constitutional remedy 
 
Another potential strategy that a court could adopt is to rely directly on a specific 
constitutional right to craft a new constitutional remedy. This is in contrast to attempting 
to “manipulate”130 the common law rules to give effect to the Constitution. There is 
nothing in the Constitution that excludes the courts from doing so. This direct approach 
may also be more conducive to fostering the transformative aspirations underlying our 
Constitution. An example of this kind of remedy is the reward of constitutional 
damages which was granted by the Constitutional Court in the case of President of 
the RSA v Modderklip Boerdery,131 as well as the case of Tswelopele Non-Profit 
Organisation and Others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.132  
While direct application of the Constitution provides an attractive solution, it has 
been argued that leaving the common law “as is” can be problematic.133 The common 
law does furthermore, require development if it is to give effect to the transformative 
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ethos of our Constitution.134 The courts have not provided a coherent framework of 
factors to determine whether the Constitution should be applied indirectly or whether 
a new constitutional remedy should be developed,135 making this remedy potentially 
difficult to utilise. 
Even if a court decides to directly apply the Bill of Rights, the methodology followed 
under the subsidiarity principles illustrate that where there is a legislative and common 
law lacunae, the common law should be developed to provide a new constitutionally-
inspired remedy. The court could for instance, interpret the right to have access to 
adequate housing so as to redistribute a portion of the family property to the vulnerable 
family member. In Butters136 the Court did redistribute the family property (to a certain 
extent) through the use of the universal partnership. There does however, need to be 
more of a shift in terms of the burden of proof associated with these contracts, as well 
as the infusion of a constitutional perspective.  
It is clear that the rules governing cohabitation can and should be developed to give 
effect to the socio-economic rights of female cohabitants. While the development of 
principles to guide the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights is necessary, it is not 
only the interpretive approach of the courts that requires development. These doctrinal 
developments need to be coupled with institutional changes to the judiciary. There is 
therefore, the need to further transform the composition and nature of the South 
African judiciary so as to better represent the diversity prevalent in our society. 
Specialised training of judicial officers regarding gender inequality in our society is 
particularly required if we are to foster more gender-sensitive approaches to family law 
issues. As further emphasised by Bonthuys:  
 
“In a constitutional context which demands gender equality, all judges should as a matter 
of course commit themselves to furthering substantive equality on the basis of gender… 
[F]ailure to do so could be regarded as a failure to apply the law of the country fully and 
correctly. The gendered elements of a case dealing with tax, company law or contract may 
be less obvious, while family law concerns itself with the roles, duties and rights of 
husbands and wives, of mothers and fathers… [F]or this reason I believe that all family law 
cases should be approached in a manner that is mindful of their potential for reinforcing 
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pervasive social and legal structures of gender inequality and that is committed to 
countering sexist stereotypes.”137  
 
A relational feminist interpretation of the socio-economic rights of female 
cohabitants is best suited to promoting a transformative jurisprudence on the rights of 
female cohabitants. It is therefore necessary to infuse family law cases with a relational 
feminist lens, focusing on the socio-economic rights of female cohabitants.   
5 5 3 Summary of the judicial interventions required 
 
The above discussion underscored the lack of a gender-sensitive approach to 
family law issues in South Africa. There is therefore the need to further infuse this area 
of law with a constitutional perspective committed to substantive gender equality and 
justiciable socio-economic rights. A relational feminist interpretation of the socio-
economic rights of female cohabitants is particularly conducive to developing the 
family law regime so as to structure more equitable relations between cohabitants.  
In order to catalyse this change, the South African jurisprudence does however, 
need to be further engendered. The interpretive approach adopted by the lower courts 
should also be informed by a relational feminist framework. This relational feminist 
lens is particularly necessary when interpreting and developing rules governing the 
socio-economic consequences of terminated domestic partnerships. While the courts 
can utilise the Bill of Rights both directly and indirectly, the above analysis reveals that 
existing legislation and common law rules are the primary tools for giving effect to the 
horizontal application of socio-economic rights.138 Specific legislation, such as the 
MSSA could be interpreted so as to apply to cohabitants. The legislature should also 
however, be compelled to amend and enact the Domestic Partnerships Bill.  
The common law also requires further development. This is due to the fact that the 
current legislative framework fails to provide for the socio-economic rights of 
cohabitants, while being informed by a private law lens. The common law definition of 
marriage could be extended so as to include a more functional conception of family 
relationships. Another option is infusing the common law rules relating to a tacit 
universal partnership with the values and purposes underlying the socio-economic 
rights. The common law principles of “boni mores” and public policy underlying family 
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contracts should furthermore, be informed by the Constitution’s normative value 
system, which includes a commitment to progressively realising the socio-economic 
rights, while fostering substantive gender equality. 
If the most effective and expeditious form of relief can only be offered through the 
direct application of the specific constitutional rights, then the court should rely on a 
socio-economic right to provide a constitutional remedy to a cohabitant. For example, 
a court may order a more equitable distribution of the family home between the 
partners. However, the courts have not yet provided a coherent framework of 
considerations to guide when a direct remedy would be most appropriate. While direct 
access to quality public services needs to be improved, this needs to be coupled with 
the development of private law so as to foster a more equitable distribution of socio-
economic responsibilities between cohabiting men and women.  
5 6 Implications of a relational feminist framework for transforming the socio-
economic consequences of cohabitation  
 
The purpose of South African family law is to protect vulnerable family members 
and to ensure fairness between the relevant parties within family law disputes.139 In 
spite of this, the current legal framework governing cohabitation is reinforcing systemic 
patterns of gender inequality within our society. 
This study revealed that the negative conception of autonomy underlying classic 
liberalism provides an inadequate framework for responding to the specific socio-
economic rights of female cohabitants. The first significant shift that is required by the 
state is the reconceptualisation of the liberal elements shaping our response to 
cohabitation. A relational feminist framework has the potential to foster this shift, while 
being particularly consonant with the transformative aspirations underlying our 
Constitution. In accordance with transformative constitutionalism, a relational feminist 
interpretation of the socio-economic rights of female cohabitants, emphasises the 
need for greater recognition of the existing relational social context, a value-sensitive 
approach to the socio-economic rights of cohabitants and the need to develop the 
state’s positive responsibility to regulate cohabitation in a manner that transforms 
gendered socio-economic inequality. 
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This relational feminist framework reveals that the answer to governing cohabitation 
does not lie in simply extending a formalised model of the private law rights underlying 
marriage to cohabitants. Instead the law needs to respond to the specific needs of 
cohabitants in a manner that challenges the patriarchal and hierarchal paradigms 
informing our family law framework. This hierarchical paradigm is evinced by the fact 
that the legislative system governing our family law regime is extremely fragmented,140 
with vulnerable family members continuing to fall through the gaps. The dominance of 
a liberal common law lens is further evinced by the provisions of the draft Domestic 
Partnerships Bill, which primarily focuses on protecting registered domestic 
partnerships. 
In spite of the socio-economic disadvantage perpetuated by family law rules, none 
of the family law cases have considered that a specific family law provision deprives 
women of their ability to access socio-economic rights such as housing and social 
security. This infringement occurs either through preventing them from inheriting land 
or housing or through preventing them from being able to claim maintenance.141 
Raising relational socio-economic rights arguments within these cases is, therefore, 
more likely to induce a substantial shift within our family law regime. For example, 
focusing on the socio-economic needs of cohabitants opens up a different range of 
social and material facts for the court to consider. Examining how to foster more 
equitable socio-economic relations between cohabitants also undermines moral 
debates about which relationship form is more deserving of protection 
Sections 8 and 39 of the Constitution have significant potential to advance socio-
economic rights arguments within the private sphere. Cases that raise socio-economic 
rights arguments have the additional potential to compel the legislature to enact 
legislation so as to effectively govern the status of cohabitants. While this would 
contribute to legal certainty, in order to ensure that this legislation truly enriches the 
family law framework, it will need to challenge some of the underlying gendered norms 
informing the family unit. It is therefore imperative that the courts and the legislature 
engage with section 8 of the Constitution, as well as the socio-economic rights of 
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cohabitants in a manner that ensures a more equitable distribution of socio-economic 
resources within families.  
A relational feminist interpretation of the socio-economic rights of cohabitants 
requires the courts to consider the kinds of relations we are structuring and the kind of 
relations more likely to reflect the constitutional values. How these rights would be 
raised within particular cases is a strategic choice that will depend on the facts of the 
case. However, raising these rights would at the very least reveal the gendered 
distributional consequences of family law rules. These arguments underscore that the 
law’s current failure to regulate cohabitation is entrenching the unequal status quo.  
A fundamental shift is thus required, from the classical liberal conception of 
autonomy informing our regulation of cohabitation, to a relational feminist conception 
of socio-economic rights for female cohabitants.142 A relational feminist interpretation 
of the socio-economic rights of cohabitants therefore enables the executive, the 
legislature and the judiciary to transform the law to be more responsive to the specific 
needs and experiences of cohabiting women
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Chapter 6:  Conclusion  
 
6 1  Introduction   
 
    In South Africa, women continue to disproportionately bear the socio-economic 
burdens of divorce and family dissolution.1 This study sought to examine the 
implications of a relational feminist interpretation of socio-economic rights, to transform 
the socio-economic consequences of terminated domestic partnerships for women. 
The need for this development is underscored by the fact that, in spite of certain 
progressive developments in recent years, social and economic equality remains an 
elusive aspiration for many women.2 In particular, research has revealed the persistent 
prevalence of gender inequality in intimate relationships, often resulting in substantial 
socio-economic disadvantage for women.3 While all relationships need to be 
regulated, cohabiting women remain particularly vulnerable to destitution. Given the 
constitutive power of the family unit, transforming the socio-economic consequences 
of family dissolution is necessary in order to give effect to the socio-economic rights 
of women.  
During the course of this study, it became clear that certain features of our legal 
system constrain the transformative potential of the Constitution to respond to the 
specific needs of female cohabitants.4 This is evinced by the liberal conception of 
choice, as well as the traditional conception of a public/private law divide and 
individualism. 
   As a result of these limiting paradigms, the status of cohabitants continues to be 
regulated through a patchwork of private law rules that fail to recognise and regulate 
existing relational dynamics between cohabiting men and women. A private law lens, 
in particular, often ignores the existing social context, while maintaining the unequal 
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status quo.5 This approach has perpetuated the disconnection between the law and 
the lived realities of cohabiting women. 
    After highlighting the particular vulnerability of cohabitants, and the manner in which 
the current legal framework exacerbates this disadvantage, this dissertation examined 
how these rules could be transformed so as to be more responsive to the needs and 
circumstances of female cohabitants. This undertaking should be informed by the 
constitutional project of seeking to foster social justice6 and substantive gender 
equality.7  
Using the normative relational feminist framework developed in chapter two and the 
lessons gained from Canadian and Dutch family law, it became clear that the 
executive, the legislature and the judiciary can and must take steps to develop this 
area of law so as to bridge the disconnection between the family law regime and 
women’s lived realities. The purpose of this concluding chapter is to highlight some of 
the important recommendations and reflections as to the nature of the positive steps 
that are required in terms of developing the private law rules regulating cohabitation 
to give effect to the Constitution’s progressive values and human rights norms. 
 
6 2  Synthesis of study’s recommendations 
  
  In this section I summarise some of the emerging conclusions and 
recommendations that arose from the various chapters in this dissertation. One of the 
preliminary conclusions of this study is that classic legal liberalism provides an 
ineffective framework for recognising and responding to the specific socio-economic 
needs of cohabiting women. This indicates the need for a transition towards a 
relational feminist framework for regulating the socio-economic consequences of 
terminated domestic partnerships. 
 
6 2 1 Value of a relational feminist framework  
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 The South African Constitution has been recognised for its transformative potential. 
Realising the socio-economic rights and empowering women lies at the heart of this 
transformative endeavour. In order to foster the transformative aspirations underlying 
our Constitution, there is a need for a shift in terms of our mode of thinking about 
cohabitation. The need for transformation is emphasised by the fact that the current 
liberal choice argument, underlying our family law system, obscures the relational 
complicity prevalent in poverty and gender inequality. A liberal conception of choice 
also silences feminist voices in a particularly gendered area of law. This traditional 
liberal framework fails to address the full panoply of applicable legal, social and 
material issues that need to be considered in determining how to regulate cohabitation. 
Moreover, these liberal underpinnings prevent the courts from engaging with the 
values and purposes underlying the socio-economic rights, through maintaining a 
formal equality approach to relationship recognition. While the right to equality has the 
potential to be transformative, liberal interpretations of this right, in the context of family 
law, have tended to conflate equality and human dignity considerations, while failing 
to recognise and address the existing relational context governing cohabitation.8 In 
order to transform existing gender inequality, the current liberal approach needs to be 
replaced with a relational feminist interpretation of the socio-economic rights of 
cohabitants. 
 Accordingly, this study revealed that a relational feminist interpretation of the socio-
economic rights of female cohabitants has significant potential to transform the socio-
economic consequences of terminated partnerships so as to empower female 
cohabitants. A relational feminist lens, with its focus on the social context in terms of 
how men and women are relating to one another in our society, a value-sensitive 
conception of rights, a relational notion of the state’s responsibility and the need to 
transform gendered relations, is necessary to shift private cohabiting relations. A 
relational feminist interpretation of socio-economic rights, can foster this 
transformation, as it recognises the nuances surrounding choice, while being 
responsive to the socio-economic rights of women. Utilising a relational feminist 
framework to examine how existing rules are structuring socio-economic relations 
between cohabitants also indicates potential avenues for developing the law so as to 
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structure more equitable socio-economic relations between cohabiting men and 
women.   
6 2 2 Need to transform the South African legal framework 
 
 As highlighted in chapter three, the South African family law framework is both 
fragmented and hierarchical. It is also insufficiently responsive to women’s specific 
needs, with women disproportionately bearing the socio-economic disadvantages of 
divorce and family dissolution. In addition, the piecemeal approach adopted by the 
legislature towards recognising relationships, results in a number of vulnerable 
women, falling through the gaps of our legal system.9 While all family forms need to 
be protected, it is clear that cohabiting women remain disproportionately vulnerable to 
homelessness and destitution.10  
A further problem with this system is that it continues to be regulated through a 
private law lens, predominantly informed by pre-constitutional common law reasoning 
that lacks a constitutional and feminist perspective.11 An example of this is provided 
by recent developments on the tacit universal partnership, as it pertains to cohabitants. 
These developments were catalysed by the Supreme Court of Appeal. While the 
recognition of universal partnerships between cohabitants entails a positive 
development, the court’s use of a contractual paradigm tends to hide existing patterns 
of gender inequality prevalent in our society.12 A contractual lens also allows the courts 
to ignore the dysfunctional patterns of relating between cohabiting men and women. 
The tendency of the courts to avoid engaging with constitutional issues in family law 
also undermines the further development of family law rules in accordance with the 
Constitution. In contrast to this, a commitment to fostering substantive gender equality 
requires examining the gendered socio-economic disadvantages of family dissolution. 
This gender-sensitive response is necessitated by the entrenched socio-economic 
inequalities tied to women’s reproductive role and the “deeply gendered opportunities 
and burdens” that emanate from this.13 As the Constitution is committed to establishing 
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a society where everyone is able to reach their full human potential, it is essential to 
recognise these inequalities and to utilise the law to transform them.  
The answer to this gendered issue does not however, lie in simply extending a 
formalised model of marriage to domestic partners. While domestic partnerships need 
to be recognised and regulated,14 this recognition needs to be informed by a relational 
feminist interpretation of the socio-economic rights of female cohabitants. The legal 
response to cohabitation should thus shift from a moralistic private law debate towards 
a relational feminist framework focused on giving effect to the socio-economic rights 
of female cohabitants.  
In terms of this relational feminist shift, the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (PEPUDA) offers significant potential in assisting 
female cohabitants. While this is in terms of unfair discrimination, there is scope for 
challenging the private exploitative and discriminatory behaviour of cohabiting 
partners under PEPUDA. This is in terms of the grounds of gender, marital status and 
(potentially) family responsibility and socio-economic status under PEPDUA. This Act 
also provides for a broad range of remedies, with the Equality Courts empowered to 
provide settlement agreements, restraining orders and damages. Utilising PEPUDA 
would therefore shift the focus from the traditional private law remedies to a broader 
range of remedies based on the constitutional goal of fostering substantive gender 
equality. 
6 2 3 Value of a comparative study 
 
In terms of foreign law developments, there have been certain progressive 
advances pertaining to the protection of cohabitants, in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands and Australia. Canada has however, been heralded for 
going further in terms of providing protection to unmarried cohabitants. Under 
Canadian family law, there have also been substantial developments that have 
adopted an inclusive and functional approach to family law.15 In terms of the functional 
comparative approach, Canadian provinces have extended protection to cohabitants, 
either through the ascription model or the registration model (with some provinces 
using a combination of both measures). In spite of these developments, Canadian 
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women and children continue to bear the socio-economic burdens of family dissolution 
disproportionately. This has been partially attributed to the rise in neoliberalism, an 
increased reliance upon liberal conceptions of choice and debates concerning public 
versus private responsibility for the socio-economic well-being of families.16  
Dutch family law has also been recognised for being both progressive and trend-
setting. While Dutch law has recognised registered domestic partnerships since 1998, 
there is no formal recognition of unregistered relationships. In addition to this, 
inequality between Dutch men and women persists. While the number of Dutch 
women in the labour market has steadily increased in recent decades, there is still a 
socio-economic imbalance between divorced and separated Dutch men and women. 
A comparative perspective on the Dutch system highlights that in order to transform 
gendered relations, gendered socio-economic inequalities in the private sphere, need 
to be recognised and addressed from a relational feminist perspective. 
The comparative analysis in this study revealed that simply extending legislative 
recognition to cohabitants without adopting a relational and gender-sensitive approach 
to cohabitation will not be sufficient to transform underlying patterns of gender 
inequality in our society. As a result of the marginalisation of feminist voices within 
Canadian and Dutch family law, the Canadian and Dutch courts have also tended to 
adopt a formalistic approach to equality. The limitations of an equality framework, as 
evinced by Canadian jurisprudence, further underscores the significant and 
unexplored potential of adopting a relational feminist interpretation of the socio-
economic rights of female cohabitants, to address gender inequality in intimate 
relationships. Within the formal equality framework, the limiting paradigms underlying 
traditional marriages have been extended to Canadian cohabitants, as well as Dutch 
registered partnerships while offering them less protection than married couples.  
In spite of the formal equality approach underlying Canadian legislation, there have 
been certain progressive family law judgments that have recognised the link between 
gendered disadvantage and the detrimental socio-economic consequences of family 
dissolution. The value of these gender-sensitive judgments was emphasised in the 
significant legislative developments that followed these decisions. The retrogressive 
trends within Canadian law, characterised by the rise in neoliberalism and the 
                                                          
16 S B Boyd & CFL Young “Feminism, Law and Public Policy: Family Feuds and Taxing Times” 
(2004) 42 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 545 556. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
246 
 
marginalisation of feminist voices within family law, however, also serve as warnings 
for South Africa. This is in terms of the dangers of adopting a liberal approach to 
interpreting the rights of cohabitants, as well as the danger of marginalising feminist 
voices within a particularly gendered area of law. The express inclusion of justiciable 
socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution further emphasises the 
obligation on the South African government to progressively realise the socio-
economic rights of female cohabitants. 
6 2 4 Positive developments required 
 
This study ultimately revealed that the state has the power to address and transform 
the negative consequences of terminated domestic partnerships for women. In order 
to do so, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary collectively need to undertake 
a range of positive policy, legislative and jurisprudential steps in order to empower 
cohabiting women.  
The executive and the legislature have a particular responsibility in this regard, in 
that state-provided public services need to be improved, in a manner that is responsive 
to the specific needs and experiences of women. This includes improving access to 
existing services thought removing gendered barriers, while improving the quality of 
services. Coupled with adopting targeted socio-economic programmes, is the need for 
a comprehensive legislative framework regulating the status of cohabitants.  
The legislature therefore needs to amend and enact the Domestic Partnerships Bill 
in accordance with a relational feminist framework. The Bill should be amended to 
recognise the link between systemic gender inequality and the potential of socio-
economic rights to address gender inequality in intimate relationships. In addition to 
recognising and addressing the existing social context, the Bill should aim to give 
effect to a more substantive conception of autonomy, a relational understanding of 
human dignity and substantive gender equality.  
Accordingly, the Domestic Partnerships Bill should be infused with a relational 
feminist interpretation of socio-economic rights, extended to vulnerable cohabitants 
who fulfil certain basic requirements. While the ascription model has been criticised 
for undermining respect for autonomy, in a country with extreme levels of poverty and 
gender inequality, an automatic presumption of equal sharing in socio-economic 
resources, with priority given to caregiving partners, would more effectively assist the 
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most vulnerable women in our society. A presumption of equal sharing is furthermore, 
more likely to shift relations between cohabiting men and women in an egalitarian and 
dignity enhancing direction. Amendments to the language used in the Bill are also 
necessary, with reference to the socio-economic rights and the socio-economic 
consequences of terminated domestic partnerships required. 
Given that the judiciary is tasked with the duty to protect and fulfil the rights in the 
Bill of Rights, the judicial interpretation of common law rules and legislative provisions 
governing cohabitation need to be informed by the need to give effect to the socio-
economic rights of female cohabitants. Sections 8 and 39 of the Constitution have 
significant potential to serve as the primary vehicles for developing South African 
family law. While it is true that the socio-economic rights are not able to solve all of the 
problems within this area of the law, highlighting the distributional consequences of 
family law rules will assist in developing interpretations of these rights that are more 
responsive to relational power imbalances.17 Furthermore, raising these rights would 
reveal the need to develop remedies that are sourced within these specific rights, thus 
facilitating an approach that is more responsive to the specific socio-economic needs 
of cohabiting women. The courts could thus utilise sections 8 and 39 of the Constitution 
to develop the private law rules that are being utilised to regulate cohabitants in 
accordance with the Bill of Rights. In addition, the courts could develop more 
transformative remedies, such as ordering a more equitable distribution of the family 
property.  
A fundamental shift from the classical liberal notion of family law issues, to a 
relational feminist conception of family law, grounded in human rights principles, is 
thus required.18 A transformative approach will enable lawmakers and judges to pay 
additional attention to the contextual factors shaping women’s choices and their 
access to resources.19     
6 3 Concluding remarks 
 
 Given the progressive framework of rights protected in the South African 
Constitution, the state is not powerless to address the socio-economic inequality 
facing female cohabitants. For example, the constitutional instruction to “protect, 
                                                          
17 M Pieterse “Relational Socio-Economic Rights” (2009) 25 SAJHR 198 198. 
18 Bhana (2015) Stell LR 3. 
19 Bhana (2015) Stell LR 3. 
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promote and fulfil” the rights in the Bill of Rights,20 specifically empowers the state to 
proactively address this issue. The Constitution is also the supreme law of the 
Republic, with all areas of law subject to its provisions.21  
 In accordance with this study, a transformative approach to cohabitation needs to 
illustrate an understanding of cohabiting women’s socio-economic disadvantage, 
while seeking to dismantle the systemic inequalities emanating from family roles.22 
Social and economic transformation is accordingly possible through innovative 
interpretations of socio-economic rights between cohabitants, as informed by a 
relational feminist framework. In this manner, family law legislation and common law 
rules could be interpreted to enhance women’s feasible options. Innovative remedies 
based upon the socio-economic rights of cohabitant could also be crafted to ensure a 
more equitable distribution of the socio-economic consequences of family dissolution 
between men and women.  
 A context-sensitive approach which seeks to reflect the constitutional values would 
also shape a more responsive and transformative family law framework. A relational 
feminist interpretation of socio-economic rights can therefore be utilised to structure 
more egalitarian family relations, while dislodging many of the underlying norms and 
paradigms that exacerbate inequality.23 A relational feminist interpretation of the socio-
economic rights of female cohabitants is thus more likely to give effect to one of the 
key messages underlying our Constitution, which is the need to eradicate all forms of 
gender inequality in our society.24  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20 S 7 of the Constitution. 
21 S 8 of the Constitution. 
22 C Albertyn “Substantive Equality and Transformation in South Africa” (2007) 23 SAJHR 253 
253.   
23 Bhana (2015) Stell LR 3. 
24 See Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 4 SA 197 (CC); 1996 6 BCLR 752 (CC) para 44. C Albertyn 
“Gendered Transformation in South African Jurisprudence: Poor Women and the 
Constitutional Court” (2012) 22 Stell LR 591 600; L Chenwi & K McLean “A Woman’s Home 
is her Castle? - Poor Women and Housing Inadequacy in South Africa” in B Goldblatt & K 
McLean (eds) Women’s Social and Economic Rights (2011) 105 110. 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
249 
 
Bibliography 
 
Books 
Baines B, Barak-Erez B & Kahana T (eds) Feminist Constitutionalism: Global 
Perspectives 1st ed (2012) United States of America: Cambridge University Press  
Boyd S B (ed) Challenging the Public/Private Law Divide: Feminism, Law and Public 
Policy (1997) London: Toronto Press Incorporated 
Brand D & Heyns CH (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa (2005) Pretoria: 
Pretoria University Law Press 
Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2008) Cape Town: Juta & Co   
Dugard J “Sources of International Law” in Dugard J International Law: A South African 
perspective 3 ed (2007) Cape Town: Juta & Co 
Gouws A (ed) (Un)thinking Citizenship: Feminist Debates in Contemporary South 
Africa (2005) Lansdowne: University of Cape Town Press 
Goldblatt B & McLean K (eds) Women’s Social and Economic Rights (2010) Cape 
Town: Juta & Co 
Gilligan C In a Different Voice (1992) United States: Harvard University Press 
Hahlo HR The South African Law of Husband and Wife 2 ed (1963) Cape Town: Juta 
& Co 
Heaton J (ed) The Law of Divorce and Dissolution of Life Partnerships in South Africa 
(2014) Cape Town: Juta & Co 
Koggle CM Perspectives on Equality: Constructing a Relational Theory (1998) United 
States: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 
Kristof N & Wudunn S Half the Sky: How to Change the World (2010) Great Britain: 
Virago Press 
Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative 
Constitution (2010) Cape Town: Juta & Co 
Mak C Fundamental Rights in European Contract Law: A Comparison of the Impact 
of Fundamental Rights on Contractual Relationships in Germany, the Netherlands, 
Italy and England (2008) The Netherlands: Wolters kluwer  
Meyersfeld B Domestic Violence and International Law (2010) Oregon: Hart 
Publishing 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
250 
 
Nedelsky J Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (2011) 
New York: Oxford University Press 
Noddings N Women and Evil (1989) United States: University of California Press 
Sen A Inequality Re-examined (1992) United States of America: Harvard University 
Press 
Sutherland E (ed) The Future of Child and Family law: International Predictions (2012) 
United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press 
Tushnet M Advanced Introduction to Comparative Constitutional Law (2014) UK: 
Edward Elgar Publishing  
Van der Walt AJ Property and Constitution (2012) Pretoria: Pretoria University Law 
Press 
Weintraub J & Kumar K (eds) Public and Private in Thought and Practice (1997) 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 
 
Chapters in books 
Albertyn C “Feminism and the Law” in Roederer C & Moellendorf D (eds) 
Jurisprudence (2004) Cape Town: Juta & Co 291-327 
Albertyn C “Judicial Diversity” in C Hoexter & M Olivier (eds) The Judiciary in South 
Africa (2014) Cape Town: Juta & Co 245-287 
Albertyn C & Goldblatt B “Equality in the Final Constitution”  in Woolman S, Roux T & 
Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 edition (Original Service June 
2008) Cape Town: Juta & Co chapter 35-1 
Andreß, HJ & Hummelsheim D “Introduction” in Andreß HJ & Hummelsheiem D (eds) 
When Marriage Ends: Economic and Social Consequences of Partnership Dissolution 
(2009) United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing 1- 5 
Artz L & Smyth D “Introduction: Should We Consent?” in Artz L & Smyth D (eds) 
Should We Consent? Rape Law Reform in South Africa (2008) Cape Town: Juta & Co 
1-21 
Boele-Woelki K & Braat B “Autonomy in the Netherlands” in J M Scherpe (ed) Marital 
Agreements & Private Autonomy in Comparative Perspective (2012) Oxford & 
Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing 229-255 
Bonthuys E “Gender and Work” in E Bonthuys & C Albertyn (eds) Gender, Law and 
Justice (2007) Cape Town: Juta & Co 244-294 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
251 
 
Boyd S B & Baldassi C “Marriage or Naught/ Marriage and Unmarried Cohabitation in 
Canada” in Bottomly A & Wong S (eds) Changing Contours of Domestic Life, Family 
and Law: Caring and Sharing (2009) Oregon: Hart Publishing 111-130 
Brand D “What are Socio-Economic Rights For?”’ in Botha H, van der Walt A & van 
der Walt J (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 
Stellenbosch: African Sun Media 33-56 
Chenwi L & McLean K “A Woman’s Home is her Castle? - Poor Women and Housing 
Inadequacy in South Africa” in B Goldblatt & K McLean (eds) Women’s Social and 
Economic Rights (2011) Cape Town: Juta & Co 105-127 
Chirwa DM & Khosa S “Towards Enhanced Citizenship and Poverty Eradication: A 
Critique of Grootboom From a Gender Perspective” in Gouws A (ed) (Un)thinking 
Citizenship: Feminist Debates in Contemporary South Africa (2005) Lansdowne: 
University of Cape Town Press 137-156 
Clark B & Goldblatt B “Gender and Family Law” in E Bonthuys & C Albertyn (eds) 
Gender, Law and Justice (2007) Cape Town: Juta & Co 195-243 
Davis D “Developing the Common Law of Contract in Light of the Light of Poverty and 
Illiteracy: The Challenges of the Constitution” in S Liebenberg & G Quinot (eds) Law 
and Poverty: Perspectives from South Africa and Beyond (2012) Cape Town, Juta & 
Co 403-417 
De Vos P “Still Out in the Cold? The Domestic Partnership Bill and the (Non)Protection 
of Marginalised Women” in Sloth-Neilson J & Du Toit Z (eds) Trials and Tribulations, 
Trends and Triumphs, Developments in International, African and South African Child 
and Family Law (2008) Cape Town, Juta & Co 129-142 
Eiselen S & Pienaar G Unjustified Enrichment: A Casebook (2008) Durban: LexisNexis 
1-10 
Fraser N “From Redistribution to Recognition: Dilemmas of Justice in a “Postsocialist” 
Age?” in Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the Post-Socialist Condition (1997) 
New York: Routledge 11-6 
Goldblatt B “Citizenship and the Right to Child Care” in A Gouws (ed) (Un)thinking 
Citizenship: Feminist Debates in Contemporary South Africa (2005) Lansdowne: 
University of Cape Town Press 117-156   
Jackman M & Porter B “Socio-Economic Rights Under the Canadian Charter” in M 
Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and 
Comparative Law (2008) New York: Cambridge University Press, 209-229 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
252 
 
Jackson V C “Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodologies” in Rosenfeld M & Sajo 
A (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (2012) United 
Kingdom, Oxford University Press, 54-74 
Liebenberg S “Socio-Economic Rights beyond the Public/Private Divide” in Langford 
M, Dugard J & Madlingozi T (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: Symbols or 
Substance? (2014) Cape Town: Juta & Co 63-91 
Moosa N “The Dissolution of a Muslim Marriage by Divorce” in J Heaton (ed) The Law 
of Divorce and Dissolution of Life Partnerships in South Africa (2014) Cape Town: Juta 
& Co 279- 354 
Nussbaum M “Introduction: Feminism and International Law” in Women and Human 
Development: The Capabilities Approach (2000) United States of America: Cambridge 
University Press 1-33 
Oomen B “Giving Effect to Social Rights” in Oomen B Rights for Others: The Slow 
Home-Coming of Human Rights in the Netherlands (2013) UK: Cambridge University 
Press 146-165 
Porel D & Devey R “The Demographics of Fatherhood in South Africa: An Analysis of 
Selected Data 1993-2002” in L Richter & R Morrel Baba (eds): Men and Fatherhood 
in South Africa (2006) Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council 38-49 
Porter B & Jackman M “Introduction: Advancing Social Rights in Canada” in Porter B 
& Jackman M (eds) Advancing Social Rights in Canada (2014) Toronto: Irwin Law 1-
29 
Rogerson C “Canada: A Bold and Progressive Past but an Unclear Future” in E 
Sutherland (ed) The Future of Child and Family law: International Predictions” (2012) 
New York: Cambridge University Press 77-111 
Scherpe J M “Introduction to European Family Law Volume iii: Family Law in a 
European Perspective” in European Family Law Volume iii: Family Law in a European 
Perspective (2015) UK: Edward Elgar Publishing 1-2 
Shue H “The Interdependence of Duties” in P Alston & K Tomasevski (eds) The Right 
to Food (1984) The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 83-110 
Smith B “The Dissolution of a Life or Domestic Partnership” in J Heaton (ed) The Law 
of Divorce and Dissolution of Life Partnerships in South Africa (2014) Cape Town: Juta 
& Co 387-474 
Sonnekus JC The Law of Estoppel in South Africa 2 (2000) Cape Town: LexisNexis 
1-48 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
253 
 
Sonnekus JC “The Personal Consequences of Divorce” in J Heaton (ed) The Law of 
Divorce and Dissolution of Life of Partnerships in South Africa (2014) Cape Town : 
Juta & Co 33-50 
Sumner I & Warendorf H “Marriage” in Family Law Legislation of the Netherlands: A 
Translation including Book 1 of the Dutch Civil Code, Procedural and Transitional 
Provisions and Private International Law Legislation (2003) New York: Antwerp 
Van der Merwe Stoop T Historical Foundations of South African Private Law (2000) 3-
12 
 
Journal articles 
Albertyn C & Goldblatt B “Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the 
Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality” (1998) 14 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 248-276  
Alberyn C “Using Rights and the Law to Reduce Women’s Vulnerability to HIV/AIDS” 
(2001) 5 Law, Democracy & Development 179-194 
Albertyn C “Contesting Democracy: HIV/AIDS and the Achievement of Gender 
Equality in South Africa” (2003) 29 Feminist Studies 595-615 
Albertyn C “Substantive Equality and Transformation in South Africa” (2007) 23 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 253-276  
Albertyn C “The Stubborn Persistence of Patriarchy?” Gender Equality and Cultural 
Diversity in South Africa’ (2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review 165-208 
Albertyn C “Gendered Transformation in South African Jurisprudence: Poor Women 
and the Constitutional Court” (2012) 22 Stellenbosch Law Review 591-613 
Albertyn C “Religion, Custom and Gender: Marital law Reform in South Africa” (2013) 
9 International Journal of Law in Context 386-410 
Alstott A “Private Tragedies? Family Law as Social Insurance” (2009) 64 Harvard Law 
and Policy Review 1-29 
Bailey M “Regulation of Cohabitation and Marriage in Canada” (2004) 26 Law and 
Policy 153-175 
Bakht N “A v B and Attorney General of Quebec (Eric v Lola): The Implications for 
Cohabiting Couples outside Quebec” (2014) Working Paper Series 262-277 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
254 
 
Bakker P “Chaos in Family Law: A Model for the Recognition of Intimate Relationships 
in South Africa” (2013) 16 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/ Potchefstroomse 
Elektroniese Regsblad 116- 150 
Bala N “Alternative for Extending Spousal Status in Canada” (2000) 17 Canadian 
Journal of Family Law 169-199 
Bala N & Bromwich RJ “Context and Inclusivity in Canada’s Evolving Definition of the 
Family” (2002) 16 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 145-180 
Bannister T Equal Access to Health Care Services for Survivors of Gender-Based 
Violence (2014) 12 Equal Rights Review 62-76 
Barclay C “Substantive Equality: A Feminist Critique of the Notion of Difference in the 
Canadian and the South African Equality Test” (2001) 5 Independent Journal of 
Discrimination and the Law 167- 188 
Barlow A “Regulation of Cohabitation, Changing Family Policies and Social Attitudes: 
A Discussion of Britain within Europe” (2004) 26 Law and Policy 57-86 
Barratt A “Private Contract or Automatic Court Discretion? Current Trends in Legal 
Regulation of Permanent Life-Partnerships” (2015) 26 Stellenbosch Law Review 110-
131 
Bhana D “The Horizontal Application of the Bill of Rights: A Reconciliation of Sections 
8 and 39 of the Constitution” (2013) 29 South African Journal on Human Rights 351-
375 
Bhana D “The Development of a Basic Approach for the Constitutionalisation of Our 
Common Law of Contract” (2015) 26 Stellenbosch Law Review 1-28 
Bilchitz D & Judge M “For Whom does the Bell Toll: The Challenges and Possibilities 
of the Civil Union Act for Family Law in South Africa” (2007) South African Journal on 
Human Rights 466-499 
Bonthuys E “The South African Bill of Rights and the Development of Family Law” 
(2002) 119 South African Law journal 748- 782 
Bonthuys E & Erlank N “The Interaction between Civil and Customary Family Law 
Rules: Implications for African Women” (2004) Journal of South African Law 59-73 
Bonthuys E “Family Contracts” (2004) 121 South African Law Journal 879-901 
Bonthuys E “Race and Gender in the Civil Union Act” (2007) 23 South African Journal 
on Human Rights 526-542 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
255 
 
Bonthuys E “Realising South African Children’s Basic Socio-Economic Claims against 
Parents and the State: What Courts Can Achieve” (2008) 22 International Journal of 
Law, Policy and the Family 333-355 
Bonthuys E “Institutional Openness and Resistance to Feminist Arguments: The 
Example of the South African Constitutional Court” (2008) 20 Canadian Journal of 
Women and the Law 1-36 
Bonthuys E “The Personal and the Judicial: Sex, Gender and Impartiality” (2008) 24 
South African Journal on Human Rights 239-262 
Bonthuys E “Domestic Violence and Gendered Socio-Economic Rights: An Agenda 
for Research and Activism” (2014) 30 South African Journal on Human Rights 111-
133 
Bonthuys E “Developing the Common Law of Breach of Promise and Universal 
Partnerships: Rights to Property Sharing for all Cohabitants?”(2015) 132 South African 
Law Journal 76-99 
Bonthuys E “RH v DE: A Feminist Minority Judgment on Adultery” (2015) 31 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 379-400 
Boyd S B “Spaces and Challenges: Feminism in Legal Academia” (2011) 44 University 
of British Columbia Law Review 205-220 
Boyd S B “The Impact of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms on Canadian Family 
Law” (2000) 17 Canadian Journal of Family law 293-333 
Boyd S B & CFL Young “Feminism, Law and Public Policy: Family Feuds and Taxing 
Times” (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 545- 582 
Bradley D “Regulation of Unmarried Cohabitation in West-European Jurisdictions-
Determinations of Legal Policy” (2001) 15 International Journal of Law, Policy and the 
Family 22-50 
Brodsky G & Day S “Denial of the Means of Subsistence as an Equality Violation” 
(2005) Acta Juridica 149-170 
Brodsky G & Day S “Beyond the Social and Economic Rights Debate: Substantive 
Equality Speaks to Poverty” (2002) 14 Canadian Journal on Women and Law 185-219 
Brodsky G, Cox R, Day S & Stephenson K “Gosselin v Québec (Attorney General)” 
(2006) 18 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 189 -249 
Budlender D “Women and Poverty” (2005) 64 Agenda 30-36 
Chant S “Re-thinking the Feminisation of Poverty in regard to Aggregate Gender 
Indices (2006) 7 Journal of Human Development 201-220 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
256 
 
Chaskalson A “Human Dignity as a Foundational Value for Our Constitutional Order” 
(2000) 16 South African Journal on Human Rights 193-204 
Choudhry S “Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative 
Constitutional Interpretation” (1999) 74 Indiana Law Journal 819- 891 
Classens A & Smythe D “Marriage, Land & Custom: What’s Law Got To Do With It?” 
(2013) Acta Juridica 1-27 
Cockrell A “Can You Paradigm? - Another Perspective on the Public/Private Law 
Divide” (1993) Acta Juridica 227-245 
Coetzee Bester B & Lou A “Domestic Partners and “the Choice Argument: Quo 
Vadis?” (2014) 17 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/ Potchefstroomse 
Elektroniese Regsblad 2951-2981 
Cooper D, Moore E & Mantell JE “Renegotiating Intimate Relationships with Men: how 
HIV shapes attitudes and experiences of marriage for South African women living with 
HIV: ‘Now in my life, everything I do, looking at my health” (2013) Acta Juridica: 
Marriage, Land & Custom 218-291 
Conway H & Girard P “No Place like Home”: The Search for a Legal Framework for 
Cohabitants and the Family Home in Canada and Britain” (2005) 30 Queen’s Law 
Journal 715-771 
Copelon R “Recognising the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as 
Torture” (1994) 25 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 291-353  
Currin E & Bonthuys E “Customary Law and Domestic Violence in Rural South African 
Communities” (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 607-636  
Davis D & Klare K “Transformative Constitutionalism and the Common and Customary 
Law” (2010) 26 South African Journal on Human Rights 403- 509 
De Villiers C “Daniels v Campbell NO: The Long Battle of a Woman Married according 
to Muslim Personal Rights to acquire Ownership of her Home” (2003) 4 Economic and 
Social Rights Review 1 -10 
De Vos P “Grootboom, the Right of Access to Housing and Substantive Equality as 
Contextual Fairness” (2001) 17 South African Journal on Human Rights 258-276 
De Vos P “Same-sex Sexual Desire and the Re-imagining of the South African Family” 
(2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 179–206 
De Vos P & Jacobs B “Same-sex Marriage, Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships 
in South Africa: Critical Reflections on an On-going Saga” (2007) 124 South African 
Law Journal 795-826 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
257 
 
De Jong M “The need for New Legislation and/or Divorce Mediation to Counter Some 
Commonly Experienced Problems with the Division of Assets upon Divorce” (2012) 2 
Stellenbosch Law Review 225-240 
Ellman I “Marital Roles and Declining Marriage Rates” (2008) 41 Family Law Quaterly 
455-465 
Eskridge WN “Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus, Default 
Rules, and Override Rules” (2012) 100 Georgetown Law Journal 1881-1930 
Finnie R “Women, Men, and the Economic Consequences of Divorce: Evidence from 
the Canadian Longitudinal Data” (1993) 30 Canadian Review of Sociology and 
Anthropology 205-236 
Flood J “Share the Wealth? Kerr v Baranow and the ‘Joint Family Venture’” (2011) 27 
Canadian Journal of Family Law 361-389 
Fredman S “Redistribution and Recognition: Reconciling Inequalities” (2007) 23 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 214-234 
Fredman S “Engendering Socio-Economic Rights” (2009) 25 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 410- 44 
Fudge J “Substantive Equality, the Supreme Court of Canada and the limits to 
Redistribution” (2007) 23 South African Journal on Human Rights 235-252 
Gavigan S & Chunn D “From Mother’s Allowance to Mother’s Need Not Apply: 
Canadian Welfare Law as Liberal and Neo-Liberal Reforms (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal 733- 771 
Gavigan S “Something Old, Something New? Re-Theorizing Patriarchal Relations and 
Privatization from the Outskirts of Family Law” (2012) 12 Theoretical Inquiries into Law 
271-301Goldblatt B “Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission 
for Gender Equality Intervening) 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA)” (2000) 16 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 138-144 
Goldblatt B “Regulating Domestic Partnerships: A Necessary Step in the Development 
of South African Family Law” (2003) 120 South African Law Journal 610-629 
Goldblatt B “Case Note: Same-Sex Marriage in South Africa – The Constitution; 
Court’s Judgment” (2006) 14 Feminist Legal Studies 262-270  
Goldblatt B “The Right to Social Security- Addressing Women’s Poverty and 
Disadvantage” (2009) 25 South African Journal on Human Rights 442-466 
Goldblatt B “Poverty and the Development of the Right to Social Security” (2014) 10 
International Journal of Law in Context 460-477 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
258 
 
Goldschmidt J “Protecting Equality as a Human Right in the Netherlands: From 
Specialised Equality Body to Human Rights Institute” (2012) 8 Equal Rights Review 
32-49 
Hahlo HR “The Law of Concubinage” (1972) 89 South African Law Journal 321-374 
Harris P, George R & Herring J “With This Ring I Thee Wed (Terms and Conditions 
Apply)” (2011) 41 Family Law 367-373 
Heaton J “Striving for Substantive Gender Equality in Family Law: Selected Issues” 
(2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 547- 574 
Heaton J “An Overview of the Current Legal Position regarding Heterosexual Life 
Partnerships” (2005) 68 Journal for Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law 662-670 
Holland W “Intimate relationships in the New Millennium: The Assimilation of Marriage 
and Cohabitation?” (2000) 17 The Canadian Journal on Family Law 114-127 
Jackman M “The Protection of Welfare Rights Under the Charter” (1998) 30 Ottawa 
Law Review 257-338 
Jewkes R & Morrel R “Sexuality and the Limits of Agency among South African 
Teenage women: Theorising Femininities and their Connections to HIV Risk Practices” 
(2012) 74 Social Science & Medicine 1729-1737 
Joseph S “Problematizing Gender and Relational Rights: Experiences from Lebanon” 
(1994) 1 Social Politics 271-295 
Joseph S “Teaching Rights and Responsibilities: Paradoxes of Globalization and 
Children's Citizenship in Lebanon” (2005) 38 Journal of Social History 1007 -1016 
Kaddaria R & Freeman MA “Economic Consequences of Marriage and Its Dissolution: 
Applying a Universal Equality Norm in a Fragmented Universe” (2012) 13 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 323-360 
Kaganas F & Murray C “Law and Women’s Rights in South Africa: An Overview” 
(1994) Acta Juridica 1 -38 
Kehler J “Women and Poverty: The South African Experience” (2001) 3 Journal of 
International Women’s Studies 1-13 
Kelly A “Navigating Gender in Modern Intimate Partnership Law” (2012) 14 Journal of 
Law and Family Studies 1-61 
Klare K “Law-Making as Praxis” (1979) 40 Telos 123- 135 
Klare K “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 146-188 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
259 
 
Kovacs R J, Ndashe S & Williams J “Twelve Years Later: How the Recognition of 
Customary Marriages Act of 1998 is failing Women” (2013) Acta Juridica: Marriage, 
Land & Custom 273-291 
Kruuse H “‘Here's to you, Mrs Robinson’: Peculiarities and Paragraph 29 in 
Determining the Treatment of Domestic Partnerships” (2009) 25 South African Journal 
on Human Rights 380-391 
Langa P “Transformative Constitutionalism” (2006) 17 Stellenbosch Law Review 351-
360 
LaViolette N “Waiting in a New Line at City Hall: Registered Partnerships as an Option 
for Relationship Recognition Reform in Canada” (2002) 19 Canadian Journal of Family 
Law 115-172 
Lifshitz S “The Liberal Transformation of Spousal Law: Past, Present and Future” 
(2012) 13 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 1-60 
Lind C “Domestic Partnership and Marital Status Discrimination” 2005 Acta Juridica 
108-130 
Leckey R “Gimme Shelter” (2001) 34 The Dalhousie Law Journal 197-228 
Leckey R “Family Law as Fundamental Private Law” (2007) 86 La Revue Du Barreau 
Canadien 69-96 
Leckey R “Contracting Claims and Family Law Feuds” (2007) 57 University of Toronto 
Law Journal 1-42 
Leckey R “Cohabitation and Comparative Method” (2009) 72 Modern Law Review 48- 
72 
Leckey R “Family Outside the Book on the Family” (2009) 88 Canadian Bar Review 
545-78 
Liebenberg, S & O’Sullivan M “South Africa’s New Equality Legislation: A Tool for 
Advancing Women’s Socio-Economic Equality?” (2001) 21 Acta Juridica 70-103 
Liebenberg S & Goldblatt B “The Interrelationship between Equality and Socio-
Economic Rights under South Africa’s Transformative Constitution” (2007) 23 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 335 -361 
Liebenberg S “The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights” 
(2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 149-176 
Liu M “Prophet with Honour”: An Examination of the Gender Equality Jurisprudence of 
Madam Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dube of the Supreme Court of Canada” (2000) 25 
Queens Law Journal 417-478 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
260 
 
Lubbe G “Taking Fundamental Rights Seriously: The Bill of Rights and its Implications 
for the Development of Contract Law” (2004) 121 South African Law Journal 395-410 
Mak E “Globalisation of the National Judiciary and the Dutch Constitution” (2013) 9 
Utrecht Law Review 36-51 
Mamashela M & Carnelley M “The Catch 22 Situation of Widows from Polygamous 
Marriages being Discarded under Customary Law” (2011) 87 Agenda 112-120 
Mbazira C & Sloth-Nielsen J “Incy-wincy Spider Went Climbing Up Again- Prospects 
for Constitutional (Re)interpretation of Section 28(1)(c) of the South African 
Constitution in the Next Decade of Democracy (2007) 2 Speculum Juris 147-166 
Merry SE “Rights Talk and the Experience of Law: Implementing Women's Human 
Rights to Protection from Violence” (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 343-381 
Meyersfeld B “If you can See, Look: Domestic Partnerships and the Law” (2010) 3 
Constitutional Court Review 271-294 
Meyerson D “Who’s in and who’s out? Inclusion and Exclusion in the Family Law 
Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of South Africa” (2010) 3 Constitutional Court 
Review 295-316 
Michelman FI “On the Uses of Interpretive “Charity”: Some Notes on Application, 
Avoidance, Equality and Objective Unconstitutionality from the 2007 Term of the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa” (2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review 1-55 
Millbank J “The Role of “Functional Family” in Same-Sex Family Recognition Trends” 
(2008) 20 Child and Family Law Quarterly 1-28 
Modri J “The Rhetoric of Rape: An Extended Note on Apologism, Depoliticisation and 
the Male Gaze in Ndou v S” (2014) 30 South African Journal on Human Rights 
134- 148 
Mossman MJ “Conversations about Families in Canadian Courts and Legislatures: 
Are there “Lessons” for the United States?” (2003) 32 Hofstra Law Review 171-200 
Mossman MJ “Choices and Commitments for Women: Challenging the Supreme Court 
of Canada in the Context of Social Assistance” (2004) 42 Osgoode Law Journal 615-
680 
Murphy R “Unstable Categories: Comparing the Politics of "Gender" in the Early 1990s 
in Canada and South Africa” (2002) 14 Canadian Journal on Women & Law 300-330 
Nedelsky J “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts & Possibilities” (1989) 1 Yale 
Journal of Law and Feminism 7-36 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
261 
 
Olsen F E “The Myth of State Intervention in the Family” (1984) 18 University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform 835-864 
Pieterse M “Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights” 
(2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 383-411  
Pieterse M “Relational Socio-Economic Rights” (2009) 25 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 198-217  
Pieterse M “Legislative and Executive Translation of the Right to Have Access to 
Health Care Services” (2010) 14 Law, Democracy & Development 1-25 
Porter B “Judging Poverty: Using International Human Rights Law to Refine the Scope 
of Charter Rights” (2000) 15 Journal of Law and Social Policy 117-162 
Posel D & Rudwick S “Changing Patterns of Marriage and Cohabitation in South 
Africa” (2013) Acta Juridica: Marriage, Land & Custom 169-180 
Ratner S R “Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility” (2001) 
111 Yale Law Journal 443-546 
Rogerson C “Developments in Family Law: The 2002-2003 Term” (2003) 22 Supreme 
Court Law Review 273-341 
Romany C “Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in 
International Human Rights Law” (1993) 6 Harvard Human Rights Journal 87-113 
Scheppele KL “Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying 
Cross Constitutional Influence through Negative Models” (2003) 1 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 296-324 
Ross T “The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, our Helplessness” (1991) 79 The 
Georgetown Law Journal 1499- 1525 
Schrama WM “The Dutch Approach to Informal Lifestyles: Family Function over Family 
Form?” (2008) 22 International Journal of Law, Policy & the Family 311-332 
Scott C & Macklem P “Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social 
Rights in a New South African Constitution” (1992) 141 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1-29 
Sen A “Human Rights and Capabilities” (2005) 6 Journal of Human Development 151-
166 
Sinclair J “Poverty: Giving Meaning to the Right to Social Assistance” (2012) 23 
Stellenbosch Law Review 191-224 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
262 
 
Sinclair J “The Financial Consequences of Divorce in South Africa: Judicial 
Determination or Private Ordering?” (1983) 32 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 785-811 
Sloth-Nielsen J “The Child's Right to Social Services, the Right to Social Security, and 
Primary Prevention of Child Abuse: Some Conclusions in the Aftermath of Grootboom” 
(2001) 17 South African Journal on Human Rights 210-232 
Sloth-Nielson J & Van Heerden B “The Constitutional Family: Developments in South 
African Family Law Jurisprudence under the 1996 Constitution” (2003) 17 International 
Journal of Law, Policy and the Family” 121-146 
Smith BS & Robinson JA “The South African Civil Union Act 2006:  Progressive 
Legislation with Regressive Implications?” (2008) IJLPF 356-392 
Smith BS & Robinson JA “An Embarrassment of Riches or a Profusion of Confusion? 
An Evaluation of the Continued Existence of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 in the light 
of Prospective Domestic Partnership Legislation in South Africa” (2010)13 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/ Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 30-75 
Smith BS “Rethinking Volks v Robinson: “The Implications of Applying a 
‘Contextualised Choice Model’ to Prospective South African Domestic Partnerships 
Legislation” (2010) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/ Potchefstroomse 
Elektroniese Regsblad 238-300 
Smith BS “The Interplay between Registered and Unregistered Domestic Partnerships 
under the Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill, 2008 and the Potential Role of the Putative 
Marriage Doctrine” (2011) 128 South African Law Journal 560-593 
Thompson DA “Ideas of Spousal Support Entitlement” (2014) 34 Canadian Family Law 
Quarterly 1-3 
Treloar R & Boyd SB “Family Law Reform in (Neoliberal) Context: British Columbia’s 
New Family Law Act” (2014) International Journal of Law, Policy & the Family 1-24 
Tushnet M “The Issue of State Action/Horizontal Effect in Comparative Constitutional 
Law” (2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutonal Law 79-98 
Van der Schyff G & Meuwese A “Dutch Constitutional Law in a Globalising World” 
(2013) 9 Utrecht Law Review 1-5 
West R “Rights, Capabilities and the Good Society” (2001) 69 Fordham Law Review 
1901-1933 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
263 
 
Williams L “Issues and Challenges in Addressing Poverty and Legal Rights: A 
Comparative United States/South Africa Analysis” (2005) 21 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 436-472 
Woolman S “The Amazing, Vanishing Bill of Rights” (2007) 124 South African Law 
Journal 762-794 
Young C & Boyd S B “Losing the Feminist Voice? Debates on the Legal Recognition 
of Same Sex Partnerships in Canada” (2006) 10 Feminist Legal Studies 1-28 
 
 
Research reports 
Australia 
 
Goldblatt B “Different Routes to Relationship Recognition Reform: A Comparative 
Discussion Of South Africa And Australia” Law and Society Association                                             
Australia and New Zealand (LSAANZ) Conference (2008) 6 
<http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstream/2123/4043/1/LSAANZ%20Goldblatt%20Rel
ationship%20Recognition%20LSAANZ%20final%20paper.pdf.> (accessed 04-07-
2015) 
 
Canada 
 
Jackman M & Porter B “Women’s Substantive Equality and the Protection of Social 
and Economic Rights under the Canadian Human Rights Act” in Status of Women 
Canada, Women and the Canadian Human Rights Act: A Collection of Policy 
Research Reports (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 1999) 43-112. 
 
Williams C Statistics Canada, Economic Well-Being in Women in Canada: A Gender-
based Statistical Report (Ottawa, December 2010) 6 
<http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-503-x/89-503-x2010001-eng.htm> (accessed-14-
09-2015) 
 
The Netherlands 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
264 
 
Antokolskaia MV, Breederveld B, Hulst JE, Kolkman WD, Salomons FR and 
Verstappen LCA “Koude uitsluiting, Materiële problemen en onbillijkheden na 
scheiding van in koude uitsluiting gehuwde echtgenoten en na scheiding van 
ongehuwd samenlevende partners, alsmede instrumenten voor de overheid om deze 
tegen te gaan” (2010) Netherlands Institute for Law and Governance 
<https://www.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/koude-uitsluiting.aspx> (accessed 17-02-
2016)  
 
Schrama W S “National Report: The Netherlands” Informal Relationships- The 
Netherlands (2015) 1 44 <http://ceflonline.net/wp-content/uploads/The-Netherlands-
IR.pdf> (accessed 03-03-2016) 
 
South Africa 
 
Abrahams N, Mathews S, Jewkes R, Martin LJ, and Lombard C (Medical Research 
Council) “Every Eight Hours: Intimate Femicide in South Africa 10 years later.” Medical 
Research Council Policy Brief (2012) 1-4 (accessed 06-06-2014). 
 
Alliance for the Legal Recognition of Domestic Partnerships “Submission to the 
Department of Home Affairs on the Draft Partnerships Bill, 2008” (2008) 3 
<http://www.tlac.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/domestic-partnership-alliance-
submission-on-the-draft-domestic-partnerships-bill.pdf> (accessed 26-02-2013) 
 
Budlender D, Chobokoane D & Mpetsheni Y “A Survey of Time Use: How South 
African Women and Men Spend Their Time” (2001) Statistics South Africa 49-79 
Centre for Applied Legal Studies “Written Submissions on Behalf of the                                              
Amicus Curiae in the matter between Volks v Robinson” (2004) 1- 
<http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/cgisirsi/iVAWeQ6geD/MAIN/0/57/518/0/
H-CCT12-04> (accessed 12-04-2013) 1- 32 
 
Centre for Applied Legal Studies “Submission to the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Home Affairs: The Civil Unions Bill (2006) <http://pmg-assets.s3-
website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com> (accessed 12-10-2013) 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
265 
 
Gerntholtz L & Nsibandeby N “Using the Law to Secure Women's Rights to Housing 
and Security of Tenure: A Brief Examination of Some Key Aspects of Family and 
Customary Law and Domestic Violence Legislation” (2006) 1-19 
 
Makwane M & Berry L “Towards the Development of a Family Policy for South Africa”                    
(2013) Human Sciences Research Council Policy Brief 1 4 
<http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/3337/2013febFamily%20Policy.pdf> 
(accessed 24-07-2013). 
 
Nath D “We were Never meant to Survive: Violence in the Lives of HIV Positive 
Women in South Africa” (2012) 25 <http://www.oneinnine.org.za/58.page> (accessed 
04-06-2012) 
 
National Development Agency “State of Poverty and its Manifestation in   the   Nine    
Provinces of South Africa” (2014) Human Sciences Research Council 
<http://www.nda.org.za/docs/Research%20Report%2020State%20of%20poverty%2
0in%209%20provinces%20of%20SA.PDF>. (accessed 05-06-2015). 
 
Rogan M Economic Research South Africa “Poverty and headship in   post-apartheid 
South Africa 1997 - 2008” (2012) ERSA 
<http://www.econrsa.org/system/files/publications/working_papers/wp288.pdf> 
(accessed 05-06-2015) 
 
South African Democratic Government and Rights Unit “Submission and Research 
Report on the Judicial Records of Nominees for Appointment to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, High Court, Competition Appeal Court and Electoral Court” (2013) 
<http://www.dgru.uct.ac.za/usr/dgru/downloads/Final%20submission%20and%20res
earch%20report%20April%202013%20email%20version.pdf.> (12-02-2013) 1-159 
 
South African Law Reform Commission “Project 118:                                                         
Report on Domestic Partnerships” (2006) i 7 
<http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_prj118_2006march.pdf> (accessed 20-10-
2012) 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
266 
 
Stats SA “Poverty trends in South Africa: An examination of absolute poverty between 
2006 and 2011” (2014) The Presidency Towards a Fifteen Year Review (2008) 
<http://www.info. gov.za/DownloadFileAction?id=89475> (accessed 07-08-2015) 
 
Stats SA; Statistics South Africa Income and Expenditure of Households 2010/2011 
(PO100). <http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0100/P01002011.pdf> (accessed 
05-06-20150 
 
Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy Centre “Submission to the Portfolio Committee                  
on Housing on the Social Housing Amendment Bill 29 of 2007” (2007) 1 
<http://www.tlac.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/submission-social-housing-
amendment-bill.pdf> (accessed 23-02-2012) 
 
Women’s Legal Centre Trust; Rural Women’s Movement & the Commission for 
Gender Equality “Mayelane v Ngwenyama & Another: Amicus Curiae Heads of 
Argument” (2013) 41 <http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/19940.PDF> 
(accessed 31-05-2013) 
 
Women’s Legal Centre Trust & The Centre for Applied Legal Studies “Written 
Submission on Behalf of the Amicus Curiae” (2005) 
<http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/3296.PDF> (accessed 09-03-
2011) 
 
Wilson F & Cornell V “Investing in People: Nurture, Education and Training” in F Wilson 
& V Cornell (eds) Guide to Carnegie 3: Strategies to overcome Poverty                                     
and Inequality, Conference Report (2014) I 68 
<http://www.carnegie3.org.za/docs/Carnegie3_April13_WEB.pdf> (accessed 15-08-
2015); 
 
International research reports 
 
Goldblatt B & Lamarche L “Background document for the Workshop - ‘Interpreting and 
Advancing Women’s Rights to Social Security and Social Protection” (2013) 
International Institute for the Sociology of Law 1 2 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
267 
 
 
Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights United Nations                                       
Habitat “Women and the Right to Adequate Housing” (2012) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/WomenHousing_HR.PUB.11.2.pdf> 
(accessed 12-09-2012) i -93 
 
 
Theses and Dissertations 
 
Bannister T The Right to Have Access to Health Care Services for Survivors of 
Gender-based Violence LLM Thesis University of Stellenbosch (2012) 
 
Mohs A Choice v Equality: The Legal Recognition of unmarried Cohabitation in 
Canada LLM thesis the University of British Columbia (Vancouver) (2010)  
 
Reiding H The Netherlands and the Development of International Human Rights 
Instruments LLD dissertation Utrecht University (2007) 
 
Smith BS The Development of South African Matrimonial Law with reference to the 
Need for and Application of a Domestic Partnership Rubric DPhil thesis University of 
the Free State (2009) 
 
Van der Berg S A capabilities Approach to the Judicial Review of Resource Allocation 
Decisions Impacting on Socio-economic Rights LLD dissertation Stellenbosch (2015) 
 
Table of Cases 
Canadian cases 
A v B and Attorney General of Québec (AG) v A [2013] SCC 5  
Bracklow v Bracklow [1999] 1 SCR 420 
Droit de la famille [1999] RDF 384 (Sup Ct.) 
Eldridge v Attorney General of British Columbia [1997] 151 DLR (4th) 577 (SCC) 
Gosselin v Québec (Attorney General) [2002] 4 SCR 429 
Irwin Toy Ltd. v Québec (Attorney General) [1989] 1 SCR 927 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
268 
 
Kerr v Baranow 2011 SCC 10; [2011] 1 SCR 26 
Layland v Ontario [1993] 14 OR (3d) 658 104 DLRI (4th) 214 
M v H [1999] 2 RCS 3 
Miron v Trudel [1995] 13 RFL (4th) 1 (SCC); 2 SCR 418 
Moge v Moge [1992] 43 RFL (3d) 345 (SCC); [1992] 3 SCR 813 
Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v Walsh [2002] 4 SCR 355 
Peter v Beblow [1993] 1 SCR 980 
Petkus v Bekker [1980] 2 SCR 834; [1980] 22 (SCC)  
Symes v Canada [1993] 4 SCR 695 
Taylor v Rossu [1998] ABCA 193; [1998] 523 216 AR 348 
Watch v Watch [1999]182 Sask R 237 
 
Dutch cases 
Hof Den Haag 2 November 2010 
Rb Amsterdam 13 Februari 1990, NJCM 456-460 
Rb Rotterdam 27 January 2010, LJN BM 7429 
HR 31 May 2005 ECLI NL HR 2005 AS2748 
 
European Court of Human Rights 
Johnston and Others v Ireland ECHR (1986) Application no 112 
Van der Heijden v Netherlands ECHR (2012) Application no 42857/05  
 
South African cases 
Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive 
officer of the South African Social Security Agency and Others [2015] ZAA 7; 2015 6 
BCLR 
Bannatyne v Bannatyne (Commission for Gender Equality, as Amicus Curiae) 2003 2 
SA 363 (CC) 
Barnard v Barnard 2000 3 SA 741 (C) 
Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 4 SA 197 (CC); 1996 6 BCLR 752 (CC) 
Butters v Mncora 2012 (4) SA 1 (SCA); 2012 2 All SA 485 (SCA) 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2001 4 938 (CC); 2001 10 
BCLR 995 (CC)  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
269 
 
Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 3 SA 936; 2000 8 
BCLR 837 
DE v RH 2015 5 SA 83 (CC); 2015 9 BCLR 1003 (CC) 
Development and Others 2009 4 SA 222 (CC); 2009 2 SACR 130 (CC) 
Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister for Justice and Constitutional  
Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA) 
Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development 2003 2 SA 198 (CC) 
Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) 4 SA 744 (CC) 
Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North, and Others 1997 2 SA 261 (CC); 1997 2 
BCLR 153 (CC) 
Gory v Kolver NO 2007 (3) SA 97 (CC); 2007 3 BCLR 294 (CC) 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); 2000 
11 BCLR 1169 (CC)  
Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 3 BCLR 243 (CC); 2009 3 
SA 152 (CC) 
Gundwana v Steko Development CC and Others 2011 3 SA 608 (CC); 2011 8 BCLR 
792 (CC) 
Harksen v Lane 1997 11 BCLR 1489; 1998 1 SA 300 
J v Director - General: Department of Home Affairs 2003 5 SA 621 (CC) 
Juma Musjid Primary School case, & Others v Essay NO and Other [2011] ZACC 13; 
2011 8 BCLR 761 (CC) 
Kahn v Kahn 2005 2 SA 272 (T) 
K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC); 2005 9 BCLR 835 (CC) 
Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste v Willers 1994 3 SA283 (A) at 333C-D 
K v P [2010] ZAGPJHC 93 (15 October 2010). 
Mayelane v Ngwenyama and Another (CCT 57/12) [2013] ZACC 14; 2013 4 SA 415 
(CC) (30 May 2013) 
MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC); 2008 2 BCLR 99 
(CC) 
MM v MN 2010 4 SA 286 (GNP) 
Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie (Doctors for Life International, Amici Curiae); Lesbian 
& Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 1 SA 524 (CC); 2006 3 BCLR 
355 (CC) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
270 
 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice (1999) 1 SA 6 
(CC); 1999 3 BCLR 280 (CC)  
Ndou v S 2014 1 SACR 198 (SCA) 
Nortje v Pool NO 1966 3 SA 96 (A)   
Paixão and Another v Road Accident Fund [2012] 4 All SA 262 (SCA); 2012 6 SA 377 
(SCA) 
Paixão and Another v Road Accident Fund JHC (05692/10) [2011] ZAGP 68 
Petersen v Maintenance Officer, Simon's Town Maintenance Court [2003] ZAWCHC 
61; [2004] 1 All SA 117 (C) 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In Re Ex Parte President 
of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674; 2000 3 BCLR 241 (CC) 
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers (2005) 1 SA 217 (CC); (2004) 12 
BCLR 1268 (CC) 
Police Services v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC); 2014 10 BCLR 1195 
(CC) 
President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC); 1997 6 BCLR 708  
President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery 2005 5 SA 3 (CC); 
2005 8 BCLR 786 (CC) 
RH v DE 2014 6 SA 436 (SCA) 
Ross v South Peninsula Municipality 2000 1 SA 589 (C) 
Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 690 (C) 
Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 6 SA 1 (CC) 
Sepheri v Scanlan 2008 1 SA 332 (C) 
S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 2 SACR 1 (CC); 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) 
S v Modise (113/06) [2007] ZANWHC 73 (9 November 2007) 
S v Moipolai (CA 53/2004) [2004] ZANWHC 19 
Tswelopele Non-Profit Organisation and Others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan 
Municipality [2007] ZASCA 70; [2007] SCA 70 (RSA); 2007 6 SA 511 (SCA) (30 May 
2007) 
Volks NO v Robinson 2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC) 
Women's Legal Trust v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others ZACC 
20; 2009 6 SA 94 (CC) (22 July 2009)  
Zulu v Zulu & Others 2008 4 SA 12 (D) [2008] ZAKZHC 10 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
271 
 
 
Table of Constitutions, legislation and bills 
 
Canadian Law 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982 
Canadian Human Rights Act RSC 1985 c H-6 
 
Provincial legislation 
Adult Interdependent Relationship Act SA 2002 c A-45 
British Columbia Family Relations Act 
Domestic Relations Amendment Act 1999 SA 1999 c 20 s 2 
Family Law Act SNWT 1997 (Nu) 1997 c 18 
Family Law Act RSNL 1990 c F2 
Family Law Act RSO 1990 c F3  
Family Law Act SBC 2011 c25 
Family Law Reform Act of 1978 SO 1978 c2 
Family Maintenance Act RSM 1987 c F20 
Family Property Act SS 1997 c F-63 
Family Reform Act RSO 990 c F3 
Family Relations Act RSBC 1996 c128 
Family Services Act SNB 1980 c F22 
Insurance Act RSO 1980 c218  
Matrimonial Property Act RSNS 1980 c9 
Matrimonial Property Act SS 1979 c M-61 
Québec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms 1976 CQLR C-12 
The Family Maintenance Act 2016 CCSM c F20 
 
The Netherlands 
Dutch Constitution 
The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 2008  
 
Dutch legislation 
Equal Treatment Act, 1994  
Registered Partnership Act 324 of 1997  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
272 
 
Registered Partnership Adjustment Act 660 of 1997 
Van Houten Act on Child Labour 1874 
 
Dutch policy 
Dutch National Action Plan on Human Rights: The protection and promotion of human 
rights within the Netherlands of 2014 
 
Germany 
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany 
Nigeria 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 
Pakistan 
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 
 
South African Law 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
 
Legislation 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1997 
Divorce Act 70 of 1979 
Domestic Violence 116 of 1998 
Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955 
General Law Fourth Amendment Act of 1993 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 
Land Act of 1913  
Marriage Act 25 of 1961 
Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 
Matrimonial Affairs Act 37 of 1953 
Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 
Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998   
Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 24 of 1987 
Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
273 
 
Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 
Bills 
Domestic Partnerships Bill of 2008 
Muslim Marriages Bill of 2010 
 
International law instruments 
African Union  
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/rev.5 
European Council 
European Convention on the Adoption of Children 1967 CETS 58 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
213 UNTS 222 
United Nations 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1977) 
UN Doc A/34/46 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966), UN Doc 
A/6316 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 999 UNTS 171 
International Federation for Human Rights, Montreal Principles on Women’s 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2002) 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) UN Doc A/810  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
